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One of the most important missions the Army has is to maintain its readiness. Unit readiness rests on the morale, discipline, and training of its soldiers. It rests equally on having quality soldiers and their families feel good about life in the Army community. Our soldiers and their families must have a safe and secure environment in which to live, work, and train. The military police (MP) accept that challenge daily.

MP protect the Army’s assets through active physical security measures. And MP undertake a vigorous economic crime program. They guard the Army’s people and installations against terrorist threats. Their initiatives in crime prevention and family advocacy and their “work friendly” attitude show they care about soldiers and their families. MP unstintingly fulfill their law and order mission, knowing it to be vital to the Army’s success in combat.

This field manual (FM) discusses each element of the MP law and order mission. It addresses law enforcement operations, investigations, confinement of US military prisoners, and terrorism counteraction. This FM will assist MP in understanding how each of these elements is an essential part of their law and order mission. Commanders will find it useful in understanding how MP help support the fulfillment of command responsibilities.

Because many aspects of the MP law and order mission are undertaken largely to provide a safe environment for the total Army community, much of the discussion in this FM is devoted to MP law and order responsibilities in a peacetime environment.

The proponent of this publication is Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Submit changes for improving this publication on Department of the Army (DA) Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) and forward it to Commandant, US Army Military Police School, ATTN: ATZN-MP-DML, Fort McClellan, Alabama 36205-5030.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used both men and women are included.

*This publication supersedes FM 19-10, 30 September 1976.
The MP Corps provides the Army a wide range of diverse support. On the battlefield MP provide commanders combat, combat support, and combat service support. Both "an Arm and a Service," the MP Corps plays an important role in battle. But MP also play an important role in supporting commanders beyond the successful resolution of battle. Through their law and order mission MP continue their active support of Army commanders by ensuring the existence of the lawful and orderly environment units need to maintain combat readiness. MP performing law and order operations extend the commander's command and control. They aid commanders in obtaining and maintaining combat proficiency. They prevent diversion of military resources. They suppress the chance for criminal behavior; they protect and assist the military community. And they help commanders ensure US forces are disciplined troops of high morale.

In a theater of operations MP conduct law and order operations only when the combat commander requires it and when battle intensity permits. During intense continuous combat, like that expected near a main battle area or in a developing theater of operations, MP are most needed to expedite and conserve vital resources for combat forces. In intense combat the commander's priority of need is most often for MP combat and combat support operations. MP are employed more often for battlefield circulation control (BCC), area security, and enemy prisoner of war (EPW) operations and less often for law and order operations. But a commander's need for law and order operations depends on the tactical situation. And it depends on the level of command involved and the location of the command on the battlefield.

In a peacetime environment MP conduct extensive law and order operations. These operations support commanders' order and discipline in the field and on installations around the world. The performance of these operations impacts even beyond the maintenance of law and order. Many peacetime law and order operations and subelements embody basic methods, measures, and techniques MP use to carry out their BCC and area security missions. For example, operating a traffic control post (TCP) is a measure basic to the MP missions of BCC and area security. Operating TCPs is also basic to the MP law and order mission. MP conducting law and order operations in a peacetime environment are consistently exercising battlefield skills.

In peacetime as well as in combat MP provide commanders with a well-armed, communications-intensive, and highly mobile asset. While combat ready, the MPs' professional orientation ensures their ability to operate with restraint and authority, within probable cause, and with a minimum use of force. This makes MP ideally suited as a response force in civil confrontations or disorders, in terrorist counteractions, and in low-intensity conflicts in a noncombat area.

Away from conflict, wherever US forces are located, the MP Corps is the protector and assistor of the military community. MP efforts are directed to ensuring a lawful and orderly environment. MP help ensure commanders have troops, equipment, and supplies when and where they need them to maintain readiness. By their efforts to preserve the law, MP help the commander ensure a high standard of order and discipline within the commander's units. By their efforts to assist and protect the military community, MP help ensure a high level of well-being among the commander's troops.
MP provide commanders with the support they need wherever and whenever it is needed. In peace and war MP help commanders ensure a lawful and orderly military environment. MP enforce laws. MP investigate disorders and suspected crimes. MP confine US military prisoners. MP take counteractions against terrorism. And always, MP are prepared to quickly expand their law and order operations into their full-scale battlefield range of combat, combat support, and combat service support operations.

Military police help the commander get his people, supplies, and equipment where he needs them when he needs them. MP help relieve the commander's burden of providing security and protection for critical persons, facilities, and equipment. MP are the initial response force to criminal and enemy attempts to demoralize, terrorize, or sabotage the military community or its operation. MP relieve commanders of the responsibility for detaining and safeguarding prisoners and MP reduce opportunities for crime. Only the magnitude and purpose inherent in each operation changes from peace to war.
The provost marshal (PM) for each command is that command’s advisor on MP combat, combat support, and combat service support operations.

In a theater of operations and in tactical units the senior MP officer at each echelon is the commander’s advisor for MP operations. He is a member of the command’s special staff. For example, the theater army PM is the theater’s senior MP. He is responsible for staff supervision of MP matters at theater army level. In theater army area commands (TAACOMs) and corps, the MP brigade commanders are their commands’ PM. As PMs they serve on their commanders’ special staff as planners for MP operations. At division level the senior MP officer is the division PM.

On military installations outside a theater of operations the installation PM is the installation commander’s advisor for MP law and order operations. As the chief law enforcement officer on the installation the PM provides the installation commander with professional and technical advice concerning law and order objectives, policies, and directives.

The installation PM—
- Advises the commander and staff about MP abilities.
- Prepares plans and policies.
- Directs and reviews MP operations.
- Maintains liaison with United States Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) support elements.
- Assists and supervises interaction of supporting and supported units.
- Coordinates with civilian law enforcement agencies, allied forces, and host nation (HN) military and civil police.

- Provides staff supervision for the installation confinement facility.

If an Office of Command Provost Marshal is established, the command PM would, in addition to the above, be responsible for command and control of operations to include administration, logistics, training, and administering of military justice for all assigned and attached MP units in the command.

On installations the commander determines the degree of law and order needed to support order and discipline. The PM advises the commander on the means and methods needed to achieve the commander’s needs. The PM implements the commander’s law and order policies and

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plans. The PM ensures MP plans and operations supporting the commander’s plan are carried out. The PM recommends when and where to concentrate the command’s MP assets. The PM supervises MP support on the installation or within the command’s area of operation. The PM coordinates matters of MP concern on a daily basis.

The PM keeps the commander advised on MP operations. The PM ensures that MP provide protection and assistance to the military community. The PM ensures MP enforce laws with objectivity. And the PM sets the example in community relations that reflect and enhance the MP image.

The PM establishes command and control procedures to effectively manage MP resources and provide law enforcement when and where needed. The PM’s management and contingency planning are the key elements to ensuring effective law and order operations.

Planning MP support is a continuous process at every echelon. In the absence of specific directions or orders, the PM plans the use of MP assets. The PM evaluates current operations and projects future courses of action. The PM bases his plans on assumptions consistent with sound judgment and a thorough knowledge of the situation and mission.

The PM ensures MP planning is practical and flexible. The PM ensures that plans are coordinated with staff sections and subordinate commands. And the PM ensures plans reflect manpower and resources needed by MP. (This includes needs for command and control, fire support, equipment, and supplies. It also includes construction, communication, transportation, and aviation support.) As new information is received, the PM reviews, updates, and modifies plans. The PM ensures that the commanders get the MP support they need.

The PM ensures that MP show mutual respect and maintain a professional, working relationship when working with local civilian police. Civilian police are normally led and directed by persons with many years of experience in dealing with people and law enforcement. In coordination with the local civilian police executive, the PM establishes policies to guide MP when dealing with civilian police. For example, sometimes direct telephone lines for liaison are established between an MP station and a civil police station. Arrangements may be made for the use of the civil police radios and their telephone call box facilities. But use ordinarily is limited to emergencies or special situations, and care is taken not to overload the civil police networks. (Requests for this type of service are coordinated with the local communications-electronics officer or civil affairs officer.) MP must be familiar with the civilian police department’s manual of procedures.

When MP are assigned to work directly with foreign national police, their actions are governed by the prevailing status of forces agreements. The PM ensures that MP maintain a professional attitude and that they are not critical of how other nations do things.

Large installations may have a deputy provost marshal (DPM). The DPM may aid the PM by supervising general MP activities and services. The DPM may manage physical security, crime prevention, and investigations for the PM office. Often a DPM makes work assignments and reviews work for compliance with policies, standards, and regulations. The DPM may review and improve work methods, organizational structure, and position assignment to achieve optimum efficiency. The DPM may manage the civilians assigned to the PM office. The DPM can assist subordinate supervisors in meeting civilian personnel requirements. The DPM can ensure issues like merit promotion, performance appraisals, equal employment opportunity, career development, and labor-management relations are addressed. The DPM often counsels civilians, and communicates with
the civilian personnel office to obtain further guidance on managing civilian personnel. The DPM may also manage civil law enforcement operations, commercial activities programs, and reserve component support for the PM office.

IMPLEMENTING

The primary focus of MP law and order operations on a military installation is the MP station. MP station personnel implement the PM’s plans and operations.

MP stations are the center of activity for all MP functions, especially law enforcement. A station should be located as near as possible to a point that provides effective direction and centralized control of all MP operational elements. Wherever possible, existing facilities are used for the MP station. But consideration is given to the mission, available transportation route, communications facilities, and proximity to troops or facilities. Commanders may establish MP stations in any area where the incident rate or offense experience indicates a need for a permanent MP presence.

The MP station operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week to provide law enforcement assistance and information whenever needed. The general public invariably turns to the MP for assistance and information. When dealing with the public, MP must be able to provide the correct information needed. And they must be courteous when providing assistance and information. MP posts and patrols often have available maps of the post or city to provide the public. MP

ORGANIZING

In a theater of operations PM functions are under a table of organization and equipment (TOE) (IAW AR 310-31). On installations PM functions are organized under a table of distribution and allowances (TDA) (IAW AR 5-3). A TDA may contain civilian and military positions, whereas a TOE contains only military positions. And a TDA organization can be tailored to suit the needs of a particular MP organization. A TDA organization can be used outside the continental US (OCONUS) as well as in the continental US.

THE PM OFFICE

MILITARY POLICE COMPANY

The MP company provides command management, administrative support, and logistics for assigned military personnel. The MP company provides discipline, housekeeping, welfare activities, and food services. It also provides training (see Appendix B for information on MP firearms qualification).
OPERATIONS SECTION

All MP stations have an operations section. This section is the primary control point for all MP operations. The pivotal duty position of desk sergeant is part of the operations section. The desk sergeant is the key individual in this hub of operations. He receives and records complaints. He provides quick response to calls for assistance where crimes have been committed. He ensures traffic is controlled and that traffic accidents are investigated. He informs the PM of serious incidents that deal with personnel, installation security, threats to military operations, and so forth. He processes, detains, feeds, and prepares disposition of offenders. And he maintains continual observation of confinement facilities when occupied. He receives for and secures personal effects of offenders and prepares required reports. He maintains DA Form 3997 (Military Police Desk Blotter) and DA Form 1594 (Daily Staff Journal or Duty Officer’s Log). And he prepares DD Form 460 (Provisional Pass). He obtains medical aid for an offender, complainant, or witness who is physically ill or who seems to be in shock, in a coma, or heavily intoxicated. The desk sergeant maintains communications with patrols, directs actions of patrols, and reviews patrol reports. And he furnishes information, as authorized, to military personnel and the public. He keeps the duty officer informed of pertinent matters and
dispatches reserves in the absence of the duty officer. The desk sergeant maintains a lost and found property service, or coordinates this service with the adjutant section, as directed by local regulations. Also in the operations section is the radio operator who operates the communications net control station. Some station operations sections have subelements for administration, communications, and records and reports.

The operations section ensures all law enforcement and investigative activities are implemented, coordinated, and controlled as directed by the PM. This section ensures that police liaison and public relations activities are established and maintained with the military and civilian communities served. The operations section provides support to all installation contingency plans. It plans for the use of resources and provides operational control of the special reaction team (SRT). The operations section maintains control of all MP investigations, criminal intelligence data collection, and physical security operations. The operations section ensures all traffic operations are coordinated, planned, and directed in coordination with the traffic section. Entry and exit of the installation is controlled by the operations section. The operations section dispatches patrols, maintains communications with patrols, establishes traffic control points, and mans these points, as required.
The operations section establishes patrol areas, policies, and responsibilities for MP personnel while on duty. Personnel requirements and employment of the supporting MP company are determined in coordination with the supporting unit. The daily required distribution of personnel is determined the operations section. The number of personnel by grade, job assignment, and required skill is given to the MP unit commander as soon as the requirement is known.

The operations section determines MP training requirements and recommends them to the MP unit commander. The operations section serves as an evaluation center for MP personnel to determine additional training and equipment requirements. These requirements are furnished to the supporting MP company. Job site training is coordinated between the PM and unit commander to facilitate continuous development of technical skills of assigned personnel. Inexperienced personnel are paired with experienced personnel. Duty assignments must be appropriate to grades. If personnel are not qualified for assignments in accordance with their grades, training must be initiated to correct the deficiencies before individuals perform such duties.

In some stations other sections, like MP investigation, absentee/deserter apprehension, protective services (when authorized), juvenile, military working dog (MWD), and wildlife conservation enforcement, may be organized to operate independently of the operations section, but they maintain close coordination.

ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

The administrative section performs all administrative functions for the PM office. This section maintains administrative liaison with other staff sections and the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). It maintains files and safeguards classified documents. It controls correspondence, records, and forms. This section plans and conducts research to include multiyear planning and budget and manpower projections; it is responsible for implementing the automated Offense Reporting System (ORS) and the Vehicle Registration System (VRS). (See DA Pam 5-3 for information on work method techniques.)

The administrative section prepares serious incident reports (SIRS) for the PM. Serious incidents are communicated through the chain of command to ensure commanders are knowledgeable of such events. SIRS will be processed in accordance with Army Regulation (AR) 190-40 and AR 27-50.

The PM ensures that the commander is notified when such incidents occur. Procedures for notifying the chain of command of incidents and their seriousness are usually set by the installation commander. Often this is done during his inbriefing with the PM. The PM ensures the intent of the commander’s directives are reflected in the standing operating procedure (SOP). The SOP outlines the notification procedures to be used by the desk sergeant and MP duty officer (MPDO). The PM ensures that information is factual and passed on in its entirety. The SOP provides the immediacy in which the installation commander will be notified. Generally, the commander is given the facts of the case verbally as soon as possible. The commander is given a copy of the military police report (MPR) which contains all information relevant to the SIR.

PHYSICAL SECURITY/Crime PREVENTION SECTION

The physical security/crime prevention section oversees the installation’s physical security and crime prevention programs. The section coordinates policies and procedures for these programs. It ensures that the programs are administered and maintained. The personnel in this section help unit commanders and staff sections formulate and administer security plans and procedures and crime prevention programs.
MP in the crime prevention section support the commander in his responsibility for ensuring the welfare of members of the command. They oversee the development of the Army crime prevention program. The objective of this program is to reduce criminal activity and improve the readiness posture of all commands. By suppressing the opportunity for criminal behavior, MP help the commander maintain a fighting force in a state of high morale and discipline.

Physical security personnel establish and maintain a current priority listing approved by the commander of critical activities and facilities within the command. They provide input to the PM and the command staff on budgeting, inspection results, and the installation physical security plan.

Specific responsibilities of the physical security section include—

- Developing and updating installation physical security plan.
- Reviewing physical security SOP.
- Reviewing work orders to ensure compliance with physical security requirements.
- Performing technical assistance visits.
- Conducting physical security classes.
- Establishing and monitoring intrusion alarm procedures.
- Providing members for installation command inspection team.

Installation physical security programs are tailored to the local threat. Security requirements are determined by the installation PM; USACIDC field offices; military intelligence units, agencies, and activities; local civilian law enforcement agencies; annual DA physical security threat statement; and operations security (OPSEC) evaluations and surveys. The installation physical security program is described in a comprehensive physical security plan. This plan addresses specific detection, assessment, response, delay, and communications measures taken to safeguard personnel, materiel, and equipment. These include lock and key control; protective barriers, lighting, and sensors; MP patrols, vehicle checks, and searches; community relations programs; and neighborhood crime watch.

Physical security surveys and inspections, crime prevention surveys, and personal security assessments for high-risk personnel identify existing or potential conditions conducive to criminal or terrorist activity. Specific guidance for conducting physical security surveys is contained in AR 190-13.

Specific questions used by the person conducting an inspection are developed from regulatory procedures governing the operation of the activity or facility being examined, pertinent internal security requirements, and experience. See FM 19-20, FM 19-30, and AR 190-13.

**ABSENTEE/DESERTER APPREHENSION SECTION**

An absentee/deserter apprehension section is established if justified by AR 5-9 and the absentee/deserter program (see Chapter 6). Justification depends on caseload and geographic and demographic data. The PM resources the section based on historical caseloads and area of responsibility as designated in AR 5-9. The section may be organized with an officer in charge (OIC)/noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) and one or more two-man apprehension teams chosen in accordance with AR 190-9. If the caseload is small, this function may be performed as an additional duty by MP patrol personnel or the MP investigation section.

The absentee/deserter apprehension section conducts investigations of absent without leave (AWOL)/deserter personnel. The section compiles and distributes all documents pertinent to AWOL/deserter personnel. The status of individuals is verified through United States Army Deserter Information Point (USADIP), and all regulatory reporting requirements involving AWOL/deserter personnel are
THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION

Techniques to be employed by absentee/deserter apprehension teams in making apprehensions must be clearly outlined in an SOP. The SOP must state what is to be done, how it is to be done, and why it is necessary. Team personnel must be familiar with these procedures. Further guidance can be obtained from AR 630-10 and AR 190-9.

The absentee/deserter apprehension section handles the administration of the program. The section handles the initial reporting requirements concerning absentees/deserters. The section processes absentees/deserters being returned to military control.

And the absentee/deserter apprehension section maintains the administrative working files. This includes individual case files in "active," "inactive," and "closed" categories, as well as a suspense file. Each case file includes documents received, leads developed, actions taken, and persons or agencies with whom coordination was made. Memorandums for record are used for most actions, or information not shown on MP reports, statements, work sheets, or other documents.

JUVENILE SECTION

PMs with significant juvenile problems can set up a separate juvenile section if resources are available. This section handles juvenile crime, delinquency, and misbehavior.

MP and MP investigators (MPIs) assigned to this section can be volunteers. The number of people assigned depends on availability of personnel, extent of the juvenile problem, and degree of command interest. PMs try to select MP or MPIs who have a counseling or social work background, or who have been involved in volunteer work with the young. Personnel assigned to this section deal with delinquent youths, make appropriate referrals to social agencies, and provide knowledgeable recommendations for disciplinary action and preventive measures.

By closely monitoring juvenile activities MP and USACIDC personnel can aid in

...
establishing an effective delinquency prevention program, identifying potential problems, and solving juvenile offenses. Elements of a juvenile delinquency prevention program are—

- Determining juvenile group hangout areas.
- Making note of juvenile identities and activities.
- Developing sources of information.
- Determining current feelings of unrest or boredom.
- Identifying group leaders.
- Paying special attention to parking lots, schools, or vacant buildings as hangout areas or targets for delinquent acts.

INSTALLATION CONFINEMENT FACILITY

The presence of an installation confinement facility and its personnel promotes law and order. It assists the commander in maintaining unit discipline and strength. It is an integral part of the military justice system. It provides limited counseling, administrative services, and custodial supervision for pretrial prisoners, short-term posttrial prisoners, casual prisoners, and posttrial prisoners awaiting transfer to a correctional facility.

MILITARY POLICE INVESTIGATION SECTION

The MP investigation section investigates disruptive incidents and suspected offenses for the PM. MPIs conduct those criminal investigations for which the PM is responsible. MPIs may also be called upon to provide personal security when needed for high-risk persons visiting or leaving the area. MPIs are selected in accord with AR 190-30 by the local commander responsible for law enforcement operations. The MPI supervisor is normally a company grade commissioned officer or a senior noncommissioned officer. MPIs are normally under the control of the operations officer.

MPIs wear the duty MP uniform, to include the appropriate components of distinguishing MP equipment. However, local commanders may authorize MPIs to wear the military uniform devoid of distinguishing MP accessories, or civilian clothing when it is essential to the successful completion of a specific investigation. MPIs authorized to wear civilian clothing may request a civilian clothing allowance in accordance with AR 700-84. MPIs are armed with either the .45-caliber pistol, the 9-mm pistol, or the .38-caliber revolver, depending upon equipment authorizations and local directives.

Individuals selected to become MPIs must complete formal training. One formal course is the MPI course conducted at the United States Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, Alabama. Formal training also can be received through an MPI course established by a major command authorized to award an additional skill identifier. Individuals may receive OJT in conjunction with formal training.

Upon receipt of a favorable written response from the US Army Crime Records Center (USACRC) and completion of formal training, the individual can be awarded the additional skill identifier V5 and be issued MPI credentials. Credentials are issued to MPIs by the local PM or a designated MP unit commander. DA Forms 3837 and 3837-1 (Military Police Investigator Credentials) are the only authorized credentials for MPIs. Credentials are serially numbered, containing the name, description, date of birth, color photograph, and signature of the MPI to whom they are issued. The credentials are authenticated by the PM and are issued for a period not to exceed 24 months.

To ensure positive controls are used for the issuance and accountability of MPI credentials, the PM ensures the following actions, as a minimum, are taken:

- Appointment on orders of a commissioned officer as credential control officer and a commissioned officer as alternate credential control officer.
• Establishment of a credential control log.
• Establishment of controls over unissued credentials and the establishment of adequate inspection procedures.
• Development of procedures for the temporary and permanent withdrawal of credentials.

Once credentials are issued to an investigator, he becomes responsible for keeping them in a safe place. If credentials are lost, the investigator reports this loss immediately to his supervisor.

**PATROL SECTION**

The patrol section responds to incidents received by the MP desk or observed by the MP. MP patrols report and investigate all suspicious activities, apprehend persons who have or are in the process of committing an offense, and ensure the security of the military installation. The primary objective of MP patrols is to protect, assist, and provide high visibility of MP in areas subject to criminal activity. MP patrols—

• Ensure physical security of military installations, personnel, property, and equipment.
• Secure crime scene.
• Enforce laws, orders, and directives on military installations or areas under military control.
• Provide information and assistance to members of the military community and the general public.
• Control the flow of military and civilian traffic subject to their jurisdiction.
• Control crowds of military and civilian personnel subject to their jurisdiction.

**GAME WARDEN SECTION**

MP actively support the conservation of installation wildlife. The MP support of the Army’s wildlife conservation is managed by the installation game warden.

The game warden is often times organized under the patrol section. The game warden’s duties are set by the PM to meet the wildlife conservation laws and needs of the local area. MP game wardens are the liaison between the military installation and the federal fish and wildlife service, state fish and game agency, and local law enforcement agencies for fish and game control. (See AR 420-74 and DA Pamphlet 420-7.)

**TRAFFIC SECTION**

The traffic section provides accident reporting and investigation services for motor vehicle accidents. This section coordinates with the Directorate of Engineering and Housing and the Safety Office concerning traffic patterns and flow. (See FM 19-25.)

**MILITARY WORKING DOG SECTION**

The MWD section manages and operates MWD facilities. It provides advice on MWD matters. It trains and maintains proficiency of MWD teams to support MP and other agencies. It maintains the health and welfare of MWDs. And it maintains kennels, related facilities, and equipment. (See FM 19-35.)

**SPECIAL REACTION TEAM**

The SRT, through intensive training in combat in built-up areas, marksmanship, rappelling, physical training, first aid, and the use of specialized equipment, is designed to neutralize or apprehend a barricaded offender with a minimum of danger to hostages, team members, other MP, and others. All team members receive cross-training in the specialized duties of other members. For additional information see Chapter 21.
CHAPTER 2
Extending MP Support

The specific operations MP perform at a given time are determined by the need of the echelon or installation commander and by the availability of MP resources. On the battlefield the echelon commander’s priorities of need determine which MP operations are accomplished. In a peacetime environment the installation commander’s priorities determine which MP operations must be accomplished. In either case MP assets are limited, thus all assets are committed at all times.

The PM must consider ways to extend his resources. Even on the battlefield, for example, courtesy patrols may be performed by non-MP personnel when authorized by the commander. In peacetime, when dictated by the situation, the PM may request assistance in the form of additional manpower and equipment from general purpose tactical MP units assigned to the installation. These units include, but are not limited to, corps MP companies, heavy division MP companies, and light division MP companies. Assets like unit reserve and ready reserve forces and MWD teams are readily available to the PM. Some installation alternatives like contracting services and Department of Defense (DOD) guard/police force require extensive planning, coordination, and justification. Other assets, like volunteers, require some expenditure of existing MP resources, but this loss is more than offset by the gain in productive assistance.

AUGMENTING RESOURCES ON THE BATTLEFIELD

On the battlefield the PM, aware that not all MP operations can be accomplished all of the time, continuously effects a trade-off between the number and kind of MP operations that the commander requires and the number and kind of MP operations that can be resourced. But in some circumstances augmentation assets may be required to accomplish the mission.

If the division PM needs more assets to accomplish missions, he uses his technical link with the corps PM. He requests X number of MP assets to do the mission. He explains that his division MP assets are totally committed. The corps PM then assesses his own assets to see if he can provide the requested support. He informs the division PM of his decision. If the corps PM agrees to provide support, the problem of how to do the mission is solved. However, the corps PM may say he cannot offer support at that time. The division PM then reconsiders the division commander’s desires and goals (criticality of the missions). He must decide whether or not to request support through the official chain of command. If he decides to...
make the request, he notifies the division chief of staff or the G3. He tells him that he has not been able to get support from the corps PM. He asks for commander-to-commander contact to get the needed support. The chief of staff or the G3 informs the division commander. He, in turn, talks to the corps commander. If they decide support should be provided, the corps commander will direct the corps PM to provide the assets. But they may decide corps assets cannot be used to support the division’s mission. In that case support for those missions is delayed until division or corps MP assets are free to do them.

ENHANCING SUPPORT ON THE INSTALLATION

In considering enhancing support on the installation, there are questions that must be answered. Will the majority of duties consist of protection or enforcement? And how critical is the mission to national security? The answers to these questions can make a difference in the composition of the work force. The PM may decide that a reserve force is needed or that an MWD team would better suit the needs of the installation. Or the PM may decide that contracting services, a DOD guard/police force, or volunteers could be used to supplement the MP.

USING RESERVE FORCES

Reserve forces such as unit reserves and ready reserves can provide the PM with added personnel. To respond to emergency situations the size and makeup of the MP unit reserve force depends on the situation and MP resources available. The unit reserve is made up of MP who are off duty, who have just completed a tour of duty, or who are assigned to later tours of duty. The unit reserve is used only when ordered by the PM or his authorized representative. Vehicles and emergency equipment are required when this force is used. An MP unit reserve is used for specific purposes, such as control of disasters or civil disturbances.

A ready reserve force is a small motorized reserve patrol force. This force is available to meet minor emergencies, reinforce details, and handle special events. This force is either stationed at the MP station or on call in the MP unit area.

USING MILITARY WORKING DOG TEAMS

Use of MWD teams also extends. PM resources. The teams, consisting of one dog handler and his dog, can often function in place of a two-man MP team.

All dogs and their handlers are trained at Lackland Air Force Base. All dog handlers, even those working with narcotics/explosives detector dogs, are first trained as patrol dog handlers. Patrol dog handler training teaches handlers how to care for and feed their assigned dog and the importance of obedience and proficiency training. This training helps handlers to develop a complete understanding of their role in the MWD program.

All dog handlers receive training on the drug abuse problem, techniques of searching, the law of search and seizure, custody of evidence, and other subjects as deemed necessary.

The dog handler must be qualified with the .45-caliber pistol, the 9-mm pistol, the .38-caliber revolver, and/or the M16 rifle before he may carry the weapon. No other weapon will be used nor may any weapon be carried concealed.

The length of tours of duty for MWD teams is determined by the needs of the command. Schedules must also consider the climate and terrain conditions that can enhance or reduce a dog team’s effectiveness. Scheduling must include the time necessary for training the dog, caring for and feeding the dog, and kennel sanitation and maintenance.
The standard for employment is approximately 30 hours per week. Proficiency training is mandatory. And at least four hours of proficiency training per week are required in performing patrol dog techniques and tasks.

Dual-trained MWDs will require four hours of training in patrol tasks and four hours of training in specialty tasks (drug or explosives detection). The minimum standard of proficiency to maintain certification as a narcotics detector dog team is a 90 percent or better detection rate. The minimum standard of proficiency to maintain certification as an explosives detector dog (EDD) team is a 95 percent or better detection rate. Narcotics or explosives dog teams must maintain an average proficiency that meets or exceeds the minimum proficiency standard. Failure to do so for three or more consecutive months will result in automatic recertification of the narcotics or EDD team. The team is recertified only after retraining and consistent demonstration of the minimum standard of proficiency. An appointed certification authority or the instructor staff of the Air Force training activity can then recertify the team.

