The Contemporary Role of Children as Combatants
by Mr. Ralph D. Nichols, Military Analyst, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)

In the contemporary operational environment (COE), many different scenarios and asymmetrical threats challenge U.S. forces. One of the situations that our troops may face in the near future, and have certainly faced in the past, is how to deal with children as potential combatants. Many anecdotal and verifiable reports of children soldiers (defined as under the age of 18 years old, and as young as 5 or 6 years old) confronted and confounded U.S. troops during the Vietnam conflict in the decade of the 1960s and first half of the 1970s. Vietnamese children served as sources for human intelligence for regular North Vietnamese fighting forces, and for the guerilla elements of the Viet Cong. Some of these children were active combatants. In this capacity, they shouldered and fired in anger their Chinese- or Russian-procured AK-47 sub-automatic weapons against U.S. forces. Reports of children luring soldiers into ambushes, and even wiring themselves for detonation (booby-trapped explosives set off upon contact with U.S. troops) are well known. These events represent recent historical examples of U.S. forces facing children fighters. In 1993 our troops fought with rebel factions in the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia (urban warfare). Many of these rebel forces were comprised in part with children. In the movie “Black Hawk Down” (patterned after the insightful book by Mark Bowden), a memorable, dramatic moment occurs when a U.S. soldier thrusts the door open to a house only to be confronted with a very young male child (under the age of 10 by appearance) thrusting a gun barrel at close distance against him. The soldier is faced with the immediate ethical dilemma of whether or not to attempt to kill someone trying to kill him. Only the “someone” is a small child.
A REMINDER!

If you have articles and lessons of interest to the Total Force, please contact the Managing Editor, Dr. Lon R. Seglie, at Coml (913) 684-3035/2255 or DSN 552-3035/2255; FAX DSN 552-9564/9583; e-mail: <segliel@leavenworth.army.mil>.

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Currently, the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS³) dedicates a lesson to ethical decisionmaking. An incident that occurred in Operation DESERT STORM, involving a Special Forces “A Team,” and a child is examined. The situation is reprinted in its entirety below. The situation remains relevant, in the context of the current worldwide war against terrorism, with Afghanistan as the predominant theater of operations presently, with the possibility of a renewed conflict with Iraq looming on the near horizon.

**“SITUATION:**

You are a captain and the leader of a Special Forces “A Team.”

Your team is hiding in a wadi (depression) well forward of other U.S. forces to monitor enemy troop movements along a key MSR (main supply route).

There’s not much movement on the MSR during the day, so the members of your team normally stay well camouflaged in “spider holes” to prevent discovery. At night, the soldiers come out of their spider holes to observe and report movement on the MSR, as well as to take care of any other essential activities.

On the second day of the operation, a group of Bedouins (nomads) set up camp near the team’s position. A young girl – she looks to be about 5 or 6 years old – wanders into the wadi and finds a U.S. candy wrapper that had been carelessly dropped by one of your soldiers. The little girl picks up the candy wrapper and begins to walk back toward her camp.

You don’t know the loyalties of this particular group of the Bedouins, but you’re reasonably sure the adults will be curious enough that they’ll come looking for the source of the obviously American candy wrapper. Although the spider holes are well camouflaged, someone walking among them will undoubtedly notice them. Your position, and, therefore, your mission, will be compromised.

All the members of your team have weapons with silencers. Any one of them can shoot the girl before she leaves the concealment of the wadi. Chances are, the Bedouins won’t see or hear a thing. You quickly review several possible courses of action:

1) You can order your team to kill the girl before she leaves the wadi.
2) You can do nothing and hope that no one finds the team’s hiding position.
3) You can send a soldier out to capture the girl and prevent her from returning to the Bedouin camp.
4) You can abort the mission, and the team can exfiltrate and evade enemy forces until reaching safety or being extracted.”

After some period of discussion, the CAS³ students agree on what they would do in this type of situation. The actual course of action (COA) that was pursued and successfully accomplished by the actual A Team was to abort the mission, and extract the team (COA 4). This lesson brings to life the enhanced situational awareness that soldiers must possess when engaged in potential or actual armed conflict, when civilians, and especially children, are present on the battlefield. This can occur unexpectedly in a remote area (as illustrated in the above scenario in an Iraq desert), or in a crowded urban area. In the CAS³ example, the child is clearly not a hostile, active combatant. The young nomad girl is simply a curious child.

From the last two decades of the 20th century to the present, an estimated two million children died in armed conflicts, many in Africa. Three times that number may have been seriously injured or permanently disabled. Over 12 million children became orphans. Many of the children that perished in the tribal, ethnic wars (such as Rwanda) were bearing arms. It was not uncommon to see a male child as young as five years old up to 17 years of age conscripted to fight or perish.

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So what is new in the fact that children are serving as hostile combatants? During World War II in Western Europe, young German youth served in the Wehrmacht (translated as “German Army”), especially during the latter stages of the conflict, circa 1944. The Hitler Youth Brigade that fanatically and hopelessly helped defend Berlin against the rapid onslaught of the Soviet Army from the East, and the converging allied forces, led by General Dwight D. Eisenhower from the West, comes to mind. The German youth that served during this period of World War II were predominately teenagers between the ages of 13 to 17. In a war of attrition, the manpower pool was drying up for Nazi Germany. Hitler, in addition to impressing the youth of Germany into the dying war effort, also resorted to conscripting older adults (50 to 65 years of age). What Nazi Germany did in World War II in losing a war of attrition as a nation state is not dissimilar to what other nations have done in modern warfare (since the 18th century). When pressed for manpower needs, the nation resorts to widening the available draft ages for combatants, thus teenagers and senior citizens in increasing numbers begin to appear in armed conflicts.

In the same recent period (1980s to the present) that produced massive children casualties in tribal, ethnic and civil wars in Africa, an even larger number of males fatally succumbed to the sexually transmitted disease that continues to threaten the continent – the HIV-AIDS virus. Thus armies were filled with whatever resources were available – young male children. One could speculate in this manner that nations are doing what they have always done – fill armies with whatever manpower pool is readily available for the stated purpose of conducting warfare.

The role of children as primary hostile combatants is expanding worldwide. “Wars are now being fought in backyards and in the streets of cities instead of on more defined battle lines, putting women and children at more risk,” according to Christine Knudsen of Save the Children organization. Her observations are based on work done in Chechnya and Guinea in West Africa. According to a Reuters Foundation report in May 2002, civilians are increasingly bearing the brunt of war casualties, and, in particular, children. Around the turn of the 20th century, only five percent of war casualties were civilian. That figure jumped to 65 percent in World War II, and has reached astronomical proportions with more recent conflicts – 90 percent.

With asymmetrical warfare, there are no front lines. In Africa, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Burma, El Salvador, Mozambique and many other areas that have intrastate conflicts between informal militia, war takes place in the midst of communities. Civilians are targets because of the ethnic, religious and/or tribal group to which they belong. Caught in this crossfire, children and adolescents are vulnerable to exploitation by the opposing warring factions. In 1986, when the National Resistance Army battled its way into Kampala, Uganda UN observers were shocked to see four and five year olds in the ranks. Uganda’s rebel army had an estimated 3,000 child soldiers under the age of 16, including 500 young girls. Approximately 250,000 children under 18 (some as young as five) served in 33-armed conflicts in 1995 and 1996 alone.

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3 Ibid.


5 Ibid.
Why are children being thrust into the role of combatants? Is it merely to fill manpower requirements? There are other reasons for the recent dramatic upsurge in seeing children as combatants:

- Forced recruitment, also known as press-ganging or impressments. This was commonplace in the El Salvador civil war of 1980-1992, and in Afghanistan. This is the beginning of a tyranny of fear and indoctrination that is designed to weaken the child psychologically, and to make them highly compliant and subservient to their commanders.  

- Some children volunteer for duty because they believe it’s the only way to guarantee regular meals, clothing and protection. Unaccompanied children with no parents to protect them, people who are fearful that they will die of hunger or from inadequate health care seek military activity.  

- Many current religious, ethnic-rooted disputes, such as Palestine, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Northern Ireland, have taken place over generations. In-bred hatred passed down from their parents compels children to become soldiers as soon as they enter teens.  

- “I joined because I wanted power, because the first rebel soldiers who came into Sierra Leone were killing our brothers, seizing power and were bad,” the words of a former child soldier.  

- Light assault weapons, such as the American M-16 and widely available AK-47, are easier for children to use and shoulder. The worldwide spread of these weapons makes them more accessible to obtain.  

- In many ways children make desirable soldiers; they do what they are told. If they are recruited early enough, they have only a limited sense of right or wrong. Sometimes, they are given dangerous assignments, or they are given orders to commit acts of atrocity. From the mouth of a former child soldier: “Sometimes we killed 10, 15, or 30. And at the end of it all, we all celebrate by drinking rum, smoking cannabis. We could even take the blood and rub it into our skins.”  

- Survival in “total war.” The “African World War” still simmering in central Africa grew directly from the Rwandan Civil War and consequent genocide. After the war began, the then government of Rwanda mounted a sustained information campaign to portray all rebels and their sympathizers – defined as anyone not pro-government – as subhuman. The most common label applied was the Kinyarwandan term for “cockroaches.” Rebel military leaders took in children of both ethnic groups to protect them. Calling them “the little boys,” the children were often under 10 years of age. They served as messengers, and in extremis combatants. The government on the other hand created an entire youth-based militia, the Interahamwe, dedicated to extermination of the Tutsi and all Hutu tribe moderates. The post-genocide dilemma has been: What to do with such youths afterwards? It supposedly has been easier to demobilize the little boys of the rebel army that won the war. The genocidal youth of the Interhamwe have been a thornier issue. Indeed, the continued existence of Interahamwe, and allied hardcore military units from the previous regime led to the expansion of the Rwandan war beyond the country’s borders.

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7 Ibid.  
8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid.
The overwhelming majority of the estimated quarter-million child soldiers are found in the poorest nations on earth such as Afghanistan, Angola, Southern Sudan, Somalia, Mozambique and Sierra Leone. It is entirely possible that U.S. soldiers may have faced young soldiers in recent skirmishes in Afghanistan.

**Lessons Learned**

**Situational Awareness:** Since an estimated quarter-million soldiers in the world are children, we may end up fighting a faction or nation that has a portion of their force that is under the age of 18. Enhanced situational awareness of civilians on the battlefield, along with carefully monitored and well-reasoned rules of engagement to limit collateral damage to civilians, must be constantly monitored. With no front lines in asymmetrical warfare, this will be a complex issue with which to wrangle.

**Rules of Engagement (ROE):** Many American soldiers are socialized in Judeo-Christian values during their adolescent years prior to active military service. They are not conditioned to respond to fight against “kids.” This constitutes an “unfair fight” in most minds raised in the U.S. However, when someone is shooting at you with live ammunition, should the ROE remain the same? Do you return fire with the intent to maim or kill your opponent? Soldiers need to quickly discern between a hostile combatant and an innocent civilian and make the right choice at the right time (e.g., the candy wrapper scenario). Some of the pointed issues that relate to ROE are:

- How do you distinguish between children and adult fighters in combat?
- How should the ROE be adjusted to accommodate the possibility of fighting children?
- What is the ROE for children combatants collecting intelligence; is it the same or different than adult soldiers?

**Leader Attributes:** FM 22-100, Army Leadership, outlines the physical, mental and emotional attributes that our leaders must possess. Some of the notable mental attributes that would be brought to bear in a situation that involves U.S. forces fighting children are:

- Possess and display will, self-discipline, initiative, judgment, self-confidence, intelligence, common sense and cultural awareness.
- Analyze situations.
- Balance resolve and flexibility.
- Think and act quickly and logically, even when there are no clear instructions or the plan falls apart. (NOTE: Perhaps clear, well-thoughtout ROE as applied to children combatants will help ameliorate this challenge.)

Combat leaders will be challenged to the maximum to maintain emotional equilibrium when fighting adolescents. The applicable emotional attributes that will challenge leaders in a situation that deals with U.S. forces fighting children are:

- Remain calm during conditions of stress, chaos, and rapid change.
- Exercise self-control, balance, and stability.
- Demonstrate mature, responsible behavior that inspires trust and earns respect.

The physical attributes that challenge leaders when faced with fighting under-age soldiers are:

- Cope with hardship.
- Continue to function under adverse conditions.
Post-Conflict: Some of the myriad considerations to consider after hostilities cease are:

- What accommodations should be made for adolescent enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) and casualties?
- What are the public affairs, psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs considerations?
- What role do non-government agencies play in regard to children soldiers; how much interface and responsibility do U.S. forces have in this effort?
- What roles, if any, do U.S. forces have in repatriation of former children soldiers?
- What post-conflict needs do U.S. soldiers have (i.e., post-traumatic syndrome, other psychological adjustments to “normalcy”)?

Conclusion and Recommendations

It is difficult to predict the next conflict – what conditions may exist, where, and how the fight will take place. In the COE, with no front lines associated with an asymmetrical threat, “total” warfare cuts a large swath, engulfing communities, and increasingly endangering civilians, especially children. In an age of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the variety of threats has multiplied exponentially. The “threat” now encompasses many more children serving as combatants. Our forces need to recognize this and be prepared to deal with the complexities associated with this alarming trend. How can we more effectively deal with the role of children on the modern battlefield?

- Military leaders at all levels (tactical, operational and strategic), in concert with political and diplomatic officials (State Department) associated with the nation’s security, must be cognizant of the emerging dangers of children serving as hostile combatants.

- Army leaders must exercise sound judgment in conjunction with the desired leader attributes highlighted from FM 22-100 when dealing with children (as intelligence gatherers, actual combatants, and innocent bystanders) on the battlefield.

- Innovative, comprehensive, detailed deliberate planning that factors in ROE for children on the battlefield, ethical decisionmaking, cooperation and integration of non-government agencies (NGOs) to deal with hostile conflict and post-conflict concerns needs to take place with a goal of minimizing civilian casualties, while simultaneously ensuring adequate force protection for U.S. troops.

- Integrate role players as children in an urban environment at the combat training centers (CTCs). In this manner, our troops will be confronted with the multi-faceted roles of children on the modern seamless battlefield of the present and near future. It will surely test their resolve, the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP), leader attributes, ROE and force protection. Role players should serve as sources of human intelligence (HUMINT), hostile combatants, innocent bystanders, and as orphaned, homeless, and starving refugees. This would give our troops rotating through the CTCs a more realistic portrayal of children and civilians on the battlefield in an urban warfare setting that U.S. forces are already facing now in parts of Afghanistan and the Balkans (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo) and theaters of operation on the horizon.
This diary was compiled from 13 rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana. It draws lessons from 33 platoon after-action reviews (AARs), offering them under the categories of sustain and improve. The diary is intended as a broad brush of typical platoon operations during rotations at JRTC. It is not set in a format of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) or field manual (FM). It does provide an excellent start point for the junior leader preparing for a rotation. It is also useful for the company commander in establishing training goals at Home Station.

1. Sustain:

a. Soldier attitudes. Soldier attitudes on JRTC rotations have been generally high. Soldiers are motivated and ready for the training. Although there are some soldiers that do not want to be in the rotation, a majority are highly motivated, eager to get into the field, and looking for a fight with the opposing forces (OPFOR).

b. Mail. Every unit on a JRTC rotation has gotten mail, even during short rotations such as the Army National Guard units. This helps ensure that motivation and morale stay high.

c. Rations. T-Rations and hot rations have been delivered during many rotations in the defense phase or in battalion or brigade assembly areas. This has a profound impact on soldier attitudes. During a few rotations, some companies set up assembly areas and serve T-Rations during the movement-to-contact phase. Again, this is a great morale booster. Many soldiers commented that unit leaders really care about them if they are willing to set up an assembly area with perimeter security and provide a hot meal. A refit and re-arming operation during combat operations works wonders.

d. Taking charge. Junior leaders are quick to take charge when senior leaders become casualties. Although they are sometimes not fully prepared to plan and conduct combat operations, they assume command quickly and take action. Some Home-Station training needs to be conducted to help better prepare them for leading patrols, especially the junior NCOs and senior specialists.

e. Rehearsals. Generic rehearsals are conducted almost every rotation, especially at the immediate staging base (ISB) or prior to deployment.

f. Aggressiveness. Soldiers and platoons are aggressive during rotations. Sometimes they are overly aggressive and fail to use battle drills. That said, an aggressive stance against the enemy shows them you are ready to fight and they often break contact from the unit. Channel the aggression into violent execution of battle drills.

g. Use of strong skilled soldiers. Using soldiers with strong skills provides immediate benefits and shows that leaders know their men, their strengths and weaknesses. All too often, units depend too much on the strong skilled soldiers and burn them out. The wise leader makes sure that the others are up to speed on their training, and rotates soldiers on the various duties.

h. Communicating with locals. This is a plus in combat operations. Talk with the locals when you come in contact with them. They are a wealth of information about trails, weather, location of enemy, when the enemy comes around, and other matters. Some units avoid the locals, but the majority approach and talk to the locals.

i. Encoding numbers. Some units use this to great effect on internal platoon frequencies. The format of “STOP DANGER” has been widely used as such:

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Any other 10-letter word group can be used, so long as the letters do not repeat. How it is used. Grid coordinated and frequencies are the most common use for this. Example: A frequency of 55.750 would be sent as AAGAS.
j. **Tiers on a Map.** This is another technique for small unit communications, especially when there are not enough frequency hopping SINCGARS radios. Platoons may not have enough SINCGARS to replace all the squad radios (AN/PRC-126 or 127 radios). It is simple to use.

The grid you want to send in is: WQ435905.
Encoded, using tiers, it would look like: I Set - WQ, Grid - B5X5.
This allows the processing of sensitive information over unsecured communications.

k. **Standing operating procedures (SOPs).** Generally, platoon SOPs are unwritten. Even so, they are fairly well understood by all members of the platoon. This could pose a problem in war for new and replacement soldiers. They do not know the platoon SOPs and will have to learn them while they are in a combat zone.

l. **Equipment accountability.** Accountability of platoon equipment is pretty good. Very few platoons lose gear. Platoon sergeants and squad leaders checking soldier equipment for tie downs, and conducting hands-on checks prior to moving out on missions, pre-combat inspections (PCI) are the key.

2. **IMPROVE (AREAS NEEDING ATTENTION):**

   a. **PLANNING.**

   (1) **Clear, simple orders.** Clear, simple orders are the ticket at platoon and lower levels. Many times the orders are vague in content and wordy. If the orders are vague, lower leaders add excessive words so that the soldiers think the leaders know what is going on. Leaders need to remember the old statement – Keep It Simple Soldier (KISS). A simple, clear, properly articulated order does not need to be a book or novel, but one page with the meat and potatoes of what we are doing.

   (2) **Task, purpose, method, and end state = a focused mission and intent.** This is the hardest for many to understand. The task is the assigned mission(s). The purpose is what we are to do (destroy the enemy, defend in sector). The method is how we will accomplish this. And the end state is the vision of the outcome. All must be clear, simple, and to the point so that every soldier fully understands what is to be done. But all too often, it is unclear and missing key ingredients and we execute without having a clear understanding of what we are doing.

   (3) **Time Management.** The 1/3–2/3 rule has pretty much died at the platoon level. Generally speaking, this comes from higher-level orders arriving late for immediate execution. But leaders need to ensure that their subordinates have time to conduct their own planning and allow information to be disseminated prior to moving out. This holds especially true for the defense and during movement to contact. All too often, the squad leaders receive the order, and then have no time to inform their soldiers what is going on before picking up and moving out. The outcome is soldiers do not know what the mission or task is or what they are going to do. Instead, they follow the leader and feel left in the dark.

   (4) **Task organization.** All too often platoon leaders try to do all planning and then execute that plan as if they were in solitary confinement. In about 36 to 48 hours, they are lethal weapons—for the OPFOR. They must learn to task-organize the platoon and subordinate leaders, especially in the planning of missions and execution of the defense. That means tasking platoon sergeants and squad leaders in planning the operations they will have to execute. This also develops them as leaders. In the defense, they can be executing and coordinating the preparation while the platoon leader is developing the plan and verifying the plan with the commander.

   (5) **Combat Service Support (CSS).** Generally this is poorly planned at platoon level, especially casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) and resupply. Normally, there is a platoon combat command post (CCP) and a company CCP established, but no plan on how to extract casualties including routes in and out. Few personnel have or know how to use a nine-line medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) request. Soldiers need to know this so they feel comfortable in the fact that the unit can and will get them extracted in a timely manner if they become a casualty. And that there is a planned route for resupply instead of the company supply truck or battalion resupply driving around looking for them.
(6) **Integration of attachments.** This area is definitely one for improvement, especially when there are attachments such as engineers (breach teams). They are rarely included in the planning or issuance of the order. Even those who are rarely coordinate communications with the platoon. In the defense, BIFVs, engineers, or tanks often collocate with the platoon but never integrate into operations. The outcome is no mutual support and integration into the line of defense.

(7) **Combat multipliers.** This area has profound outcomes, many negative if not considered. All too often, platoons conducting search-and-attack operations get decisively engaged. Even as that occurs, attack aviation are flying nearby or on top of them searching for the enemy with no communications between the ground and the air. Or in the attack, BIFVs and tanks drive into the objective while dismounted infantry is pinned down by well-aimed fire. Again no communications link these heavy and light elements.

Supporting arms are invaluable when used properly. A BIFV or tank can easily provide cover and fire for a platoon to get from a wood line to a building and establish a foothold. Attack air can easily find caches or the exact position of the enemy so prominent terrain features too far from the planned route, rendering them useless. Careful route planning that incorporates a fire is force-fed from above, rarely given the flexibility to plan target reference points (TRPs) for the platoon. Often TRPs are on in circles over the cache. The platoon did not understand and continued moving away from the cache. The pilot then wrote a note on a piece of paper, attached it to something heavy, and dropped it on the platoon. Then the platoon understood what the pilot wanted and destroyed the cache. Certainly not the preferred technique, but it worked in this instance because that pilot wanted to support the troops.

(8) **Adjacent unit coordination.** All too often, this is not conducted. The outcome is chance contact between units and potential fratricides. It is almost impossible to establish an effective defense without such coordination. That said, it is seldom done even when coordination is made, it is poorly done. A checklist would help prevent fratricide and chance contacts with other friendly elements, especially when near company or battalion boundaries.

(9) **Rehearsals.** Rehearsals need to be focused for EVERY mission even if only a backbrief when receiving a new mission. Such focused rehearsals are rare. Usually they are generic, uncoordinated and almost never focused on the specific mission. Prior to executing an ambush, soldiers must rehearse that ambush so each fully understands his role be it POW/search, aid and litter, or assault across the objective. But this does not happen. The results are confusion and poor performance.

(10) **Fire Support.** Fire support at platoon level is generally planned poorly. Its execution is even worse. The FO is force-fed from above, rarely given the flexibility to plan target reference points (TRPs) for the platoon. Often TRPs are on prominent terrain features too far from the planned route, rendering them useless. Careful route planning that incorporates a fire plan can eliminate many immediate requests so often used. The forward observers (FOs) are trained in Fire Support planning, allow them to do their job. A good planning tool was developed by the fire support division here at JRTC and published in the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsletter No. 90-1, *Fire Support for the Maneuver Commander*, Feb 90. Have the FOs and leaders review this publication and implement the content into their planning and operations.

(11) **Contingencies.** The old what-ifs need to be considered. This rarely happens at the platoon level even in the case of a basic five-point plan for a leader’s reconnaissance, a squad patrol, reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) patrol, or other similar operations. Again, get back to the basics here. Even a lost communications contingency is rarely ever planned. One technique is to build a set of contingencies and number them in the platoon TACSOP. Then they are part of the platoon’s SOP and become known to all members of the platoon. This way, during operations, they can be referred to as per the SOP, and only a basic five-point plan needs to be issued.

(12) **Dissemination of information.** A soldier needs to know five basic things during operations: where he is going; what he is doing; when he will leave and return; when is chow; and when he will get mail? As long as a soldier has the basic information, he feels like a part of a team and can focus on the mission.

**b. EXECUTION:**

(1) **Battle drills.** Platoon and squad battle drills are rarely executed at JRTC. Usually, the unit is caught off guard and control breaks down immediately. Rather than maneuver or support by fires, soldiers just start running in the direction of fire. Battle drills are unfamiliar and there is no coordinated effort among the squad or platoon. In the best of cases, casualties are high even if the unit “wins.” More often, the OPFOR inflicts casualties and fades without losing the initiative. Soldiers and small units must rehearse battle drills until they can do them without thought. A technique for Home-Station training is to incorporate some drills into daily physical training (PT). They become “grass drills” for operations. While running down a road, you come across an open field. Run off into the field and conduct a drill or two, then get back onto the road and finish the run. This adds variety to PT and helps soldiers understand their drills and where they fit into the battle drill. The platoon and squad battle drills are:

- ♦ React to Contact.
- ♦ Platoon Attack.
- ♦ Squad Attack.
- ♦ Break Contact.
- ♦ Breach a Mined Wire Obstacle.
- ♦ Enter a Building/Clear a Room.
(2) **Navigation skills.** Navigation is one of the oldest and most difficult of soldier skills. It requires practice to master and the number of masters are steadily declining. GPS is not a panacea. Terrain association and map reading are still necessary. More and more units are relying on the plugger to give them accurate grids on where they are. Soldiers without a plugger do not know where they are. The basics need to be stressed here: a map, compass and pace count. The plugger is used to confirm location.

(3) **Movement techniques.**

(a) Platoons are not using proper movement techniques. Soldiers have a tendency to walk in a file. Leaders must ensure their soldiers to do the hard right over the easy wrong. The file is for restrictive terrain or very low visibility. Even then soldiers should not trail behind the other. There is even a right way and wrong way to use the file. Review FM 7-8 for proper techniques. Some techniques that worked well are:

- **Platoon Wedge and Vee.**
- **Squad Wedge.**
- **Fire Team Wedge on R&S patrol.**

(b) Individual movement is generally poor. Soldiers run toward the enemy in the open. Soldiers do not use individual movement techniques of the Low Crawl, High Crawl and 3-5 second rush. Or they use them improperly. Even if they do use individual movement techniques (IMTs), they do not use available cover. They may get down near a tree some 20 inches in diameter but they don’t use it as cover. Again, back to the basics. Employ some of this training during PT in the open field that you are running by.