The effectiveness of narcotics and explosives detector dog teams depends on continual reinforcement of their detection ability through proficiency training. During a handler’s extended absence, a minimum of four hours of proficiency training must still be conducted each week. This training can be performed by the kennel master, a dog trainer, or a qualified narcotics or explosives detector dog handler.

It may be necessary to periodically increase the frequency or length of proficiency training to compensate for or correct training or operational deficiencies. When proficiency training is increased, there will be some trade-off with utilization. However, it should be possible to maintain the utilization and proficiency training ratio. When both training and utilization consistently fall below the employment standard, a reduction of MWD team authorizations is indicated. Authorizations are reduced to the numbers that can maintain the standard. Excess MWD teams are reassigned to areas where they are needed.

There is no need to withdraw MWD teams from their posts during inclement weather. The dog’s ability to detect an intrusion will still exceed that of his handler or many other physical, mechanical, or electrical intrusion detection systems. MWDs stationed in cold weather areas should be acclimated to their boots and blankets during training. As a result, the dogs do not resist wearing protective equipment when weather conditions necessitate its use.

If a narcotics or explosives detector dog is unable to continue detector duties, or fails recertification, and retraining fails to correct the situation within 45 days, the circumstances will be thoroughly documented. (See Chapter 11 for more information on MWD teams.)

**USING CONTRACTED SERVICES**

The Army has PM activities that are or may be subject to the Commercial Activities (CA) Review Program (see AR 5-20). Under the CA program privately owned civilian firms compete with in-house government activities. The CA program requires that a local point of contact (POC) be designated at each installation to coordinate the installation CA program. This POC is generally designated within the Directorate of Resource Management (DRM).

An example of a service a PM may consider for contracting is police/guard training. When considering contracting the PM must—

- Identify the need for the contractor services.
- Coordinate with the installation Directorate of Contracting (DOC).
- Determine if the services to be contracted can be performed by a civilian company.
- Decide if contracting for the services will be cost effective.
• Decide if the services can be performed more efficiently by a contractor.

The PM should coordinate with the local CA point of contact prior to contracting any services. This coordination is to determine if these services are subject to a CA review.

Once these decisions are made, the local Resource Management Office (RMO) is contacted to determine if funds are available for contract services. If funds are available, a recommendation is made to higher headquarters to contract for the required services. A program analyst, your DRM POC, signs a DA Form 3953 (Purchase Request and Commitment) indicating the availability of funds.

Chain of Command

The chain of command is an essential ingredient for a successful contract. The chain of command includes—

• The contracting officer (KO), who holds the position which governs all government contracts on an installation. The KO is appointed by the major command.

• The contract officer representative (COR), who is usually the author of the statement of work (SOW). The COR represents the contracting officer and the interests of the United States government.

• The contractor, who manages the contract, and the contract employees, whom the contractor has hired.

Statement of Work

The solicitation package becomes the SOW and part of the contractual package. For a PM services contract, the individual most knowledgeable and most familiar with the types of services required and with the mission is the likely candidate to develop the SOW for the contract.

The SOW consists of tasks, conditions, and standards for the services to be performed. The task statement tells what job is to be performed. The conditions statement tells what is required to perform the services and under what circumstances the services are to be performed. The standards statement specifies to what degree the services are to be performed; that is, how well, to what degree, and how accurately.

The SOW contains paragraphs which address:

Scope of Work. This paragraph is a brief, simple, and concise overview of what the contractor services will involve.

Objective. This paragraph identifies the goal to be accomplished by the contracting service.

Phase-In. This paragraph states how many days the contractor has to commence the work. This may involve time for training of employees and for obtaining the necessary equipment. The phase-in time begins the day the contract is awarded.

• General. This paragraph is an overview of the services that are going to be performed by the contractor and under what condition (for example, weekly, monthly, first, second, or third shift).

• Contract Personnel. This paragraph addresses the specifics for each task the contractor is to perform. It is written in the SOW as “The contractor shall.”

• Quality Assurance Plan. This paragraph addresses the specifics of the tasks to be performed by the contractor and eventually becomes an appendix of the contractual package. The quality assurance plan should specify that a written response from the contractor is required for all written deficiencies noted.

• Government-Furnished Items or Notification. This paragraph addresses those items that the government will provide to the contractor for the performance of services. The equipment will be listed specifically and separately. It will be a technical exhibit during the negotiation phase and will eventually become an appendix of the contractual package. The notification addresses occasions that require government notification to the contractor to include changes in negotiations.
• Contractor Furnished Items/Equipment. This paragraph addresses what the government requires the contractor to furnish for performance of services to standard.

• Contractor Responsibilities. This paragraph states exactly what services are to be performed.

• Contract Performance Period. This paragraph states the period of time the contractor has to perform the services required by the contract (for example, 1 October 87-30 September 88).

• Attachments. The attachments may include known companies and the evaluation plan. The known companies will include institutions, companies, and organizations that already perform the services being considered for contracting. The evaluation plan identifies the specifics that the technical review board looks for in each bidder’s package.

• Evaluation Factors and Subfactors. This paragraph lists specific areas in which total points are awarded. These factors and sub factors are given numerical value and used by the technical review board to determine who is awarded the contract.

There is no publication that tells how to develop a particular contract since requirements and specifications for each contract are different. When developing the SOW the COR can use Federal Acquisition Regulations (FARs), SOPs, and other publications. The COR may ask for guidance from the chain of command. Quality contract service is totally dependent on a quality SOW. If a task is not outlined in the SOW it will not be accomplished by the contractor. The FAR outlines the areas required in the SOW. The Office of Federal Procurement Policy publishes the Guide for Writing and Administering Performance Statements of Work, which outlines the details for development of SOWS.

After the SOW is drafted, it is staffed with the local DOC. The DOC will staff the SOW with the local SJA for legal advice. After the SOW is approved, it is announced in the Commerce Business Daily, to which many companies subscribe. The contract at this point is open to the public for bids. Potential contractors have 15 days after the date of publication of the Commerce Business Daily in which the announcement of the SOW appeared, to make a request for proposal to the DOC.

If a company decides to bid on the contract, which means to offer all services required by the SOW for a certain price, the company prepares a solicitation package. The solicitation package provides a brief history of the company, descriptions of previous government contracts awarded it, and resumes of their key personnel.

When one or several solicitation packages have been received by the DOC, a technical review board is conducted. The technical review board consists of the COR, a DOC representative, an SJA representative, and others who are technically proficient in the descriptions outlined in the SOW. All individuals making up the board must be disinterested parties to the companies providing solicitation packages.

A method of conducting the technical review board is to begin with the lowest bidder and work your way up in dollar amounts. The bidder, when selected by the KO becomes the contractor. A meeting then takes place between the contractor and the chain of command to “fine tune” the SOW.

A COR may be the most technically proficient person in the area for which a contract is proposed. Sometimes a PM serves as a COR. The COR is appointed in writing by the KO.

The COR represents the interests of the United States government and carries out each aspect of contracting duties in a professional manner. The COR also represents the KO, who governs all government contracts on an installation. The KO is the only person authorized to enter into contracts for the government or change a contract on behalf of the government.
The contractor is the manager of the contract. The contractor plans, controls, and allocates available resources. The KO/COR administers the contract. Contract administration covers all actions from award of contract to close of contract. The resolution of problems that arise after awarding of a contract is a major concern in contract administration. The largest single challenge in administering contracts is to ensure that products or services paid for are in fact received.

The COR ensures the requirements are carried out in accordance with the specifications of the contract. The COR is responsible for spot checking and inspecting the contractor’s performance of work. A quality assurance evaluation plan is developed and acts as a checklist for the COR or a technical assistant appointed by the KO.

When a deficiency is noted, a written notice of deficiency is forwarded to the contractor. A copy is provided to the KO. The contractor keeps the COR informed in writing of actions taken to correct the deficiency. Copies are provided to the KO.

The COR’s file contains but is not limited to—
- A copy of the contract and all changes and modifications.
- Purchase requests and commitments (PR&Cs), which indicate to RMO that services are rendered for a fee to be paid at a later date.
- Copies of obligations of monies, which are received from RMO.
- A duplicate copy of the COR appointment letter, the original of which is maintained by the DOC.
- All correspondence between the KO, COR, and the contractor.
- Names, titles, and positions of individuals functioning for the COR as technical and administrative assistants.
- Phone conversation records between the COR and the contractor.
- Records of inspections performed.

When services are not performed or are not performed according to the terms of the contract, the DOC takes one of the following actions:
- Criminal.
- Civil.
- Administrative.
- Contractual.

In resolving contractual problems, the DOC can issue a “cure notice.” This notice states that the contractor is not performing in accordance with the contract and that the situation must be corrected. The DOC can also issue a “show cause” letter. This letter states that the contractor has a certain amount of time to show cause why the government should not terminate the contract. The contractor must then prove that the problem is beyond his control.

When contracts are terminated, the defaulting contractor becomes responsible for paying all reprocurement costs. In some cases a contractor can be made to pay a predetermined amount based on failure to provide products or services by a given date.

**USING DOD GUARD/POLICE FORCE**

The responsibilities of a DOD guard force and a DOD police force have similarities and differences. To understand these similarities and differences, supervisors and managers need to compare and contrast the responsibilities of each force.

A DOD guard force is established primarily to protect government property from hazards such as sabotage, espionage, theft, fire, and accidental or willful damage and destruction. As a secondary responsibility, guards maintain law and order and control the movement of persons and materials into, within, and from government property being protected.

A DOD police force is established primarily to promote law and order. It protects the life, property, and civil rights of persons. It
preserves the peace; prevents, detects, and investigates accidents and crimes; apprehends violators; and provides aid and comfort in emergency situations. As a secondary responsibility, DOD police protect government property.

Guards and police, as well as MP, are designated as military law enforcement officials by the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), United States 1984. Each is fully empowered by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to apprehend military members while in the execution of their official law enforcement duties. Members of each category share the same restrictions over apprehension of persons not subject to the UCMJ. Differences between DOD personnel assigned as civilian police or guards lie in the duties performed, not in their authority. Additionally, members of each series serve as agents of the installation commander in the preservation of peace. Persons not subject to the code may be apprehended and detained by personnel in either series and turned over to the appropriate civilian authorities.

Further, guards, police, and MP have the ordinary right of citizens to assist in the maintenance of peace. This assistance includes the right to make a citizen’s arrest of civilian violators on military installations. Since no federal citizen’s arrest statute exists, care is taken not to exceed the citizen’s arrest authority of the locality. In some states citizens may make arrests for felonies but not for misdemeanors. In other states a private citizen may make arrests for any crime committed in his presence. Personnel should become familiar with the provisions of the citizen’s arrest authorization granted by the law in their locality.

Administrative restrictions may be imposed locally requiring DOD guards to detain violators pending the arrival of specific law enforcement personnel. Law enforcement duties can be expected of guard force personnel. If so, they may be depolized, commissioned, or appointed as special police officers to exercise arrest authority granted by statute. As special officers, guards may have the same power as sheriffs and/or constables on federal property to—

- Enforce the laws enacted for the protection of persons and property.
- Prevent breaches of the peace.
- Suppress affrays and unlawful assemblies.
- Enforce rules and regulations established by proper authorities.

The jurisdiction and authority of these special police officers does not extend to the serving of civil processes. They are restricted to federal property where the United States has exclusive or concurrent criminal jurisdiction. Guards are prohibited from receiving extra compensation for exercising this additional arrest authority.

DOD police in federal jurisdiction enforce a wide variety of federal and state statutes, as well as agency rules and regulations. Authorized under the rules governing the armed forces, persons serving in the police series are expected to exercise authority to—

- Apprehend, under warrant, any person accused of having committed any offense against the laws of the United States or against any rule or regulation prescribed under pertinent law.
- Apprehend, without a warrant, any person committing any such offense in their presence.
- Apprehend, where applicable, without warrant, any person in a situation in which there are reasonable grounds to believe that person has committed a felony.

See AR 190-56 for more information on Army DOD guard/police forces.

**USING VOLUNTEERS**

To enhance the operation of a PM activity, PMs may seek to use volunteers. Department of the Army policy on volunteers is that they will be used to the maximum extent possible
within legal restrictions. Federal law (31 United States Code [USC] 1342) prohibits the United States government from accepting most types of voluntary services. But the Comptroller General of the United States has rendered decision B-204336 which approves the limited use of volunteers in Army crime prevention programs. Before performing any services, volunteers must sign a DA Form 4712-R (Volunteer Agreement) to agree to perform their duties without pay. Volunteers are not government employees. They must have their own volunteer chain of command headed by a volunteer coordinator.

Military and civilian retirees perform efficiently as part of an installation crime prevention or crime analysis section. They have the interpersonal skills, work habits, and attitudes needed to be effective members of the crime prevention staff. Volunteers may perform many crime analysis support functions. They may prepare and distribute literature to support crime prevention campaigns. They may make presentations on crime prevention and assist in organizing and operating neighborhood watch or other crime prevention programs. Volunteers may not answer telephones, register vehicles, or perform any other functions which paid civilian or active duty personnel have historically performed. Any other duties must be approved by Department of the Army.

Organizing and administering a volunteer program requires an investment in time. Volunteers require work space, equipment, and other support to do their jobs effectively. How the volunteer program is organized will determine how much time the PM’s staff must expend on the program. There are at least three different organizational models which may be employed: Which model is best will depend on the local situation.

On many military installations, the Army Community Service has already established or can establish a volunteer program. The Army Community Service recruits volunteers and administers the program. The demands on the PM’s staff are minimal. For this reason, this is the preferred option. See DA Pamphlet 608-28 for details.

Another option to consider is a volunteer coordinator to recruit participants and administer the volunteer program. The PM’s staff assists in recruiting and training volunteers and in any other way necessary to make the program a success. The volunteers and the coordinator develop a strong sense of identity with the PM office, and there is a built-in flexibility and responsiveness that may not exist when working through the Army Community Service volunteer program.

An outside service organization can administer the volunteer program. This option is preferable when a recognized service organization desires to setup a volunteer crime prevention program for both the installation and the local civilian community. This program ties together the Army and civilian programs, but the PM has relatively little control over this volunteer program.

**Recruiting**

The PM and installation commander must understand the importance of the volunteer program. One of the most important issues in creating a volunteer program is to decide exactly what needs to be done. There must be a specific, immediate need for volunteers. Positions are not created, then individuals recruited to do the work. Job descriptions must be developed for each position. Job descriptions define a task and its subtasks, and explain how the task will benefit the overall mission. See DA Pamphlet 608-28 for guidance in preparing job descriptions. However, any format that clearly defines the task, skills needed, reporting system, and time requirements is acceptable.

The American Association of Retired Persons has local chapters in most towns. Their rolls are usually filled with retirees who desire to maintain a relationship with the military community. Retirees almost always have the character traits and stability required for the crime prevention program.
Because they are permanent residents of the community, they offer a potential source of continuity to any operation.

There may be other local community service organizations having likely volunteers. Examples include the United Way, Red Cross, Noncommissioned Officer’s Association, and Retired Officer’s Association.

Volunteers should be interviewed several times. One interview is usually a group meeting. At this time, volunteers are given application blanks to take home and to return by mail. The program is explained, and it is announced whether or not a background check will be conducted on specific jobs. If a background check is required, local PM and civilian police department records, NCIC files, and USACRC files are checked. The group meeting allows the volunteers to be discreetly assessed and preliminary judgments made as to their suitability.

The most effective interview is one-on-one. This interview is the best way to learn individual interests, assess talents, and develop support of potential volunteers for the program. Guidelines are developed before the interview is conducted to obtain the information wanted from the interviewee. Interviewers must know what jobs are available and the hours available for volunteer work. Volunteers are given the chance to select the hours they want to work.

One of the best assets for a volunteer program is to have a motivated coordinator. A motivated coordinator can greatly facilitate recruiting. Coordinators need—

- Some managerial or supervisory skills.
- Good communications skills.
- Ability to work under minimal supervision.
- Dynamic, pleasing personality.
- Ability to identify and solve problems.

The coordinator is a key figure in maintaining the integrity of the program. The coordinator schedules volunteers for work tours. This includes scheduling backup personnel if the scheduled volunteer does not report for work. The coordinator sets work standards. And minor breaches of work standards are documented by the coordinator. Persons who fail to meet standards are counseled. Active duty and paid civilian personnel offer advice on how to perform tasks correctly. They must intervene directly when a volunteer causes a safety violation. But volunteers are disciplined only by the coordinator. Volunteers must meet the same basic standards as paid employees. They must report for work on time and act professionally while on the job. And their after-duty conduct must not reflect adversely on the installation law enforcement activity.

Volunteers seldom work a full day. It is necessary to recruit enough people to assure the work load is not too great. But it is also important not to have too many volunteers. Recruiting is a continuous process. A current inventory, showing where volunteers are needed, and a list of people who have expressed interest in becoming volunteers are useful.

All support required is identified and arranged before the volunteers report for duty. To the maximum extent possible, volunteers are provided the same working conditions as paid staff. As a rule, they are not segregated, but work closely with full-time staff so that a productive relationship develops.

Because volunteers will not usually work a 40-hour week, it is often not possible to assign each volunteer an individual desk. However, when volunteers share work space, at least part of it (for example, one desk drawer) is designated for each person’s use.

Conducting Orientation and Training

Orientation is important. There is a general orientation to the MP Corps and the PM office. Volunteers are also taken on a tour of the MP station. They are told how their particular job fits into the overall scheme and provided general information common to all
new employees. There is also a specific orientation on the volunteer program.

Volunteers are provided an explanation of the job and the job setting. Step-by-step procedures to be followed in the performance of tasks are carefully explained. Volunteers will perform required tasks under the supervision of a paid employee or experienced volunteer. The volunteer is given more freedom in small increments as he demonstrates his ability to accept the added responsibility.

Formal training must be provided when the need is identified and as determined by the PM. Lesson plans are developed for all formal instruction. Classes are brief and, whenever possible, scheduled to coincide with volunteer work periods.

Volunteers are also used to organize neighborhood watch programs or similar activities outside the office. If so, the need for government transportation and government drivers' licenses must be considered. If the installation requires vehicle registration, arrangements must be made to provide decals to volunteers to register their privately owned vehicles.

Coordinating

Once the decision has been made to use volunteers and the organization model has been chosen, it is important to coordinate with other installation activities which may be affected. It is essential that appropriate commanders and staff organizations are well informed about the program so they can respond to inquiries. As a minimum, the following people are briefed:

- The installation commander.
- The garrison commander.
- The Director of Personnel and Community Activities.
- The civilian personnel officer.
- The public affairs officer.
- The staff judge advocate.
- The Army Community Service coordinator.

To ensure that an effective working relationship develops between employees and the volunteer organization selected, all supervisors, civilian employees, and soldiers must be briefed on the program.

Included in the briefing are the specific functions volunteers will perform. The briefing must clearly state that volunteers will not replace full-time staff and that their participation will have no impact on career advancement, job stability, or any other job conditions. The briefing should define the relationship between volunteers and paid staff, especially as it relates to supervision and discipline.

The briefing should also address the benefits that will accrue as a result of the volunteer program. It is essential that everyone understands that volunteers will enhance the staff’s ability to provide first-rate law enforcement support to their installation.

Maintaining Program

The PM must ensure that volunteers receive the feedback necessary to maintain their morale and commitment to the program. There are several ways to ensure this goal is met. Volunteers and line personnel must get acquainted. One way to do this is to include volunteers in all social functions in the office that are scheduled during duty hours.

Volunteers must understand what types of information and procedures enhance successful police operations. One way to get this information to volunteers is to allow them to sit in on unclassified briefings.

Service award certificates are developed to present to volunteers for active participation in the program. Awards are keyed to the number of hours contributed; for example, 500, 1,000, or 5,000 hours. (The volunteer coordinator should accurately record hours of service performed and notify the PM when a service award is due.) Award ceremonies are held to present certificates and to recognize the contributions of the volunteers.
A luncheon or dinner may be planned to honor the volunteer staff at least annually in one of the installation clubs. Members of the installation command group may attend, as well as key members of the PM/security office.

Volunteers are removed from the program for poor performance. Removal from the program is accomplished formally. The volunteer coordinator must have documented proof of such performance, including counseling statements showing that corrective actions were attempted. If the removal is for one incident of unacceptable behavior or a violation of trust, the incident is fully investigated in order that the volunteer’s rights are protected. The situation is thoroughly investigated by the volunteer coordinator and discussed with the crime prevention officer and PM. When the decision is made to remove a volunteer from the program, the decision is relayed to the volunteer personally by the PM or a designated representative.
CHAPTER 3

Resourcing MP Operations

The proper management of resources is an important aspect of a PM’s operation. The PM is responsible for providing the input that will ensure MP operations can be carried out. Hence, PM familiarity and involvement with budget development is critical. The execution of the budget requires a clear understanding of the budget cycle. It also requires close scrutiny of requirements and monitoring of the commitment, obligation, and disbursement of funds.

MP programs compete for funding. Effective planning, programming, and budgeting of funds to obtain resources requires knowledge of the system. Programming of resources is usually planned two to five years ahead. The PM’s resource plan serves as an overall resource management document for law and order activities for the installation. It represents the summation of existing resources, their application, and new initiatives that require resourcing.

UNDERSTANDING THE COMMAND BUDGET PROCESS

The program analysis and resource review, which major Army commands (MACOMs) submit to Headquarters (HQ) DA, indicates the missions, issues, or initiatives that the MACOMs would like to see included in the Army program objective memorandum (POM). The POM conveys the Army’s proposed program to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It addresses resource levels for five fiscal years beginning with the biennial program.

A major objective during budgeting and execution is to maintain program and budget consistency. Acceptance of any change to program levels in the approved POM requires determining program trade-offs to achieve a zero-sum change. Adjustments during budget formulation must remain within the levels approved as depicted in the Army’s total obligational authority (TOA).

OBTAINING FUNDS

The PM obtains funds through the Army’s strategic management system known as the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution system (PPBES). The Army PPBES establishes and maintains the Army’s portion of the DOD Five-Year Defense Program and Defense Budget. The Army PPBES is influenced by both the DOD PPBES and the joint strategic planning system. These systems provide input to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Through its disbursement of funds the Army PPBES carries out guidance from higher HQ. It influences policies, strategy, force objectives, materiel acquisition, and other considerations. And through its request requirements, the PPBES allows for policy participation by the Army staff, Army field operating agencies, and MACOMs. (AR 1-1 contains additional information.)
PPBES architecture allocates program and budget resources to products described by management decision packages (MDEPs), which collectively establish Army force capability in terms of—

- Missions of TOE units.
- Acquisition, fielding, and sustainment of systems. (Linkage to units exists through off-line decision support systems maintained by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition.)
- Activities of the support and mobilization base.
- Operations of Army installations.
- Special functional areas (program and budget packages that cut across two or more other management areas in order to define and protect resources having high-level interest during a specific period).

MDEPs have two components. One component is a program development increment package (PDIP), which is managed by the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation. The PDIP covers five years and helps build the Army program. The PDIP helps the decision-making process accommodate either decreases or increases to the TOA and manpower levels. It provides discrete, executable levels that can be readily extrapolated to unit equipping. The PDIP is managed by functional areas (equipping, sustaining, manning, Information management, training, managing, and facilities) with an Army staff point of contact designated to defend and manage the PDIP.

The other component of the MDEP is a budget increment package (BIP) managed by the Director of Army Budget. The BIP complements the PDIP and covers the prior year, current year, and budget year.

Fund sources, known as "appropriations," in the PPBES are geared to meeting specific types of needs. For more information on PPBES, see AR 1-1 and DA Pamphlet 5-9.

The PM will obtain most resources through the Operations and Maintenance Appropriation (OMA) of the PPBES. OMA subelements, called programs, are drawn on for base operations, training, and property maintenance, among other needs. Program 11 monies are divided into functional areas as "lettered" accounts.

It is the "T" account in Program 11 of OMA that is important to PMs. The T-account monies are designated for the preservation of order. The T account is subdivided into separate elements of resource:

- Civilian pay.
- Contracts.
- Travel.
- supply.
- Equipment.
Civilian pay is based on compensation rates and authorized strength levels. Contractual elements of resource are based on a schedule of itemized contracts currently in effect and updated to reflect deletions of contracts not expected to be renewed and anticipated new contractual requirements. Travel and temporary duty (TDY) reflect a schedule of trips to include place to be visited, length and purpose of visit, mode of transportation, and per diem rate or total estimated cost per individual trip. Supplies are separated into two types: consumable and nonconsumable. Consumable supplies are those items of supply required by section chiefs or subactivities. These items, such as stationery and batteries, are priced out and compared with historical supply records. Nonconsumable supplies are durable items such as equipment. The basis for the nonconsumable supply element is the equipment replacement schedule which is derived from the expected life of the individual item. Within certain limits reprogramming may occur between the elements (except for civilian pay). This action reallocates resources from, for example, the consumable supply element to the travel element.

The PM must stay informed about commitments and obligations of the T account. The installation commander may reprogram money from the T account to another installation account within certain limits. These limits differ from MACOM to MACOM. A reprogramming action should be a cooperative effort which examines all law enforcement programs to ensure program interests are protected. The budget analyst within the Directorate of Resource Management will be able to give local guidelines.

The PM can obtain other funds, however, through other appropriations. For equipment such as night-vision devices or voice-secure radios, PMs may address Other Procurement, Army (OPA) funding requirements to their MACOMs. Approved OPA funds are provided to the MACOMs by the Army Materiel Command item manager. OPA funds are also provided as a “tail” to Major Construction, Army (MCA) projects to furnish intrusion detection systems as government-furnished equipment to a contractor. PMs must understand that OPA funds are identified for the purchase of specific items and cannot be reprogrammed. For example, OPA funds for an installation MCA project to upgrade a fence cannot be used to buy automatic data processing (ADP) equipment for the MP station. PMs must evaluate and identify the appropriate resource for the requirement being considered. When in doubt, PMs should contact their local budget analysts or MACOM PM office for advice.

Funds in support of MP investigations are available through USACIDC confidential funds to the PM. These funds, known as .0015 funds, are used in support of information gathering, investigative activities, covert operations, and other related activities. All MPI personnel must be thoroughly briefed on the conditions and procedures under which .0015 funds can be used for payment or reimbursement.

The PM obtains .0015 funds by submitting a letter of request to the approving official. The letter of request explains who (specifically) will be obtaining and using the funds. After the .0015 funds have been approved by the approving official, the fund custodian requests and actually obtains the money. The fund custodian must account for all advanced and expended funds.

MPIs obtain .0015 funds in support of specific operations. They must then provide the fund custodian with an accurate accounting of all expenditures. This accounting is documented on DA Form 5070-R (Justification Statement for .0015 Contingency Funds). The form is submitted to the fund custodian for his records. MPIs must be aware that funds are for authorized expenditures only and are subject to disapproval otherwise. Guidelines are contained in AR 195-4.
PARTICIPATING IN THE RESOURCE PROCESS

The PM must effectively participate in the PPBES to resolve and follow up resourcing issues. The PM must identify needs based on the requirements, activities, and tasks to be performed. (See DA Pamphlet 5-3 for more information on activity and task analysis.)

The justification of need is a critical element in resourcing. Justification must reflect the importance of the need and the impact on the mission if the need is not met. Resources must be identified and justified in a resource plan.

At each installation the PM must learn who develops resource priorities and what committee makes recommendations. Examples of such committees are the program resource advisory committee (PRAC) and the installation planning board. The PRAC and installation planning board make decisions that affect the PM’s mission performance.

The PRAC recommends to the installation commander which programs are to be funded. Major activity directors (MADs), who are members of the installation’s PRAC, are in the best position to make meaningful financial estimates to support their missions and to provide relevant justification for the required funds. The PM must be able to participate or, at a minimum, provide input to the installation PRAC regarding those issues of utmost concern to the PM missions.

The installation planning board decides the priority of installation work orders. For example: Will the requirement for kennels be funded this year? Will permanent or temporary kennels be constructed? Where will they be located? The PM may not be a voting member of these decision-making groups, but he may attend the meetings. (The budget analyst should be aware of when the meetings are conducted.) It is more difficult for the committee to reprogram PM funding if the PM is present and armed with defense for PM requirements.

The next step is to get involved with resource management in the early stages. Then the PM should follow each action through to completion. At each step in the process decisions will be made and priorities will be set. For example, during the first stage of the decision process, a given PM requirement may receive a high priority. But during the second stage, this requirement may be given a lower priority because of changing priorities, unprotected requirements, and emergencies. The funding process is not predictable. The PM must realize that no decision is final until the funds are actually obligated.

The final step is to do the necessary homework. Even though the PM plans, programs, and identifies present needs, the amount of time required for the process to evolve full circle is agonizing and frustrating, but important. Continuous evaluation of all law enforcement requirements, threat assessments, and problems should funding not be received must occur on a regular basis. The PM should implement a time-phased plan for the phases of the law enforcement needs program.