(c) Night Movements. Again soldiers tend to operate in a file and forget proper movement techniques. Even on fairly open terrain, soldiers will go into a file if allowed rather than use a wedge. Even with night vision goggles (NVG), they naturally tend to move back into a file formation. The general consensus is good illumination equals poor NVG use.

(4) **Security.** A general lack of security is the reason units get caught unaware at JRTC. Security must be 360° at all times. Security means soldiers watch their flanks, rear elements watch behind, and soldiers scan their sectors during movements. During halts, soldiers tend to do a rucksack flop, especially radio-telephone operators (RTO) and FOs. Soldiers need to face out and scan their sectors, RTOs and FOs need to drop the ruck on a long halt and get behind their ruck in the prone to monitor the radio. At danger areas, such as roads or clearings, leaders must heighten awareness of the situation and increase security rather than allow soldiers to bunch up. At patrol bases or assembly areas, security should never go below 50 percent unless approved by the company commander. If a patrol or other mission departs, security should be at 100 percent until they return. These are all basics taught in our schools. But time and time again, units disregard them when out in the box. Soldiers always drift toward an individual “Cone of Comfort.” For most soldiers, this is that area from their feet to about 15 feet in front of them on the march. As fatigue increases, the cone narrows, especially with a heavy rucksack. Soldiers tend to watch this area, dulled into believing that as long as the enemy is not inside the cone of comfort they are safe. Scan your sector not the cone. The OPFOR can and will hurt you without even getting close to the cone.

(5) **Awareness.** Battlefield awareness and situational awareness are the foundations of security. If the soldiers scan their sector on the move, they are aware of their surroundings. They are less likely to be caught off guard. They are also less likely to miss opportunities to hurt the enemy. It is not uncommon for a platoon or company to walk right next to an enemy CP or cache and never see it. Everyone is in the cone of comfort, watching the soldier in front of him. At times, they get into a firefight with a friendly unit because the two elements bumped into each other. Situational and battlefield awareness comes from constant scanning of sectors and equally constant monitoring of one’s position in the unit scheme of maneuver. Fixated compass men or leaders’ eyes glued to a plugger rather than guiding on a map drift into another unit’s sector. Surprised, they fail to identify targets. The results are fratricide, confusion, and a golden opportunity for an OPFOR counterstroke.

(6) **Use of combat multipliers.** As discussed earlier, attack aviation, BIFVs, M1 tanks, engineers, and other support equipment can have a profound impact on engagements with the enemy. But they need to be integrated from the planning of the operation to its execution and future operations. Know their strengths and limitations. Those guide how to employ them. They can easily be integrated into the find, fix, or finish aspect. Even if they are not task-organized to the platoon, they can still be used for support if they are in the area. This means having a communications plan and frequencies. As far as equipment goes, knowledge on the proper use of and employment of the MOPMS, JAVELIN, M240MG, and the WAM is lacking. Many times units and soldiers have difficulty using the equipment. Clearly, equipment familiarization and training at Home Station would reduce these problems.
(7) Fire Support.
(a) Clearance of fires is a systemic problem at the platoon and company levels. Battle tracking can eliminate 90 percent of the problem. The fix is simple: a platoon calls in a grid every 300 meters. If operating as squads, then squad grids are called in all the way up to the company; platoon grids are called into the battalion. This way fires can be cleared as quickly as possible and placed on the enemy.
(b) Shift vs Polar missions. During movements, the platoon FO can really make some money if he and his RTO know the polar mission technique. Polar missions are simple, requiring friendly location, direction to the enemy, distance, method, and a target description. Every leader should know that basic information at all times. Even a single soldier can make all the difference in the world here, as was the case during one rotation. The platoon was caught in a cross fire and was down to a single man who grabbed the FO radio. He initially tried a grid and when that didn’t work, in a polar mission. He placed 45 rounds of HE right on top of the enemy platoon, inflicting 95-percent casualties and destroying two 82-mm mortars before being shot by a sniper. He was named hero of the battle in the rotation AAR.

(8) Reporting. Clear, concise, timely reports must be sent up to higher. Poor reporting results in missed opportunities and casualties. All soldiers need to use the basic SALUTE format. If the battalion or company uses a different format, then every soldier needs to fully understand it and know how to use it. And all higher and support units must know it! In one event, a platoon literally filed past an enemy CP and resupply point just 50 meters away. No one saw the vehicles and OE-254 until the last platoon noticed it. They tried to call in a report, but it was not timely and the description was not clear. As a result, the unit was ordered to continue to march, missing an opportunity to take out the enemy CP and resupply point. The unit kicked itself during the AAR when it became clear what they had missed. Again this goes back to basics: scanning sectors; situational and battlefield awareness; timely and accurate reporting.

(9) Mission-essential equipment.
(a) Binoculars allow users to scan greater distances with greater clarity. The binocular (bino) reticles can aid the user in calling and adjusting fires. Assistant gunners, FOs and leaders should all have binos with them.
(b) Pluggers allow the unit to confirm location and get accurate grids for indirect fire missions. If used properly and soldiers have a strong working knowledge of the equipment, it can back up navigation. By punching in way-points, units can navigate with azimuths and distances from way point to way point. For fires, using the Average Mode can get the grid locked into a 10 digit with accuracy (a field survey), but this requires time (360 seconds or 5 minutes).
(c) Spare Barrels are rarely carried during training because of MILES play. But the unit should train as it fights. These items should NEVER be left behind. Tripods, T&Es and Pintles should ALWAYS be near the machine gunners. At every halt, the gun should be mounted and placed at a minimum the 12 o’clock position and the main avenue of approach. The tripod allows the gunners to placed well-aimed, controlled fire onto any target that may present itself.

C. DEFENSE:
(1) Clear the area to occupy. Units must search and attack an area selected for the defense prior to an occupation. This ensures that the area is clear of the enemy and that the enemy does not have eyes on all the defense operations. This is a technique and has been proven effective during multiple operations at JRTC at the platoon and company levels.
(2) Positioning of crew-served weapons. Crew-served weapons are the small unit’s greatest source of firepower. The defense should be built around them with the infantry set in to protect them. Usually the exact opposite takes place. They are tacked onto the platoon defense almost by route method, one on either flank or assigned by subunit or leader. That often puts them in poor areas for observation and avenues of fire. Careful consideration must be taken to ensure that the crew-served weapons can cover the areas of highest threat for dismounted and light skin-mounted operations. They must also ensure that they meet the requirements of the defense. The only way to determine where those emplacements should be is to look at the terrain as the attacker will look at it.
(3) Range cards and sector sketches. Range cards and sector sketches are for the most part sub-standard and do not provide a clear picture of the area of coverage or have adequate information to support the area of coverage. Again, the best way to develop a range and sector sketch is to study the terrain from the attacker’s viewpoint. Soldiers and leaders need to refer to FM 7-8 and STP 7-11BCHM 14-SM-TG, Task 071-312-3007. Prepare a range card for an M60 or M240 MG. Bring copies of DA Form 5517-R, Standard Range Card. Range cards printed on plastic are durable and are not affected by weather. For sector sketches, refer to FM 7-8, Chapter 2, paragraph 2-23.

CALL NFTF! 12 SEP-OCT 02
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(4) Security. Security during defense operations is another problem area. Take a unit that has been on the move
for several days and then put it in the defense. Soldiers will, without fail, see that as an opportunity to rest. The defense is a
leadership challenge. During the preparation phase, the soldiers are busy. Most soldiers are busily preparing their positions and
units have but one to two personnel on security. That is a calculated risk that sometimes has to be accepted; the key is realizing
that it is a risk as the unit focuses on setting in the defense by the specified “not later than (NTL)” time. When the clock strikes
that hour, platoons are set at 100-percent readiness. They are keyed up, but they are also tired. In a short time, they reduce
security 50 percent. Then human nature starts to work and soon 25-percent security is in effect. By the wee hours of the
morning, platoons are usually at 5-percent security or less. Observer/controllers (O/Cs) have videoed every soldier in platoons in
the fetal position in the bottom of the fighting positions. Hence, the leadership challenge of the defense. Soldiers are already
tired and face a wearing job in establishing a defense. Once that is ready, leaders need to troop the line hourly after the NLT
defend time. Rotate the responsibility among the platoon leader, platoon sergeant and squad leaders to ensure that all the
soldiers are performing their tasks and ready to defend when the enemy comes into the sector. Never allow the soldiers to go
below 50-percent security, unless directed by the company or battalion headquarters. The defense is not a rest stop.

(5) Priorities of work. Platoons fail uniformly to set priorities of work. The platoon and company team must
establish clear priorities of work list, then enforce it. There is a list published in FM 7-8 that can be used as a guide or adopted as
the platoon priorities checklist. Trying to handle too many tasks at once prevents unified effort in task accomplishment or
accomplishment at sub-standard levels. Focus and unity in effort will help prevent this from occurring.

(6) Manuals and government training aids (GTA). Field manuals are called field manuals for a reason. They
are not “coffee table books” intended for the unit recreation area at Home Station. FM 7-8, Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad,
and FM 7-10, The Infantry Rifle Company, and GTA 7-4-6, Company Team Defense, are valuable sources of information
when preparing for the defense, and must be on hand when preparing and executing the defense. On average, there is only one
copy of FM 7-8 available and this is usually provided by the O/Cs to assist the unit in its efforts.

(7) Interlocking fires. A defense that has gaps in its fires is an invitation for defeat. Every platoon sets in a
defense that has at least one area with NO interlocking fire. Each time, the enemy finds and exploits it. Care and attention must
take to ensure that interlocking fire is obtained in the platoon defense, and mutually supporting fires are obtained in the
company defense. Again, walking the terrain and examining it from the attacker’s perspective is key. Have an individual go
downrange while the sector sketches are being made. This identifies dead space and areas not covered by grazing fire. It also
confirms interlocking fire. If the soldier is within the sectors of fire for the two positions, then there is interlocking fire. If not,
then sectors need adjusting to support each other.

(8) Communications plan. During the defense, communications are essential. They tie the positions together,
keeping soldiers informed on what is happening. They provide information to the subordinate leaders. They need to be as
secure and as quiet as possible. PRC-126s and 127s are fine but are insecure. Wire communications are secure and should
extend from the CP to each of the squad leaders. A tug line is a silent means of alerting individual positions and to upgrade
security. The tug line can be simple 550 cord in the platoon defense kit. But communications are more than simple means of
passing information. Communications are personal, both spoken and unspoken. Leaders need to get out of their positions and go
to each of the squad’s positions. That effort does more than simply tell the soldiers what is going on. It lets them know that their
leaders care. Lastly, there needs to be a no-communication plan. Losing communications with the company with no backup can
be more than embarrassing; it can be fatal. If the company headquarters and or adjacent platoons have been over-run by the
enemy and are coming up the flanks, it is better to find that out earlier. A good communications plan can help prevent some of
the problems associated with lost communications.

CALL NFTF! 13 SEP-OCT 02
(9) **CASEVAC.** This area concerns the CSS community and line soldiers. It is often poorly planned. The service support plan must include a route into and out of the platoon and company sector of defense. It must also include a route from the platoon CCP to the company CCP.

(10) **Escape routes.** An escape route needs to be planned in the platoon defense in case the platoon is overrun, a possibility almost never addressed. An escape route allows survivors to get to a covered and concealed area, consolidate and reorganize, then counter-attack the enemy. Instead, the escape efforts are ad hoc, leaving the survivors to fend for themselves against a focused enemy.

(11) **Camouflage and concealment.** Equipment left on the ground and not used in the defense is rarely concealed. This provides a signature for the enemy to focus on and gives the platoon defense away. Generally, the barrier materials are left on the ground, right where they were dropped off. Rucksacks are positioned behind the fighting positions and rarely, if ever, camouflaged. Attention to detail, and adding this to the defense checklist or priorities of work would help prevent this from occurring.

(12) **Fighting positions.** Fighting positions have rarely been built to standard. To survive the indirect fire attack that precedes an attack, the fighting positions must have a minimum of 18 inches of overhead cover. The engineer section at JRTC has put together a diagram and standard (tested) for a fighting position built with long pickets. It takes 18 long pickets for a two-man fighting position. There are other diagrams available at JRTC and are sent to each of the engineer elements prior to arrival at JRTC. If you didn’t get them, ask your O/Cs; they will be happy to provide the diagrams.

(13) **Alternate and supplementary positions.** These are rarely designated. Even if they are, soldiers do not know where they are, much less prepare them. Usually, the factor related to this is time management. Alternate and supplementary positions must be designated, and at a minimum, dug to hasty standards.

(14) **Rehearsals.** Defensive rehearsals are generally radio drills, well after the NLT defend time. Rehearsals must be conducted during both day and night conditions. This will help ensure that all soldiers know the plan and how their part fits into the plan. A physical rehearsal to shift to alternate positions or perhaps reinforce flanks allows the soldiers to see the terrain. It may also uncover weaknesses that a radio drill won’t get at. As a minimum, soldiers must know the withdrawal from primary to alternate and supplementary positions, and the reinforcement drill for the flanks. Otherwise, when attacked and they begin to fall back to alternate/supplementary positions, they become disoriented.

(15) **Hasty positions.** There have been several instances when a platoon has been moved only minutes or an hour or so prior to the dismounted attack. In this case, soldiers picked up and moved, then simply lay on the ground to defend. *The earth is the defender’s friend: get close!* Leaders and soldiers need to get down and scratch out hasty positions as quickly as possible in the new area to defend. Even a hasty fighting position adds needed protection for the force. In the event artillery begins coming in on the element, being slightly below surface level gives more protection than laying on the surface; some of the shrapnel will pass over and miss the soldier in a hasty position. Units in a company assembly area or battalion assembly area should prepare hasty position. This simple act of scratching out a hasty position will help save a soldiers life, and presents less of a target for the enemy to place well-aimed, accurate fires upon.

d. **ADMIN.**

(1) **SOPs.** SOPs at platoon level are generally weak to non-existent. What procedures do exist are usually passed word of mouth and vague at best. Platoons need to establish a platoon tactical standing operating procedures (TACSOPs) or use the sample version that is outlined in FM 7-8. Anything that soldiers can refer to in hard copy to refresh their memory is better than a non-existing (written) reference. This will also help to integrate new or replacement soldiers as to how the platoon operates in a field environment.
(2) **Doctrinal manuals.** FM 7-8 needs to be carried by team leaders and above at the platoon level. This is a ready reference to many of the questions that arise during normal operations at JRTC and the field exercises at Home Station. Many view this manual as the bible for squad and platoon operations, but it is simply a reference item that has proven its worth in many exercises and operations.

(3) **Company and battalion TACSOPs.** Company and battalion TACSOP must be on hand at the platoon level. At a minimum, the platoon leader and platoon sergeant must have a copy during operations. During every rotation, there have been instances that an event occurs and could be answered by the company or battalion TACSOP if the platoon had a copy with them. Not to mention the reports that are contained within each, that are often neglected to be included in the platoon TACSOP.

(4) **Pre-combat checks and inspections.** These generally occur at the ISB and nowhere else. All too often, an R&S patrol is sent out during the day and fails to take mission-essential items for the patrol. Then the patrol gets caught in the dark without NVGs because they planned on getting back before dark. Or a patrol moved out to register fires but forgot to take binoculars or a spare plugger battery. Proper planning, and PCIs prevent such mistakes.

(5) **Marksmanship.** Marksmanship is an area of OPFOR excellence and blue forces (BLUFOR) mediocrity. Soldiers need to practice, practice, practice prior to entering the area of operations. Some techniques that have been tried, tested and proven are:

a) Hose-clamp the transmitter in place, but not so tight that it starts to destroy the transmitter.

b) Do not drop or bang the rifle around once it has been zeroed.

c) Day zeroing and training.

- 25 meters initially.
- Then confirm the zero at 50 and 100 meters.
- Practice at 150 then 200 meters with a harness.
- Practice at 150 and 200 meters with a soldier with harness and halo. Soldier needs to be walking, running, and conducting INT.

d) Night zeroing and training.

- Zero PVS-4s, PAQ-4s, and AIMs at 25 meters initially.
- Confirm the zero at 50 then 100 meters.
- Practice at 100, then 150 meters with the SAAF and a harness.
- Practice at 100 and 150 meters with a soldier with harness and halo. Soldier needs to be walking, running, and conducting INT.

(6) **Weapons and equipment maintenance.** Weapons and equipment are routinely neglected during the rotation. All too often, the weapons are seen with the brown rusty camouflage on them. Equipment is broken and not turned in for repair or replacement. Even the crew-served weapons are have been neglected and fail to operate when needed. A little attention to detail, preventative maintenance checks and services (PMCS), and priorities of work would go a long way here. Every gun and every other soldier should have a weapon cleaning kit at a minimum. Broken or unserviceable needs to be identified and turned in for repair immediately, not carried around as dead weight. Keep mission-essential equipment in top working order.

(7) **Personal hygiene.** After a couple of days, soldiers start to look like the war torn and tattered men of World War II. An unshaven face, weak to no camouflage, even bad breath really takes its toll. Soldiers must carry and use a personal hygiene kit, even in the field. There is no excuse for this at any level, but every rotation it is seen. Leaders must enforce personal hygiene standards with their soldiers even in the field; it must be one of the priorities of work before anyone gets any sleep.

(8) **Physical fitness.** Physical fitness at home stations must be geared to the unit mission essential task list (METL). Very often, soldiers are ill prepared for the movements in the field and fall out of the movement, especially with their rucksack load. Non-battle injuries play just as hard a toll on the unit and morale as a valid battle injury, perhaps even more so. Soldiers expect some to be injured during hostile acts. They don’t expect soldiers who cannot carry their loads to fall out of the movement. Every rotation, there are multitudes of non-battle injuries (NBI) attributed to heat, soldier load, lack of sleep, or physical fitness. Better training before deployment can help prevent some of this from happening, especially on the fitness-level issues.

(9) **What else works?** What else works are the things that are non-standard, but should be considered to help the unit fulfill its wartime mission.

(10) **CamelBak hydration system.** One of the greatest inventions yet seen at JRTC is the CamelBak. Every O/C is issued a CamelBak and thoroughly believes in its worth. The bottom line is “Hydrate or Die.”

(11) **Walkie-Talkies.** Several units came through JRTC with Radio Shack walkie-talkies fitted with whisper microphones and earpieces. Although this was a platoon solution to broken squad radios turned in to maintenance, it worked very well. They bought, out of pocket, several sets and had them all tuned to the same frequency, which was below what could be punched into a 127 or 77 radio. It worked well, and was very quiet. (NOT AUTHORIZED AT JRTC.)
The best form of welfare for soldiers is realistic, tough, first class training. --Rommel


by LTC Matt Higginbotham, DLRO, Command and General Staff College

Lieutenant Colonel Gary H. Wade, in his summary of *Rapid Deployment Logistics: Lebanon, 1958*, states:

“General Adam’s forces accomplished the overall mission in Lebanon. The tailoring of logistical forces worked, but not without drawbacks. The designated support units must have a working knowledge of the plans so that they can devise complementary plans. Support units, like combat units, must train together to ensure teamwork. Higher headquarters must integrate the nonorganic combat service support units into the planning process to ensure that those units have the opportunity to rehearse the aspects of plans that affect their operations.”

CSS planning, logistics estimates, and integration continually receive a “needs emphasis” rating at the combat training centers (CTCs). The complexity of integrating CSS with the MDMP at the brigade, division and corps levels remains a challenge for logistic planners.

Regardless of the type of operation (offense, defense, support or stability), successful integration of CSS during the MDMP is paramount. CSS integration is most effective if it is continuous, concurrent and provides detailed logistics analysis. Unsuccessful integration of CSS in the MDMP results in an unsubstantiated logistics analysis provided to commanders during critical decision-making.

This article is written for the tactical CSS planner (specifically, the G4, S4, and Support Operations Officers). Hopefully, it will provide a useful technique in integrating the CSS Battlefield Operating System with the MDMP to facilitate a thorough logistics analysis. Consider the following steps:

**STEP 1: CSS integration before the MDMP (Integration of the CSS planner with the planning staff).**

Prior to a staff planning session, CSS planners must integrate their staff/section with the respective planning staff (includes all BOS representatives). This requires the G4/S4 and Support Operations Officers to proactively seek information from either the Chief of Staff or Executive Officer (XO) of the planning headquarters. Staff planning SOPs, FM 101-5, *Staff Organizations and Operations*, and planning timelines assist planners in the MDMP. The linkage of the CSS planner with other BOS planners provides the logistician a 360-degree picture before, during and after the MDMP.

The CSS planner contributes to the MDMP by knowing his or her respective supported unit’s task organization (habitual) and all organic capabilities. A unit’s task organization with its current capabilities provides the foundation for future CSS planning. The challenge becomes how to build upon and organize a unit’s current CSS status with new mission requirements.

**STEP 2: CSS integration during the MDMP (CSS Analysis).**

Typically, CSS planners focus more on CSS products (resulting from the MDMP) than conducting a thorough logistic analysis of the mission. CSS products include the following:

a. Paragraph 4 (Service Support) of an OPORD/OPLAN.
b. The CSS Overlay.
c. Annex I (Service Support) to an OPORD/OPLAN.

The logistician has several planning tools and techniques to assist with CSS planning. Unfortunately, many planners fail to consolidate, organize and prepare the enormous amounts of data for analysis. The planner’s challenge becomes how to prepare and organize the information for a thorough analysis (See enclosure. Note: The enclosure provides the CSS planner a technique in aligning (integrating) CSS considerations with the MDMP).

The G4/S4 and Support Operations Officer identifies, organizes and analyzes logistic data. This process is often referred to as the “science” of logistics planning. The “art” of logistic planning is taking this analysis and applying it to the battlefield in a support concept (visualization). Commanders expect a thorough logistic analysis prior to the CSS planner recommending the feasibility and acceptability (regarding resources) of a COA. The results from the CSS analysis may significantly influence a commander’s decision to approve or disapprove a staff’s recommended COA. Therefore, how do CSS planners prepare the required CSS information for analysis? One tool often neglected by CSS planners in preparing information for analysis is the logistics estimate.

The Logistics Estimate seems to be one of the most misunderstood documents for the CSS planner. According to FM 101-5, Staff Organizations and Operations, Appendix C:

> “The logistics estimate is an analysis of how service support factors can affect mission accomplishment. It contains the G4’s (S4’s) conclusions and recommendations about the feasibility of supporting major operational and tactical missions.”

The logistics estimate is a tool used to consolidate all characteristics of the area of operations (AO), enemy forces, friendly forces, and CSS considerations. Consolidating CSS considerations/data with other BOS information enables the CSS planner to properly conduct an analysis. Based on the results from the CSS analysis, planners have enough information to conduct a separate analysis for each COA. The last section of the logistics estimate includes a CSS comparison of COAs with recommendations followed by conclusions. These recommendations and conclusions provide the commander critical CSS information required in COA decision-making.

The doctrinal format for the logistics estimate and other staff estimates is FM 101-5 (Appendix C). Additionally, another logistics estimate format is found in CGSC ST 101-6, CSS Battlebook (Chapter 2). NOTE: Automated and other logistic planning tools provide the logistician quantifiable data by the various commodities. This data is only useful if the proper analysis is conducted. Inserting this data into the logistics estimate requires the CSS planner to ask the question, “So what?”

STEP 3: CSS outputs resulting from the MDMP CSS analysis.

The primary CSS products required for an OPORD/OPLAN are paragraph 4 (Service Support), the CSS Overlay, and Annex I (Service Support). Upon completion of Step 6 (Course-of-Action Approval) to the MDMP, all staff sections prepare OPORD/OPLAN products for submission to subordinate units. The G3s/S3s may distribute initial products as early as the warning order. CSS products are most effective if prepared concurrently throughout the MDMP (refer to enclosure). The information for CSS products results from the analysis provided in the logistics estimate.

CONCLUSION

Successful integration of CSS within the MDMP remains a challenge for the tactical logistician. CSS planners today use different planning resources to assist them with CSS analysis. Generating numbers and data is but one step in the overall process. The most important step becomes properly integrating this data into the MDMP. Otherwise, the volume of CSS information serves a less valuable purpose, and may fail to answer the question, “So what?”