Using Available Funds

PMs can keep informed about commitments and obligations of the T account through the budget analyst. A commitment is the first step toward spending dollars. A commitment indicates to the PM’s MAD an anticipated obligation of dollars. Since a commitment constitutes an administrative reservation of funds, committed funds should not be used for making future budget decisions. Once the procurement cycle is complete, and a contract awarded or services rendered which require programmed periodic payment, the dollars are considered obligated. Obligation rates provide a measure from which to assess a well-managed budget execution program. Once obligated, the execution of contracts, delivery of equipment, or provision of services should be monitored and evaluated to determine if obligations will require adjustment.
PMs may receive a monthly account status report from the budget analyst. The account status is reported on any locally designed form that will assist the budget analyst in monitoring obligation of funds. The report transmits budget information about underutilization of funds, indicates the possibility of reprogramming funds, and indicates when funds are low. The monthly account status is an important document for the PM because it provides a history that can be used for future budget guidance and decision making.

The relationship between the PM and the budget analyst is critical. The PM and budget analyst must communicate openly about budget matters to provide the commander accurate information to make fiscal decisions. Failing to keep the commander informed invites decisions that can have negative implications on existing and planned law enforcement programs.

**Obtaining Funds For Unexpected Requirements**

Important to the success of any installation’s law enforcement effort is the PM’s acquisition of dollars for unprogrammed, unfunded requirements. These requirements are referred to as unfinanced requirements (UFRs). UFRs may result from an unexpected need arising from a change in policy, situation, or resource. Or UFRs may also result from an earlier reduction in funding. PMs identifying a UFR should immediately contact the budget analyst for advice. PMs should provide the budget analyst complete rationale and justification to support the UFR. A UFR will normally be reviewed by the program director and appropriate staff elements for authorization, prioritization, and potential trade-offs.

A UFR may be submitted for consideration anytime during the fiscal year. However, the most appropriate times are during three formal budget processes. First, the command operating budget (COB), developed midway through the current year for the following two fiscal years, serves as the base document for identifying installation resource requirements for the budget year. This is followed by the contract process which involves the installation and MACOM commanders. Finally, the budget execution review (BER) occurs midway through the current year. PMs should anticipate potential requirements and identify their needs early in the budget process. PMs should also continuously monitor their programs and identify possible alternatives that could serve as a means for providing resources for unanticipated requirements. In the future installations will review budget execution through the review and analysis process. This process will allow commanders throughout the chain of command to have continuous monitoring of each COB.

When addressing UFRs, PMs must be thorough in determining if the requirement can be accomplished if funds are made available. The requirement and supporting justification for UFRs must be clear and specific. The UFR status lists are prioritized and continually updated at the MACOM level. The lists are then forwarded to the Office of Army Law Enforcement (OALE) resource manager.

The MACOM PM must ensure an open channel of communication with the OALE resource manager. And the MACOM PM should provide a copy of the individual UFRs to the OALE resource manager. During the programming, budgeting, and execution phase of PPBES, the OALE resource manager interfaces with MACOM budget analysts. The OALE resource manager translates PM requirements to “budgetese.” This provides for a more thorough understanding by the MACOM and higher level budget analysts who “edit” the UFRs and other documents.

Most important, the OALE resource manager will speak for the MACOM PM when opportunities arise allowing DA to provide extra funds to MACOMs. The suspense requirement to obtain the extra funds is
THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION

Normally very short—sometimes a matter of hours. The short response time prohibits coordination between the OALE resource manager and the MACOM PM. The OALE resource manager must be armed with the justification to present and defend the MACOM PM's UFRs against the competition of other activity MACOM UFRs. The OALE resource manager must be prepared at the time the opportunities arise for extra funds. Keeping the OALE resource manager informed with dependable rationale and justification for UFRs is paramount in the successful awarding of extra dollars.
DEVELOPING THE INSTALLATION COMMAND OPERATING BUDGET

The systematic development of a COB is not a regulatory process that must be followed at the installation. But the use of such a procedure ensures a well-coordinated operating budget that reflects the major mission director’s recommendations. It also reflects the installation commander’s decisions on how the financial resources will be used to accomplish the mission.

The COB contains detailed costing of the approved program as well as administrative schedules to be used in support of the Army budget estimates. The COB addresses two fiscal years: The execution year and the budget year. The budget year data are used primarily for reprogramming actions and the apportionment request to the Office of Management and Budget. The biennial program years are the two years following the budget year.

To develop the COB the comptroller receives budget and manpower guidance (BMG) from the MACOM and distributes it to the MADs. During the interim, the comptroller reviews the BMG from the MACOM and develops a time-phased schedule for completion of the COB. MADs review the BMG, giving special attention to their area of responsibility. They prepare recommendations to the MACOM BMG and forward these recommendations to the Comptroller, Directorate of Resource Management.

The comptroller evaluates the recommendations, makes his own recommendations, and coordinates with the MADs for development of their recommended dollar targets. The comptroller then prepares a draft installation BMG directive which includes dollar targets and distributes it to the MADs. Next, the PRAC resolves any differences between the comptroller and the MADs and prepares the installation BMG. The PRAC-recommended installation BMG is then presented to the installation commander, normally in the form of an oral briefing. The commander then directs, changes, and/or approves the PRAC-recommended installation BMG and returns it to the comptroller for final copy and publication.

The comptroller distributes the final installation BMG to the MADs. The MADs then break out dollar guidance to the activity level and furnish operating activities with BMG and funding targets. The activity chiefs prepare their portions of the installation COB. An activity may comprise subactivities, and the activity chief will further break out the funding targets. The MADs receive input and applicable supporting schedules from each activity chief. Each MAD reviews, evaluates, and adjusts the activity portions. The MAD then prepares a summary schedule, UFR list, and decrement list. The comptroller receives, reviews, evaluates, and prepares recommendations and/or adjustments to the summary schedules, UFRs, and other supporting schedules. The comptroller then completes all schedules required in the draft installation COB and assembles them for presentation to the PRAC. The PRAC reviews the installation draft COB to ensure compliance with the BMG from the MACOM, resolves any differences among the PRAC members, and makes necessary adjustments. The chairman of the PRAC presents the recommended installation draft COB to the installation commander. The commander, after directing any necessary changes, approves the installation COB, signs it, and returns it to the comptroller for transmittal to the MACOM.
Military police success in effecting law and order relies upon acquisition, processing, and application of certain essential information. Police information aids in crime prevention and criminal investigations. Police information supports the commander in administering his unit or installation. Police information in the US Army is one of the elements of command intelligence.

The primary purpose for gathering police information is to support the commander or PM and to support the enforcement elements of MP units. The information system in law enforcement includes recording, reporting, evaluating, and managerial tasks associated with MP reports, criminal investigations reports, traffic accident reports, and armed forces traffic tickets. The information system can contribute in great measure to selective enforcement.

In correctional administration, police information includes many of the recording and managerial tasks for confinement facilities, hospital prisoner wards, rehabilitation training centers, and correctional facilities. MP develop and exchange police information and criminal intelligence with other police forces in their area of operations. Police information, including criminal intelligence, is obtained through daily contact with people, MP, and other law enforcement and security forces.

In physical security, police information includes recording and managerial tasks associated with security of individual rooms or buildings, structures, facilities, and installations. In conducting and monitoring physical security, MP will develop and exchange police information with other police forces, private security agencies, industrial representatives, and other security elements, to include tactical military forces. (See FM 19-30.)

In preserving public order, police information includes many of the recording and managerial tasks associated with civil disturbances, disorders, and natural disasters. MP conducting the normal functions involved with occurrences of these types will develop and exchange police information with local police and security agencies, national police forces, and military forces involved. However, military agencies cannot be used for collecting, reporting, processing, or storing civil disturbance information unless specific approval is obtained from Headquarters, Department of the Army. FM 19-15 discusses intelligence operations in civil disturbance situations, including the critical items of information,
sources of information, and collection by individuals.

In certain situations, such as countering terrorism, police information may go beyond the field of law and order and extend into tactical and other types of intelligence. And the information can include recording command and staff activities associated with planning, organizing, and executing MP area combat operation support. MP contribute to the intelligence required by the area commander with particular respect to the threat situation. (See FM 90-14.)

In operations against insurgent elements the police information system includes recording command and staff actions associated with stability operations. FM 100-20 discusses these operations and the MP support to such operations, including police intelligence.

Disciplinary control boards rely heavily on police information. In overseas areas, data generated by well-directed police information efforts can contribute greatly to political planning relevant to relations between United States forces and the local population or government. In CONUS, data generated by police information-gathering operations can often be more valuable than pure military intelligence in planning local public relations.

UNDERSTANDING THE CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

The criminal intelligence cycle is a continuous process. Planning ensures that intelligence collectors are provided a logical, orderly system for conducting the collection effort. Ideally, it ensures that all needed intelligence is collected in time to be of use and that all possible sources of intelligence are exploited by appropriate collection agencies. Planning includes establishment of priority areas of interest, allocation of resources, and alternate means of intelligence gathering. The establishing of priority areas of interest is normally required because of resource limitations. It is virtually impossible to collect all criminal intelligence in all areas of MP responsibility. Resources are directed to criminal intelligence considered most critical. Priorities are not permanently fixed but may vary with the situation.

The need to exploit all sources of criminal intelligence requires resourceful, flexible, and aggressive direction and coordination of the intelligence collection effort. Commanders and MP personnel involved in gathering criminal intelligence must be aware of the capabilities and limitations of all available resources to make the best use of them. Among the collection techniques employed are standard procedures and expedients, improvisations made necessary by local conditions and resources, and the employment of available specialized personnel and equipment.

If criminal intelligence is to be useful it must be recorded and capable of being rapidly retrieved when needed. Such records include journals, files, tapes, reports, maps, photographs, and automatic data processing files.

Evaluating criminal intelligence involves determining the reliability of the source and the pertinence and accuracy of the information. The determination of a source’s reliability is dependent upon past experience with the source. Accuracy concerns the truthfulness of the information and the likelihood that such information may be true. The fact that a source may be completely reliable does not mean that all information from him is accurate. The information must be evaluated in its relation to other information on hand and the prevailing circumstances of its collection (see FM 19-20).

Criminal intelligence is analyzed singularly before being integrated with other
Formally or informally many types of logic can be applied, as well as new methods of statistical analysis, operations research, systems analysis, and computer analysis.

The timely distribution of available data is of vital importance to MP operations. Criminal intelligence is useless unless placed where it can be used. Distribution is made at the most advantageous time, by the most rapid means available, considering the classification of the material.

COLLECTING AND RELEASING INFORMATION

The collection and release of information pertaining to US citizens is governed by law. The Freedom of Information Act allows citizens to obtain information and records that have been gathered on them by various governmental agencies. The Privacy Act restricts the kind of information about citizens that government agencies can collect. For more information on records administration and release of information, see AR 190-45.

AR 340-17 governs the procedures the Army will follow when a freedom of information request is received. Each installation has a Freedom of Information Act officer with whom coordination is made when acting on requests. Some MP/investigative records are exempt from disclosure. Denial of information can be made only by designated initial denial authorities who are generally heads of the DA staff agencies.

AR 340-21 governs the procedures the Army will follow concerning the Privacy Act. AR 340-21 provides guidance on the various law enforcement information systems of USACIDC and the MP. Some investigative and internal control records in the law enforcement field are exempt from disclosure. Some of these exempt records are informant registers, accreditation files, reports of investigation, MP reports, and SIR files. Each record-release request must be handled on an individual basis.

It is a requirement of the Privacy Act that people be informed of the purpose for obtaining information. Individuals are not required to disclose their social security numbers. However, the authority to obtain it for DA forms is contained in 10 USC 3012. If an individual refuses to disclose his social security number, it will be obtained from official personnel records. The law places restrictions on transferring information concerning an individual to other agencies or organizations, particularly those outside the federal government. In accordance with status of forces agreements (SOFAs) or local laws, transfer of investigatory information may be allowed to local, state, and foreign police (see AR 340-21). Coordination with SJA is made concerning questions and problems involving this act and release of information to other law enforcement agencies.

All records pertaining to juvenile offenders must be safeguarded from unauthorized disclosure. They are released only on a need-to-know basis. They must be maintained in a secure file in the juvenile office or PM office, with very limited access. See AR 190-45 for more information on how to store juvenile records.

During juvenile proceedings, information on the juvenile and the circumstances of the offense may be furnished only to the court, counsel for the juvenile, the government, or others entitled to review sealed records.
Records may also be released to a treatment facility to which a juvenile has been committed by the court if the director submits an inquiry in writing. And sometimes records may be released to an agency considering the subject for a position involving law enforcement work or affecting national security.

Records should give detailed listings of regulations the juveniles have violated. And they should include the disposition made by civilian authorities. But permanent records of nonessential minor incidents or situations resolved in conference with parents or the juvenile are not made. If the juvenile is found innocent, the records are destroyed, sealed by the court, or otherwise disposed of in accordance with local directives. Juvenile records transmitted outside the MP station or PM office will be assigned protective markings as specified in AR 340-17.

MP may, at times, come in contact with the news media. Establishing a cooperative relationship with the news media can eliminate misunderstanding between the military community and the news media.

MP do not release information to the news media. If asked to give information, MP decline. The requestor is referred to where the information may be obtained. A definitive policy as to what news is to be made available, through what channels, and under what circumstances it is to be released is established by the PM in coordination with the public affairs officer (PAO) of the installation.

The PAO, like the PM, also is a staff officer of the commander. The PAO keeps the community informed about unit operations or developments that may impact on the military community. The PAO also keeps the commander advised of community opinion and the probable community reaction to impending operations and developments.

The PAO may release to the press information concerning the post that is not classified or libelous. The PM and MP unit commanders must be familiar with ARs 360-5 and 360-61.

The PM, in coordination with the PAO, uses all available public information media, such as television, radio, newspapers, and posters to—

- Introduce MP and their mission so there will be understanding and cooperation between MP and the military and civilian communities.
- Explain enforcement plans, policies, programs, and changes so members of the military community know the law enforcement programs and govern themselves accordingly.
- Explain pertinent provisions of agreements entered into with local civil police.
- Explain the role that all members of the military community must play to prevent crimes and offenses, and actions they are to take to assist MP if they become victims of crimes and offenses.
- Publicize outstanding accomplishments of MP and other members of the military community in preventing crimes and offenses.

The sources of departmental information available to the press are strictly controlled, standardized, and reduced to a minimum. When stories are misinterpreted, the responsible reporter is contacted and the proper interpretation given. MP must be careful not to exaggerate occasional petty criticisms that are printed in the papers, as long as general press relations impact positively on the military community. In this respect, MP must remember that the press is usually a good barometer of community opinion and wields a great influence upon it. Good press relations can mean that favorable stories will be given front page coverage and unfavorable stories will be presented in a less damaging light, consistent with the facts.
USING MILITARY POLICE MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS

In an effort to standardize automated information management throughout the MP Corps, specific systems have been created for use Armywide. Under the umbrella Military Police Management Information Systems (MPMIS), the ORS, the VRS, and the Correctional Reporting System (CRS) support the law enforcement mission of the MP. Each system is designed to provide data query and report capability in response to managerial or investigative requirements.

OFFENSE REPORTING SYSTEM

The information used by the ORS is taken from each DA Form 3975 (Military Police Report). Information is stored in the computer until it is requested through a data query or in the form of a standard report. Automation of this information does not do away with the requirement to prepare and store hard copy MP reports and associated case documents. These documents must be available for court or court-martial proceedings. However, ORS provides rapid access to detailed information as well as broad statistical analysis.

Standard reports generated through ORS may be requested and used as needed at the installation level, or they may be used to satisfy a regulatory requirement for standard information such as the law enforcement and discipline report. Features of ORS include computer-generated reports that identify crime by location, summarize all offenses by type, profile adjudication of persons apprehended by the MP, and produce separate reports on any cases involving juveniles. Additionally, ORS monitors the status of all open MP reports referred to MPIs, USACIDC, traffic, or other investigative agencies. It further recognizes overdue suspenses for DA Form 4833 (Commander’s Report of Disciplinary or Administrative Action). ORS is beneficial in assisting MP in the identification of problem areas or units on an installation. For assistance on how to use the ORS, see the Offense Reporting System Functional Users Manual.

VEHICLE REGISTRATION SYSTEM

The VRS is a stand-alone system, independent of other MPMIS systems, that can provide useful vehicle data to the MP and unit commanders. It entirely automates the registration of vehicles authorized on any installation. The necessity for the timely retrieval of vehicle information is fundamental and can most efficiently and effectively be achieved through automation. VRS complements the registration process by meeting the increasing demands of law enforcement for timely information. Whether or not the actual registration process is conducted by personnel assigned to the PM is not important. Information stored through VRS is equally valuable through the process of data query and standard reports.

Reports are requested as required by the MP. The types available include registration by decal number, state license number, or personnel type. Additionally, VRS monitors the status of driving privilege suspension and revocation as well as validation of safety inspections, insurance, and post decals. For assistance on how to use the VRS, see the Vehicle Registration System Functional Users Manual.

CORRECTIONAL REPORTING SYSTEM

The CRS assists in the management of the Army’s confinement facilities. Information on each prisoner is taken from confinement orders, release orders, personal history documents, and other sources. This information assists the correctional facility staff in monitoring the custody and control of all prisoners assigned. The data base is used to generate various types of daily, monthly, and quarterly reports as required by regulation. Reports provide information
on the status of the prisoner population. Reports make it possible for prisoner gains and losses to be tracked. Reports also make it possible for statistical analysis to be performed on the information in the data base. For assistance on how to use the CRS, see the *Correctional Reporting System Users Manual*.

**DEVELOPING AND USING MP INFORMATION FILES**

MP information files must contain as much information as possible, cover as many years as possible, and be efficiently organized, consistent with the limitations imposed by AR 380-13. Information files are retained indefinitely. (To request modification of the Army filing system and method of storage and retention, see AR 25-400-2.) These files must be excluded from general inspection or review by anyone other than designated persons except upon authorization from the commanding general or installation commander. Cross-referencing of files is mandatory. Automatic data processing is used to the maximum extent possible.

The sensitive nature of these files must be understood by all persons concerned. Files contain offense charts, statistical summaries, blotters, DA Forms 3975, and information from MP and criminal investigations. These files also include rumor, supposition, conjecture, and gossip; this information may be damaging to otherwise innocent persons. These files may also contain information on friends, relatives, or fellow MP. From contacts made with other MP and MPIs and information already contained in the files, MP can pinpoint establishments, activities, friends, and problems.

MP patrols and their supervisors are alert and observant for all items of interest. They report such items fully and promptly. They question the identities of persons encountered in unusual places at unusual times. They ask their reasons for being in those places at those times. And they may ask for other information as well. Interview information, if it does not lead to an immediate apprehension, is reported by patrol personnel. Usually a locally devised field interview card is used for this purpose. It should contain spaces for complete identification of the individual (and vehicle if applicable), the time and place of the interview, the reason for the interview, and the person’s stated reasons for being in the area. Additional space can be provided for any remarks of the MP and for his signature. Data compiled from field interview cards are transferred to information cards filed in the police information file.

**AREA FILES**

Area files include information on any definable geographic area that has activities of police interest. On a CONUS installation, it may include housing areas, supply and storage areas, and recreational or training areas. Off post, it may include bar, hotel, or pawn shop areas, or any area of potential civil disturbances. With only slight modifications, the same considerations apply in overseas areas. In overseas areas where units or specific groups move into an area and more or less claim it as their own area, files become very revealing and extremely important. In rear area protection or in stability operations, areas of police interest may include those areas where populations are known to be unfriendly to the United States or allied forces, areas suitable for guerrilla training or bases, and areas that may provide potential sources of supply and equipment for insurgent forces.

**ACTIVITY FILES**

The activity files contain all information of interest to the MP. The categories in this system vary, and the information is not
limited by the area of influence or by jurisdictional considerations.

All activities that can pose a threat to military personnel, functions, or property are included in an activity file. Information concerning persons and organizations not affiliated with the Department of Defense may be acquired, reported, processed, and stored under the authority of AR 380-13 only if in the judgment of the commander concerned there is reasonable basis to believe that one or more of the following has or is likely to occur:

- Theft, damage, or sabotage of weapons, ammunition, equipment, facilities, or records belonging to DOD units or installations.
- Compromise of classified defense information by unauthorized disclosure or espionage.
- Demonstrations occurring on or immediately adjacent to Active or Reserve Army installations which are of such size or character that they are likely to interfere with the conduct of military activities, as defined in AR 380-13.
- Direct threats to DOD military or civilian personnel regarding their official duties or to other persons authorized protection by DOD resources.
- Activities or demonstrations endangering classified defense contract facilities or key defense facilities.
- Acts occurring on Active or Reserve Army installations in violation of laws or regulations.
- Subversion of loyalty, discipline, or morale of military and DOD civilian personnel (18 USC 2387).

A distinction must be recognized between the various restrictions governing the collection, storage, and dissemination of information in a peacetime environment and the need to gather information in support of tactical operations. Normally, the restrictions of AR 380-13 do not apply in the theater of operations.

**INDIVIDUAL FILES**

Any individual identified as being of special significance to the MP, either because of activities, leadership, contacts, or even as a symbol of some nature, has a dossier within the restrictions of AR 380-13. This dossier is nothing more than a complete biography to include information on habits, income, friends, weaknesses, and personal history. The individual's police record, disciplinary record, and details of other contacts with law enforcement agencies are included. See AR 340-17 and AR 380-13 for guidance regarding non-DOD-affiliated personnel.

**INVESTIGATORY FILES**

Investigatory files compiled for enforcing civil, criminal, or military law are considered exempt from mandatory release provisions of the 1974 Freedom of Information Act (5 USC 552). Information requests concerning data determined to be releasable by the PM and SJA are honored in accordance with the provisions of AR 340-17. Requests for information from representatives of the press will be processed through the appropriate command information officer. Information is not released to representatives of the press if it is likely to—

- Interfere with law enforcement proceedings.
- Deprive an individual of fair and impartial justice.
- Invade the personal privacy of an individual.
- Disclose nonroutine investigation techniques and procedures.
- Disclose confidential investigative information and sources of information.
- Reveal information that might endanger the lives or physical safety of law enforcement personnel.
USING OTHER INFORMATION SOURCES

NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER

The NCIC is a computerized information system established by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as a service to all law enforcement agencies—local, state, and federal. The system operates by means of computers, data transmission over communication lines, terminal devices, and, most important, people. Its objective is to improve the effectiveness of law enforcement through the efficient handling and exchange of documented civil and military police information.

The NCIC makes centralized criminal data rapidly available to law enforcement agencies. Patrol tactics and investigative habits must be reviewed in light of this capability if the system is to attain optimum use. The success of the system will depend on the extent to which patrols, supervisors, and investigators use it in daily operations.

The US Army participates in the NCIC system in conjunction with other law enforcement agencies. The system affords the Army timely police information regarding deserters; wanted persons; and stolen, missing, and recovered automobiles, boats, securities, license plates, weapons, and other identifiable property.

The NCIC provides data on military absentees and deserters as provided in AR 190-9 and AR 190-27. Data are obtained from DD Form 553 (Test) (Deserter/Absentee Wanted by the Armed Forces) forwarded by PMs to the USADIP at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. The USADIP, staffed by MP and personnel specialists, ensures that information received is current and correct, and that it is entered into the NCIC and disseminated to all appropriate law enforcement agencies.

The Office of Army Law Enforcement, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), is responsible for overall Army participation in the NCIC. In addition to operating the Army’s central terminal in the NCIC system, it maintains liaison with the FBI on NCIC matters. Currently, Army field terminals in the NCIC are located at designated installations and the Military District of Washington. AR 190-27 specifies procedural requirements for Army users of the NCIC system. The FBI publishes a manual containing standards, procedures, and instructions for NCIC participants. PMs maintain and update a copy of the NCIC operating manual and refer to this manual when questions arise concerning proper procedures for using the NCIC. FM 19-20, AR 190-9, and AR 190-27 provide further details concerning the NCIC.

CRIME RECORDS CENTER

The USACRC receives and maintains the permanent files of USACIDC reports and investigations and designated MP reports. USACRC ensures retention of these records and supplies data and copies of files or documents to agencies authorized to request such information. USACRC also maintains liaison with other federal intelligence agencies as prescribed in AR 195-2.

The function of the USACRC is to—

- Receive and file all USACIDC reports of investigation.
- Receive and file MP reports acquired under the provisions of AR 190-45.
- Operate and maintain criminal data reference files.
- Provide record checks, both emergency and routine, for USACIDC elements, other federal investigative agencies, and other authorized users.
- Develop specialized statistics and reports on crime within the Army as required by Headquarters, Department of the Army.
The USACRC will, upon request of authorized users, conduct a search of available files for information on a particular individual. File searches can be made as part of a crime survey check of employees at a particular establishment. Such checks are considered routine. Requests for immediate record checks may be forwarded by telephone, telecopier, or teletypewriter. Telephonic format is contained in AR 195-2. Letter or message requests are addressed to Director, US Army Crime Records Center, 2301 Chesapeake Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland 21222. Requests contain, if available, the name, date of birth, place of birth, social security number, and military service number.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

The FBI investigates all violations of federal laws, with the exception of specified violations, such as counterfeiting and internal revenue violations. The FBI classifies and maintains fingerprint files on all present and past federal employees (including military personnel) and all persons apprehended for the commission of serious crimes. The bureau also maintains the NCIC.

The 1984 Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense relating to the investigation and prosecution of certain crimes (see AR 27-10) provides guidance on investigative responsibility between the FBI and military criminal investigative organizations.

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

The Drug Enforcement Administration has prime responsibility for enforcing laws and statutes relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, depressants, stimulants, and hallucinogenic drugs. The agency will assist federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in the exchange of information and training to control the use and trafficking of narcotics and other drugs.
Military police law enforcement operations help the commander keep his command combat ready and combat efficient. The enforcement of military laws, orders, and regulations is a function of command. Commanders, by enforcing laws and regulations, ensure order and discipline. Each commander is responsible for maintaining order and discipline in his unit.

Leaders are the key to order and discipline. From on-the-spot corrections to referrals for action under the Manual for Courts-Martial, leaders execute their responsibilities through the chain of command. To assist the chain of command, MP are empowered by division, corps, and echelons-above-corps commanders to exercise control over soldiers who violate military laws, orders, and regulations. MP at all levels support the commander in his responsibility for command and control by ensuring that his directives are complied with.

Sometimes it is not in the commander’s best interest to employ MP assets specifically on law enforcement operations. Yet even then MP efforts continue to reduce the opportunity for crime. All MP missions contribute to the preservation of law and order. Law enforcement is an implied factor in all MP operations. In the course of any operation MP perform, MP operate in a manner and with intent to encourage support and to enforce the commander’s discipline and military law.

Even in a theater of operations when the intensity of battle dictates the need to concentrate MP efforts on combat support operations, the opportunity for crime is nonetheless reduced as a result of MP missions. MP battlefield combat support operations and peacetime law enforcement operations use many of the same measures. Sometimes the purpose for using the measures is the same. TCPs and checkpoints are used on and off the battlefield to help ensure critical personnel, equipment, and supplies arrive where they are needed. Sometimes the purposes for using the measures differ. In a peacetime environment, MP use physical security measures to reduce the opportunity for crime. In a theater of operations, the measures are used to protect critical facilities and supplies from the enemy. Yet the measures still suppress the opportunity for crime. (Battlefield uses for traffic control and physical security measures are discussed in FM 19-4 under Battlefield Circulation Control and Area Security.)

It is, however, recognized that most MP efforts that directly enforce laws and support order are undertaken mainly in a peacetime environment. These efforts include both proactive and reactive measures. MP undertake and support preventive programs to remove conditions promoting crime and to reduce opportunities allowing crime. MP enforcement efforts encourage voluntary compliance by all personnel with laws, orders, regulations, and directives of the commander.

Military law enforcement is best served by achieving the greatest compliance with rules with the least amount of punitive action. MP accomplish much at potential trouble spots by encouraging law-abiding persons to cooperate actively in helping fellow soldiers act properly. Friends and buddies are encouraged to remove troublemakers from the scene. And proprietors are encouraged to call MP when there may be disorders. But when necessary, MP undertake active enforcement measures. MP take immediate action to halt crimes in progress, to apprehend perpetrators, and to aid victims. MP undertake enforcement measures that range from conducting raids and seizing illegal drugs to patrolling roadways and regulating traffic.
Military police carry out their law enforcement operations with strict regard for the needs of the Army and the safety of the military community. At the same time, MP maintain a strict regard for the rights of the individuals making up that military community. Just as MP undertake their law enforcement operations in the military community to protect and preserve the life of the community, they also protect and preserve the legal rights of members of the military community. In so doing, MP carry out the Army policy of equality before the law.

**EXERCISING AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION**

All military personnel performing police work operate within their jurisdiction and authority. Jurisdiction and authority are not the same. MP may have the authority to apprehend a suspect, but the military may not have jurisdiction to try the suspect. Authority is the lawful right of designated persons or agencies to exercise governmental power or control. Military jurisdiction is the extent of and limitation on the right of an armed force to exercise authority and control over persons and offenses.

**AUTHORITY**

The authority of MP to enforce military law, orders, and regulations, by apprehension if necessary, is derived primarily from the President of the United States as Commander in Chief of the armed forces. MP must familiarize themselves with the contents of the articles of the UCMJ if they are to perform their duties effectively. National Guard and Army Reserve MP usually exercise no authority over active duty military unless they are themselves subject to the UCMJ. In a domestic territory under martial rule, the authority of the MP over persons other than those subject to the UCMJ is derived from policies and orders of the military commander which must be based upon federal law.

The authority of MP in a friendly foreign nation or territory may be, and in most cases is, different from MP authority in the US. This difference arises from the law of the country concerned (except as otherwise provided by agreement) being applicable to all persons, including MP in that country. Consequently, in the absence of an international agreement to the contrary, US troops in a friendly foreign nation are subject to the UCMJ and the laws of the nation in which stationed.

An agreement to resolve jurisdictional conflicts is the status of forces agreement. Basically, the SOFA authorizes one government to take action in cases where both governments could take action. A formula decides which government will act in a particular case. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) SOFA was the first significant agreement negotiated and has become the model for most later agreements. For example, during joint NATO operations US Army MP can be tasked to be a part of a NATO combined MP detachment (see NATO Standardization Agreement [STANAG] 2085).
Authority Over Persons Subject to UCMJ

MP have authority to take appropriate action with persons subject to the UCMJ. This authority is not limited to military reservations or federal property. All active duty military personnel are subject to the provisions of the UCMJ. It also pertains to some retired members and other personnel enumerated in Article 2, UCMJ.

The UCMJ, as established by Congress, provides one basic code of military justice and law for all services. The code authorizes the President of the United States to set rules of evidence; pretrial, trial, and posttrial procedures; and maximum punishments for violations of the UCMJ. Under this authority, the President has issued the MCM. The MCM is a primary source document for matters relating to military justice. It is an executive order implementing the provisions of the UCMJ. It establishes the military law of evidence.

Ordinarily in the US, MP have the same authority to apprehend friendly foreign military personnel as they have to apprehend civilians. On post this authority arises from the installation commander’s inherent authority to maintain order on the installation. However, after authorization by the President and upon request of the commanding officer of a friendly foreign force having service courts in this country, MP may apprehend a designated member of the friendly foreign force and deliver him to US military authorities for delivery to the requesting force.

Authority Over Persons Not Subject to UCMJ

In areas under military jurisdiction or control, MP in some cases may take persons into custody whether or not they are in the military services:

- Persons not subject to the UCMJ who are found committing a felony or a misdemeanor amounting to a breach of the peace on a military reservation may be apprehended and detained long enough to be turned over to civil authorities.
- Civilians not subject to the UCMJ also may be apprehended for violation of properly promulgated post regulations. These persons then may be escorted to the entrance of the post and may be forbidden reentry by the installation commander.
- Civilians not subject to the UCMJ may be cited for violations of the Assimilative Crimes Act not amounting to felonies or breaches of the peace (such as fishing without a valid permit) and referred to a US magistrate.
- Civilians not subject to the UCMJ may be subject to military authority in situations involving martial law or hostilities.

Thus, commanders and MP have authority to apprehend civilians in many circumstances; they may also detain civilians for a reasonable period of time in order to effect their arrest by civilian law enforcement authorities. The local SJA is consulted regarding the applicable rules. AR 600-40 provides general guidance regarding apprehension and restraint of persons not subject to military law.

Commanders have the authority to eject trespassers on the installation and to enforce the ejection of any person previously barred from entry. This authority comes from 18 USC 1382, which provides that “whoever, within the jurisdiction of the United States, goes upon any military, naval, or Coast Guard reservation, post, fort, arsenal, yard, station, or installation, for any purpose prohibited by law or lawful regulation; or whoever reenters or is found within any such reservation, post, fort, arsenal, yard, station, or installation, after having been removed therefrom or ordered not to enter by the officer in command or charge thereof, shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than six months or both.”

The US Magistrate System provides the Department of the Army with a means of processing and disposing of certain minor
offenses and traffic violations. A minor offense is defined as one in which punishment would not exceed imprisonment for one year, a fine of not more than $1,000, or both. DD Form 1805 (United States District Court Violation Notice) will be used to refer minor offenses to the US Magistrate Court.

If a case is referred to magistrate court, the individual is given the option of either paying a fine or appearing before the court to contest the charges. For only the most serious offenses is a court appearance mandatory. The court frequently sits on the military installation. An advantage to such a system is the prompt and expeditious disposition of minor offenses without resort to a federal district court.

**Posse Comitatus**

MP authority does not extend to civilians outside areas under military jurisdiction or control. The military cannot be used to help execute civilian law. The Posse Comitatus Act provides that whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or by act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army to execute civil law shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years or both. This act applies to enforcement of federal, state, county, or local law. And a related statute makes it an offense to have military personnel at a place where elections are being held, except when such force is necessary to repel armed enemies of the US (18 USC 592 and 593).

Military forces acting in civil disturbances under the provisions of 10 USC 331-333 are not in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. Nor does this prohibition extend to employing federal military forces to protect federal functions and property or to acting in an emergency. Acts having a primary military purpose and only incidentally enforcing civilian law are not prohibited.

Note that the Posse Comitatus Act does not prohibit military assistance to protect public safety as opposed to law enforcement. Thus, it does not prohibit the use of Army bomb disposal experts in deactivating and destroying explosives found in civilian communities. Nor does it prohibit Army medical personnel from rendering medical care to persons injured in a natural disaster. Further, this law does not prohibit an individual member of the Army from making a citizen’s arrest for a felony or breach of the peace committed in his presence. The act does not prohibit development and maintenance of effective working relationships between MP and their civilian counterparts nor the loan to civilian authorities of certain types of equipment.

But the law does prohibit concerted use, under orders, of units or individuals of the Army to execute the law. The Posse Comitatus Act does not prohibit investigation of offenses committed by civilians if there is an Army interest. The SJA should be consulted on a case-by-case basis to determine whether or not there is an Army interest and the measures to be taken during the investigation.

The Posse Comitatus Act does not apply when a state activates its National Guard in accordance with state law. Such a force can be used to enforce the laws of the state. However, if the National Guard is called into federal service, the Posse Comitatus Act applies.

**JURISDICTION**

Jurisdiction limits the exercise of authority. The jurisdiction of every offense or incident depends upon the status of the suspect, international agreements and treaties, the “service connection” of the offense, and other factors. The SJA is always consulted where questions exist about jurisdiction.

The term “exclusive jurisdiction” refers to the power granted to Congress by the United States Constitution to exercise legislative authority. It also applies to similar power acquired by the US through cession by a state, or by a reservation made by the US
upon the admission of the state into the Union. In the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction, the federal government assumes sole jurisdiction over the designated area. For example, many military installations have exclusive federal jurisdiction. The federal government then exercises its executive, legislative, and judicial authority over that area and the personnel within it. To avoid the difficult task of enacting and maintaining a code of criminal laws appropriate for all areas under its legislative jurisdiction, Congress passed 18 USC 13, commonly referred to as the Assimilative Crimes Act. In this statute, Congress provided that all acts or omissions occurring in an area under federal jurisdiction, which would constitute crimes if the area were under the state jurisdiction, will constitute similar crimes, similarly punishable, under federal law. This act does not assimilate crimes based on state statutes that are contrary to federal policy and law, such as civil rights legislation, nor does it assimilate state law if there is an existing federal statute or law on the subject.

Concurrent jurisdiction exists when the US is granted authority that would otherwise amount to exclusive legislative jurisdiction over an area, but the state in which the area is located retains the right to simultaneously exercise its authority along with that of the federal government. It is an area of dual jurisdiction. Under concurrent jurisdiction, state criminal laws are applicable in the area and can be enforced by the state. The same laws can be enforced by the federal government under the Assimilative Crimes Act, which is applicable to areas under concurrent as well as exclusive jurisdiction of the US. Federal criminal laws also apply. Many crimes fall under both federal and state sanction, and either the federal or state government, or both, may take jurisdiction over a given offense.

Proprietal interest applies to instances in which the federal government has acquired some right or title of ownership to an area in a state but has not obtained jurisdiction. Where the federal government has no legislative jurisdiction over its land, it holds such land in a proprietorial interest only and has the same rights as any other landowner. In addition, there exists a right of the federal government to perform the functions delegated to it by the Constitution without interference from any source. It may resist—by exercising its legislative or executive authority, or through court proceedings—any attempted interference by a state instrumentality of its exercise of constitutional responsibilities. Congress also has authority to enact laws for the protection of US property. Subject to these conditions, when the US acquires only a proprietorial interest, the state retains all the jurisdiction over the area it would have if a private individual rather than the US owned the land. The Assimilative Crimes Act does not apply to areas of federal proprietorial jurisdiction. In such areas, MP exercise authority in compliance with the instructions of the appropriate commander.

**Military Jurisdiction**

Military jurisdiction is exercised through the application of military law, the law of war, military government, martial law, and military orders and regulations —

- **Military law** regulates the entire military establishment of the US.
- **Law of war** is that segment of treaty and customary international law applicable to warfare.
- **Military government** is the administration by which an occupying power exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority over occupied territory.
- **Martial law** or martial rule is the temporary exercise of control over domestic territory by a military commander as authorized by the President.
- **Military orders and regulations** are used in a military organization for its internal direction.
Military jurisdiction extends to military personnel whether or not they are in an area under military control. The military has exclusive jurisdiction to try persons subject to the UCMJ for offenses purely military in nature, such as unauthorized absences. The Supreme Court has abandoned the requirement of showing a “service connection” for off-post offenses before a service member can be tried. A service member may now be tried in a court-martial regardless of any service connection. It is Army policy that a service member will not ordinarily be prosecuted under civil jurisdiction and later under military jurisdiction for the same offense. The military rarely has jurisdiction to try civilians.

Civil Jurisdiction

Civil jurisdiction is exercised through the application of state and federal law. Under the Constitution the states retain the right to regulate conduct of persons within their boundaries. Penal laws, which declare certain acts to be unlawful, are defined and enforced by state, county, and local governments and their regulatory agencies. For example, traffic regulations, liquor laws, and closing hours are usually set by local law. Some penal laws pertain to specific matters or areas within the civil jurisdiction of the federal government. Such federal law, like customs regulations and counterfeiting laws, is enforced by federal agencies.

Under international law, a friendly foreign power normally has primary jurisdiction to prosecute nonmilitary offenses committed within its borders by members of a visiting force. This power may be further defined or surrendered to military authorities through SOFAs and other treaties or agreements depending upon the nature and circumstances of the offense. This limitation to prosecute does not prohibit commanders from taking administrative action against suspects. Guidance on the exercise of military jurisdiction subsequent to action by civilian authorities is found in AR 27-10. When doubt exists on jurisdiction over a particular individual or offense, consult the SJA.

PROTECTING LEGAL RIGHTS

An MP can make contact with a person in any place the MP is lawfully situated. Examples of lawful contacts include questioning of witnesses to a crime and warning a pedestrian that he is entering a dangerous area. These types of contacts are reasonable, permissible, and within the normal activities of MP and commanders. They are not detentions in any sense. MP may inspect or walk through barracks or the unit area. MP may be any place where consent has been given by a person who has the power to give consent. They may be any place with the consent or authorization of a commander, or any place where they are present to effect a lawful apprehension.

An MP may make a contact when the person is not subject to the Fourth Amendment. This is a proper activity of a commander or MP. Every contact between the police and a citizen is not a detention, and does not demand a basis for the contact. Many contacts between MP (and commanders) and other persons are not based on suspicion of criminal activity. However, some contacts may result in finding evidence of a crime.

Contacts between MP and others may occur without thought of criminal activities. MP assist disabled people, untangle congested traffic, and escort intoxicated persons to shelter. MP perform other helping activities as required.

RIGHTS WARNING

The law requires that a military member who questions a military or civilian suspect
or accused must be exercising some form of police or disciplinary power before he is required to read the person his rights. If an apprehending MP considers it important to question a suspect while in the field, the MP must advise the suspect of his rights. Any individual can be read rights before even the most innocent questioning. However, a commander or MP who is questioning a suspect is performing a disciplinary role and has to read the person his or her rights. When in doubt, read the rights.

When a law enforcement official or commander intends to question an accused or suspect of an offense and knows, or reasonably knows, that counsel either has been appointed for or retained by the accused or suspect with respect to that offense, the counsel must be notified of the intended interrogation and given a reasonable time in which to attend before the interrogation may proceed. A suspect or accused who is intoxicated or who is suffering from a serious injury or illness should not be interrogated. Nor should a suspect or accused be interrogated who is hysterical or emotionally upset. In these cases the court may rule that the suspect could not give an intelligent, knowing waiver of his rights. During an interrogation the questioner will not attempt to persuade, trick, or threaten the suspect or accused into waiving his rights. The suspect or accused will make his own decisions. The questioner will not subject the suspect or accused to prolonged questioning without a break. The questioner will not threaten the suspect or accused into confessing and will not physically abuse the suspect or accused.

A suspect or an accused must be warned whenever answers are wanted to questions. If a person will be asked to perform an act that might be the equivalent of speech, such as pointing to a coat worn on a specific date, the rights must be read. It is not necessary for the warning to be given before conducting a lawful search of the suspect. But if any doubt exists, the rights are read.

On many occasions, an individual may approach an MP, a commander, or a noncommissioned officer and furnish information concerning criminal activities. Listening never requires a warning. However, any time the listener wants to interrupt the person giving the statement and clarify some information, questioning does take place and a warning is required.

A warning is not needed before questioning a person who is merely a witness to a crime. Nor is it needed to question someone who may know something about a crime but who is not a suspect. For example, asking a witness to a crime which way the perpetrator went requires no warning. Nor would asking someone to show his identification card if the identification card is not suspected to be evidence.

The warning is repeated any time there is a significant delay in questioning. If questioning a person who after waiving his rights and agreeing to answer questions has been released for the night, the next day that person must be rewarned of his rights. But if the person is released for lunch or is released to go back to the unit to get some clothing, a new warning is not required. And if it is known that an accused or a suspect has been warned by another officer and has chosen to waive his rights, there is no need to give another warning when there is no significant delay in questioning. The warning also is repeated to a suspect if he indicates that he did not understand the first warning or that he might want to change his mind about answering questions.

If a suspect remains silent after he has been given the required warnings and has been asked if he wants a lawyer and is willing to make a statement, he is not questioned further. However, if the person merely indicates that he will not sign a waiver form but is willing to waive his rights, the questioning can continue. When a person waives his rights but objects to note taking by the questioner, the questioning can continue; but the note taking stops for practical reasons.
If the accused or suspect first agrees to answer questions and then says that he does not want to talk or say anything more, the questioning stops. If the accused or suspect answers some questions, then stops and requests a lawyer, the questioner must stop asking questions until a lawyer has been provided or the accused or suspect initiates further questioning.

When a lineup will be used, the suspect must be warned of his lineup rights and his right to counsel. If a suspect is under any form of pretrial restraint, or if charges have been preferred against him, then before placing him in a lineup at the MP station, the MP must warn the suspect of his right to counsel.

“Although you do not have a right to refuse to appear in a lineup, you have the right to have a lawyer present when the witnesses to the crime view the lineup. If you wish, a military lawyer will be appointed for you to represent you free of charge.”

To ensure the pretrial lineup is not suggestive, the following steps are taken:

- There are at least four fillers in the lineup.
- MP are not to be used as fillers in lineups. Additionally, fillers in a lineup are not informed of who the suspect is otherwise nonverbal communication by them may be communicated to the witness. Fillers in the lineup resemble the suspect. When the characteristics of the suspect cannot be matched, it may be better to use some sort of photographic identification.
- The person conducting the lineup is not to be involved with the specific investigation. The person is not to make any suggestions because they may adversely affect the integrity of the lineup.
- Witnesses must be separated before and after any identification of the suspect. One witness may have an unfavorable influence on another.
- Witnesses to the lineup are not allowed to make an identification in the presence of one another.
- The suspect or his counsel is allowed to determine the suspect’s position in the lineup. The suspect is allowed to change his position after each viewing.
- When individuals in the lineup are required to try on clothing or to perform other acts, all individuals perform these acts, not just the suspect.
- The suspect’s counsel may request certain changes in the lineup procedures; however, he has no right to dictate how police will conduct the lineup. See FM 19-20 for more information on lineups.

The warning must be given by using the warning shown on the back of DA Form 3881 (Rights Warning Procedure/Waiver Certificate). A service member’s rights under the self-incrimination clause and Article 31 ensure that he cannot be forced to answer any incriminating questions or to make any incriminating physical acts equivalent to speech (for example, soldiers cannot be ordered to point out the clothes that were worn at the time of a rape offense). The taking of such evidence is considered to be requesting a statement within the meaning of Article 31.

Correct use of DA Form 3881 requires the narrative warning on the reverse of the form be read verbatim to the suspect. (See FM 19-20 for a detailed discussion for issuing rights warnings.) Warning the individual of his rights means more than just reading the warning found on the back of DA Form 3881. To waive his rights, the suspect must show some understanding which ordinarily will require, after each warning, an answer on the suspect’s part that proves his understanding. The individual must state, first, that he is willing to make a statement, and second, that he does not wish to have an attorney present nor to consult with an attorney before questioning can continue. The suspect is then asked to execute the waiver portion of the form documenting his
RIGHTS WARNING PROCEDURE

SECTION B - RIGHTS WARNING PROCEDURE

**THE WARNING**

1. **WARNING**: Inform the suspect/accused of:
   a. Your official position.
   b. Nature of offense(s).
   c. The fact that he/she is a suspect/accused.

2. **RIGHTS**: Advise the suspect/accused of his/her rights as follows:
   a. Before I ask you any questions, you must understand your rights:
      - "You do not have to answer my questions or say anything."
   b. "Anything you say or do can be used as evidence against you in a criminal trial."
   c. (For personnel subject to the UCMJ): "You have the right to talk privately to a lawyer before, during, and after questioning and to have a lawyer present with you during questioning. This lawyer can be a civilian you arrange for at no expense to the Government or a military lawyer detailed for you at no expense to you, or both."
   d. "If you are now willing to discuss the offense(s) under investigation, with or without a lawyer present, you have a right to stop answering questions at any time, or speak privately with a lawyer before answering further, even if you sign a waiver certificate." Make certain the suspect/accused fully understands his/her rights.

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**THE WAIVER**

"Do you understand your rights?"
(if the suspect/accused says "no," determine what is not understood, and if necessary, repeat the appropriate rights advisement. If the suspect/accused says "yes," ask the following question.)

"Do you want a lawyer at this time?"
(if the suspect/accused says "yes," stop the interview and have him/her read and sign the non waiver section of the waiver certificate on the other side of this form. If the suspect says "yes," have him/her read and sign the waiver section of the waiver certificate on the other side of this form.)

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**SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS**

WHEN SUSPECT/ACCUSED REFUSES TO SIGN WAIVER CERTIFICATE: If the suspect/accused orally waves his/her rights but refuses to sign the waiver certificate, you may proceed with the questioning. Make notations on the waiver certificate to the effect that he/she has stated that he/she understands his/her rights, does not want a lawyer, wants to discuss the offense(s) under investigation, and refuses to sign the waiver certificate.

IF WAIVER CERTIFICATE CANNOT BE COMPLETED IMMEDIATELY: In all cases the waiver certificate must be completed as soon as possible. Every effort should be made to complete the waiver certificate before any questioning begins. If the waiver certificate cannot be completed at once, as in the case of street interrogation, completion may be temporarily postponed. Notes should be kept on the circumstances.

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**PRIOR INCriminating STATEMENTS**

1. If the suspect/accused has made spontaneous incriminating statements before being properly advised of his/her rights, he/she should be told that such statements do not obligate him/her to answer further questions.

2. If the suspect/accused was questioned as such either without being advised of his/her rights or some question exists as to the propriety of the first statement, the accused must be so advised. The office of the serving Staff Judge Advocate should be contacted for assistance in drafting the proper rights advisal.

NOTE: If (1) or (2) apply, the fact that the suspect/accused was advised accordingly should be noted in the comment section on the waiver certificate and initialed by the suspect/accused.

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Revers of DA Form 3881

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form (waiver block) and the investigator signs the form where indicated. The suspect is asked to initial the investigator's statement, but initials are not essential. Guidance for preparing DA Form 3881 can be found in FM 19-20. When a suspect consents to questioning, the statement is recorded on DA Form 2823 (Sworn Statement). When questioning is completed, a DA Form 3975 is filled out and the required entries made on DA Form 3997 and DA Form 3998 (Military Police Desk Reference).
The individual requesting a statement or conducting the interrogation will probably do so in the English language. If there appears to be a language barrier, the interrogator must ensure that the individual is aware of his rights in his native language. The understanding of the rights also comes into play when an individual is grossly intoxicated. Such an individual cannot make a voluntary waiver.

**TEMPORARY DETENTION**

Detention is temporary. It is not used for purposes of confinement. Persons are detained only when military necessity, the safety of the individual, or the safety of others makes it necessary.

Juveniles are detained only if all or some of the following conditions are met:

- The detention is authorized by the installation commander.
- The juvenile is suspected of a serious criminal offense requiring the exercise of jurisdiction by civilian law enforcement authorities.
- The parents or other suitable relatives are not available to take custody of the offender at the time of apprehension.
- The detention is for the purpose of transferring custody of the juvenile, at the earliest possible time, either to the child’s parent or to the appropriate state or federal agency having jurisdiction.

If a juvenile must be detained until the appropriate juvenile authorities are contacted, the MP will then notify the military sponsor’s unit commander. In cases where the juvenile has no military sponsor, the MP will follow the directions given by the juvenile authority. Because of special protections accorded juveniles under many state statutes, MP may not obtain fingerprints or photographs of a juvenile without written consent of the juvenile judge. Nor may names or pictures of the juvenile be released to the public.

The youth must be kept entirely away from operational activities of the MP station. The area where juveniles are detained must be comfortable, private, and out of public view. Unless there is another suitable area, the PM’s office may have to be used. Since juveniles are not subject to the UCMJ, the detention of juveniles in correctional custody, detention cells, or hospital prisoner wards is forbidden. A detention cell may be used for juveniles when there is a threat to the community, the juveniles, or MP involved and authority has been obtained from the installation commander through legal channels. (See Chapters 6 and 10 for more information on juveniles.)

Facilities for temporary detention of adults apprehended by MP are located within the MP station. These facilities are close enough to the desk for continuous observation. They are sufficiently removed so normal operations will not be hindered. These facilities must not be open to casual view by visitors. If the cell location does not permit desk personnel to maintain observation when occupied, a guard or an MP must be posted. Closed circuit television can be used as an alternative method of observation. In detaining females, female MP must be present for security and observation purposes. Male and female detainees are not placed in the same cell.

Detention of suspects requires a blotter entry that shows who ordered the detention, the reason, the time detention began, and the time of release. Detainees are furnished normal amounts of food and water. Bedding is provided if detained more than 12 hours. Normally, detention does not exceed 24 hours. However, the installation commander may extend the period to 72 hours. Use of showers and latrine facilities for women is determined by individual PMs per AR 190-38 and available facilities.

If the decision is made by the PM or responsible MP supervisor to place a suspect in detention, a thorough search must be made. Personnel performing the search and those acting as witnesses must
be of the same sex as the offender being searched. After the search has been conducted, the offender is then placed in a cell. Money, other valuables, and personal property (other than individual clothing and wedding rings) are taken from the offender, inventoried in his presence, and secured. Items of clothing that could be used to inflict bodily injury are taken from the suspect if deemed necessary by the responsible MP supervisor. The suspect is given a receipt, DA Form 4137 (Evidence/Property Custody Document), for all items taken. The reason for and degree of any use of force required is also recorded in either the desk blotter or the DA Form 1594.

A DA Form 3975, DA Form 3998, and DA Form 4137 must be prepared on any detention involving an offense. This includes suspicions or allegations of offenses. The suspicion or allegation is described in the report, whether or not it is derogatory to the person detained. Entries are made on the MP blotter on all temporary detentions.

Persons who are under the influence of drugs, injured, or ill must be examined by a medical officer before or immediately after being placed in detention. A blotter entry is made indicating time, diagnosis, disposition, and the name, rank, and organization of the medical officer or physician’s assistant. Minor injuries requiring simple first aid, such as cuts and abrasions, are treated by MP unless the suspect specifically requests a medical officer. Written certification must be filed by the medical officer concerning the person’s health if an examination is required.
CHAPTER 6

Undertaking Preventive Programs

Military police law enforcement programs support command strength, readiness, and well-being. And they help assist and protect the military community. Most MP programs are proactive. Preventing crime by suppressing the opportunity for it is at the base of all law enforcement planning. MP programs are diverse. Major programs are directed toward supporting military law enforcement needs. But a number of efforts like customs information services and wildlife conservation are equally supportive of civilian law enforcement needs. And often the liaison and interaction between MP and the civilian community that makes a program effective is, in itself, proactive for law and order.

CRIME PREVENTION

Crime prevention is a primary goal for all Army law enforcement elements. Strong installation physical security programs and vice control programs support installation crime prevention programs. The DA crime prevention program goal is to provide a secure environment for service members and their families, government employees, and the general public. Crime prevention is a command responsibility having a continuing command emphasis.

Crime prevention employs proactive measures aimed at protecting persons and their property and the property of the federal government. Basic policies of crime prevention are presented in AR 190-31. Use of specific preventive techniques is made after a careful review of a problem and its causative factors. Concern is focused on the number and types of crimes being committed and where crimes are being committed.

Crime prevention is an ongoing process of planning, implementing measures, evaluating their effectiveness, modifying measures, and developing further information. During the planning step of the crime prevention program development, the PM must generate sufficient, accurate, and up-to-date information with which to organize a viable prevention plan. A series of priorities must be established to determine where MP assets are needed.

One of the principal means for developing information on the extent of a criminal threat is the use of a crime prevention survey. This is an examination of all physical and geographical features within and adjacent to military facilities in order to determine any conditions that may ease or encourage criminal acts that will be detrimental to the command. This thorough, complete, and continuing report includes the composition of both military and civilian populations, a review of the state of order and discipline in the command, and a study of any physical features of the military site.
LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

It becomes the principal guide for determining the personnel, equipment, and direction of the crime prevention program. Military peculiar offenses, such as disrespect and disobedience to orders, are command concerns and must be prevented by the unit commander. Installation crime prevention efforts focus on preventing the more violent crimes, such as murder, rape, and assault, by active enforcement and patrolling activities. In a mature theater of operations crime prevention program, the major effort of the PM is toward detecting organized criminal behavior that threatens the command as a whole. These areas include organized vice activities, wholesale pilferage of arriving supplies, black-market operations, currency manipulation, organized deserter bands, and narcotics activities. Such areas are a command-wide concern and require command-wide participation in their suppression and prevention.

The crime prevention plan is placed into action; orders, plans, and operational procedures are published. Education programs are implemented to alert members of the command to any criminal threat that exists. Organized task forces may be employed to aggressively move against those criminal threats considered by the commander to be the most threatening to good order and discipline within the command.

Most often when crime does occur, the Crime Prevention Branch, augmented by MP investigators, conducts a crime analysis to identify problem areas. The areas are then targeted by crime prevention and MPI personnel in a manner which makes apprehension highly possible. This permits the uniformed patrol to remain in their patrol area, deterring crime through maximum visibility.

The system may require additional personnel to be assigned to the Crime Prevention and/or MP Investigation sections based on an increased role in targeting high crime areas. However, the high visibility of uniformed patrols usually results in a decrease in crime rates.

Evaluation is made as a result of analysis and review developed through statistical data on the effectiveness of the command program. Based upon the analysis and any change of priorities by the commander, the initial program is altered to become more effective. The cycle then begins again.

The PM, as the chief law enforcement official of the command, has primary staff responsibility for crime prevention. His efforts are supported by staff members, subordinate commanders, members of governmental and law enforcement agencies within the civilian community, and other agencies. The installation crime prevention council meets to review findings of physical security and crime prevention inspections and corrective actions taken. They also review the financial impact of installation crime and preventive measures. They address crime trends and conditions conducive to crime. And they discuss the effectiveness of existing crime prevention programs. The council looks for ways to increase the usefulness of the program. The council is chaired by a member of the installation command element. The PM or security officer serves as the coordinator. The council includes delegates from the installation staff, major unit commanders, and delegates from tenant or attached units.

A crime prevention officer, appointed in writing by the installation commander, manages the installation crime prevention program (AR 190-31). MP with extensive experience in physical security or MP investigators are normally assigned as crime prevention specialists. Unit crime prevention officers (E6 or above) are designated in writing at all levels of command. Unit crime prevention officers—

- Conduct announced or unannounced crime prevention inspections of unit areas.
- Ensure electro-stylus etching markers are available to the military community for

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marking government and personal property.

- Develop crime prevention themes for installation and local command information programs.

Crime prevention personnel support the installation council by performing crime data analysis, drafting programs for the council’s consideration, inspecting the implementation of council-mandated measures, and coordinating the efforts of unit/activity crime prevention officers in implementing the installation crime prevention program. For a state-of-the-art discussion of crime analysis, crime countermeasures, and community crime prevention programs, see DA Pamphlet 190-31.