CALL NTF!  17  SEP-OCT 02
**Enclosure: CSS Steps to the MDMP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MDMP STEPs</th>
<th>CSS CONCURRENT STEPS TO MDMP</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Receipt of Mission.</strong></td>
<td><strong>1. Gather CSS Tools.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Higher Headquarters (HHQ) Orders.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Task Organizations.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Para 4 (support concepts).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Annex I</td>
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<td>- CSS Overlays with Maps of AO.</td>
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<td>- CSS Matrices.</td>
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<td>- Parent unit capabilities.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Automated Planning Tools (LEW, OPLOG Planner).</td>
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<td>- Staff planning SOPs/planning timelines.</td>
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<td>- Historical logistics estimates/logistics estimate formats.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2. Conduct Mission Analysis.</strong></td>
<td>2a. Analyze HHQ orders with focus on task organization (attachments/detachments), mission, commander’s intent, concept of operations, AO boundaries (contiguous, noncontiguous, linear, nonlinear), paragraph 4 (support concepts), support relationships and service support annexes (Annex I, two levels up).</td>
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<tr>
<td>a. Analyze HHQ Orders.</td>
<td><strong>b. Conduct IPB/LPT and LPB (Logistic Preparation of the Theater or Battlefield).</strong> CSS planners assist the G2/S2 and engineers with CSS logistic preparation of the battlefield information such as: support infrastructure of AO, HNS, airfield/road network, bridge classifications, hard-stand utility, possible logistics nodes, MSRs, LOCs inside and outside AO, support area requirements, RSOI considerations.</td>
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<td>b. Conduct IPB.</td>
<td><strong>c. Determine tasks (specified, implied, and essential).</strong> Extract specified tasks from HHQ orders under task to subordinate units. Many maneuver tasks will generate implied CSS tasks. Include all CSS FACTS and ASSUMPTIONS. Extract any REQUIREMENTS from these initial tasks and facts/assumptions. Additionally, based on unit capabilities and CSS facts, calculate initial REQUIREMENTS from the various logistic planning tools.</td>
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<td>c. Determine tasks (specified, implied, and essential).</td>
<td><strong>d. Review available assets.</strong> After studying the task organization, specified and implied tasks, the CSS planner analyzes the support relationships of assigned, attached, OPCON, or DS units. Based on the relationships, additional internal or external support REQUIREMENTS may be generated. Compare organic support CAPABILITIES with additional support CAPABILITIES of assigned, attached, OPCON or DS units added to task organization. Build a separate TASK ORGANIZATION FOR SUPPORT highlighting all additional support CAPABILITY required that exceeds organic support capability. This generates SHORTFALLS. In addition, provide the present CSS situation (current status of all CSS functions) as a start point for future CSS analysis. The current status can be in matrix format.</td>
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<td>d. Review available assets.</td>
<td><strong>e. Determine constraints.</strong> This is where the logistician identifies all shortfalls in support requirements. Task organization changes (noted above) and CSS considerations to the type mission (offensive, defensive, stability or support) generate SHORTFALLs. Prepare initial CSS OVERLAY. At a minimum, include locations of current and proposed support locations, operational boundaries (from operational graphics), MSRs from HHQ, locations of major maneuver HQ, locations of major CSS units and mission graphics (OBJs) if available.</td>
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<td>MDMP STEPs</td>
<td>CSS CONCURRENT STEPS TO MDMP</td>
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<tr>
<td>f. ID critical facts and assumptions.</td>
<td>f. Refine critical CSS FACTS and ASSUMPTIONS list from all available plans, orders, estimates and AO/country studies. Focus on critical CSS facts and assumptions before operations and possibly during operations. Structure by CSS function.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Conduct risk assessment.</td>
<td>g. Conduct CSS RISK ASSESSMENT. Prepare initial LOGISTICS ESTIMATE. Consolidate all CSS information gathered from previous paragraphs into the logistics estimate. Remember, the logistics estimate is a working document.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Determine initial CDR's CCIR.</td>
<td>h. Know what they are. Also, focus on requirements from actions at NAI's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Determine initial recon annex</td>
<td>i. Determine support requirements and concept for reconnaissance effort. At corps level, include a support concept for the ACR; at division level, a support concept for the Division Calvary Squadron; and at brigade level, a support concept for the Brigade Reconnaissance Troop. Include these concepts in the logistics estimate. Additionally, prepare initial REAR AREA DEFENSE PLANS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Plan use of available time.</td>
<td>j. Refine PLANNING TIMELINE, LOGISTICS ESTIMATE, and develop initial CSS MATRIX (optional). Prepare initial SUPPORT CONCEPT from information gathered in logistics estimate and concurrent planning with BOS reps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. Write the restated mission.</td>
<td>k. Continue to refine the SUPPORT CONCEPT, CSS OVERLAY, and prepare an initial ANNEX I (SERVICE SUPPORT) from logistics estimate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. Conduct mission analysis briefing.</td>
<td>l. As part of the MA briefing, the CSS planner must prepare to brief the initial SUPPORT CONCEPT and current statuses of commodities, by CSS function. Additionally, include any critical logistics TASKS and SHORTFALLS. Any shortfalls mentioned must include proposed recommendations to alleviate shortfall.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m. Approve restated mission.</td>
<td>m. Understand restated mission and any CSS implications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n. Develop initial CDR's intent.</td>
<td>n. Understand CDR's intent. Ensure information and CSS analysis captured in logistics estimate support this intent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o. Issue the Cdr's guidance.</td>
<td>o. Capture CSS PRIORITIES and CONSIDERATIONS mentioned by the Commander when issuing guidance. ENSURE all logistic analysis meet this guidance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p. Review facts and assumptions.</td>
<td>p. Review CSS FACTS and ASSUMPTIONS. Focus on those assumptions that have become facts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Course-of-action development.</td>
<td>3. Based on logistic information gathered in logistics estimate, begin to apply analysis of REQUIREMENTS, CAPABILITIES, and SHORTFALLS to each proposed COA. Consider developing a CSS MATRIX highlighting key considerations by CSS function for each COA (a technique).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Course-of-action analysis (wargame).</td>
<td>4. Apply information from the logistics estimate to the operational synchronization matrix to assist in the wargame. Each COA should have specific CSS considerations, priorities of support identified, logistic unit locations, and a feasibility analysis conducted with CSS risk identified. The greater the risk to CSS units, the lesser the feasibility (supportable), or identification of ways to mitigate the risk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Course-of-action comparison.</td>
<td>5. During COA comparison, the CSS planner must inform the Commander, Chief of Staff or designated representative of the CSS feasibility or supportability of a COA. DO NOT WAIT FOR COA APPROVAL TO PROVIDE SUPPORTABILITY ANALYSIS. This is where the CSS planner needs to articulate, from the analysis of information in logistics estimate, the following: Most Supportable, with associated risks; Supportable, with associated risks; and Least Supportable, with associated risks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Course-of-action approval.</td>
<td>6. CSS planners refine SUPPORT CONCEPT (Para 4), TASK ORGANIZATION for SUPPORT, CSS OVERLAY, and refine ANNEX I (SERVICE SUPPORT), from information in the LOGISTICS ESTIMATE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Orders production.</td>
<td>7. CSS Planners prepare and submit Paragraph 4, ANNEX I, and the CSS OVERLAY to the OPLAN/OPORD for distribution to subordinate units.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A light artillery battalion, in the midst of their support cycle, has all of its personnel tasked out in every conceivable direction. Soldiers man gates and head out on funeral detail. Large-scale collective training is not being conducted and personnel are not available. It is at a moment like this when a single phone call can instantly alter the immediate, foreseeable future. A deployment. A deployment that is to occur within 48-36 hours via strategic air into hostile territory. The battalion immediately mobilizes its resources to pushing the first firing battery out while continuing to support their tasking requirements. The hours lengthen, fatigue sets in, but the task is done. The lead elements are ready to deploy and those left behind shore up the lessons learned. While the mission was accomplished, the amount of quick-reaction required by company-grade officers at the battery level could have largely been prevented and it can cause one to ask the question, “Were we really prepared for this?”

How often have we overlooked the shortcomings in our battery’s ability to deploy by justifying to ourselves that “when the time comes, we’ll have time,” or “we’ll get plenty of notice,” or “there will be a build-up period?” The nature of today’s international scene makes statements like these sound quite irresponsible. In the world of the light division, the likelihood of deploying to meet threats that require quick reaction remains high. It is important to note that the maneuver elements we support do not possess the amount of equipment, and do not need the amount of reaction time that a light artillery battery does. As a result, it is vital that lieutenants and captains in firing and headquarters batteries alike devote the extra time to ensure that they will be ready to move when the brigade combat team (BCT) they support does.

The company grade officer, especially the lieutenant, is the first line of attack in ensuring that adequate preparation is being conducted in the realm of strategic deployability. Executive officers, fire direction officers, and platoon leaders are the planners in the unit that is closest to “the trenches.” Lieutenants that devote the time to ensure their battery is prepared will allow their chain of command to be free to concentrate on the tactical realities deployed units face once in theater. This article outlines areas within impacting readiness that lieutenants and captains can expertly manage and improve upon. As a company grade officer, you can enhance your battery’s readiness in the realms of training, supply, maintenance, and personnel management.

Training

Instruction at the battery level in all facets of deployability is vital. However, before that is to occur, the leadership must be well-versed in the requirements and direction the battery training must take. The leadership involved comprises your unit’s movement team. An officer representative can direct the planning involved while an NCO representative can bring practical experience to the table. It is also recommended that the battery’s mechanic is also a part of this team since he has immediate knowledge of the unit’s equipment and its status. At Ft. Campbell, KY, there is a Strategic Deployability School (SDS) that a large portion of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)’s lieutenants attend which satisfies the requirement for trained leaders. It is recommended that this course, or the equivalent on other posts, be completed prior to entry into a firing battery if possible. Individuals occupying Fire Support Officer positions are prime candidates for this option. Outside of SDS, being hazardous material (HAZMAT) qualified is also important. A large quantity of the equipment we transport via air and sea is subject to stringent United Nations (UN) and federal regulations with which we must comply if we are to flow into theatre unhindered.

Once the leadership is trained at the individual level, the battery can be trained at the collective level. Training should focus primarily on the areas of rail and air. Soldiers need to be trained in proper rail-loading techniques to include all safety requirements. A proper understanding of the manning necessary, along with the blocking and bracing needed for each load, is imperative. Air movement encompasses a wider range of training. This includes proper preparation of vehicles for airlift, pallet-building classes, training identified chalk-leaders in their
responsibilities, possessing enough shoring during loading, and successfully maintaining all load-plans and
HAZMAT documents. Having a unit movement officer (UMO) book at the battery level will help greatly in this
endeavor. Here a lieutenant can annotate and keep track of the individual and collective training the battery has
completed and still requires.

### Sample Predeployment Preparation Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTION</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unit Equipment Lists</td>
<td>AUEL</td>
<td>The Authorized Unit Equipment List (AUEL) is created through TC-ACCIS software and annotates all vehicles, howitzers, and major storage devices on your property book.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DEL</td>
<td>The Deployed Unit Equipment List (DEL) is an off-shoot from your AUEL and lists all equipment that is part of the package with which your unit will deploy. <em>This doesn't necessarily mean all items from the AUEL are included.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Air-Load Plans</td>
<td>Created by ALPS software, your loads for transport via strategic air should include plans for C-5, C-17, and C-141. <em>NOTE: ALPS software updates frequently; be aware of version changes and how they might impact your load plans.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chalk Leader Memorandums</td>
<td>Have memorandums signed by the UMO specifically identifying chalk leaders for the respective aircraft for which you have loads planned; make these individuals aware that this entails responsibility for all personnel and cargo on their chalk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training Memorandums</td>
<td>Annotate training conducted by your unit that involve air loading and 463L Pallet building.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Battalion Air Movement SOP</td>
<td>This should be updated annually.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail</td>
<td>Rail-Load Plans</td>
<td>Rail-Load plans are created via TC-ACCIS and should include all items off of your DEL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Battalion Rail Movement SOP</td>
<td>Update annually.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training Memorandums</td>
<td>Note all rail-load training conducted by your unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convoy</td>
<td>Vehicle Load Plans</td>
<td>All howitzers, vehicles, trailers, and generators in the unit should have load plans done on them. <em>Note: Ensure the weights, dimensions, and serial numbers on all of the loads are accurate; this will prevent your unit from having to reprint shipping labels when alerted.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Convoy Training Memorandums</td>
<td>Track all convoy training conducted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Battalion Convoy SOP</td>
<td>Update annually.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Force Assembly Area (TFAA) Packets</td>
<td>Task Force Assembly Area (TFAA) Packets</td>
<td>Each of your vehicles should have a TFAA packet containing a copy of a Joint Air Lift Inspection Record, its load plan, as well as a Shipper’s Declaration of Dangerous Goods (SDDG). <em>Note: Make these packets weatherproof; they will be exposed to rain.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>Publications</td>
<td>There is a slew of Army, Navy, Air Force, and FORSCOM pubs and regs that govern unit movement. Your unit will require you to keep different ones on hand. For the sake of space, maintain them on CDs and acquire on-line updates as needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maps/Diagrams</td>
<td>Maintain maps, routes, and diagrams to all the rail areas, airfields, and assembly areas in your area.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Outside of these training events, one should also look into planning and adequately resourcing a Capstone exercise that will test how valuable the training has been while also checking the systems the unit has in place. A Battery Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercise (EDRE) can serve to validate every step of the deployment process from the initial alert to Task Force Assembly Area (TFAA) operations. Your battalion will assist you in providing resources, or put you in contact with the appropriate agencies, to conduct such an exercise. Initiate the EDRE with an alert and have your unit do a complete load-up of all their vehicles and equipment. Maintain strict adherence to your unit’s prescribed timeline and have all personnel and equipment checked and ready to board the aircraft accordingly. A thorough and honest AAR at the conclusion of an EDRE will further serve to enhance battery preparedness to deploy.

**Supply**

A property book that is not being managed successfully will serve to slow down unit movement procedures at a time when the last thing anyone wants to deal with is supply. Lieutenants, often the Fire Direction Officer (FDO), who serve as battery supply officers while in garrison, should keep this in mind when supervising day-to-day operations in this area. The establishment of a garrison battle rhythm for your supply sergeant is ideal in this area. Institute a constant rotation where hand receipts are being updated and all property is properly identified and tracked via ULLS-S4. It would also serve to properly identify the amount of Class II the battery requires to sustain operations for 15 days after initial deployment.

Outside of that, two issues that tend to come up are excess and shortages. Excess is property on the battery commander’s hand receipt that does not have use in battery operations (MTOE authorized or not). Major General Cody, former commander, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), instituted a program in early 2001 titled “Slim Eagle” which affords commanders at Ft. Campbell the opportunity to turn in excess property as long as it is identified via NSN or serial number, allowing it to be removed from hand receipts. An opportune time to turn in excess material is at the conclusion of EDRE operations. Go through all of your battery’s storage facilities after your load-up is complete. Chances are anything left behind is something that should probably be turned in at the earliest opportunity. Doing this in a training environment will pay dividends in the long run.

Shortages are an entirely different animal. Supply officers need to keep meticulous track of the commander’s shortage annexes and continuously push for ordering property on those shortages. Create a priority list that tracks your unit’s shortages in the order of most to least necessary if alerted; this can be your critical shortage list. Additionally, ensure your battalion is aware of the shortages you are tracking. Battalion commanders will periodically afford you the opportunity to order all the shortages you annotate. Budgetary availability may prevent you from ordering all that you would like; however, the imminence of deployment will suddenly afford your battery the opportunity to acquire all the equipment it requires. If this does not occur, DO NOT laterally transfer equipment from other batteries within your battalion. While this might alleviate your battery’s supply woes, it will have the unfortunate drawback of placing your sister batteries in bad shape and it is likely they will be preparing to deploy as well.