**PROVIDING PHYSICAL SECURITY**

An effective physical security program supports installation crime prevention. A strong physical security program helps identify, reduce, eliminate, or neutralize conditions favorable to criminal activity. Physical security inspections and surveys are conducted as a part of the overall program. Physical security inspections and surveys reduce the opportunity, and desire, for engaging in criminal acts. Physical security inspections and surveys are made on designated mission-essential or vulnerable activities within a command. This includes reserve centers and Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) activities that a command supports. The results of physical security inspections are reported on DA Form 2806-1-R (Physical Security Inspection Report). Physical security surveys are reported on DA Form 2806-R (Physical Security Survey Report). (See AR 190-13.) Activities examined may be internal (such as cash flow procedures) or external (such as lighting intensity or door security).
Physical security inspectors are selected by the PM, security officer, or installation commander. Inspectors must hold military occupational specialty (MOS) 95B and meet the qualifications listed in AR 190-13. Civilian inspectors must meet Office of Personnel Management qualification standards. (These standards can be found in the local civilian personnel office.) Qualified physical security inspectors are issued DA Form 4261 and DA Form 4261-1 (Physical Security Inspector Identification Card).

Before conducting inspections the inspectors must know the function or mission of the area, facility, or activity being inspected. They must be familiar with the regulations and directives required for the operation of the activity. They should know of offenses or incidents that have occurred in the past. They review prior surveys or inspections conducted and who conducted them. They also note deficiencies found and if any personnel changes have occurred.

Inspectors check to see if adequate security safeguards are provided. They note practices or conditions that contribute to the commission of crimes. They look for changes or additions required. That is, they see what personnel, regulations or directives, procedures, or equipment is needed to satisfy security requirements. And they note the actions needed by the commander, PM, or other staff officers to provide required security.

After inspecting, the inspector makes a thorough analysis of findings. He or she weighs deficient measures, factors, or conditions against existing standards and requirements. The inspector balances manpower and financial costs of recommended measures against the protection provided. Then the inspector briefs the PM on the findings using maps, plots, sketches. He recommends corrective action. If necessary he makes on-site visits with the PM to clarify the recommendations.

Following the inspector’s final briefing, the PM reports the findings of the survey with recommended actions to the commander. Upon receipt of the commander’s decision, a written report is provided to the responsible office for action and reply. If extensive time is needed for the corrective action, target dates for completion are established and reported in the reply.

Follow-up inspections should be made of the facility, activity, or area inspected after a lapse of not more than three months. This will show if recommendations have been carried out. It will also show if major changes in mission or personnel may make further study and evaluation necessary. Specific guidance in establishing and maintaining a practical, economical, and effective physical security program is contained in AR 190-13. For activities that may require surveys and inspections, see FM 19-30, AR 195-2, and AR T90-13.

CONTROLLING VICE ACTIVITIES

An effective vice control program helps ensure a command’s strength, readiness, and well-being. Vice activities have adverse effects on the health, welfare, and morale of a command. Prostitution, gambling, narcotics, and other types of vice can lower the command’s readiness or contribute to criminal incidents. MP suppression of vice helps the commander maintain discipline and order.

On post, the control of vice is a PM responsibility. Off post, the control of such activities rests in the hands of the civil authorities. But MP may assist in the prevention of offenses outside a military installation by enforcing off-limits regulations. And they can warn military personnel to avoid known trouble spots and areas.

The provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act prohibit participation by MP in raids, searches, and seizures of establishments off post conducted by civil police. However, in overseas areas where this act does not apply MP may participate in such action if requested by civilian authorities and when a
military member is involved. Since SOFAS and international law will apply, the local SJA office is contacted before participating in any such activity.

**Prostitution and Gambling**

AR 190-24 and AR 210-10 provide that prostitution will be suppressed by all commanders in areas under Army control and among persons subject to Army jurisdiction. The regulations specify that places of prostitution will be placed off-limits to military personnel. Commanders are enjoined to cooperate with agencies engaged in activities designed to suppress prostitution affecting military personnel.

The suppression of prostitution is an established policy of the Department of the Army in its program for the welfare of personnel, the development and guidance of character, and the control of venereal disease. The policy applies to all overseas commands as well as those commands within the continental United States. It is the responsibility of all commanders to secure compliance with this policy. All practices that can in any way be interpreted as fostering or condoning prostitution will be prohibited. Violations will be handled through appropriate disciplinary actions. Identified houses of prostitution will be declared off-limits to all US military personnel. Action taken in this connection will be coordinated with proper authorities of the other services. In the United States, the civil authorities have complete control over the suppression of prostitution off the military installation. The policy of suppression is accomplished through cooperation with civilian law enforcement agencies and health organizations. Full cooperation will be given civilian and other government agencies engaged in the suppression of prostitution and the elimination of sources of venereal infection. Where local authorities fail to cooperate, the commander may appeal to higher authority to negotiate improvement of conditions. The commander may also take necessary countermeasures, such as temporarily declaring the affected area or establishments off-limits to soldiers.

The May Act, 18 USC 1384, was initially enacted by Congress in 1941 as an emergency measure to prohibit prostitution within such reasonable distances of military and/or naval establishments as the Secretaries of the Army and Navy should determine to be needed for the efficiency, health, and welfare of the Army and Navy. The act makes it unlawful within such “reasonable distance” to engage in prostitution, to aid or abet prostitution, or to procure or solicit for the purpose of prostitution. Persons or organizations not subject to the articles of the UCMJ who are guilty of violating the May Act will be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.

Department of the Army policy stresses control of gambling rather than suppression. But Army regulations prohibit gambling in service clubs (AR 215-1) and gambling by disbursing officers (AR 37-103). Excessive losses because of gambling may lead to commission of other crimes and offenses, such as robbery, burglary, and embezzlement. The PM is familiar with the gambling situation within his jurisdiction and adjacent areas. The PM studies its impact on offense rates and the conduct of personnel who are off duty. When appropriate, the PM recommends to the commander that consideration for off-limits action be presented to the Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board. Information on dishonest gambling practices is made available to civil agencies concerned with controlling gambling.

Preventive action against gambling is implemented through appropriate command channels. Publicity relating to gambling is used to inform all personnel of the inherent dangers of gambling.
Alcohol and Drug Abuse

The introduction, sale, possession, and use of alcoholic beverages are permitted on Army installations as authorized by AR 215-2. But commanders must ensure that persons under 21 years of age are not permitted to use, possess, buy, or introduce intoxicating beverages in any form to an activity unless the laws of the state allow it. Persons under 21 years of age must not be employed in any capacity for the sale, handling, dispensing, or serving of any intoxicating beverages. Nor may intoxicating beverages be sold, used, consumed, or permitted in, on, or about the premises of any service club, crafts facility, or youth activity facility. The PM enforces the command’s adherence to this regulation.

The costliness of drugs and difficulty in obtaining them can result in the user resorting to criminal acts to obtain them. Commanders and PMs at all levels curb the use or sale of narcotics and other prohibited drugs through education, detection of trafficking, and prompt apprehension and disposition of users and suppliers.

In areas where narcotics, marihuana, and other dangerous drugs are readily available to military personnel, information on the dangers of using these drugs, the aid that can be given to police authorities, and the progress made in prosecuting sellers and users of narcotics is disseminated through command, public information, and human self-development program channels. For example, specially trained personnel may speak to assembled troops on the dangers of drug use.

Public awareness is an important factor in the prevention of alcohol and drug abuse. Coordination with civilian law enforcement and Alcoholics Anonymous can help to formulate and implement drug and alcohol abuse awareness programs. These programs also can help identify on- and off-post conditions that contribute to the installation’s alcohol and drug problem.

Installation commanders, with the help of the post MP, will maintain an alcohol safety action program (ASAP) and an alcohol countermeasures program patterned after the Department of Transportation Alcohol Safety Action Projects. These programs are designed to help identify alcohol and drug abusers. Rehabilitation programs require extensive planning, coordination, supervision, and an understanding of the offender to be effective. Evaluations of accident rates, driver’s license suspension and revocation actions, public opinion, and feedback from counseling and medical personnel are used to enhance these programs.

The public must be aware of the alcohol and/or drug problem, the behavior of an intoxicated driver or drug user, and the impact these problems have on the community. Individual actions that may be taken by the public need to be emphasized. To enhance the MP enforcement effort against alcohol and drug abuse, the public must be educated in the—

- Nature of the ASAP and its objective.
- Enforcement and countermeasures employed.
- Implied consent provision.
- Blood alcohol content index and its applicability.
- Legal and administrative consequences of driving while intoxicated.

The PM analyzes past and present alcohol and drug offenses. Traffic studies, as described in FM 19-25, maybe undertaken to determine factors such as voluntary compliance with speed limits, effectiveness of traffic control devices, and accident patterns. The PM then attempts to isolate areas requiring additional traffic supervision and enforcement beyond normally available resources. Once the PM identifies the factors that contribute to alcohol and/or drug problems, countermeasures are adopted and corrective actions taken.
Countermeasures will be proportionate to the resources available for the mission and to the nature of the specific problem. Some effective countermeasures include—

- Checkpoints at installation entrances to check vehicle registrations/driver’s licenses and to determine if the driver is or has been drinking.
- Traffic patrols dedicated solely to detecting and apprehending drinking drivers.
- Concentrated public education programs.

The PM is concerned with all aspects of these programs, but other staff agencies such as installation medical authorities, the alcohol and drug counselor, the chaplain, the SJA, the information officer, and the unit commander will have an active part in these programs as well.

The unit commander will ensure military personnel are referred to the installation alcohol and drug program for evaluation when convicted of, or subject to, official administrative action for any offense involving driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The person’s past history of such offenses will determine if referral to a mandatory drug-alcohol education or rehabilitation program is required. Driving privileges will be revoked in accordance with AR 190-5 for all drunk driving convictions as well as for those individuals who refuse to submit to chemical intoxication tests.
PREVENTING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

Military sponsors are responsible for the proper conduct of their dependents. Investigation into the causes of misconduct and the collection of background data are limited to essential information. But MP may extend their investigation to include the conduct of the child’s military sponsor if that conduct is dangerous or harmful to the child. Depending upon the frequency and nature of the juvenile’s offenses, a number of corrective measures may be taken.

In CONUS the commander has several administrative options that may be used separately or collectively. The commander may find it sufficient to accept payment for property that was damaged, destroyed, or stolen. The juvenile may be barred from using specific post facilities in which the offense took place. Hospital, dental, and other statutory privileges can be denied only under extraordinary circumstances (10 USC 1076). The commander also may order the youth off the post and barred from reentry. The commander may take more serious administrative measures for youths who reside on post by terminating the sponsor’s government quarters. When OCONUS the commander may reduce or suspend the juvenile’s privileges, officially reprimand the sponsor, or return the sponsor and dependents to the United States.

In CONUS the commander’s judicial options include considering the circumstances of the crime, jurisdiction, and prior offenses of the juvenile. Close liaison must be established between the PM, SJA, and civil authorities.

State and local juvenile courts are the desired agencies for handling minor juvenile cases as prescribed by 18 USC 5032. If an offense committed by a juvenile is a state crime and not committed in an area of exclusive federal legislative jurisdiction, local police and courts may assume jurisdiction.

If a juvenile offense is committed on a post where there is concurrent jurisdiction and MP investigation reveals that a dependent juvenile has committed a state crime, final disposition could include administrative action or trial by the appropriate civilian court or both. Many state statutes do provide for appeal of an adjudication of delinquency. If a state provides for an appeal, the juvenile court will provide the PM’s juvenile section this information and further guidance.

Damage to federal property is a federal crime. When juveniles commit serious federal offenses, the appropriate coordinating agencies may include the FBI, US Marshals, and the US Attorney’s Office. The ability to prosecute juveniles in federal district court is limited by 18 USC 403. According to the Supreme Court of the United States, a juvenile has no constitutional right to appeal. When the offense takes place OCONUS the juvenile may be prosecuted in HN courts if the case is serious and upon the advice of the SJA.

Diagnostic Interview

When an offense has occurred that involves a juvenile as a suspect, a juvenile officer or noncommissioned officer (NCO) conducts a diagnostic interview as soon as possible after the offense is committed. The purpose of the interview is to seek an answer as to why the offense occurred, and to gather information to determine what disposition would be in the best interests of the youth, the family, and the military community. Investigation into the causes of the misconduct and the collection of background data are limited to essential information. But MP may investigate the conduct of the child’s military sponsors if that conduct is dangerous or harmful to the child.

The diagnostic interview is conducted with the juvenile, with one or both parents present. The intent is to deal with the problem in a family context if possible, rather than as the youth’s problem alone. The interview may be conducted in private if
parents are uncooperative, domineering, or if their presence has an adverse effect upon the juvenile. While commanders have every right to monitor the situation and to receive reports of diagnostic interviews, they are not allowed to actively participate in counseling sessions.

During the interview the juvenile officer attempts to find out if the juvenile has a previous history of delinquency and behavior problems and, if the youth was a runaway, where he or she went and what happened. The juvenile officer attempts to find out the youngster’s feelings about the family and behavior at home as well as the parents’ feelings about the youth and their perception of the current problem. The juvenile officer also attempts to find out what actions, if any, the parents and the juvenile are taking to solve the behavior problems. Guidance on investigating juvenile delinquency and conducting juvenile interviews and interrogations is found in FM 19-20.

Based on the interview, the juvenile officer may counsel the juvenile and the family if a satisfactory solution appears to have been agreed upon. The youth may be referred to the school guidance counselor, a chaplain, or other social service personnel if the youth and family express a desire to seek professional help for their family problems. Or the youth may be referred to the mental hygiene clinic, an Army social worker, or other appropriate agency if it appears that deeply rooted problems are impairing the youth’s normal functioning in the family or community. The juvenile officer may recommend to the PM that administrative action be taken against the youth. Normally, this is reserved for repeat offenders. Or the juvenile officer may recommend that the juvenile be referred to the appropriate civil juvenile court system.

MP overseas often must contend with both juvenile dependents of United States military and civilian personnel and nondependent juvenile citizens of the host nation. This calls for great discretion and tact. Delinquent behavior off the installation may affect relations with the host nation. In incidents occurring on the installation, MP become involved in the investigation on referral of the incident to the proper social service activity for disposition. Minor incidents may be disposed of without formal action. The parents are counseled and the youth reprimanded, with a warning as to the consequences of future delinquency. More serious incidents involving juvenile dependents which are detrimental to the command may result in administrative action being taken.

Police and School Liaisons

Police and school liaison programs include MP visiting installation schools to create ongoing communication between the PM, the MP, the school faculty, and the student body.

The PM can establish good relations with local school officials by—

- Becoming acquainted with school officials on both a formal and informal basis.
- Reviewing the school delinquency prevention program and tactfully recommending improvements and offering other assistance.
- Working with the school guidance counselor or other school staff to determine disciplinary problems and other relevant data.
- Offering to speak and show films to the students on bicycle safety, drug and alcohol information, and other programs that will aid in creating a feeling of trust and friendship.
- Making MP assets available for school functions or affairs, such as open house displays, career days, athletic programs, and tours of military facilities.

Meetings between parents and the MP and school staff can do much to educate the parents to the causes of delinquency. The
development of a close working relationship with area schools will increase the effectiveness of any plan for delinquency prevention and control. The active assistance of school officials is necessary if plans for the welfare of the students are to be successful.

In a school environment the MP may serve as a resource person for school counselors. Depending on local policy, the MP may even become a part of a carefully structured school counseling and referral team. The MP may present safety and other lectures and advise school authorities on means of controlling theft and vandalism. The MP is not used to enforce school regulations, maintain order within classrooms, or become directly involved in ordinary school behavioral problems.

Juvenile Council

The juvenile council maintains an ongoing liaison with federal, state, and local juvenile systems and planning agencies. The juvenile council seeks to coordinate the juvenile welfare services of all installation agencies. It makes the system responsive to the child’s needs by eliminating jurisdictional disputes and misconceptions. The juvenile council reduces duplication of juvenile services and provides for efficient delivery of such services through systemwide planning. Planning must be flexible and responsive to community needs.

Members of the council review juvenile cases, dispositions, and follow-up treatment to ensure proper handling. The council is also responsible for the formulation and review of post delinquency programs. Representation on the council by the installation commander will allow juvenile problems and trends to be closely monitored and can generate interest within the command for juvenile programs.

CONTROLLING TRAFFIC

MP control traffic to enable the safe movement of personnel and supplies. On the battlefield, control of traffic is a part of the main MP mission of BCC. In combat MP use many of the same basic measures for BCC that in a peacetime environment are used to accomplish their law and order mission. Traffic control is accomplished as main supply route regulation enforcement. The traffic control measures used for BCC include measures of—

- Operating traffic control posts.
- Operating mobile patrols.
- Emplacing temporary route signs.

Other, more specialized, measures include operating—

- Holding areas.
- Roadblocks.
- Checkpoints.
- Defiles.
- Straggler control posts.
- Straggler collecting points.

See FM 19-4 for detailed discussion of traffic control as part of BCC.

In a peacetime environment on military installations, in addition to the measures used routinely to control circulation on the battlefield, MP enforce installation traffic laws. They investigate motor vehicle traffic accidents within their jurisdiction. They assist civilian agencies investigating traffic accidents involving military personnel or military vehicles. As part of their traffic control measures, MP may coordinate convoy movements with civil police authorities or provide convoy escort. They may also conduct vehicle registration. They may supervise the installation’s vehicle impoundment lot. And to help ensure movement of traffic, MP often employ speed and intoxication detection equipment to screen for unsafe drivers.

MP conduct traffic control studies to obtain information on specific traffic problems and usage patterns unique to an installation. Traffic control studies (see FM 19-25) provide information on types
of accidents that occur most frequently, the
time of day when accidents are most
frequent, the place where accidents are most
likely to occur, and driving offenses and
other factors that tend to cause accidents.
ADP equipment used for storage, retrieval,
interpretation, and validation of traffic
control information has greatly improved
the usability of traffic data. These data, once
collected and analyzed, can be used to
prevent traffic accidents. The PM can use
these studies to determine present and future
needs concerning traffic control and
associated traffic programs.

The PM can also use these studies to
analyze past and present alcohol and drug
offenses. The PM then attempts to isolate
areas requiring additional traffic supervision
and enforcement beyond normally available resources. Once the PM
identifies the factors that contribute to
alcohol and/or drug problems, counter-
measures are adopted and corrective actions
taken.

Results of traffic studies provide MP with
methods to prevent accidents. One method is
to distribute MP effectively during the hours
and days when, and at points where,
congestion is greatest or where accidents are
most likely to occur. MP must give particular
attention to the types of violations that are
causing accidents. MP also evaluate
effectiveness of traffic enforcement
measures and emphasize driver training and
pedestrian education. MP recommend more
effective uses for traffic control devices and
safeguards. They also coordinate traffic flow
with facilities engineers. They recommend
engineering improvements to eliminate
hazards that cause frequent traffic
accidents.

**Installation Traffic Control**

The basis for a well-planned and
organized traffic control plan is a traffic
enforcement program and educational and
safety programs. MP traffic control plans
provide for the safe and efficient movement
of military and civilian vehicles. These plans
are coordinated with headquarters, staff
offices, and civil authorities before
implementation. Plans will include accident
investigation and prevention and the
conduct of traffic control studies and
surveys. When developing plans, movement
of military convoys, emergency medical
vehicles, and fire trucks will take precedence
over all other vehicular traffic.

MP are responsible for implementing the
installation traffic control plan. These
responsibilities include—

- Enforcing all traffic laws, regulations,
and orders.
- Reporting and investigating traffic
accidents.
- Operating traffic control posts on the
installation.
- Reporting traffic conditions.
- Performing escort and convoy escort
duties.
- Recommending type and location of
traffic control devices.
- Advising facility engineer of traffic signs
and control devices that need repairing
or replacing.

Whenever possible, traffic signs and
devices are used to indicate routes and
dangerous points and to direct or control
traffic. Unmanned traffic control equipment
aids in providing maximum control using a
minimal number of MP assets. MP post
temporary signs and route markings.
Luminous paint or other appropriate
material may be used for night illumination
consistent with safety or blackout
regulations. Information concerning signs
can be found in the *Manual on Uniform
Traffic Control Devices*.

The making and posting of permanent
signs and devices is a facility engineer
function. MP on patrol report to the facility
engineer the location of traffic control
equipment needing repair. MP report to the
PM control points requiring signs.
LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

Speed-measuring devices are used to conduct speed studies and increase compliance with traffic laws. When planning to use speed-measuring devices, the device or method best suited for the situation must be considered. These considerations are—

- Cost.
- Local recognition by judicial authorities.
- Training required for persons to use devices.
- Maintenance requirements.
- Mission and environment of unit employing the devices.

Speed-measuring devices or methods used by the MP are—

- Stopwatches.
- Radar.
- Aircraft.
- Pace method.

See FM 19-25 for more information on speed-measuring devices and methods.

Traffic Offenses

MP ensure military vehicles are operated only by authorized military or civilian personnel. MP efforts are directed toward serious traffic offenses. Serious offenses include speeding, reckless driving, drunken driving, overloading, and transporting civilians without authority. The driver or the senior passenger, or both, if charged with a serious offense, may be apprehended and the vehicle impounded. Minor offenses not referable to the magistrate system may be referred to the unit commander using DD Form 1408 (Armed Forces Traffic Ticket) or DA Form 3975. All other traffic offenses will be handled using DD Form 1805.

If the installation commander tasks the PM to have vehicles registered on post, then DA Form 3626 (Vehicle Registration/Driver Record) must be filled out and maintained.

DA Form 3626 is prepared on each registrant of a car. A separate form is prepared on persons who also drive the car and are involved in a chargeable traffic offense or receive a moving traffic violation.
It is made out in one copy. If the form indicates suspension or revocation of the registrant’s driving privileges or shows accumulation of points, the form is to be mailed to the PM of the gaining command upon permanent change of station (PCS) of the soldier concerned.

The forms of military personnel who are being separated from the service and civilian personnel who terminate employment will be destroyed. Information concerning decals and control procedures is outlined in AR 190-5.

DD Form 1805 is used by law enforcement agencies in conjunction with the US Magistrate System to cite individuals with minor offenses. PMs must coordinate with the US magistrate of his area for—
- A list of minor offenses for which mail-in procedures are authorized.
- The amount of the fine for each specific offense.
- A list of minor offenses which require a mandatory appearance of the violator before the magistrate.

Two copies are returned to the PM office for transmittal to US District Court. A copy is returned to the PM office for filing. And a copy is issued to the violator or placed on the violator’s vehicle. All violation notices require:
- Social security number of issuing MP.
- Date of notice.
- Description of violation, including place and time if applicable.
- Violation code number and issuing location code number.

DD Form 1408 is used for reporting minor traffic offenses. A copy of the form is forwarded through command channels. DD Form 1408 is administratively processed in accordance with AR 190-5. The form does not require any supporting forms or letters of transmittal. A copy is filed in the office of the PM. A copy is given to the violator. Or in the case of an unattended vehicle violation, this copy will be placed under the windshield wiper of the vehicle or otherwise conspicuously affixed to the vehicle.
DD Form 1408 may also be used as a warning notice. Void traffic tickets will be marked VOID in large letters and all copies turned in to the desk sergeant.

DD Form 1920 (Alcoholic Influence Report) is used to record observations of an individual apprehended for an offense in which alcoholic influence, such as drunken driving, is a factor. This form is made out in sufficient copies to satisfy local requirements. At least one copy will be attached to each copy of the DA Form 3975.

Detecting an intoxicated driver is both the most difficult task in the enforcement effort and the most important. If MP fail to detect violations, other countermeasure programs will also fail. Several methods may be used to deter violators. An effective installation intoxicated driving prevention program may include the use of systematic gate inspections, a cone maze, or regular, trained patrols.

Systematic gate inspections may be used to deter violators. These inspections may be conducted to ensure security, military fitness, or good order and discipline. Gate inspections must be coordinated with the local SJA and authorized by the installation commander. Gate inspections must be documented, and signs must be displayed to warn personnel that they are liable to search upon entry, exit, or while on the installation. Incoming personnel who object to being inspected are not searched over their objections. In this case they can be denied the right of entry. Personnel exiting the installation cannot refuse inspection. MP selected to participate in the inspection are thoroughly briefed. MP maintain a log recording all significant events.

The cone maze is setup in an S shape and also is an effective detection aid. Normally, the unimpaired driver will see the cones at a reasonable distance, perceive the problem, slow down, and carefully adjust to the challenge. An impaired driver, on the other hand, because of inadequate perception, unusually fast vehicle speed, or the inability to make multiple turning movements within the lane of travel, will knock down or run over cones.

The MP observes visual clues when the suspect is operating a vehicle. An effective detection program begins with the recognition that those who drive under the influence have certain behavior patterns that can be identified.

The typical contact involves three separate and distinct phases. It should be emphasized that MP will probably not go through all three phases with every suspected violator. Probable cause must be established to apprehend. Many times this is readily apparent by phase two.

In phase one the MP observes the vehicle in motion to note any initial clues of a possible violation. The major decision is to determine if there is sufficient cause to stop the vehicle. The MP observes the manner in which the suspect responds to the signal to stop and notes any additional evidence of a violation. The MP looks for clues such as driver—

- Attempting to elude the stop.
- Stoping vehicle in roadway where shoulder is available.
- Using the wrong turn signal.
- Obstructs other traffic.

Once the vehicle is stopped, phase two begins. In phase two the MP observes the driver during initial contact. The major decision is to determine if the suspect should exit the vehicle for field sobriety testing. The MP observes the driver exit the vehicle and notes any additional evidence of impairment. The MP looks for more obvious clues such as the driver—

- Fumbling through his billfold.
- Leaning on the automobile for balance,
- Slurring his speech.
- Stumbling.
- Seeming to lack orientation.
- Having a flushed face.
- Having bloodshot eyes.
If the MP is still undecided at this point, **phase three** begins. In phase three the MP administers a preliminary breath test and formal psychophysical field sobriety tests consistent with state law to evaluate the extent of the suspect’s impairment. The MP must take adequate traffic control measures during the testing phase to ensure the suspect’s safety at all times. The major decision is to determine if the driver is to be apprehended. Tests will help determine probable cause. Once the decision to apprehend has been made, the successful prosecution depends upon the MP’s ability to organize and present all relevant information to the court. The MP’s observations are critical.

Blood withdrawal is the most accurate method of determining different levels of alcohol and/or drug intoxication in the blood. This procedure is done by authorized medical personnel. However, breath analysis has been accepted as a substitute for blood withdrawal for alcohol testing. Evidential blood alcohol testing equipment is critical to the actual evaluation and subsequent prosecution of violators. The use of the portable breath tester may provide sufficient evidence for probable cause. Each installation is authorized one chemical breath-testing device by Common Table of Allowances (CTA) 50-909. Chemical breath analysts are selected and trained to use the device. The device provides rapid, reliable, and judicially acceptable test results. For judicial purposes, the device used must be one that is authorized for use in the host state. Chemical breath-testing devices and the percentage levels of alcohol impairment are outlined in AR 190-5.

If the chemical breath-testing device is not available or is not legally usable in the area, then the formal psychophysical field sobriety tests are used. The one-leg stand, the walk and turn, and the horizontal gaze nystagmus test (HGNT) have been developed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, using many years of experience throughout the country, and have been refined by scientific research to make them as accurate and discriminating as possible. When properly administered and interpreted, these tests are highly reliable tools used to evaluate a suspect’s degree of alcohol impairment. But the HGNT is a difficult and complex test to train. This test can only be used if the MP has been trained and certified competent by a qualified trainer. PMs can send MP to the Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) Law Enforcement/Instructor Training Course at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, to receive training in HGNT procedures. MP who are trained can then train unit members.

The MP *must use* his or her judgment to determine which test is used. The one-leg stand test and the walk and turn test are divided attention tests because they require the suspect to divide his attention between mental tasks and physical tasks. Both tests require the suspect to balance and listen. The MP must demonstrate the one-leg stand and the walk and turn test before requiring the suspect to perform the test.

The one-leg stand test requires the suspect to balance while counting out loud. The walk and turn test requires the suspect to—
- Comprehend verbal instructions.
- Process information.
- Recall memory.

While administering this test, the MP determines if the driver—
- Keeps his balance while listening to the instructor.
- Starts before instructions are finished.
- Stops to steady himself while walking.
- Touches heel-to-toe.
- Steps off the line.
- Uses arms to balance.
- Loses balance while turning.
- Takes the incorrect number of steps or just cannot do the test.
ABSENTEE/DESERTER PROGRAM

MP pursue an aggressive absentee/deserter program that is preventive as well as reactive. The reduction of absenteeism is primarily within the sphere of command leadership. But the PM as advisor to the commander emphasizes the preventive measures available to commanders to reduce absenteeism in the Army. He also does this through his participation as a member of the Army Community Service Council, the Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board, and other related activities in accordance with AR 190-9. Absentee/deserter investigations are undertaken to provide the command a broad-reaching ability to return absentees/deserters to military control. And because good coordination and communication between military and civilian law enforcement agencies is basic to the absentee/deserter program, the program also serves to enhance MP/civilian police relationships.

WILDLIFE LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM

The Wildlife Law Enforcement Program operates to enforce laws pertaining to water pollution, litter, forestry, recreational facilities, and boating. The intent is also to protect government property such as range buildings, construction or range equipment, and telephone and power lines. Measures used to accomplish the program range from check stations at roadblocks and checkpoints to publicity and administrative measures like information points.

The Wildlife Law Enforcement Program ensures control of predators and domestic animals on the installation. It ensures that the hunting and fishing seasons are monitored as determined by the installation commander and state and federal laws. The program also ensures the enforcement of environmental and safety regulations. It ensures that training on boating and hunting safety includes local, state, and federal laws pertinent to the local area. Coordination is effected between the DEH, the installation recreation activity, the safety office, and the game warden on camping, boating and hunting safety. The program ensures that help and information are provided to persons using government recreation facilities.

MP CUSTOMS INFORMATION SERVICES

MP customs units furnish a wide variety of customs information to entire commands as well as units and individuals. MP customs personnel often present briefings on customs information to units and other groups. The units provide desk sergeants of MP stations basic customs information for answering routine questions from the military community. The MP customs units themselves can be contacted for detailed and technical information. General information, such as new or changed requirements, privileges, procedures, and so forth, are publicized through newspapers, command information publications, armed forces radio, and similar news media. General information may be prepared in the form of news releases. Radio and television talks and interviews may be presented. Brief and concise fact sheets can be developed, and display posters may be produced and distributed on items of current or continuing customs interest.

Specific information will be sought, particularly by individuals, on such matters as sales or transfers of personal property, the import or export of certain items, weapons and vehicle registration requirements, border crossings, and others. Specific
information may be furnished by maintaining and publicizing walk-in and telephonic services to which all members of US forces have ready access. An important part of the customs information service is the ready availability of all blank forms required for customs actions. Instructions for completion of the blank forms should also be made available. Display boards with completed samples may be maintained at walk-in service locations.

The walk-in station may also display—
- Customs travel information for the host and neighboring countries.
- A list of restricted trademark items.
- US rates of duty for various imports.
- State laws pertaining to importation of alcoholic beverages.
- The addresses and locations of host nation offices concerned with customs, tax, and registration matters.

Personnel assigned to provide customs information must be experienced and, as a minimum, familiar with the contents of—
- DOD Regulation 5030.49-R.
- The Gun Control Act.
- Pertinent international agreements.
- Command directives.

In addition MP customs personnel must be familiar with applicable Army and command regulations that pertain to the operation of sales facilities. Weapons and other tax-free items are often sold at rod and gun clubs in host countries. MP must make every effort to monitor these operations frequently. And MP ensure that managers and sales personnel are thoroughly informed of host country and US customs requirements. Particular emphasis is given to transfer limitations, firearms registration, resale, importation requirements into CONUS, and provision of accurate information to customers.

MP render customs assistance to sales facilities by—
- Briefing managers and sales personnel.
- Monitoring facilities frequently.
- Providing managerial personnel with pertinent customs information and ensuring that each facility has regulations on file, to include weapons regulations when applicable.
- Providing a customs briefing at the annual rod and gun club convention, if one is held, or at any other meeting of the membership.

To ensure that sales personnel and members have a basic knowledge of pertinent customs regulations, detachment commanders, field officers, and NCOICs coordinate with each local sales store manager and arrange formal or informal customs classes. They also maintain good rapport with managerial personnel and assist them in developing a customs enforcement program.

Public events conducted by US forces in overseas locations, such as open houses, Fourth of July celebrations, youth carnivals, and so forth, to which nonmembers of the forces may be invited or admitted, may involve the transfer or sale of US forces tax-free items, particularly food and beverages, to nonmembers. Such transfer or sale often requires prior approval of the host country customs and/or tax authorities. This approval will probably specify limits to the amounts which may be so transferred or sold, as well as require that they be consumed on the premises. Items such as tobacco products on which taxes are collected at the time of the sale are not normally included in such approval. MP customs personnel can furnish assistance in an advisory capacity to persons planning such events and can assist them in obtaining any required approval. Consultation with the local SJA office will normally be required since a legal interpretation of treaties and local statutes is often involved.
DOD Regulation 5030.49-R provides for US military enforcement of US customs laws, postal regulations, and regulations of the US Department of Agriculture (AR 40-12) with respect to plant products, animals, and birds. The Department of the Army serves as the executive agent for the DOD Military Customs Inspection Program.

**DISASTER RELIEF AND AREA DAMAGE CONTROL**

MP may be called upon to assist in disaster relief operations. The preservation of law and order following the development of disaster conditions can be a major problem. MP should report any indications of civil disturbances so that measures can be taken to prevent major incidents. MP may assist in the prevention of looting; protection of property, especially critical facilities; prevention of panic; and enforcement of emergency restrictions. They may also assist in traffic and circulation control, and the evacuation, and detention of civilians. Additionally, MP teams may be used to provide guidance to other military units performing law and order functions.
The PM bases his law enforcement measures on the premise of "selective enforcement." Selective enforcement is the key to effective law enforcement. The PM focuses MP resources on the actions and areas where they are most needed. Police incidents are usually caused by conditions and acts that continue to cause trouble unless corrected.

Basing law enforcement measures on selective enforcement fosters an efficient use of manpower. And it lends direction to crime prevention and law enforcement efforts. It allows MP actions to be based on logical, systematic information that makes the best use of resources.

To employ selective enforcement the PM must have access to up-to-date information. A PM needs data that will provide pertinent facts for solving continuing enforcement problems. The PM must ensure he has the people and equipment he needs to do the job. And he must employ these resources where they are most needed. Effective law enforcement is proactive and minimizes unproductive time. Checking a building during hours when the facility is closed is not proactive. Being at the facility before it closes is proactive. It eliminates the need to check the facility immediately after it closes. And it places the MP at the facility for maximum visibility and deterrence at the most vulnerable time.

PMs, like all modern police administrators, have learned through training and experience that MP assets must be dispersed when and where police problems are likely to occur. The amount or volume of crime that occurs is not evenly distributed over the course of a week or a day. In 100 offenses reported during a seven-day period, more crimes will have occurred on certain days of the week, at certain times of the day, and in certain places. Analysis of such information keeps the PM alert to changing needs for police services. Then the services, matched to the number of MP available, can be provided in the areas in which they are most needed.

Selective enforcement is founded on a continuous process of accumulating, analyzing, and interpreting data. Information in complaint reports, vehicle accident reports, and offense reports is tabulated, computerized, marked on spot maps, and filed in the proper files. Each complaint or offense for which a report has been made is studied.

An analysis of data accumulated over a period of time can show the nature of a problem and how often it recurs. Analysis can also show the requirements for the most effective assignment of MP. This data allows the PM to plan enforcement activities without relying on intuition or arbitrary plans.

The basis for selective enforcement is accurate, historical data on time, place, type, and frequency of incidents or violations. Careful interpretation of this data can help determine the cause of crime, project operating costs, forecast personnel and equipment requirements, and maintain accurate reports on the status of discipline within the command.
COLLECTING, COMPILING, AND USING SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT DATA

Selective enforcement requires the support of statistical data. Proper collection and interpretation of this data is essential if successful results are to be achieved. The best sources of information are the routine records and reports readily available to PMs. To be useful, the routine reports must be accurate and complete. If operating personnel like desk sergeants, patrols, and investigators fail to record incidents, accidents, or violations accurately, the resulting data will not be factual.

Collecting and compiling enforcement data must be done systematically. Clear instructions must be available concerning the information that is needed and the format in which it is to be collected. Misunderstood instructions can result in lost time or erroneous decisions based on poor data. The responsibility for collecting and compiling data is assigned to a specific individual or section. If too many people work with the data, the likelihood of misunderstood instructions, errors, or inconsistent or inaccurate data increases.

The method used to compile and organize the data depends on available data resources and the desired results. Computer technology helps. It can easily provide the statistical analysis needed to produce pertinent information. For instance, computers, sorting reports of crime by day of the week and hour of the day, can make comparisons readily available. Specific types of information may be requested. Reports can be obtained that reflect increasing and decreasing trends.

Raw data must be organized and summarized before it will become meaningful for planning purposes. Data are usually obtained from various reports, records, or surveys and appear as unorganized numbers and facts. By systematic rearrangement or classification, meaning and significance may be given to data. This makes the information easier to compare with other groups of similar data. It also offers a chance for further analysis of the facts.

An imaginative PM will find many ways to present selective enforcement data. A presentation should be tailored to fit the situation, the facts being presented, and the intended audience.

One useful method of organizing and presenting data is by the construction of a frequency distribution table. The basic data are located by finding the largest and smallest numerical values. The difference between these two values (such as the range) is determined. The values are grouped in the order of their magnitude, in groups of twos, threes, fours, fives, and so forth. The size of this grouping factor, called the class interval, normally is such that not less than ten, nor more than twenty, of such groupings result. Consideration is given, however, to the total number of numerical values with which it is necessary to deal. The completed tabulation is described as a frequency distribution.

Presenting data in a frequency distribution table places the data in logical order. It condenses and simplifies the data. But essential details are retained. A frequency distribution table groups items of the same class and specifies the number of items in each class. Data can be classed by type of offense, time of day of offense, and age of offenders. With some types of data it is useful to group classes together for easier interpretation. For example, if we are listing numbers of offenses by time of day, it would be helpful to combine two or more hours together to form an hour group or interval. A table that lists offenses for three-hour periods (such as 2100 hours to 2400 hours equals 284 offenses for a six-month period) would be more meaningful for most enforcement problems than a listing of 24 different one-hour periods.
Another statistical aid to the PM and his staff is the calculation of percentages. Data presented in percentage form give a clear picture of problem area locations. Percentages are also helpful in presenting briefings and reports. A percentage is the relationship of a part to a whole calculated on the basis of 100.

**CALCULATION OF PERCENTAGE**

If 800 offenses occurred at Fort Zebra during a certain month, 40 AWOLs would constitute 5 percent of the total number of offenses. To arrive at this result, the following computations are made:

Base figure: 800 (Offenses)
Figure compared to base: 40 (AWOLs)

\[
\frac{40}{800} \times 100 = 5\%
\]

Divide the base figure into the figure being compared to the base, and multiply the result by 100 for a percentage.

This method may also be used to determine percentage of increase or decrease in troop strengths. The only difference is that an additional computation must be made to determine the actual increase or decrease involved.

**CALCULATION OF PERCENTAGE OF INCREASE OR DECREASE**

1st Brigade increased in strength from 4,852 in July to 5,294 in August. The percentage of increase is 9.1 percent.

\[
\frac{5,294 - 4,852}{4,852} = \frac{442}{4,852} = 0.091
\]

The base figure is 4,852. The figure being compared to the base is 442. The formula for this example is—

\[
\frac{442}{4.852} \times 100 = 9.1\%
\]

Percentage of decrease is calculated in the same manner.
The rate of occurrence is generally expressed in terms of frequency per some standard unit such as 100, 1,000, 100,000, 1,000,000. These figures (100, 1,000, and so forth) are arbitrary. They act as a common denominator to make evaluation and comparison easier.

A graph or chart provides the PM with a medium for presenting facts in a clear, understandable, logical, and interesting manner. (See Appendix C for more information on presenting statistical data.) A graph can give meaning to a collection of facts when that meaning, if presented in another form, might not be clear. On a graph or chart data can be quickly compared. Graphs permit the condensation of facts and figures and can demonstrate deficiencies and trends. A graph can provide the same information as a table, but usually has the advantage of greater simplicity and clarity. But care must be taken in the preparation of graphs to avoid faulty presentation and interpretation. The following are features found in most graphs:

- A distribution of a group of values or traits or characteristics.
- A brief, simple, and direct title describing the topic the graph represents.
- The unit or units of measure used.

**CALCULATION OF PERCENTAGE RATE PER STANDARD UNIT**

If 600 offenses occurred at Fort Zebra during a certain period and 30,000 troops were stationed there during this period, the offense rate is 20 offenses per 1,000 troops. The formula used to achieve this result is—

\[
\text{Number of offenses} \times \text{standard unit} = \text{rate per standard unit}
\]

In applying this formula to our example, it would appear thus:

\[
\frac{600}{30,000} \times 1,000 = 20 \quad \text{(rate per 1,000 troops)}
\]
ACQUIRING DATA FROM MP REPORTS AND FORMS

Complete, accurate, and timely completion of forms is of prime importance to law enforcement. All the effort expended in enforcement and investigative activities is wasted unless data are properly recorded and reported. And based on accurate data compiled from MP forms, the MP can plan crime prevention, traffic control, and enforcement programs that are timely and effective rather than reactions to situations.

MP records and forms are unclassified except when they contain defense information as defined in DOD 5200.1-R and AR 380-5. When privileged information is contained as defined in AR 340-17, records will be marked “FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY” and safeguarded accordingly. Records will be maintained and disposed of in accordance with Army regulations.

MP desk sergeants and supervisors must ensure that subordinates do not release information without proper authority and clearance from the post information officer or SJA (see AR 340-17).

Computer technology enhances the ability to obtain and process information not previously possible because of time and resource limitations. When used to their fullest extent, automated systems become useful managerial and investigative tools. Computers have the ability to retrieve in a very short time obscure bits of information not readily available through the most elaborate cross-indexing. Moreover, the ability of computers to arrange statistical information in a meaningful format can automate crime analysis and assist MP in patrol distribution and crime prevention efforts.

To obtain useful information, all data entered into the computer must be timely and accurate. The basis for building any law enforcement data base comes from the records and forms completed by the MP and supporting agencies. Attention must be given to the kind of information desired prior to implementing an automated system. Consideration must be given to the manner in which the computer stores and retrieves information. A systematic arrangement of files allows for specific query capability as well as meaningful report generation.

RECORDING TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS

MP desk personnel are authorized by the Department of the Army to record telephone conversations for a clear and accurate record of emergency communications for command, operational, or record purposes. This authorization extends only to reports of emergencies, analysis of reported information, records of instruction or commands, warnings received, requests for assistance, and instructions on locations of serious incidents.

There are restrictions when telephone and radio conversations are recorded:

- All telephones connected to recording equipment will be labeled “FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY–CONNECTED TO RECORDING DEVICE.” Access will be restricted to desk personnel only.
- Recording equipment connection must be coordinated with appropriate telecommunications personnel.
- Official telephone numbers for the MP desk will be listed in appropriate telephone directories with a statement that emergency conversations will be recorded for accuracy of records.
- Installation commanders must issue letters of authorization for such activities. One copy will be forwarded to Department of the Army.
- Conversation recordings in overseas areas must also conform to SOFAS and other international agreements.
- Recording equipment at MP desks may not be used to conduct wiretapping, investigative monitoring, and eavesdropping activities.
MAINTAINING RADIO LOG

DA Form 3945 (Military Police Radio Log) is used as an official record of all MP radio calls. The radio log is begun at 0001 hours and closed at 2400 hours each day and contains all radio traffic to and from the MP station and patrols during the period. The form is normally prepared in one copy. It is filed sequentially in the desk sergeant's files and serves as a backup reference for the desk blotter and other reports. It is important that the source, time, and subject of routine calls be entered in the log. In the case of serious incidents, the radio log entry is more detailed. Electronic tape-recording equipment is routinely authorized for use on MP desks. Audiotapes may be used in place of DA Form 3945.

PREPARING MP REPORTS

DA Form 3975 is prepared on all complaints received and incidents observed or reported to MP, except routine traffic violations and those minor violations noted by MP where corrective action consists of a verbal warning. DA Form 3975 is also prepared when an apprehension is made or a military person is returned to US Army control from another apprehending agency. The military police report is initiated immediately upon receipt of information. If time does not allow for the immediate initiation of the report, the report should be initiated as soon as practicable. This report assures complaints are recorded, systematically assigned for follow-up, disposed of, or referred, and posted to the MP desk blotter.
**EXAMPLE OF MILITARY POLICE REPORT**

**MILITARY POLICE REPORT**

For use of this form, see AR 190-4 for the procurement agency or DECRODAR.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MILITARY POLICE REPORT NUMBER</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>USCARE CONTROL NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>06281-87-MPC001</td>
<td>871223</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**THRU Commander**
15th Engineer Bn
Fort Blank, AL 12345

**10 Commander**
HHC, 15th Engineer Bn
Fort Blank, AL 12345

FROM CDR, USACOM & MPCEN & FM
ATTN: Provost Marshal
Fort Blank, AL 12345

1. REPORT TYPE STATUS
   - Information
   - Commanders Action (DA Form 485)
   - Supplemental
   - Concurrent

2. EVALUATION
   - Criminal Offense
   - Civilian Offense
   - Military Offense
   - Traffic Offense
   - Found Not
   - Unidentified

3. COMPLAINT/GENERAL INCIDENT (See Reverse Attached for Summary)
   Disorderly Conduct (Art 134, UCMJ)
   - On Post
   - Off Post

   6. LOCATION
      - In front of the Junior Enlisted Club, Bldg 223, Ft Blank, AL 12345
      - Time of Offense: 2330
      - Date of Offense: 871220

4. OFFENSE CODES
   - 3 Y2

5. COMPLAINT RECEIVED BY
   - FRANKLIN, Joseph P., E-6, Desk Sgt
   - Date: 2330

6. REASON FOR ARREST
   - In violation of Army Regulations

7. NAMING OF SUBJECT
   - ADAMS, Jeffrey David
   - Rank: E-3

8. DATE OF BIRTH
   - 28-55-7766
   - Place of Birth: Lubbock, TX
   - Date of Birth: 600606
   - Age: 27

9. COLOR HAIR
   - A: Brown

10. COLOR EYES
    - A: Blue

11. HEIGHT
    - 150

12. WEIGHT
    - 57.5"

13. JUVENILE
    - Yes

14. SEX
    - M

15. COMPLAINT
    - None

16. CONVICTED
    - No

17. PERSONS RELATED TO REPORT
   - ANDERSON, Judy D.
     - Rank: E-4
     - Date of Birth: 662-12-2244
     - Address: HQ CO, Ft, Blank, AL
     - Phone: A

18. PROPERTY DATA
    - N/A

19. DISPOSITION
    - Released to Unit 15G on DD Form 629

ENCL.
1. DA Form 2823 (ANDERSON)
2. DA Form 3881 (ADAMS)
3. DA Form 4833 (ADAMS)
   - 1 - Unit Cdr
   - 1 - PM File

**FOR THE COMMANDER**

[Signature]

**TYPICAL NAME, RANK, AND TITLE OF REPORTING OFFICER**

JOHN T. LOGAN

CPT, Ops, Operations Officer

**DA FORM 3975**

**FM 19-10**
MAINTAINING MP DESK BLOTTER

The MP desk blotter is a chronological record of police activity developed from reports, complaints, information, and incidents. The desk blotter is not a substitute for the MP report. Its entries, in narrative form, contain the essentials of the report. It states concisely the who, what, when, where, and how of an incident. It cites the identity of persons related to an incident. And it directs readers to the MP report for details. Entries do not list names of juvenile subjects. In certain types of incidents/offenses such as rape and child molestation, names of victims should also be protected. In these cases, entries reflect the term “protected identities” (PI) where the name of the subject/victim is normally listed. If approved by the installation/activity PM, this technique may be used whenever information on a particular entry should be controlled. In that case, the blotter will indicate that the entry is restricted. And it will show the number of the associated MP report. The action taken and the name of the person recording the entry will be indicated in the columns provided.

The desk blotter covers the period from 0001 to 2400 hours. Time recorded in the “time column” reflects the time the information is typed on the blotter. The first daily entry on each blotter is always “blotter opened” and the last entry on each blotter is always “blotter closed.” The blotter is normally prepared in original and two copies. One copy is sent to the senior commander supported by the respective PM office (see AR 190-45). The original is maintained in the PM files. The other copy is maintained in the desk sergeant files. With approval of the senior commander, extracts may be prepared for subordinate commanders when the blotter contains entries that pertain to their respective commands. As determined by local policy, the form may be used to provide information to the supporting USACIDC element. Distributed copies of blotters or extracts will include the following statement (typed, printed, or stamped): “This blotter or extract is a daily chronological record of police activity developed from reports, complaints, incidents, or information received and actions resulting therefrom. Entries contained on the blotter may or may not be complete or accurate and are not adjudications attesting to the guilt or innocence of any person.” The desk sergeant or duty officer verifies the entries. An authorized individual signs the blotter after it has been closed.

Information concerning the administration of the MP station, such as personnel changes, inspections, visitors, and other administrative data, is recorded on DA Form 1594 and in the MP desk journal.

SUBMITTING CRIMINAL DATA REFERENCE CARDS

DA Form 2804 (Crime Records Data Reference) is used to forward to the Crime Records Center information on subjects of investigations for—

- Violations of Article 111 through 133, UCMJ.
- Violations of Articles 77 through 84, 87 through 110, and 134, UCMJ, for which the maximum punishment prescribed in the MCM is confinement for six months or more.
- Offenses which result in revocation or suspension of driving privileges or the assessment of six or more points as outlined in AR 190-5.
- An offense under the Assimilative Crimes Act (18 USC 13) or other federal statute for which there is no corresponding offense in the MCM and for which a maximum punishment of six months or more confinement is prescribed.

A separate DA Form 2804 is submitted for each identified subject (real name and aliases) of an investigation of a special category offense, regardless of DA Forms 2804 previously forwarded as a result of separate investigations. Completed DA Form 2804
### EXAMPLE OF MILITARY POLICE DESK BLOTTER

**UNIT OR STATION DESIGNATION**  
Office of the Provost Marshal, Fort Blank, AL 12345

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENTRY NO.</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT, INCIDENT, POLICE INFORMATION</th>
<th>SUMMARY OF ACTION TAKEN</th>
<th>ENTERED BY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 0001</td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;This blotter/extract is a daily chronological report of police activity developed from reports, complaints, incidents or information received and the actions resulting therefrom. Entries contained on the blotter may or may not be complete or accurate and are not adjudications attesting to the guilt or innocence of any person.&quot;</td>
<td>Information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 0425</td>
<td></td>
<td>BLOTTER OPENED:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SUBJECT: SIMONS, ROBERT A., E-5, M/C/29, 041-36-4289, Co A, 13th INF Bn, Ft Blank, AL 12345</td>
<td>MPR # 03199-87</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>VICTIM #1: SIMONS, NANCY E., D/W, F/C/25, 421-85-3321, BLDG 3355A, 95th St., Ft Blank, AL 12345</td>
<td>DA Form 3975</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>VICTIM #2: KING, WILLIAM D., E-4, M/C/21, 459-21-9062, Co A, 13th INF Bn, Ft Blank, AL 12345</td>
<td>DA Form 2823(3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TIME/DATE: 0001 hrs, 20 Aug 87</td>
<td>DA Form 4137</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LOCATION: QTRS 3355A, 95th St., Ft Blank, AL 12345</td>
<td>DD Form 629</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MIL/POL: SGT SCHIFF / SP/4 ROBINSON, 1st MP Co, Ft Blank, AL 12345</td>
<td>Notified: CID</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DETAILS: Preliminary investigation revealed that SIMONS, R became drunk at the NCO club during the evening of 19 Aug 87. SIMONS R left the NCO club at approx 2345 hrs in his POV, and drove to his quarters where he found his wife, SIMONS, N, and his best friend, KING, undressed in the master bedroom. SIMONS, R immediately went to the living room and obtained from his gun cabinet a Savage, Model 99 shotgun, and then returned to the bedroom and with two shots killed SIMONS, N, and KING. At 0055 hrs, SIMONS, R notified the MP Desk SGT. SIMONS, N and KING were pronounced dead by Coroner. Dr. (MAJ) MAIR at the Hill Top Army Hospital at approx 0230 hrs. SIMONS, R was apprehended by MPs and transported to the MP Station and administered a portable breath test with results being .23%. Investigation continues by CID.</td>
<td>CID (BUTLER) at 0105 hrs, MPDO (SAPP) at 0115 hrs, UNIT CDR (BOCK) at 0320 hrs. SIMONS, R rel'd to CID.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 2400</td>
<td></td>
<td>BLOTTER CLOSED:</td>
<td>Information</td>
<td>PAVLOV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FOR USE OF DESK BLOTTER, SEE AR 190-42; SEE APPENDIX 1**

**DATE**: 20 August 1987

**NO. OF PAGES**: 1
with completed DA Form 3975 is forwarded by the preparing office directly to Director, US Army Crime Records Center, 2301 Chesapeake Avenue, Baltimore, MD 21222. The card is completed in accordance with AR 195-2, except for the report of investigation (ROI) number block, which reflects the number shown in the USACRC control number block of the completed DA Form 3975.
Military police practice preventive patrolling. Preventive patrolling places a uniformed patrol in the right place at the right time. It has as its major feature the protection of people, not property. The primary emphasis of preventive patrolling is having uniformed patrols work areas where analysis shows many people gather at times when the likelihood of crime is greatest. Emphasis is placed on such establishments as the post exchange, commissary, package beverage store, hospital (during evening shift changes), banks, gas stations, and the numerous recreational facilities.

The hours of operation of all establishments are verified and plotted on a time chart to indicate opening and closing periods. These are the times of the highest susceptibility of most establishments to crime. Uniformed patrols are assigned to these areas at those times for maximum visibility and deterrence.

COMMUNITY PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE

Whether providing soldiers a safe environment in which to train, providing commanders a means to promote order and discipline, or providing military suspects fair and impartial investigations, MP protect and assist the military community.

The MP purview for implementing law and order in the military community affects more than just commanders and their troops. The military community includes family members of military personnel. It sometimes includes DA civilian employees. And it can sometimes include installation visitors and the surrounding civilian populace.

MP on patrol work for positive community relations. Public cooperation and understanding benefit both the community and the MP. The handling of incidents requires observation, approach, and tactful corrective action or assistance by MP.

MP behavior is professional while on duty. MP follow proper procedures for handling incidents. Their behavior is impartial, not judgmental. Minor violations are usually interpreted as noncriminal and require only a warning or on-the-spot corrective action. Taking a subject into custody is only done as a last resort when compliance cannot be achieved by other means.

MP often are called on to assist persons unable to help themselves. Military personnel may require assistance either for their own protection or because they are unable to care for themselves properly. They may be intoxicated, ill, confused, or in shock; they may be without funds or transportation for return to their units; or they may, if not properly assisted, become the victims of various offenses such as robbery, assault, or rape. Such persons are not apprehended or taken into custody, although it may be
necessary to take them to the MP station for return to their units.

MP also protect juveniles. Most MP contact with juveniles occurs when patrols investigate minor offenses like disturbing the peace. Sometimes contact is made when juveniles are seen committing acts that could be harmful to people or property. Usually, MP stop the misconduct and, when needed, refer the incident to the parents. Or, for those juveniles who have committed minor offenses, a verbal warning by the MP or making the child’s parents aware of the situation may correct their actions. Investigation into the causes of the misconduct and the collection of background data are limited to essential information. But MP may extend their investigation to include the conduct of the child’s military sponsors if that conduct is dangerous or harmful to the child.

MP on patrol respond to reports of crime. The initial action by MP at a crime scene is to look for victims and, if there are signs of life, render first aid. Everything else is secondary to the welfare of the injured person. Only when death of the person is established, do MP next take action to protect the crime scene. MP patrols also protect the community by enabling military investigators to pursue their inquiries expeditiously.

The first MP to arrive at a crime scene have the critical task of securing the scene. They preserve its physical aspects so that it can be examined in detail by crime scene investigators and/or lab examiners. (See FM 19-20.) The patrol prevents unauthorized intrusions and protects the scene from change until an investigator arrives. The MP prevent unneeded movement of physical evidence, which can render the evidence useless. They rope off entrances and exits and routes possibly used by the suspect. They post guards to control spectators near zones likely to yield physical evidence. If needed, they réroute traffic. They cover fragile evidence and areas that could be affected by rain, snow, wind, smoke, or direct sun rays. And when investigators arrive, the MP make all of their information immediately available. Knowing that details are important, the MP who arrive and secure the scene provide their observations on any changes.

**PATROL METHODS AND MEANS**

MP patrol activities are coordinated by the MP officer or MPDO in charge of the MP station. Patrol personnel report for duty to a designated officer or noncommissioned officer. The relief is formed and is reported to the desk sergeant. The desk sergeant gives all personnel their specific duty assignments. Personnel and equipment are inspected. Personnel are briefed by the duty officer, the desk sergeant, or the patrol supervisor. MP assigned to traffic control posts, gate duties, and foot and motor patrols are briefed on the information they are authorized and expected to furnish. Maps and informational material to enable them to answer questions not covered in their briefing are helpful.

MP patrols are dispatched by the desk sergeant, desk clerk, or radio operator. The patrol supervisors then take charge of dispatched patrol personnel. When two or more patrol supervisors are directed to operate in unison, the desk sergeant designates a leader for the operation. The desk sergeant keeps patrol supervisors advised of adjacent patrol operations and foot patrol areas. This permits reinforcement of any areas if it becomes necessary.

There are many different ways to patrol. The method or combination of methods is based on statistical analysis conducted by the PM office.