**Maintenance**

A soldier and his unit will be more willing to fight when he knows that his equipment will not fail him when he needs it the most. It is here that maintenance comes in to play. When we think of maintenance, the first thing that springs to mind are vehicles and howitzers. Field Artillery units across the Army are ingrained into a very thorough focus in this area. While vehicle and howitzer maintenance are important parts of the battery’s readiness, we must also remember that fire control equipment, along with individual and crew-served weapons maintenance, is also a part of the montage that is a well-maintained unit. Communications and NBC equipment also fall under this category. In most of these areas, the Executive Officer (XO) of the battery plays a key role. Vehicles and howitzers need to be continuously serviced to -10/-20 standards. If the battery has not done so already, placing your vehicles on the low mileage program by submitting the appropriate paperwork and conducting a biannual service will minimize the amount of services your vehicles will have to go through each year. Howitzer services, occurring on a quarterly basis, should happen in conjunction with a frequent and thorough scrub of their -4s. Unfortunately, light artillery units do not possess howitzer maintenance facilities at the battalion or DIVARTY level, forcing XOs to
coordinate with outside support units and accommodate their schedules. This lengthens the time needed to conduct services and often impacts your battery’s time to train. A unit MTOE change in this area would be ideal; however, it is not a reality at this moment in time.

The battery’s Uniform 6 equipment is also a part of your management of maintenance for deployment. Your howitzer mechanic’s equipment, especially his supply of nitrogen and WTR, needs to be reviewed as often. Howitzers, such as the M119A1, behave differently under varying weather conditions and, consequently, have different requirements to maintain firing capability. Planning for all weather contingencies needs to be considered. As an XO, you should maintain a unit basic loadlist of POL items that are necessary for combat operations. Your howitzer mechanic should keep a supply of POL that ensures the guns are properly functioning in all climate zones. Deploying to an area that can get extremely cold, such as Afghanistan, when you were preparing for a fight in a temperate zone can potentially make your battery unable to shoot, and, therefore, useless to the maneuver you support.

Directly linked to being able to have firing capability is keeping track of the status of the battery’s fire control equipment. The gunline’s Collimeter’s, M140 Alignment Devices, sights, and Gunner’s Quadrants, along with the battery’s aiming circles and the Gun-Laying Positioning System (GLPS), as well as the FDC’s AFATDS, HTU, and BCS hardware, all serve as lynch-pins in your ability to conduct combat operations and, as a result, deploy. Establish systems, if you have not already, to keep track of these vital pieces of equipment. Add these items to the sheets you already use to track your vehicles and howitzers so you do not lose sight of them. Track purging dates as well as points of contact to the manufacturers of these sensitive pieces of equipment. If they are not in your battalion’s ULLS box, they should be. The same goes for all of the battery’s individual and crew-served weapons.

Personnel

All the equipment and organization in the world are nothing without personnel. Undoubtedly well-trained, the soldiers of the battery need to have their personal affairs in hand if a deployment is to go smoothly. All individuals in the battery should have Soldier Readiness Packets (SRPs) that contain their shot records, next-of-kin information, life insurance data, wills and power of attorney, extra identification tags, and family care plans as applicable. An excellent system to employ to keep your unit’s SRP readiness at 100 percent is making SRP updates a quarterly affair while also using them as part of new soldiers’ inprocessing requirements. All of this information should be maintained at the battery and summarily forwarded to your S-1 for redundancy. The battery’s Family Readiness Group (FRG) program is also an integral part of deployability. Maintaining a battery FRG booklet that can keep family members informed will prevent issues from arising while the battery is deploying. The book should include point of contact phone numbers along with a list of agencies that exist to assist families of deployed personnel. A strong FRG leader is also a must in this arena. Keeping family members informed will have the secondary effect of keeping your soldiers’ minds on the job at hand and be the last link in the chain that will pull your battery into the theater of operations.

Conclusion

All the aforementioned factors, training, supply, maintenance, and personnel management, if constantly scrutinized, will make the pains of deployment minimal to nonexistent. Do not forget that training in those areas are vital to smooth deployment procedures. A lot of the material, although generally covered, has application in all light artillery batteries. The company grade officer, as a primary planner and trainer, using these guidelines or improving upon them as applicable, will alleviate a lot of his chain of command’s concern in the realm of strategic deployment.
When the U.S. Army began Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and their campaign in Afghanistan, the Afghan Military Forces (AMF) were already holding up to 4,500 detainees throughout the Coalition Joint Operational Area (CJOA) Afghanistan. U.S. forces were directed to collect personal identification data (PID) on all potential Taliban and al-Qaeda members in an effort to identify America’s newest enemies.

Collecting PID creates a better database for identifying potential enemy threats and to screen these individuals to determine if they meet the criteria to be treated as detainees. If an individual meets the specified criteria, he is taken into custody in a detainee status and secured for further processing. Host Nation forces would encounter pockets of resistance throughout the area of operation (AO) and secure them for U.S. forces to conduct PID collection operations. These operations were conducted in conjunction with multiple battlefield operating systems (BOSs) in a combined arms effort to properly conduct the collection of PID. PID collection packets, consisting of names, fingerprints, DNA, and digital photos, have become a key tool in America’s “War On Terrorism.”

Prior to the arrival of the PID team, Special Operations Forces (SOF) liaison with leaders of the local indigenous population ensuring candidates for detainee status actually exist at a prescribed location and that the area is prepared for military forces to enter and conduct PID collection operations. A PID collection operation consists of eight different teams (refer to attached schematic).

- **Command and Control (C^2) Team.** The C^2 team consists of key leaders and support soldiers. Key members of this team include the battalion S3 (or similar type capability), a battle captain, a communications soldier, a driver/gunner, and a Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) officer. This team is located inside the security perimeter in a position that allows for observation of the entire operation. Members of the team maneuver throughout the PID area, ensuring a smooth transition between the various stations and positive control over the detainees until they reach the holding area. The S3 is responsible for overall mission accomplishment, proper detainee handling, and guidance in any case not covered during the mission brief. The battle captain ensures mission success by conducting liaison operations with the SOF on the ground and ensuring the PID collection site is established and operational. The communications specialist carries FM capability for communicating with air support and other friendly forces in the AO, and as a secondary communications system for internal communications with the security forces on the perimeter for conducting detainee operations. Communications are maintained internally between the security positions and the C^2 communications specialist. Actions on the objective and Rules of Engagement (ROE) are discussed during mission rehearsals. The driver/gunner remains vigilant of the surroundings throughout the PID collection operation. The SJA representative provides legal assistance/guidance as needed throughout the entire operation.

- **Perimeter Security Team.** The perimeter security team is comprised of two military police (MP) squads and a platoon leader (security element size is based on METT-TC). Organic MP teams are placed to ensure 360-degree outward coverage of the perimeter. The perimeter size is determined by METT-TC. The number of detainees dictates the size of the holding and staging areas and the number of personnel at the mobile interrogation team (MIT) stations. The MIT stations determine the distance necessary to ensure privacy with each detainee during the screening process. The PID and medical teams need minimal space to conduct operations within the security perimeter.

- **Staging Area Security Team.** The staging area is a preliminary location from which to isolate and establish control over those individuals selected for processing. The staging area security team consists of two soldiers with either
an M4/16 or an M249 in tactical overwatch positions. All detainees are bound at the feet and hands and have hoods covering their heads for disorientation. Two guards are positioned with their backs to the center of the perimeter to prevent potential fratricide if weapons fire becomes necessary.

**Personal Identification Data Collection Team (PID).** MP and Criminal Investigations Division personnel are ideal for PID collection operations based on their organic functions of detaining personnel and conducting investigative operations. The PID team is the second stage in all PID collection operations. A team consists of three soldiers, with multiple teams operating simultaneously if enough security teams are available. The PID gathering builds or adds to an existing database through the collection of dexorybo nucleic acid (DNA) samples by swabbing the mouth and collecting hair follicles, fingerprints, and digital photos of the upper torso area. All individuals being detained must be put through this process for data collection. Upon collecting the data and storing it in the proper containers, all information will be processed through the appropriate database.

**Mobile Interrogation Team (MIT).** The MIT consists of interrogators and interpreters. The MIT determines if a detainee fits the screening criteria given by higher headquarters. The screening process takes approximately 10-15 minutes per individual. If a person does not fit the criteria, they are turned back over to the leader of the indigenous population or, in this case, the AMF. If they do meet the criteria, they are taken into U.S. forces’ custody and escorted to the medical station.

**Medical Team.** The medical team consists of a unit medic at a minimum, but a Physician’s Assistant is preferable. The medical team conducts a cursory medical examination of the detainee for any previous injuries sustained before coming under the control of U.S. forces. Any injuries identified are noted accordingly and, if necessary, tended to at that time. The medical team also allows for prior notification at the theater collection point if more advanced medical attention is necessary upon arrival.

**Holding Area Team.** The holding area is established to maintain control over those individuals who have been identified as meeting the criteria by the MIT, and who will remain in U.S. forces’ custody for transport out of the AO to the theater collection point. The staging area security team consists of two soldiers with either an M4/16 or an M249 in tactical overwatch positions. All detainees are bound at the feet and hands and have hoods covering their heads for disorientation. Two guards are positioned with their backs to the center of the perimeter to prevent potential fratricide if weapons fire becomes necessary.

**Detainee Security Team.** Once the detainees are brought into the PID operations security perimeter, the detainee security team will take charge of all movement and detainee control until they are either released back to the AMF or transported back to the theater collection point. Each security team consists of two soldiers that secure the detainee throughout the process. Once the detainee enters the holding area, the detainee falls under the control of the holding area security team, and the detainee security team returns to the staging area to conduct another PID escort. This process continues until all detainees have been processed through the PID and screening areas. The perimeter security teams will only assist if absolutely necessary to help maintain positive control. Overall security of the detainees while in flight is also the responsibility of the detainee security team.

To date, PID collection operations have been conducted in over five different areas throughout Afghanistan, collecting data on over 3,500 potential members of terrorist organizations.

The military police corps is playing a critical role in the PID collection process. From the collection of data, to the security of detainees during the operations, and subsequent aerial escort missions back to the collection points, the military police have proven to be a true combat multiplier in Afghanistan.
WAKE UP AND SMELL – THERE’S SOMETHING WRONG!

by COL (Ret) Daniel H. French, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

While doing some reading and research in back issues of CALL Quarterly Trends at the CTCs, I was struck by a blinding flash of the obvious. We are still making the same tactical mistakes in training, and what we did wrong then, we still do wrong today. We consistently seem to have the same difficulties each and every rotation. Why, and what are the real problems? Are the officers who we are selecting for promotions and command stupid – or do they lack tactical experience and a sense for warfighting? Are our staffs incompetent – or just poorly trained? Surely, they all read the same magazines on their profession of arms, see what has to be fixed, and have the capability to put together a training plan focused on these “needs improvement” trends. Do we not understand training, training management, and our warfighting capabilities? Are the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) too difficult a problem for us to solve? Are we looking at the right things, identifying the right problems, and, more importantly, are we looking at how we might be able to fix the problems? Is our doctrine too rigid, complicated, lacking flexibility – or do we not understand our doctrine? How can an Army that is so great not fix simple things such as:

“Platoon leaders are not using mortars when they make contact;”

“Commanders and staffs do not understand the MDMP;”

“Commanders are not capable of making decisions in a timely manner?”

After looking at this closely and from seeing this at the CTCs as a player, observer/controller, and OPFOR commander, there seem to be multiple reasons for our inability to train and fight well.

ESTABLISHING A TRAINING PROGRAM

Among the first questions we should ask are, “What are the training objectives? Do we have a clear vision of what we must accomplish during a training cycle – individual, leader, and collective? Are we warfighting-focused in training? How are we conducting training? How are we preparing for training? Where in our Army do we teach our officers and NCOs about training and training management? Where do we teach NCOs how to train our soldiers, and how do we establish standards? The Training Circulars (TCs) are wonderful as a starting point, but where do we talk about how to conduct a battalion or company-training meeting? Where do we show them the tools necessary to conduct a training meeting? In the Cavalry Scout/Armor Crewman (19D/K) Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC), our NCOs receive a total of two hours on training and training management. These NCOs are the very foundation of our individual training programs and a key ingredient for our training development. If platoons and companies are the foundation for successful warfighting, where do these young officers and NCOs get the basics they need to prepare and conduct training?

Where do we develop standards for individual training, and what represents a trained (“T”) rating as we develop our training plan?

The foundation for good training rests with the commander’s ability to identify the training objectives for his unit. What must his unit do to be successful in combat, and what does it look like? What are the critical tasks his unit must accomplish, and what are the standards for each task (individual, leader and collective)? For example, as a commander of a mechanized brigade, I might need to see my units, conduct a tactical road march of a certain distance, conduct a movement to contact, attack, and defend. I would look at this over the period of a year, put out my annual training guidance at least six months prior to the training year, and then further focus my subordinate units with quarterly training guidance. Coordination with my Command Sergeant Major to identify individual tasks will ensure I tie my training objectives together. This is a very simple process but one that takes the ability to see your unit first and foremost as a warfighting force.
As a battalion commander, and later as a brigade commander, I watched company commanders wrestle with training meetings and management, and I saw them conduct training that was not acceptable. After much hard work by some brilliant, young captains, we put together a Training Leader Development class to give company commanders the tools they needed to prepare and conduct effective training meetings. I’ve attached slides, which may not provide the total answer, but provide a system for the conduct of effective training meetings.