When setting patrol areas and routes, consideration must be given to–

- Mission of the patrol and directives and policies to be enforced.
- Billeting, transient, and resident population centers.
- Hours of operation of theaters, service clubs, and community clubs.
- General information on any recent criminal or mischievous activity.
- Traffic patterns and frequent accident sites.
- Post size and population density.
- Total mileage to be covered by the patrol.
- Location of adjacent military and civilian police patrols.
- Location of nearest medical facility, police station, and fire station.
- Communications capabilities and limits.
- Personnel available for patrol.
- Including patrol orders in patrol note-books at the time of briefing:

The means of patrolling usually depends on operational needs and environmental conditions. For example, MP can patrol using mopeds, snowmobiles, or boats. Foot patrols provide intensive law enforcement in potential or high crime areas such as–

- Warehouses.
- Family member quarters.
- Commercial establishments.

Foot patrols check doors and windows for security and signs of attempted or forced entry. Foot patrols enhance community relations by providing assistance to people on a personalized basis. Use of foot patrols to enforce off-limits policies enables the MP to monitor trouble spots and prevent offenses from occurring. (See FM 19-4 for specific procedures for conducting combat foot patrols.)

Motor patrols provide highly mobile MP who can respond to a wide variety of law enforcement and emergency situations. Motor patrols operating in defined areas provide planned continuity of operations and enhance the more intense coverage provided by foot patrols. Motor patrols are also used for traffic control and enforcement of traffic regulations. Motor patrols must maintain constant communication with the MP base station. (See FM 19-4 for specific procedures for conducting combat patrols.)

The type of patrol visibility required is based on each activity's vulnerability to crime. Visibility objectives should be established and "coded."

### EXAMPLE OF PATROL VISIBILITY CODES

**CODE A**
Slow roll-by to be seen. Checks are made of areas such as theaters and bowling centers, with the patrol moving toward these facilities at closing time.

**CODE B**
Park in a visible area; dismount and walk through the area. Checks are made of hospitals, parking lots, and like facilities during the 2300-2330 change of shift.

**CODE C**
Park in a visible area; meet the manager. Checks are made of facilities dealing with large amounts of cash receipts, or facilities located in more isolated areas.

The kind of check each activity receives is based on its code patrol checks. A feedback form, completed by each activity manager and provided to MP operations, permits adjustment of patrols and patrol areas.

Motor patrol personnel must know how to respond to emergencies that require immediate and knowledgeable action. Knowledge of how to request aeromedical assistance, emergency medical treatment assistance, backup assistance and procedures on proper defensive tactics until help arrives is important.

Unmarked vehicles may be used if needed to provide limited warning of MP presence. The most effective use of unmarked vehicles is during surveillance operations.
Aircraft patrols can be used when MP are required to cover large, sparsely populated areas where motor patrols are inefficient or ineffective. Helicopters are normally used in performing aircraft patrols.

MP patrols may be supplemented by courtesy or unit patrols provided by commanders of units other than MP. These courtesy/unit patrols consist of NCOs who may wear brassards for identification. Courtesy/unit patrols must rely on regular MP in securing crime scenes and questioning suspects. Courtesy/unit patrols must not interfere or attempt to prevent apprehension of personnel who have committed an offense. The MP duty officer will brief and debrief courtesy/unit patrols. Briefings will emphasize procedures for obtaining MP support, limits of authority, and any pertinent information concerning the town area. Emphasis must be placed on the procedure that courtesy/unit patrols deal only with personnel from their unit; however, information concerning personnel from other units may be provided to the MP.

CONUS OFF-POST PATROLS

In CONUS off-post patrols will normally not be employed. Where off-post patrols have been established, the desk sergeant will brief patrol personnel on—

- Coordination of requirements with armed forces police detachments.
- Limitations of the Posse Comitatus Act as it applies to local laws.
- All policies governing off-post law enforcement.
- Published off-limits areas and establishments as determined by the Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board. (See AR 190-24.)
- Apprehension of personnel not on official business who are present in off-limits establishments.
- Enforcement of curfews when established.
- Trouble spots based on post data.

OCONUS OFF-POST PATROLS

In overseas commands it is necessary that MP have a working knowledge of SOFAs and pertinent international laws as well as local laws, agreements, and customs. All working agreements with host nations must be reviewed by the SJA prior to implementation. Due to the language barrier it may be advisable to have an interpreter fluent in the host nation language to assist in interrogations, investigations, and other operations. Due to host nation restrictions the jurisdiction and authority change from locale to locale.

PATROL DISTRIBUTION

Efficient use of manpower and other resources is critical for effective patrol operations. Essential to the success of patrol operations is appropriate distribution of manpower. Supervisors must develop a distribution plan addressing both available manpower and the need for enforcement.

Military working dogs can be an effective means of patrolling while reducing manpower requirements. (See Chapter 11 for more information on military working dogs.) One-man patrols conserve manpower. They are useful for emergency traffic control. And a one-man patrol can respond to complaints if chance of contact with a criminal is minimal. But careful consideration must be made based on the types of crime occurring on the installation. Consideration must also be given to backup requirements and the experience level of assigned MP.

How many work hours of patrol time are available to the PM in a 24-hour period? How should these hours be distributed for the most effective patrol coverage? These are two of the questions that can be answered using compiled data.

Patrol distribution equalizes the work load among patrol units. If the work load is unbalanced, one unit may spend its entire
shift responding to calls and completing reports, while another is underemployed. Unequal work loads can also adversely affect MP morale. Equal patrol areas allow personnel to spend roughly equal percentages of their time between responding to service calls and preventive patrol.

Standards for distribution will vary. On one installation it may be the number of crimes or accidents, while on another it may be the number of buildings to be checked. The geography of the installation will affect distribution plans. Railroads, bridges, and rivers must all be considered so that no area is denied protection.

Response time is another factor to consider. Response time in most patrol areas should be minimal and about equal to other areas. The larger and more diverse the area, the more difficult it will be to equalize the patrol areas.

Distribution plans consider the varying numbers of patrol units available for duty on any one shift, depending on the number of units on each shift, adjustments are made in patrol area responsibilities.

DISTRIBUTION POLICY DECISIONS

Policies must be developed to adequately distribute patrol force coverage. Which services will be handled by telephone and which will require a unit to be dispatched? Which calls will be referred to more appropriate agencies, such as Army Community Service or the unit commander? There must be a clear policy on the degree to which patrol personnel handle crime investigations. Do they gather witnesses as well as secure the crime scene? The extent that patrol vehicles will become involved in traffic control, investigation, and enforcement must be decided. The building security tasks that will be accomplished by patrol units must be set. The time period that patrol personnel can be separated from their vehicle to accomplish these tasks must be set. The reporting responsibilities of patrol personnel must be delegated. Personnel must know what information and details must appear in their reports. Even who will review and type the reports and if the reports will be written in the station or at the scene must be decided. And certainly, the priorities for assigning service call precedence if insufficient patrol units are available must be known.

PATROL DISTRIBUTION DATA

The PM has most of the data he or she needs to make a careful analysis of the past events occurring within a jurisdictional area. Data that can be used to project future as well as current police needs are often a part of the normal receipt of complaints and the dispatching of patrols.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEANS OF COMPLAINT OR REQUEST</th>
<th>NATURE OF THE COMPLAINT OR SERVICE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RADIO</td>
<td>Location of occurrence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TELEPHONE</td>
<td>Date and time complaint received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TELETEYPE</td>
<td>Date and time complaint occurred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LETTER</td>
<td>Unit assigned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN PERSON</td>
<td>Date and time unit dispatched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Date and time assignment completed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The number of complaints received per month varies markedly during the course of a year. The complaints range from a high of 251 in August to a low of 124 in January. The monthly average of offenses is 167.17. For the following January, a conservative prediction would be that the number of offenses would fall in the 124-251 offense range, further defined by historical data for the month of January and the previous year’s average. Caution must be exercised in such predictions to consider any changes that might affect the rate of offenses, such as unit transfers or increased troop strengths.

A PM, knowing only dates and times that crimes or complaints have occurred, has limited information concerning the number of offenses or work load to be affected in upcoming months. More precise projections can be made if it is known how the offenses varied by day of the week and hour of the day over the past year. The PM may want to give additional “weight” to certain offenses, such as assaults and robberies, compared to lesser offenses, such as curfew violations. Any patrol distribution plan must reflect the logical requests for police service in the area.

A 24-hour day, 7-day week is used to develop a frequency distribution table. The resulting data shows that a large percentage of crime/complaints occurs on Friday and Saturday. The pattern shows a low on Sunday of 10 percent and a high on Saturday of 18.2 percent of all reported crimes/offenses. Friday and Saturday accounted for 35.4 percent of all weekly offenses, Wednesday through Saturday for 65.6 percent.

### COMPLAINT LEVELS COMPiled BY MONTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>TOTAL 2,006</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
<th>RANK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>124 Lowest</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>251 Highest</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average number of complaints reported per month ......... 167.17
Average number of complaints reported per day ............ 5.50
Once the high offense days of the week are known, the high offense hours of the day should be determined. The assumption is made that prior patterns of offenses should occur in the future, subject to any uncontrollable variations such as weather or troop strengths. With this basic data, the distribution of the patrol force by shifts and days of the week becomes meaningful.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRIME/COMPLAINT OCCURRED</th>
<th>DAY OF THE WEEK WHEN OCCURRED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0001-0100</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0100-0200</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0200-0300</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0300-0400</td>
<td>31</td>
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<td>0400-0500</td>
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<td>0500-0600</td>
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<td>0600-0700</td>
<td>45</td>
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<td>0700-0800</td>
<td>64</td>
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<td>0800-0900</td>
<td>86</td>
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<td>0900-1000</td>
<td>105</td>
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<td>1000-1100</td>
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<td>1100-1200</td>
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<td>102</td>
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<td>1600-1700</td>
<td>113</td>
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<td>1700-1800</td>
<td>125</td>
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<td>1800-1900</td>
<td>103</td>
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<td>1900-2000</td>
<td>108</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000-2100</td>
<td>132</td>
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<tr>
<td>2100-2200</td>
<td>113</td>
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<tr>
<td>2200-2300</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2300-2400</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of all complaints reported, 3.1 percent occurred between 0001-0100 hours. Of the total number of 61 complaints occurring during these hours, 9 occurred on Saturday.
COMPUTATION OF PATROL HOURS

This section describes a simplified patrol distribution plan. For illustrative purposes it will be assumed that the PM has 35 personnel available for patrol duty per 24-hour day, or 1,400 work hours of available patrol service per week. This figure is obtained by multiplying the number of personnel by the number of hours worked per week (35 times 40 equals 1,400 work hours).

In this sample plan, days off, holidays, and so forth are not considered. Each of the 35 personnel work an eight-hour day and a five-day week. It may be desirable for the purposes of a particular PM office to project into work hours available the leave time or other factors that reduce manpower availability.

The traditional 0001 to 0800, 0800 to 1600, and 1600 to 2400 hours shifts were selected for this distribution plan. Local considerations may dictate different shift hours.

The following information describes the manner in which the patrol distribution plan should be developed:

- Take the percentages of complaints by day from the table that was developed to show complaint levels by day and hour. Place these daily percentages at the bottom of columns for each day of the week, Sunday through Saturday, in a new table for showing projected patrol distribution.
- Construct columns showing the total number of military police available and the work hours available, and enter the appropriate figures.
- Determine the shift design to be used. Place the shift hours to be used in the far left column. Using the table showing complaint levels by day and hour, determine the percentage of complaints occurring during the different shifts, and place these complaint subtotals in a column immediately to the right of the shift column, matching the percentage subtotals to the corresponding shifts. For example, 20.4 percent of all complaints occurred from 0001 to 0800 hours. This percentage is obtained by dividing 410 complaints by 2,006 total complaints.
- Disperse the total number of work hours of patrol service available by multiplying work hours available by the percentage of complaints received per shift. Enter the results in a column showing average work hours (1,400 multiplied by 20.4 percent of complaints equals 286 work hours). Work hours should be rounded to whole work-hour weeks. In this example 286 work hours is rounded to 280 work hours. Divide this figure (280 work hours) by the 40-hour work week of each MP. The result is the number of MP required for the 0001 to 0800 shift per week (seven MP in this example). Repeat this procedure for the remaining two shifts. Enter this data in the columns titled average work hours.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shift</th>
<th>Percent of Complaints</th>
<th>Personnel Available</th>
<th>Average Work Hours</th>
<th>0001-0800</th>
<th>0800-1600</th>
<th>1600-2400</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Wed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>10.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
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and personnel available, opposite the corresponding shifts.

- The work hours are then distributed based on the percentage of complaints received per day of the week for each eight-hour shift. That is, the average work hours of patrol service available is multiplied by the percentage of complaints to obtain the work hours of patrol service required. These computations are also made for the other two shifts. Any numbers that must be rounded are rounded up when the decimal place is 0.5 or greater.

\[
\text{280(WORK HRS) \times .10 (SUN) = 28 HRS REQUIRED}
\]

\[
\text{280(WORK HRS) \times .115 (MON) = 32 HRS REQUIRED}
\]

- Having constructed a projected patrol distribution table, the data are now used to develop a table showing the actual patrol distribution based on eight-hour increments. The computed work hours of patrol service must be converted into working personnel. Increments of eight are used because each person works an eight-hour day.

- In the example for projected patrol distribution above, note that 28 work hours have been assigned to Sunday on the 0001-0800 shift. As this converts to 3.5 personnel (28 work hours divided by 8-hour day), a decision will have to be made on whether three or four personnel will be assigned to the shift. In this instance, three persons were assigned duty (3 MP times 8 hours equals 24 hours). Four of the 28 work hours must be transferred to another day on the 0001 to 0800 shift. Work hours are not moved from shift to shift, only from day to day on the same shift.

- This procedure is done for all remaining days and shifts. At this point, the number of patrol personnel per shift on each day of the seven-day workweek has been determined. Thirty-three personnel have been scheduled for duty. The remaining two personnel will be used to replace personnel who are on TDY or leave or in the hospital. Or they will be used in selective enforcement operations.

![Example of Actual Patrol Distribution (35 MP) in 8-Hour Increments](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shift</th>
<th>Percent of Complaints Per Shift</th>
<th>Personnel Available</th>
<th>Average Work Hours</th>
<th>Distribution by Days of Week by Work Hours</th>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>0001-0800 Hours</td>
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<td>0800-1600 Hours</td>
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<td>1,400</td>
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</table>
PATROL SHIFT DESIGN

The shift arrangement worked by patrol personnel determines to a large measure the level of their morale, job satisfaction, and effectiveness. Poorly designed rotational shifts create confusion, fatigue, and turmoil. The number of shift patterns is infinite, so a satisfactory one can be designed for every installation. The shift pattern should be responsive to MP operations. MP assets must be available when needed. Squad and platoon integrity should be maintained, if possible, under the same supervisory personnel. Patrol personnel should be fully utilized. Nonoperational tasks such as painting, unit training, and maintenance are time-consuming, and, if not properly distributed, can overwork personnel.

The methods used to design shifts are detailed. The shift design process must take into account:

- Analysis of the existing work schedule to determine its effectiveness.
- Determination of the MP and security force staffing requirements.
- Allocation of personnel based on crime and/or other analysis.
- Determination of the type of work schedule that would best suit the needs of the PM operation.

Regardless of which shift schedule is designed, when possible, consideration must be given to shift preference of personnel. For further information on how to design a shift, see the US Department of Housing and Urban Development Work Schedule Design Handbook: Methods for Assigning Employees’ Work Shifts and Days off.

SHIFT PREFERENCE PLAN

Shift assignments can do much to motivate patrol personnel. Although some shift patterns are based on squad integrity, incoming and assigned personnel can be rotated between squads. Personnel who attend schools, who have family problems, or who prefer working odd-hour shifts can have their work preferences considered. However, such a plan can be implemented only in a stabilized patrol shift environment.

In establishing a shift preference plan, all personnel should initially identify the shift they want. Based on rank, time-in-grade, and efficiency of operations, the shifts are established. Guidelines must then be set to consider future requests for transfer to other shifts. Merit, seniority, length of time on a particular shift, and discipline are some standards that have been used to govern transfers in units using this plan. For the most desirable shifts, a standing transfer list may have to be established.

SPECIAL SHIFTS

Occasionally it is necessary to temporarily increase the number of MP patrols for special events, for special operations, or for selective enforcement. If the on-duty squad cannot meet the added commitments, it must be augmented. In doing so, one objective should always be to minimize the loss of off-duty time if possible.

On-duty hours for regularly scheduled shifts can be increased so that they will overlap with the on-coming shifts for special situations. For example, on New Year’s Eve if the midnight shift reports for duty at 2200 hours and the evening shift is retained until 0200 hours, the number of patrols can be approximately doubled during the most troublesome period.

An extra fourth shift can be formed to overlap two regular shifts. This fourth shift does not have to be organized as a regular squad but can be of whatever size the PM feels is necessary. It would be subordinate to regular shift supervisors. As an example, the PM desires to apply a selective enforcement campaign against drunk drivers. Most of these offenses occur from 1800-0200 hours. He could employ a fourth shift of six MP organized into three patrols, working under the regular shift supervisor. This extra shift would not have regular patrol areas but would concentrate on gates, roads, and other areas frequented by drunk drivers.
CHAPTER 9

Conducting Searches And Seizures

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides that the right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. It also provides that no warrants shall be issued except upon “probable cause.” And without probable cause no search is admissible in a court of law unless it is incident to a lawful apprehension, conducted with the consent of the person searched, or is otherwise legal.

There is probable cause to search when there are reasonable grounds to believe that items connected with criminal activity are located in the place (room and barracks, privately owned vehicle, or quarters) or on the person to be searched. MP must know and understand search and seizure procedures to function effectively within the law.

During raids MP must adhere to laws governing jurisdiction and authority, search and seizure, apprehension, and use of force in order to ensure evidence obtained is admissible in court. MP must understand the procedures involved in obtaining a search warrant or authorization. Probable cause must be shown before getting a search authorization. The seizure of items for use as evidence is limited. The items must be specified in the search authorization, or they must be in plain view; any illegal articles that are found are confiscated. Seized property or evidence is receipted. Receipting for seized property establishes its accountability and chain of custody.

**DETERMINING SCOPE OF AN AUTHORIZED SEARCH**

Once authorization to search has been obtained) the person conducting the search must carefully comply with the limitations imposed by the authorization. Only those locations described in the authorization may be searched and the search may be conducted only in areas where it is likely that the object of the search will be found. For example, if an investigator has authority to search the quarters of a subject, the investigator may not search a car parked on the road outside. Likewise, if the authorization states that the MP is looking for a 25-inch television, that MP may not look into areas unlikely to contain a television, such as a medicine cabinet or file cabinet.
An authorization to search for contraband implicitly carries the limited authority to detain occupants of a home, apartment, or barracks room while the search is conducted. Also, the MP may detain occupants leaving the premises at the time the MP arrive to execute the search authorization.

**AUTHORIZING A SEARCH**

The commander may authorize the search of a person or place under his command when there is probable cause to believe that items connected with criminal activities are located in the place or on the person to be searched. When time permits, the commander consults the office of the SJA. A commander may not delegate his or her authority to authorize a search to another individual in the unit. However, the power may devolve to the next senior person present when the commander is absent or when circumstances are such that the commander cannot be contacted.

When there is a military magistrate or judge on an installation, law enforcement personnel may obtain the magistrate’s or judge’s authorization to search, following the procedures set forth in AR 27-10. Law enforcement personnel can also seek the commander’s authorization. Federal magistrates have powers similar to military judges but are limited in area and authority by their respective district court.

AR 27-10 sets out the procedures for obtaining an authorization to search. Information in the form of statements, either written or oral (and which can be transmitted by telephone or radio), must be presented to a commander, magistrate, or military judge. It is not mandatory that these statements be sworn, but an oath may be required by the authorizing official and, in a close case, an oath may be the factor which determines admissibility. The authorizing official will then decide, based upon the statements, whether or not probable cause to search exists. Once the authorizing official determines that probable cause exists, the official will issue either an oral or a written authorization to search. Even though there is no general requirement that probable cause statements or the authorization to search be in writing, various commands or units may impose additional requirements. Strict adherence to these requirements is mandatory. The authorizing official must specify the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

**DETERMINING PROBABLE CAUSE**

To determine if probable cause exists, the authorizing official will evaluate whether or not the information furnished to him is reliable and reasonably warrants his acting on the basis of that information. The overall issue of reasonableness is composed of two elements. The first is the source’s basis of knowledge, which may be established by—

- Personal observation.
- Statement of the person or accomplice to be searched.
- Self-verifying detail.
- Corroboration.

The basis of knowledge can be established by showing that the commander personally observed the criminal activities himself, or that he is basing his authorization on the fact that a third party personally observed the criminal activity, that this fact has been related to him, and that such information has been corroborated or substantiated.

In the drug area, personal observation must also include facts indicating there is a basis for belief that what was seen were drugs (that is, the commander has had a class on drug identification, or the third party has had a class on drug identification or has furnished reliable information in the past as to the particular drug in question).

The commander or the person seeking the authorization from the commander may have trustworthy information that items connected with criminal activities are located in the place to be searched based on information obtained from a statement of the individual to be searched or an accomplice of the individual to be searched.
One way to pass the basis of knowledge test is by showing that the tip was so detailed that the information must have been obtained as a result of a personal observation by the informant or from a statement of the defendant or an accomplice. The best example of when a tip is self-verifying is the one the Supreme Court used in *Draper v. United States* (Illinois v. Gates, 1983; Massachusetts v. Upton, 1984).

In the above case, the arresting police officer had received a tip from an informant that the defendant had departed Denver, Colorado, to travel to Chicago. The informant (1) said the defendant would return by train on 8 or 9 September; (2) described the defendant’s physical appearance; (3) indicated that the defendant would be carrying a tan zipper bag; (4) said the defendant walks with a fast gait; and (5) said the defendant would be carrying heroin. Before making the arrest, the arresting police officer verified facts 1 through 4.

The court indicated that the tip was so detailed that it could conclude that the informant obtained his information in a trustworthy manner, such as by personal observation or a statement of the defendant or a combination of the two.

When the police officer can verify a number of the items listed in the informant’s tip, the conclusion is that the other items in the tip must also be true. The best example of corroboration is, again, *Draper v. United States*. A number of courts have indicated that the Draper situation could apply not only to train stations but airports or rendezvous-type situations with automobiles. In the case of an anonymous tip, this corroboration is extremely important and may be essential to a finding of probable cause.

**Reliability Test**

The commander must also be satisfied as to the credibility of the person furnishing the information. This has been called the reliability test and may be established by one or more of the following:

- Demeanor of the individual furnishing the information to the commander.
- Statement of past reliability.
- Corroboration.
- Statement from victim or eyewitness of offense.
- Declaration against interest.
- Information from other law enforcement officials.
- Information obtained from senior NCOs and above as a result of being passed through the chain of command.

When the information is personally given to the commander—not by an MP, but by the third party who obtained the information—the commander can judge the individual source’s reliability at that time. In many cases the individual may be a member of the commander’s unit; thus, the commander is in the best position to judge the credibility of the person. Even when the person is not a member of the authorizing commander’s unit, it is an eyeball-to-eyeball situation in which the commander can question the individual and determine the consistency of statements made by the individual. The eyeball-to-eyeball situation may either lend to or detract from establishing credibility. The same is true when the individual is a member of the commander’s unit. Again, the commander’s personal knowledge of the informant can lend to or detract from establishing credibility. Corroboration and demeanor of the person are particularly important when questioning first-time sources with no established record of past reliability.

One of the easiest methods for determining reliability is to know that the informant has proven reliable in the past. There should be some indication as to the underlying circumstances of past reliability—such as this informant has furnished correct information three times in the past about wrongful possession of a particular type of drug, naming the drug.
The person furnishing the information to USACIDC and then to the commander may furnish information that is against the person’s penal interest—such as he is aware he is admitting an offense, and he has not been promised any benefit. Thus, he may be prosecuted himself. This lends a great degree of reliability to the information furnished.

Obtaining information from other law enforcement officials through normal channels gives a presumption of reliability concerning the information. This factor comes into play when the desk sergeant puts out an all-points bulletin. It is not necessary for the apprehending MP to personally obtain the information from the source. Of course, the original source of the information must satisfy the reliability test. But this determination can be made later and need not be made by the MP who received the all-points bulletin. In other words, reliance on another MP is considered to be reasonable. The same is true for reliance on the report of the victim of a crime. Remember if acting on the basis of an anonymous tip, corroboration of the information may be essential to a finding of probable cause.

Plain View
An MP who is lawfully in any place may, without obtaining a warrant or a commander’s authorization, seize any item in plain view or smell which he has probable cause to believe is contraband or evidence of a crime. This is so even if the seizable item is not related in any way to the crime that the MP is investigating. Seeing an item in plain view in proximity to an individual may justify an apprehension or further search of the same area or another area.

An MP may use binoculars, flashlight, or in some cases, a ladder or stool. The same rationale that applies for plain view also applies for plain smell.

The commander or MP can lawfully apprehend or search during a lawful, hot pursuit. They also may lawfully apprehend or search while conducting an investigation at a unit or office premises.

Listed are a few of the places where the commander or MP can lawfully apprehend or search.

- Areas of public or private property normally accessible to the public or to the public view.
- Any place with the consent of a person empowered to give such consent.
- Any place pursuant to an authorization to search the particular place.
- Any place where the circumstances dictate an immediate police response to protect life or prevent serious damage to property.
- Any place to effect a lawful apprehension, such as business, home, on the street, or in a vehicle. (In the absence of exigent circumstances, a prior authorization is required to apprehend someone in a private residence.)

While on patrol, an MP may observe an item in a parked car; or while making a routine spot check of a vehicle, the MP may notice something that will aid in a criminal prosecution. The MP may seize that item.

When an MP is lawfully at a place to make an apprehension, he may not examine the entire premises solely to look for evidence. With an apprehension authorization, an MP may go to the on-post quarters to apprehend an individual for an offense. While standing in the foyer of the quarters, the MP may see some item that will aid in a criminal prosecution. He may seize the item that is visible from the foyer. He may not, without invitation, go to the other rooms of the house.

DETERMINING ARTICLES SUBJECT TO SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Items can be subject to seizure when specified in a legal search warrant, during a search conducted under a commander’s authorization, or during an otherwise lawful
search. All seized items should be clearly marked with the initials of the person making the seizure and the military date and time. While it may be desirable to seize property in the presence of the accused, it is not mandatory; however, a DA Form 4137 must be issued and the chain of custody maintained.

During a lawful search, any evidence relating to crimes other than that specified by the search warrant or search authorization may be seized, provided it is in plain sight during the search or in a place where the specified evidence could reasonably be found.

CONDUCTING ENTRY AND SEARCH TO PROTECT PERSONS OR PROPERTY

A commanding officer or noncommissioned officer may search government property used in connection with assigned duties (such as desks and filing cabinets located in an individual’s assigned office or building) to look for contraband or property held in a representative capacity. Any evidence found in the desk may be admissible at a trial.

An MP may make a warrantless entry into any premises whenever he has reason to believe that it is necessary to prevent injury to persons, to prevent serious damage to property, or to render aid to someone in danger.

While on patrol in the housing areas or barracks area, an MP may hear sounds of a fight or cries for help coming from a building. Upon hearing these sounds, he may enter the building to prevent injury or damage. Once the danger or emergency conditions have ceased, he may take only the necessary steps to carry out the purpose of the original entry.

An MP, who is pursuing a person who he has probable cause to believe is armed and has just committed a serious crime, may enter a vehicle or building believed to have been entered by the suspect and may search the multiple dwelling unit or vehicle for the person or any weapons that might be used to further his escape. Once the individual pursued is apprehended, the search will be limited by the search incident to apprehension rules.

When the person pursued is not found on the premises, the MP may search the premises for evidence of the suspect’s identity or the location to which he is fleeing if it is unknown.

The hot pursuit rule will apply when the MP receives a report of an armed robbery or rape and shortly thereafter receives the description of the person who has committed the offense, and pursues the suspect, at which point the suspect enters a quarters on post. He and the other MP may enter the building (for example, quarters or house) and search wherever the suspect may be hiding.

An MP may go to the on post quarters of an individual when the MP has been notified of a domestic disturbance. At the particular house, the officer will try to quell the disturbance, and if the MP views any contraband or any other item which he reasonably believes to be evidence of criminal activity, these items may be seized. Additionally, the disturbance may be such as to give the MP a basis for apprehending one of the individuals at the home. Thereafter, a search incident to the apprehension may be conducted.

CONDUCTING AN IDENTIFICATION SEARCH

An identification search applies to an incapacitated person or to an unsecured or stolen vehicle. An MP may examine the personal effects of any person who appears to be incapacitated, to learn either the cause of the incapacitation or to identify the individual.
When MP are called to a barracks, they may find an individual unconscious because of an overdose of prescription drugs or a prohibited substance. The MP may gain entry to the room and call for medical help. After the call for medical help, the MP may search the immediate area and the personal effects of the individual to obtain evidence of identity. The MP may also search the immediate area to determine what substance was used to overdose, so medics can treat the illness properly.