Training for warfighting requires preparation, and too often we miss this piece of the puzzle. By focusing our young officers first on the preparation for training, and then on the conduct of the training event, we help ensure successful execution. If we can put a system in place, we can better use time and conduct meaningful training for our soldiers. Then we need our leaders to make training as realistic as possible. They need to focus on battle training, not on teaching garrison classes. Leaders need to be able to visualize what their activities might look like under combat conditions and translate that vision into simple and effective training exercises. They should read *Realistic Combat Training* by Robert Riggs, written in 1955, but certainly pertinent to training today. Soldiers join the Army wanting a physical and mental challenge, not to be put to sleep with unimaginative, boring training. The training centers received the message, but CTCs should not be the only place where our soldiers receive tough, realistic training. We need to create an environment that looks, feels, and smells like combat. Include moulage kits, smoke and pyrotechnics, physical and mental challenges — for all soldiers in each and every training event. We must create the “fog and friction” of combat so our leaders become adaptive to every situation.

A young soldier from the 10th Mountain Division was interviewed as the Division entered Haiti, and he was asked if he thought this was a difficult mission. His response, “No, I have been to the JRTC.” This is how all our soldiers should respond concerning Home-Station training. We need to challenge our soldiers and ourselves by setting realistic conditions and putting them in the most difficult environment possible. We have lost much of this as our Vietnam veterans depart the service. Those of us who served under these great soldiers learned about combat and how to train for success. We had platoon sergeants who took the time to teach us what training should look like and how to make it realistic for our soldiers. Today’s environment and threat certainly provide questions as to what future battlefields will look like, but one Ranger after the Somalia debacle probably had it about right when he said, “I must train my soldiers to live fire in situations that are confusing and turmoil surrounds them. If they perform well here, they will perform well in combat.” This is not a bad philosophy for establishing your training program.

**TRAINING EXECUTION**

Once we have established a training program, we must move to the important issues of the execution of training and define what is good training. Training must be as close to combat as we can make it. It must have all the sights, sounds, feel, and smells of combat, or we cheat our soldiers. I believe in the “Crawl, Walk, Run” methodology for training. The “Crawl” phase is very basic as we lay the foundation for understanding and learning. As we move to the “Run” phase, soldiers should see complex live-fires, limited visibility, MOPP IV, and the “fog of war.” Why do we wait for our CTCs to set this up for us? JRTC puts out a live-fire manual that walks you through the simple, inexpensive, but effective ways to set up a live fire at your Home Station, including targets and safety zones.

At Home-Station training, we have to put a new emphasis on marksmanship training. We can no longer believe that our marksmanship program is complete once we conduct weapons qualification. We must carry it on to combat marksmanship, where soldiers fire their weapons under combat-like conditions, not on a sterile weapons qualification range. During one live-fire convoy ambush, soldiers jumped off the truck, assumed a good prone firing position, and let the rounds fly. Unfortunately, no targets fell, but lots of wasted rounds flew down range. These soldiers had never been taught to move to a position from which they could see and engage their targets. They had also never fired from the kneeling unsupported or standing position. While this seems simple to most of us, unless we train our soldiers, and they are confident in moving under fire with their weapons, that will not be combat marksmen. All soldiers, whether combat arms, combat support, or combat service support, must become proficient riflemen if we are to be successful in the next conflict.

The future battle will surround us and the enemy will be everywhere. That means we must train convoy live fires for support personnel and provide classes not only on MOS-related subjects, but also on warfighting. These include tasks such as how to prepare range cards,
prepare fighting positions, emplace claymores, and the proper use of hand grenades. There will be much uncertainty on tomorrow’s battlefield, and our rear areas provide lucrative targets for the enemy. We must, therefore, ensure we train all our soldiers. We must have soldiers capable of protecting themselves and understanding what it takes to win. Soldiers throughout the battlefield must not only pull maintenance, conduct sick call, and process administrative paperwork – they must be proficient in all aspects of warfighting.

THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS (MDMP)

Next, let’s take a look at the MDMP, an important process because it organizes your thoughts for warfighting. This process is well suited for division and corps-level planning, but for the untrained and inexperienced staff, it is far too slow and cumbersome for the quick, agile, tactical planning expected by commanders on the future battlefield. The MDMP provides a wonderful framework for teaching staff planning to subordinates and allowing them to see why the process is important – and to see that creating a product is not the key. What we expect from this process is an understanding of the enemy, terrain, and ourselves.

Does a commander with over 15 years experience really need a MCOO to tell him where the enemy can go and how terrain will affect the operation? Who is the most experienced person in the unit at battalion and above, and who best understands the personalities, strengths, and weaknesses of his subordinate commanders? The staff is responsible for looking at capabilities, requirements, and identifying the shortfalls to support the COA the commander has selected. The current MDMP process puts far too much emphasis on creating a product vice understanding the fight and seeing the future. Staff officers spend far too much time making slides and creating products instead of seeing the fight as the commander does and then determining how to support the commander’s fight.

Strict, blind adherence to the MDMP process also tends to look at the fight in a linear fashion instead of orchestrating activities throughout the battlespace. A good example of this is our synchronization matrix, which shows time over battlefield operating systems (BOSs). What are we synchronizing? Is not the intent of the process to set up and solve tactical problems in a linear fashion? What if we took the battlefield activities: gain and maintain contact, disrupt the enemy, fix the enemy, maneuver, and follow through, and synchronized these based on an event and the effects we desire to attain. For example, the chart would look like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BATTLEFIELD ACTIVITIES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BOS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intelligence Event:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Effects:</td>
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<td>Maneuver Event:</td>
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<td>Fire Support Event:</td>
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<td>Air Defense Event:</td>
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<td>C² Event:</td>
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<td>Effects:</td>
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CRITICAL EVENTS: COMMANDER’S DECISION POINTS:
The commander must identify the critical events he sees for this operation, such as: EVENT: Locate division reconnaissance, EFFECTS: Destroy 70 percent. Now, each BOS proponent will determine what they can do and how they will assist in meeting the effects the commander desires. For example, the Intelligence BOS will put: EVENT: UAV identify division reconnaissance, EFFECTS: locate at NAs.

For a battalion, you would only have four to seven critical events, and for a brigade, no more than seven. Thus, the commander focuses his staff on the events that must be synchronized and the effects they need to create. This allows the staff to use their systems to create the effects the commander needs and also permits the executive officer to shift resources to meet the effects the commander requires for success. During this process, the commander should be forward, seeing the battlefield and talking to subordinate commanders to develop a common picture of the fight and to cement his intent early on. Using his knowledge of subordinate units’ strengths and weaknesses, the commander begins to develop what intelligence requirements he needs to make decisions. This matrix allows us to synchronize what we must do – battlefield activities, with the effects we want our BOS to create for us. The staff must realize that until the effects are created, you must continue to put resources toward accomplishing the effects, or ask the commander if a change to the plan is needed.

The following is an example of how this might work. The brigade commander is forward in the TAC and should receive the mission and guidance from higher headquarters at this location. The commander and S3 immediately begin to develop a COA. The commander takes time to visualize the fight, discuss options with the S3, and then writes his draft intent, while the S3 works on an overlay. The FSCOORD begins to look at essential fire support tasks (EFSTs), how he will support the scheme of maneuver, and the commander begins working his CCIR. The XO or the battle captain should come forward and pick up the products and ensure he has the same vision of the fight as the commander and return to the staff. The staff then evaluates available capabilities to meet the commander’s requirements, refines necessary control measures, identifies preparation and execution actions requiring brigade-level coordination, and produces the final order for the commander’s approval. From start to finish, this process should take no more than six hours until an order is issued. Now, the brigade commander is free to go around the battlefield, talking to subordinate commanders, watching preparations, and ensuring his subordinates and he have a common view of the fight.

Ideally he is discussing how they collectively view the enemy in sector, how they envision the fight taking place, and how he will address issues or concerns. Throughout this process, the S3 takes notes and keeps the XO informed of any changes or adjustments to the plan.

**TYING IT ALL TOGETHER**

Finally, we come to tying together training and warfighting. Why do we put the CTCs as the Capstone of our training plan, when, in reality, they should just be a stepping-stone toward our becoming true warfighters. How often do we see units put on their training calendars “The Road to the CTC?” Our final destination must be to “fight and win our nation’s wars,” and the CTCs are merely tools to evaluate where we are and where we need to go in our training. We need to execute training as if we are preparing to fight a war, and we must establish clear standards on what we expect for success. We need to establish what constitutes a “T” at all levels – from individual tasks to leader tasks to collective tasks.

Have we identified clear standards for our soldiers and units, or are we in an “I feel like” analysis of training? A rating of “T” for a movement to contact should be done at night, live fire, in MOPP 4. That is how we will fight. We always hear that to be successful we must be proficient at squad and platoon training. Well, that means they are a “T” in all individual, leader, and collective tasks before we move to the next level. I know multi-echelon training is important, but we must place a clear focus on these elements if we are to succeed. We cannot pay lip service to this; we must hold commanders accountable. Staffs must maintain their proficiency during major training events. When a unit deploys, every operation and every day for the staff is a tactical planning exercise that must include daily jumping of the TOC.

How can the CTCs help us more? Let’s get away from checklists and units getting a “pat on the back,” merely because they produced documents vice fought the war. Let’s look at execution and determine what was the problem, or what was done right. Let’s get O/Cs to help us determine the best way to fix something and clearly identify problems as either a training issue, a resource issue, or a competency issue of the commander and staff.

Our Army is too great, and our leaders far too talented to not accept this challenge and fix what we need to truly be the best army in the world.
The DOD components shall rely on the most effective mix of the total force, cost and other factors considered, including active, reserve, civilian, host nation, and contract resources necessary to fulfill assigned peacetime and wartime missions.

— DoD Instruction 3020.37

Many issues related to the use of contractors on the battlefield (COB) are of growing concern at all echelons of the Department of Defense. The greatest hurdle in planning for the use of COB and actually requisitioning their services boils down to a fundamental lack of understanding about contractor deployment, force protection, and support requirements.

Different types of COB perform different functions and have unique requirements for deployment integration in the Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) sequence, funding procedures, and contracts to support the military in a battlefield environment.

The Army is a strong advocate of “training the way you’re going to fight;” however, this concept is not adequately applied to contractor support. The military enjoys the knowledge and expertise of various services provided by contractors in garrison settings. This dependence on contractor support at home stations must be considered during contingency or deployment planning sessions.

Contractors are a force multiplier, both in garrison and on the battlefield. A technique used to determine the continuity of contractor support from a garrison to battlefields is to directly ask each contractor providing essential mission support, “What provisions are in your contract to deploy with my unit to combat and how are you getting there?” If a contractor in garrison is not designated to deploy with your unit, raise the issue though the chain of command.

Civilians have established themselves as an integral and vital part of the Department of Defense’s total force team. With distinction, they perform critical duties in virtually every functional area of combat support and combat service support, both at home and abroad.

— AF Pam 10-231, Federal Civilian Deployment Guide

Contractors have played vital roles on battlefields for centuries. The United States began its own revolution with an augmentation of COB and has continued to use them. So if contractors have had a hand in conflicts since this nation was founded, why does each new generation of the military have to rediscover the lessons associated with integrating this old practice into new conflicts?

In the past, two predominate reasons kept COB from becoming a doctrinally recognized part of military planning: lack of recognition and doctrine. Most civilians and many military personnel do not realize the impact that contractors have had on battlefields. As a result, when conflicts and wars terminate, efforts to capture lessons learned from the COB have had little emphasis. This issue is now being addressed by the military, and significant progress in being made in the areas of establishing COB regulations and incorporating COB provisions in field manuals and during training exercises.
TYPES OF COB

No one knows better than I the tremendous work that Brown and Root has done in Somalia. The flexibility and competence demonstrated by your employees were key factors in allowing U.S. forces to transition logistical support to the UN.

– General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, while Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

As doctrine and terminology related to employing COB are developed, it is important to understand the definitions of the various types of contractors that populate modern battlefields, and appreciate their unique requirements. Each type requires different considerations in contract procurement, tracking management, support, and force protection. Furthermore, some contracts may dictate the incorporation of contractors in the TPFDD.

Three broad categories of contractor support are provided by theater support contractors, external support contractors, and systems contractors.

Theater support contractors perform services that are oriented to the immediate needs of the operational commander. Examples are services such as light construction, port operations, transportation, and security augmentation. Some historic examples of services provided by theater support contractors include loading and offloading aircraft that were involved in the Berlin Airlift Operation, and the stevedores who provided port service during U.S. military involvement in Vietnam.

Generally, theater support contractors are procured from the principal assistant responsible for contracting (PARC). The PARC is the commander’s senior acquisition advisor responsible for planning and managing all theater support contractors. The urgency of the contract and the magnitude of the cost will determine which venue is used to obtain the contractors. Theater support contractors are more likely to contract Host-Nation Support (HNS) because of the nature of the services being provided. While the commander is responsible for the safety and security of the contractors, there is normally no requirement for their integration into the TPFDD; however, their presence should be coordinated and included in operational plans so that their administrative and logistical requirements will be identified to the appropriate planners.

Consideration must be given to potential shortfalls and unexpected support requirements. Military contracting officers follow operational principles and guidelines outlined in Field Manual 100-10-2 to acquire the needed contingency contracting. The contracting officer coordinates with the appropriate staff directorates (G1 through G6) and the hosting U.S. embassy staff for recommendations and compliance with HNS agreements. HNS resources improve response time and free airlift and sealift assets for other priority needs. Contingency contracting complements, but doesn’t replace, available operational military support systems.

External support contractors provide the combatant commander and his staff the capability to use pre-planned contractor support to augment support capabilities through the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) umbrella and the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP).

A task force designated to participate in a peacekeeping deployment may require general ground and intermediate aviation-maintenance support, but a maintenance company’s Modified Table of Organization and Equipment is not designed for supporting extended maintenance operations over wide areas. Further, the units probably also have support responsibilities to other customers at their Home Stations. The service component commander can fill the void of military capabilities with agencies such as LOGCAP and AFCAP.

System contractors provide support to materiel systems. Most system contractors enhance readiness and continuity in training on advanced or recently fielded systems; however, some system contractors perform maintenance and operations that are unique to the military.

These system contractors perform services that have no military counterpart, yet are required during both garrison and deployed operations. Currently, there is no doctrinal definition to distinguish these types of system contractors. The differences inherent in the duties performed by these system contractors have significant implications for planners.

There are two broad categories of system contractors: mission enhancing and mission essential.

Mission-enhancing system contractors provide assistance to equipment that is newly fielded, modified, technically challenging or maintenance-intensive.

New and upgraded fielded equipment is normally accompanied by a field service representative (FSR). The FSR is a contractor with an inordinate amount of experience with, or developmental knowledge about, the equipment. Such contractors are supplied from the applicable program managers (PMs) for periods of from one to three years, depending on the system.

During the warranty period, the PM funds deployment of the contractors; usually, one or two of them go with a battalion. Their small numbers, minimal equipment-support requirements, and the short duration of their service pose little disruption when they are
integrated into the deployment phase, which does not necessarily mean their incorporation in the TPFDD.

Most units continue to utilize the FSRs beyond a system’s warranty period to increase readiness and depth in maintenance capabilities, including training. The mission-enhancing contractors’ services are still managed through the PM offices but are paid for either by the unit or the installation. But regardless of who pays the bill, a unit that wants contractor assistance during deployments should contact its PM to ensure there are provisions for “their” contractors to deploy to a battlefield environment.

Bear in mind that if the contractor service is not being funded by the PM, the service of a contractor in a potentially hostile environment will increase costs dramatically. For budget planning, ensure that those costs are included in budget estimates and/or contingency operation funding requirements.

Mission-essential system contractors do not augment organic capabilities or provide assistance with a system – they are the only support for the system. Mission-essential system contractors operate or maintain new or highly sophisticated systems that the U.S. military cannot maintain itself, such as some unmanned aerial vehicles and specialized NBC contamination-detection vehicles.

Incorporating mission-essential contractors in operational plans (OPLANs) and contingency plans (CONPLANs) is crucial. They are vital and must be included in the TPFDD. Units with mission-essential contractors for direct or general support during peacetime should also review all applicable OPLANs and CONPLANs to ensure that contractors are included in the TPFDD and their deployment requirements are not in conflict with their contracts.

CIVILIANS ACCOMPANYING THE FORCE

War hath no fury like a non-combatant.
– C. E. Montague

Two issues that make contractors on the battlefield controversial are their proximity to combat operations and the consequent force-protection requirements. The military has made provisions to grant contractors on the battlefield a status as civilians accompanying the force” (CAF), which is recognized by the Geneva Convention. But no matter how the American perspective categorizes contractors, their official U.S.-bestowed status is irrelevant if an enemy does not acknowledge our definition of CAF or abide by the Geneva Convention. Deploying U.S. military forces to support our national interests and expecting our adversaries to understand the American perspective of war is naïve and unrealistic.

As contractors assume wider supporting roles, particularly those that involve operating equipment, their activities blur distinctions between CAF and combatants. According to Army Regulation 715-9, contractors may not be used in, or undertake any role that could jeopardize their status as, CAF. With the integration of technology and tactics, such as the complex video and communication systems that control UAVs, contractors are providing the type of cutting-edge support likely to result in enemy casualties.

As the traditional concept of the forward edge of the battle area continues to fade in asymmetrical warfare, contractors will be drawn ever closer to opposing forces. Contractors who support and operate systems armed with weapons in a hostile environment need a change in regulations that incorporates consideration of the evolving role of CAF.

Many of our past military involvements have been limited wars; however, to our adversaries they have been total war. In the morality of war, jus in bello raises the issue of discriminating in the treatment of combatants, non-combatants, and CAF.

The participants and the nature of a particular conflict often determine how members of the opposing force and their supporters will be treated. There are those who hold a firm belief that COB assisting the adversary are just as liable as combatants; therefore, there is often no moral distinction between targeting either a combatant or a CAF who is involved in arming or feeding the combatant.

Provisions for contractors to bear arms for defensive purposes on the battlefield further complicate the ability of adversaries to discriminate between combatants and CAF. Force-protection considerations for COB should be taken to protect them based on the enemy’s perspective. Ultimately, it will be the adversaries’ perspective that will determine how contractors will be perceived and treated in warfare.

PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACTOR SUPPORT

Field Manuals 100-10-2 and 3.100.21 outline principles for COB support, and are useful in verifying a range of requirements. While the following principles are not inclusive, they should be considered when planning or reviewing the use of contractors on the battlefield:

- Commanders are responsible for protecting COB in their area of operations.
- Contractors must have not only the appropriate skills but also the equipment necessary to accomplish their support requirements.
Contracted support must be integrated into the overall support plan. Military and contractor systems must not place additional burdens on soldiers. There must be a plan for support before contractors arrive in the theater, and in the event that contractors either do not deploy or cannot continue to provide contracted services. Significant changes in contractor activities may require contract modifications. Contractors manage and supervise their employees.

In accordance with Army Regulation 715-9, contractor employees generally are not assigned below echelon-above-division level, but may be temporarily deployed forward as needed, consistent with the combatant commander’s policy, the tactical situation, and the terms and conditions of the contract.

Peacekeeping operations deploy units as task forces requiring split-base support and logistical operations, but neither ground nor aviation maintenance support units have the MTOE authorization of equipment and personnel to conduct such operations for extended periods or over considerable distances. Many of the higher level maintenance functions require external support contractors either to augment home-based or deployed-force operations.

Normally, external contractor support tends to deploy forward to augment support on the battlefield rather than in garrison. Contractors augmenting MTOE capabilities are used on a basis of approximately one (contractor for military) to one in their support roles. An advantage of this support is that they are not encumbered by some of the additional duties associated with the military, such as responsibilities for guard duty, KP, or training.

**PLANNING FOR CONTRACTOR SUPPORT**

Despite significant efforts to effectively manage LOGCAP, U.S. Army, Europe officials’ inexperience and lack of understanding of the contract, the contractor’s capabilities, and program management created problems during deployment and resulted in unnecessary costs. The General Accounting Office Report on Bosnia Peacekeeping operations, such as those in the Balkans, creates challenges for logistical planning. Often 25 percent of a higher level maintenance unit’s personnel will deploy in support of peacekeeping operations. Significantly, the 25 percent of personnel who deploy might represent 100 percent of the capability to support a specific system that still requires support at the Home Station.

This void is normally filled by contractors in garrison. Additionally, external contractors are hired to fill the same support requirements for the peacekeeping operations in theater, creating a duplication of effort and a drain on funds. Unit readiness issues are also masked by the 25-percent deployed; who will fill the TPFDD in support of another contingency operation?

As decisions are made for COB, there must be a clear understanding of the numbers and requirements of contractors required to deploy and the impacts on the units deploying and those remaining in garrison.

Planners from battalion to unified command staff levels must be informed of contractor requirements. The vertical flow of information will allow planners to adjust apportioned forces in the event of peacekeeping operations or in a two-theater operation plan.

If any facet of contractor support is not planned for, such as how they get to the battlefield, their positioning on the battlefield, medical and life support systems, or force protection, the commander faces a potential loss of combat effectiveness. These issues must be addressed by operators and logisticians in the planning process.

As today’s military incorporates systems that are increasingly technical and require contractor support, planning and integration of contractors on the battlefield is essential to maximize the potential of new technologies.

Teamsters driving U.S. Army fuel trucks near Colonia Dublan during the 1916 Mexican Punitive Expedition. Photo obtained from www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev.
While assigned as an Infantry Section Leader in Afghanistan from April through September 2002, my unit conducted numerous patrols focusing on reconnaissance and route clearance, as well as verifying the status of various water wells and the attitude of the civilian populace. We normally operated with at least two-up armored HMMWVs, one with a .50 caliber and the other with an MK19. For some patrols we added an additional two-cargo M966 HMMWV. A medic, an interpreter, and an Afghanistan soldier always accompanied the six to twelve U.S. Infantrymen. At times we would have “add-ons” including counter-intelligence (CI) agents, leaders and staff previewing routes, or members from CALL. I was selected to lead many additional patrols because of the rapport established between the local elders and my team.

We met our interpreters several days before we started the patrols. We spent many hours together and were taught some of the basic language and local customs. I asked the correct way to show proper respect to the different age groups of people with special focus on the elders. The elder of the village is a well-respected and usually educated man but is not necessarily the oldest male in the village. It is his responsibility to ensure the needs of the village are met. He is expected to greet strangers (accepting the risk himself) and decide if they bode good or evil for his people. The younger village members show him sincere respect and respond to his requests immediately. I wanted to be sure the villagers were not offended as we conducted our patrols through their villages and farms.

Usually we would stop about 200-300 meters from the village and set up security. Then the interpreter and I would walk up to the village and seek out the elder. The first visit was usually tense but, with a friendly smile and a handshake, we began the slow process of building trust. I had the assurance that my patrol was watching my back and the interpreter would tell the elder that we meant no harm to his village or his people. We also asked a few questions to ensure that we had a good understanding of the best way to travel through the area. Some example questions are:

1. Would you mind if we drove through town or is there a safe by-pass around the village? Usually the response would be that we were welcome to drive through town.

2. Where do the children play so we can watch for them and make sure they are a safe distance from the trucks? In every case, we were shown the play area and thanked for our concern.

3. Do you mind if we come back through again? We were invited back and thanked for helping them.

We would then usually be invited for tea. I asked the interpreter if they would be offended if I declined. He explained that if I did not accept the offer, then the elder would not believe we were friendly and meant them no harm. So, after sharing tea for about 20 minutes, we were safely on our way through town. The extra time for public relations was critical to the success of our mission.

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

As we became better acquainted in each of the villages, we expanded our questions to gather more intelligence about the areas. Some example questions are:

1. Are there any strangers moving into your village that did not live here before the war? On some occasions, there were and the information was passed to the S2.

2. Have your people found any new mines while they were farming/working? The people started to warn us about the mines to include helping us mark some safe routes through existing minefields.

3. Have you seen any of the Taliban soldiers in this area?

When some of the towns became hostile or closed their gates because of some careless patrols conducted by other nations’ forces, I was tasked with taking my team on patrol and attempting to re-establish rapport so
the route would open again. Fortunately, because of the earlier visits when we took the time to show some respect and share in their customs, the doors were reopened and patrolling resumed. I would then take their complaint to the S2 to be worked through proper channels.

Soldiers on patrol take a few moments to kick a soccer ball with local children. (Photo from Stars and Stripes website.)

The reputation for having good rapport with the locals led to my selection to conduct several CI and HA (humanitarian aid) missions. On these missions, there were usually a lot of children in the towns. I would assist the patrol by keeping the children out of the way. Getting the kids interested in me worked well. I would take out a pen and some paper and ask one of their names in their own language. Then I would write it in English as best I could and ask them to write the name in Pashtu. When we had both written the name, the paper was given to the child. The activity allowed the gunners to pull security without having children in the kill zone and the leaders to accomplish the CI or HA intent. The Intelligence staff and the local Elder commended the effectiveness of this technique.

Another simple technique was to wave a lot. This caused the locals to wave and allowed us to locate the people with weapons more readily. In addition, we seemed friendly and that resulted in friendlier responses whenever we stopped for information or for a security halt.

On several occasions, we heard of people that were harassed by previous patrols. After some sincere questioning of the locals, we learned that the previous patrol had in some way been viewed as disrespectful. Usually, the disrespectful perspective was based on a simple activity that we take for granted such as passing out candy or ink pens to the children. Although the children loved it, the adults looked on the practice as not respecting their ability to provide for their own. We would go to the Elder and explain our custom of sharing and apologize for the offense. Then we would ask the proper way to give these items to the kids. The answer was simple. Give the items to the Elder and he would pass the candy or ink pens to the villagers. At this point, the villagers became comfortable with this tradition because respect was then focused on the village Elder.

Soldiers hand out toys they bought with their own money to children who eagerly await the soldiers’ visits. (Photo from Stars and Stripes website.)

Because of the success of our earlier patrols, my team was selected to escort Akmed Karzi, the king’s brother. This was a great honor, and I was thrilled to lead the escort. I was informed that my team was selected by the S5 specifically because of the earlier reports about the success of the CI, HA, and patrol missions. The task was to lead him through a village with a known minefield and to mark the route for safe passage.