An MP on patrol at night may observe a car in a parking lot after the establishment has closed. If someone is observed in the vehicle apparently unconscious, it is proper for the MP to open the vehicle, learn if the individual is unconscious, notify a doctor, and then obtain evidence of the identification either from the individual or from the car itself.

An MP who finds a vehicle unsecured—one that is registered on post or has a visitor’s pass and is capable of being secured—will secure the vehicle, leaving a note that the individual who owns the vehicle should secure it himself next time. If the vehicle registered on post cannot be secured, the MP will attempt to learn the identity of the owner by first calling the PM office if time permits and, if not, by searching the vehicle for identification. If the vehicle is not registered on post or does not have a visitor’s pass, the MP may search the vehicle for identification.

If while searching the unsecured car, the owner of the vehicle is identified, the person making the search for identification will attempt to contact the owner and ask him to secure his vehicle in the future. If while looking for identification evidence of a crime is found, the evidence may be seized and may lead to appropriate action against the individual for criminal conduct.

If the owner of the vehicle cannot be determined by looking for identification, the vehicle should be secured temporarily by the MP, and an attempt should be made through all available means to determine the owner or if the vehicle was stolen.

In some states license plate numbers may not be stored in a computer. It may be difficult to determine whether or not a vehicle is stolen unless the identity of the owner can be determined immediately.

When the MP is permitted to make a search for identification, the scope of the search is limited to areas such as glove compartments and consoles where owner and vehicle identification are normally kept. The scope of the search may also include reading documents that are lying in open view inside the car. Once identification has been established, the search is ended.

CONDUCTING AN AUTOMOBILE SEARCH

An apprehending MP may make a warrantless search of the interior of a car at the time and place of apprehension if there is probable cause to apprehend one of the occupants. The scope of the search can be extended to the entire automobile if there is probable cause to believe there is evidence in the trunk or under the hood. The warrantless search need not take place where the apprehension of the occupant took place if there is a valid reason for conducting the search at another place such as at an MP station.

Where there has been a stop of an automobile, the MP stopping the automobile may make a protective search of the passenger compartment of the automobile if the MP possesses reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contains weapons potentially dangerous to the MP. Whether or not reasonable suspicion exists depends on the same factors discussed later for a frisk of an individual. The investigative search extends to those parts of the passenger compartment in which a weapon may be placed or hidden. Just because there is a stop of an automobile
does not mean the MP may conduct an investigative search.

When an individual is stopped for a robbery that has occurred on post and the driver is apprehended on post and taken to the MP station, the car may also be taken to the MP station. If the robbery has recently taken place, there may be probable cause to believe the car contains evidence of the robbery, and it may be searched at the MP station, even though there is no authorization from the commanding officer to search the vehicle.

An individual may be stopped for a traffic offense, and the MP may see items in plain view such as drugs or drug paraphernalia or evidence of other crime. This would give the MP probable cause to believe that other evidence is located in the vehicle. Thus, the vehicle can be searched there or it can be taken to the MP station where a search of the entire vehicle may be made. If the car was not in motion prior to the owner being taken into custody, and there is no likelihood of the vehicle being removed by a third party, a search warrant should be obtained to search the vehicle.

**CONDUCTING AN AREA SEARCH**

If an offender has left the scene, an adequate number of MP teams should be detailed to participate in an area search. An area search is conducted by using the quadrant method. The area to be searched is divided into four equal pie-shaped wedges radiating outward from the crime scene. One or more units are assigned to each quadrant. The search is begun at the outer perimeter of the quadrant. Units search inward toward the crime scene using a zigzag pattern. It is recommended that units overlap each other’s patterns to ensure complete area coverage.

The search for the offender continues until an apprehension is made or the search is abandoned.

In initiating a search, speed is important. Patrol personnel should not wait until a complete description of the offender and/or vehicle is obtained. They should immediately deploy with the information available and start the search. Further information can be forwarded to units in the field by radio or other means of communications as it is made available.

An area search may be conducted by using a motor vehicle or setting up a fixed post. Or a foot search may be conducted. When conducting a motor vehicle search patrol personnel remain in their vehicles and conduct a rapid area search of fields, parking lots, sidewalks, large throughway alleys, and roads. They are limited in their ability to search because they are conspicuous in a patrol vehicle and thus easily avoided. Also, they are unable to search in detail behind bushes, in doorways, and so forth. Fixed posts are useful at intersections or other vantage points on possible escape routes. These positions can be either single vehicles or formal roadblocks. When conducting a foot search the patrol vehicle is parked, and the search is carried out on foot. Personnel conducting such a search should stop frequently and listen for sounds of the offender. Trees, bushes, and other concealment should be used to protect approaching searchers from being seen by the suspect. Personnel in the area should be questioned. They may have seen the fleeing suspect or strange vehicles in the area. Foot searches can also be initiated to find witnesses and to look for evidence.
CONDUCTING A CONSENT SEARCH

An MP who wishes to make a search that is not otherwise authorized may do so if the person or persons in control of the immediate area or object to be searched voluntarily give their consent. To ensure that the consent is voluntary, the MP should warn the individual of his intent to search. Ideally the individual’s consent would be in writing.

“I have no authorization to search. I would like to search you or a particular place.”

If the person consents to a search, it will be a voluntary waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights. It must be voluntary and not mere acquiescence to authority. A refusal to consent to search, like evasive answers to a question, may arouse suspicion, but this evasiveness is not enough to amount to probable cause to search. When you have the subject’s consent, you may continue with the search without authorization. A pitfall of consensual search is that it may alert a suspect and permit him time to dispose of evidence or to escape from the installation.

One question a subject may ask is, “What happens if I do not consent to search?” The answer should be that appropriate action will be taken. If the subject persists, tell him you will apply for a search authorization. Do not tell him you will get one.

CONDUCTING A SEARCH OF ABANDONED PROPERTY

MP lawfully in any place may, without an authorization to search, recover any abandoned property and examine its contents for seizable items. While on patrol MP may observe an abandoned vehicle on an isolated road. It is proper to search the vehicle for any items that may be seized.

While on patrol an MP may apprehend an individual for a traffic offense. Prior to the vehicle coming to a complete halt, with the offender in it, he notices the offender throwing a small envelope from the vehicle. The MP may recover the envelope and seize any objects inside.

CONDUCTING A TRASH AND GARBAGE CONTAINER SEARCH

MP lawfully in any place may, without obtaining authorization to search, examine the contents of a trash or garbage container that is not located next to on-post quarters or not located in the driveway of the on-post quarters. Thus, the garbage cans located on any street near the curb may be searched without authorization to search.

CONDUCTING A SEARCH OF PREMISES WITHOUT RIGHT TO PRIVACY

MP may, without authorization, search any premises to which a suspect no longer has a right of possession or has demonstrated a lack of intention to return.

An individual who has been a resident of the guest house, but who has checked out earlier in the day, has given up the right to object to a search of his former room. Additionally, when an individual has left the guest house and has not returned for two or three days, and has not provided some intention of returning, that room may be searched. Any items found will be admissible in court.
CONDUCTING A FIRE SEARCH

After a fire in private quarters, the fire marshal and MPI may investigate the cause of the fire so long as the fire fighters are still present performing their duties. Once this investigation is discontinued and the MP and the fire fighters leave the scene, the MP may not return unless an authorization to search the premises without consent has been obtained or it is an emergency. An emergency is when there is an immediate threat that the fire might rekindle.

When the premises are completely destroyed, investigators may return at any time to investigate the cause of the fire. Additionally, when fire officials leave because of darkness and smoke, they may return within a reasonable period to continue their investigation.

MAINTAINING STATUS QUO OR FREEZING THE SITUATION

In some instances, probable cause may not exist without further investigation, or the MP may want to seek advice from a SJA. In such situations, the MP may want to hold a house, room, or automobile in a status quo.

Assume the husband has taken his spouse to the hospital because of a gunshot wound. He implies that he may have been involved with the crime or that he knows what weapon was used, but he will not tell the MP where it is located. If the husband has been legally apprehended or is consensually at the MP station and there are no children in the family, the MP may want to place notices out on the premises that no one will be allowed to enter without MP permission.

CONDUCTING A BODY CAVITY SEARCH

Under certain situations, a search of body cavities may be permitted. Coordination with the SJA is recommended before conducting a body cavity search.

SEIZING BODY FLUIDS

An individual may consent to giving a blood or urine sample. Nonconsensual extraction of blood and urine may be made pursuant to a search authorization. Nonconsensual extraction of blood or urine may be made without such an authorization only when there is a probable cause that evidence of crime will be found and when the delay that would result if an authorization were sought could result in the destruction of the evidence. An order for the individual to give blood or to collect a urine specimen is permissible if done as part of a lawful inspection.

The voluntary and involuntary extraction of blood or urine must be done by a medical specialist, physician’s assistant, medical doctor, or other person who is authorized to collect samples.

CONDUCTING A FRISK

An MP may frisk any person whom he has lawfully stopped when the MP reasonably suspects the person is carrying a concealed weapon or dangerous object, and the frisk is necessary to protect the MP or others. The frisk may be conducted immediately upon making the stop or at any time during the stop—whenever a reasonable suspicion to frisk arises.

A number of factors may be examined in determining whether or not there is reasonable suspicion that the individual is armed and that the frisk is necessary for the protection of the MP or others.
Listed are a few factors that may give grounds for a frisk:

- Appearance.
- Actions.
- Prior knowledge of the individual stopped.
- Location of the stop and whether or not it is a high crime area.
- Time of day.
- Purpose behind the stop.
- Companions of the person stopped.

If, while conducting a frisk, an MP feels an object which he reasonably believes to be a weapon or dangerous item, he may seize this object.

**CONDUCTING INVENTORIES**

A commander may direct an inventory of an individual soldier’s property when the soldier is absent from the unit on ordinary or emergency leave or when hospitalized. If the commander or his designated representative discovers items that would aid in a criminal prosecution, these may be seized and used as evidence. A commander or his designated representative also may conduct an inventory of the property of an individual who has been placed in military or civilian confinement.

When an individual is apprehended for driving while intoxicated or is a subject under apprehension which involves transportation to the PM office, the vehicle of the individual will be secured. When there is space at the place of apprehension, the vehicle may be secured there; however, if there is no place to secure the vehicle, it will be impounded at the PM office and inventoried.

When a person is apprehended for DWI as he pulls into his quarters parking lot, there is no reason to impound the vehicle. However, if a person is apprehended on one of the outer roads of the post and there is no place to secure the vehicle and there is a possibility that items may be stolen, the vehicle should be impounded at the PM office and inventoried. (AR 700-84 and DA Pam 600-8 contain more information on conducting inventories of personal clothing and property.)

**CONDUCTING INSPECTIONS**

The commander has the inherent right to inspect the individual barracks in which individual soldiers are housed to ensure the command is properly equipped, functioning properly, and maintaining standards of readiness, sanitation, and cleanliness, and to ensure that personnel are present, fit, and ready for duty.

Such an inspection may include an examination to locate and confiscate unlawful weapons and other contraband if the primary purpose is to determine if the unit is functioning properly, is maintaining standards of readiness, and is fit for duty. This inspection may also include an order for the individual to collect a urine specimen.

A commander conducting an inspection for these reasons may find items he believes may aid in a criminal prosecution. These items may be seized. The inspector may only look in those areas that will enable him to achieve the purpose and scope of this inspection. When inspecting for food or flammable products, such as lighter fluid, he may look in cigar boxes or other suitable containers.

Normally a commander will conduct periodic security checks to ensure that wall lockers and footlockers are locked. If the commander or his representative conducts a security inspection and notices a wall locker or footlocker unlocked, he may take the valuables from the locker secure them in the unit supply room until the individual returns to the unit. If, while removing the valuables, the person conducting the inspection sees
items that would aid in a criminal prosecution, these may also be seized.

The commander has the right to conduct a search for weapons after a unit has been firing on the range and has returned to the unit area and found a weapon missing. Under these circumstances the commander or his designated representative may conduct a search of all persons who were on the range and others who were in a position to steal the weapon, to include their living area and private automobiles.

Under no circumstances may an inspection or inventory be used as a subterfuge for a search (United States v. Roberts, 2 Military Justice Reporter 31 [Court of Military Appeals, 1976]).

If the commander is looking for evidence of a specific crime, or suspects that an individual or group of individuals have drugs in their possession but does not have probable cause for such a belief, he may not use the inspection of the unit as a subterfuge for a search of the individual or group of individuals. Subterfuge normally takes place when a commander or MP "feels" an individual has contraband in his possession' or living area but not enough information to amount to probable cause and uses an inspection of the type previously mentioned in this section to search for the contraband.

CONDUCTING RAIDS

A lawful raid is a surprise, legal invasion of a building or area. A raid may be made to apprehend offenders, to obtain evidence of illegal activity, or to recover personal or US government property. Occasionally this raid is made to prevent the commission of a crime or to confiscate contraband.

A raid must be justified. It must have a clearly stated purpose. The authority to conduct a raid stems from and is justified by having probable cause. Probable cause for a lawful raid comes from information obtained through surveillances, registered/confidential sources, criminal intelligence, or other sources.

Raiders are conducted by the agency that has jurisdiction of the case. This agency will have mission responsibility and may be augmented by other agencies based on the reputations of those being raided.

Military authorities authorize and conduct raids in areas under military control. Civil police conduct all raids in areas not under military control. Military authorities can request that civil police conduct a raid if enough justification exists. And MP or USACIDC special agents may accompany civil police as observers. Although forbidden by the Posse Comitatus Act to participate in a raid, MP or USACIDC special agents may help identify persons or property seized. If military personnel are apprehended in a civil police raid, they may be released to observing MP or USACIDC special agents without formal receipt.

A raid must be coordinated with units and agencies that will be affected by the raid or that can add to the raid's success. Coordination with the SJA helps ensure that the results of a raid can be used in court. In the interest of security, however, coordination is limited to that which is essential. The time of the raid should be selected, if possible, to ensure minimum interference from heavy traffic and allow rapid movement to ensure the presence of subjects and illegal items.

PLANNING A RAID

To be successful raids must be planned. Plans must include not only team composition, equipment, and operational concept, but also any special arrangements that must be made. And alternate plans should be developed. The raiding party can switch to the alternate plan on prearranged signals if the original plan goes awry.
A raid plan should be concise, simple, flexible, and should generally follow the steps used for planning an operations order. It must be based on sound tactical concepts and should be adaptable to any contingency.

A raid is planned in detail with each member of the raiding party briefed on the—
- Objective of the action.
- Number of offenders and their names, descriptions, injuries, and so forth.
- Act the offender is suspected of committing.
- Reputation, background, characteristics, and mental state of the offender.
- Hostages or other bystanders involved and their descriptions.
- Location of the offender (apartment, floor, room number, window, and so forth).
- Offender and if he is armed, and, if so, the type of weapon and amount of ammunition if known.
- Physical layout of the operation (sewers, skylights, adjacent buildings, type construction; for example, wood, brick, and so forth).
- Support forces.

The effectiveness of a raid depends largely upon specific planning and preparation including use of criminal intelligence. Essential to the effectiveness of any raid is the speed and surprise with which it is executed. Although some raids must be staged with a minimum of planning and preparation, the factors of proper coordination, manpower, and equipment to include special weapons must not be overlooked. Essential factors in planning a raid are—
- Mission.
- Opposition expected.
- Items to be searched for or seized.
- Composition of raiding party.
- Orientation of personnel.
- Position and role of each member.

Planning time can be reduced by following an SOP. The SOP contains checklists to help planners. And it gives guidelines for recurring raid factors common to all successful raids. These factors are surprise, speed, simplicity, superiority, and safety.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTORS OF A SUCCESSFUL RAID</th>
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<tr>
<td>SURPRISE of time and place</td>
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<tr>
<td>Essential for success</td>
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<td>Catches subjects unaware</td>
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<td>Raiding party can move in when least expected</td>
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Surprise keeps subjects from organizing resistance to the raiding party and from destroying or concealing evidence. It keeps them from escaping or helping other subjects escape. And it lessens their chances for suicide attempts if they are so inclined. The subjects of the raid must not know they are targets until the operation begins. The fewer people who know a raid is planned, the greater the likelihood of surprise. Once the raid begins, it must be carried out with speed and precision. The time of the raid must be planned to fit the circumstances. The best time to carry out a raid is when few uninvolved people are about. Raids are often conducted at daybreak. The element of surprise is usually on the side of the raiding party at that time of day.

Speed of execution is vital to the success of a raid. And speed can only be obtained if, from the planning stage onward, all participants have and know their specific assignments. Thus, simplicity of the plan is a key factor for a well-organized raid. Raiding party instructions must be clearly stated. And they must be easy to carry out.

Superiority in manpower and equipment can make the difference between a raid’s success or failure. Superiority comes from knowing and exceeding the subject’s capabilities. The need for superior manpower or maneuverability dictates the number of members used in the raiding party. And superiority of firepower is desirable in any raid situation. If criminals know the raiding party is better armed than they are, they are less likely to resist. If criminals are armed as well or better than the raiding party, they may believe they have a chance for escape and thus offer greater resistance.

Safety must have a high priority in any MP operation. Danger is inherent in any raid situation. The raiding party must be thorough, cautious, and safety conscious. Speed must not be gained at the expense of safety. Using trained and experienced personnel reduces the hazard of injury to or death of innocent persons. Every raid member must be able to recognize all members of the raiding party. In multiorganizational raids, distinctive clothing, like raid jackets, can clearly identify raiding party members. Each member of the multiorganizational raiding party must be familiar with all aspects of the operation, as well as his or her own mission.

**DETERMINING RAIDING PARTY COMPOSITION**

The raiding party’s composition is determined by the situation and the resources available. There is no set number of people or teams who should make up a party. A suggested organization, which can be modified as needed, is composed of a raid commander; entry, security, prisoner, reserve, and medical teams; and their respective commanders. Sometimes specially detailed persons or teams augment the raiding party. For example, a chemist or a special dog handler team may accompany the basic party.

The raid commander has the overall responsibility for planning and conducting a raid. Raid commanders are selected for their experience and leadership ability and for their knowledge of the situation. Team commanders are responsible to the raid commander for the supervision of their respective teams. They, too, are selected for experience and leadership ability. A reserve team commander is usually named as the assistant raid commander. He assumes command of the raiding party if the commander is injured. A chain of command is established for the raiding party and within each team.

The entry team is the maneuver element. It enters the target area to make apprehensions, as needed, and/or recover property. The entry team may have a recorder, a photographer, and an evidence custodian. The recorder makes notes of events, and property recovered during the raid.
The photographer complements the recorders notes with photographs of items or events. The evidence custodian assembles, tags, and receipts for the evidence or properties seized.

The security team provides cover for the entry team. It also seals off possible avenues of approach and escape.

The reserve team reinforces or assists wherever needed. Part of this team may stay mobile for use as a pursuit unit. If the reserve team is not needed for its basic purpose, it can augment processing and help control the raid site.

The prisoner team enters the building or area after it is secured. It takes charge of prisoners apprehended by the entry team. The prisoner team must be aware that the entry team does not make a complete search of the prisoners at the time of apprehension.

The medical team should include a doctor if possible. The medical team normally remains with the reserve team. The medical team treats injuries incurred by members of the raiding party or subjects of the raid.

**DETERMINING EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS**

Equipment is selected to suit the raid’s purpose and the expected degree of opposition. Special equipment like public address systems, night-vision devices, and drug detector dogs are carefully chosen. Too much equipment can slow the raiding party. Too little equipment can hamper the raid’s effectiveness.

The raid commander selects the weapons to be used. He considers the subject’s armament, the terrain of the neighborhood, and the degree of resistance expected. He ensures that MP armed with special weapons are proficient in their use.

If riot control munitions are used, they must be planned for. (See FM 19-15 for specific procedures for use of riot control agents.) Clearance to use riot control munitions must be obtained from the installation commander. The raiding party must have protective masks. And wind direction, traffic, and population density must be considered. Type of munitions must be considered. For example, using burning-type munitions in wood structures can cause fires.

Effective communications are a must for a successful raid. Natural voice, visual, and radio communications give the raid commander control over his various elements. At a minimum, the raid commander and each team leader need a radio. Members of the security team occupying likely avenues of escape also need radios. (Radio equipment must be checked before use. Use of relays may be necessary.)

Hand and arm or whistle signals are often used to direct movements, such as when to begin the raid. Visual and sound signals should be backed by radio communications. The reverse is also true. The local telephone system can be used as well. The important point is to have an alternate means of communication. One method is not enough.

**PERFORMING RECONNAISSANCE**

If time permits, the raid commander performs a reconnaissance of the building or area to be raided. He may have photographs, maps, blueprints, or sketches collected to supplement visual observations. And he may consider covert operations to gain entrance to help develop his raid plan.

When performing a recon, the MP look for the best route of entry to the target. They check for vantage points and patterns of occupants of the area. And they note points offering observation and fields of fire for the raiding party and/or the occupants.

When reconnoitering a specific building, MP may enter only if doing so will not compromise the raid. MP can obtain blueprints from the facility engineer to gain a thorough knowledge of floor plans and
interior arrangements of a building. MP can note the doors and windows, their construction, and the direction in which they open. They can note likely exits and entrances to include emergency doors and fire escapes. They seek interviews with reliable persons who are responsible for or who have previously entered the area. And they identify persons who may or will be in the building. They spot the location of activities in the area; for example, MP may note the placement of dice and card tables used for gambling. They also assess likely problem areas.

EXECUTING A RAID

No two raids are alike. But many raids are based on similar types of information and follow similar sequences of actions.

Night raids are more hazardous than daylight raids. In many civil jurisdictions a night raid must be justified to a magistrate. The magistrate must be convinced that the purpose of the raid could not be achieved during the daytime, perhaps because the subject would not be at home. This legal restriction is not written into military law. But the principle applies. The law supports the point that a raid should be announced and the raiding party should clearly identify themselves as MP before the party enters. This identification is difficult at night because visibility is limited. Command and control are also harder at night. And the chance of injury to police personnel, subjects, and innocent bystanders is greater.

Special situations result when females and juveniles are present or are the subjects of a raid. If it is believed females will be apprehended during a raid, arrangements must be made to have them searched and attended by a female MP who is assigned to the raiding party. When juveniles are the subjects of a raid, care must be taken to use minimum force. Plans must be made to process them separately from adult offenders. And they must be maintained separately until they are released to their parents or transferred to juvenile facilities.

If a covert agent is operating within the subject group, he should be advised to be absent at the time the raid will take place. If he cannot be absent, he must be apprehended during the raid or given a plausible means of escape. If apprehended, his later disposition will depend upon the situation, his mission, and his prior identification as a covert agent to the local police. The identity and description, if possible, of the covert agent should be given to all members of the raiding party to prevent any accidental shooting of the covert agent.
CHAPTER 10
Conducting Apprehensions

Military police must be prepared to take immediate, coordinated action at the scene of a crime. This action sometimes involves apprehension. MP must be familiar with standing operating procedures, laws of apprehension, use of deadly force, handling and custody of evidence, and crime scene protection. In cases involving felony crimes, procedures are prearranged for notifying the USACIDC office and other law enforcement agencies. Prompt investigation can often aid in the swift apprehension of offenders.

AUTHORITY TO APPREHEND

MP and civilian guards or police employed by the Army have the same authority to apprehend. Their authority is derived from the installation commander’s inherent authority to maintain order on the installation. AR 600-40 affirms that—

- All members of the military have the ordinary right of private citizens to assist in maintenance of the peace. This includes the right to apprehend offenders. Citizen’s arrest power is defined by local law. In exercising this power, care should be taken not to exceed the right granted by law. Service members also must be familiar with the limits imposed upon military personnel by the Posse Comitatus Act.
- The restraint of the person imposed under the provisions of AR 600-40 will not exceed that reasonably necessary, nor extend beyond the time required to dispose of the case by transfer of custody to civil authority or otherwise, under the law.

The laws of most jurisdictions are relatively clear on the arrest authority of peace officers. They are also somewhat obscure on the authority of private individuals. The SJA should be asked to conduct a survey of local laws relating to citizen’s arrest on and off the installation. As the authority for the citizen’s arrest is the law of the local jurisdiction and not AR 600-40, any variance between it and AR 600-40 should be made clear to all concerned.

Limited authority exists to apprehend persons not subject to the UCMJ. This does not mean these offenders go unpunished. If administrative measures are not sufficient, action may be taken as provided in AR 27-40, which sets forth procedures for filing complaints with US magistrates.

In applying the law authorizing apprehensions in the capacity of a private person, the following terms must be understood:

- A felony is any offense punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one year.
- A misdemeanor is any offense not a felony.
- A breach of the peace is a public offense where violence or the threat of violence is causing or likely to cause an immediate disturbance of public order. Any act which involves the use of force or the threat of immediate use of force towards the person or property of another is a breach of the peace.
A private person is any person other than a peace officer or police officer, whether he is or is not a citizen of a particular state or area or resident therein. The authority of a private person to make an apprehension may be broadened under local law. Generally, it is restricted to felonies and breaches of the peace.

The phrase “in his presence” means that an act occurs within range of any of the person’s five senses.

**APPREHENSION OF JUVENILES**

Juveniles may be apprehended under the conditions set forth in AR 600-40. Upon apprehension, MP will follow normal apprehension procedures and SOPs and will notify juveniles of their legal rights and the offense for which apprehended.

The authority of MP on an installation, as far as juveniles not subject to military law are concerned, is derived from the installation commander’s inherent authority to maintain order on the installation.

The general authority placed upon the installation commander by Army regulations gives that commander broad powers to create policies and publish regulations governing the conduct on post of civilian and dependent juveniles. The installation commander may authorize the MP to make a citizen’s arrest when more serious criminal offenses are committed on a military reservation by a juvenile. Since state laws may vary regarding citizen’s arrest power, the SJA is consulted for guidance.

Immediately upon arrival at the MP station, the offender’s parents or guardians must be notified of the apprehension. Parents or guardians must also be told of the juvenile’s rights and the offense for which apprehended.

**MEANS OF APPREHENSION**

The need to apprehend an offender can occur with little warning. It can happen at any time. Speed in erecting barricades, redeploying patrol units, and performing similar actions are necessary for rapid apprehension. A plan of action for each type of apprehension is immediately available to the desk sergeant. The plan considers the placement of temporary roadblocks, checkpoints, and methods of alerting patrol officers.
It considers decisions on when to use lights and sirens. It considers traffic control in the operations area. It considers location and employment of specialized equipment and communications requirements. It considers evacuation of bystanders and the apprehension of offenders at the scene of the crime. It considers the pursuit of armed suspects and area searches for suspects and witnesses. It considers coordinating with other military, federal, and civil law enforcement agencies. And it considers securing crime scenes for investigators.

CORDON

Patrols converging on the scene of a crime may establish a hasty cordon. Reserve personnel, temporary barricades, and other devices are used by MP to complete the encirclement of the area. All personnel stationed along the cordon prevent entry of unauthorized persons. A separate force is normally used to accomplish the actual apprehension. All cordon MP are given a description of the person, vehicle, or property sought. Action is not delayed to await accurate, detailed descriptions.

Checkpoints and barricades are used when fugitives are known to be proceeding along a definite route or in a definite direction. This helps to block their escape.

PURSUIT

Formal written arrangements between military and local civilian police are required for “hot pursuits.” These agreements set forth procedures to be followed and limitations imposed on hot pursuits. These agreements provide for mutual assistance during pursuits. MP must not leave their jurisdiction without written arrangements. Hot pursuit is a direct, continuing pursuit with the immediate probability of apprehension. When apprehended, the same search may be made as is authorized for any lawful apprehension.

Because of the danger involved in high-speed pursuits, specific guidance is provided. MP policy specifies types of offenses that justify a high-speed pursuit. Pursuit of an armed robbery suspect is normally warranted. The dangerous pursuit of traffic violators is much less justified. Lights and sirens are always used in pursuits. Normally only one vehicle will use a siren. When two emergency vehicles approach the same intersection from different directions, the sound of each siren tends to mask that of the other. This increases the chances of the vehicles colliding.

Emergency and pursuit vehicles are exempt from most traffic regulations. A pursuit is never carried to the extent that the safety of bystanders or the MP is endangered. MP do not operate military vehicles in a reckless manner during pursuits or participate in unlawful pursuits. If necessary, the pursuit is terminated.

MP never fire weapons from a moving vehicle. Bystanders could be hit with missed shots and ricochets. MP in pursuing vehicles keep the MP station constantly advised of their location and direction of travel. This will allow a multiunit pursuit to be initiated and coordinated.

CONTACTS AND STOPS

An MP or commander must conclude that an apprehension or stop is justified. If not, communication with a person begins with a contact. Contacts and stops are similar actions but have differences. (See Chapter 5.)

MP must stop any person they reasonably suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. This action must be in a place the MP has a right to be. Both
pedestrians and occupants of vehicles can be stopped. If a soldier who is stopped is a suspect and is to be questioned, the MP must read him his Article 31 rights.

The term “reasonable suspicion” cannot be precisely defined. The stop must be based on more than a hunch. The MP must be able to state specific facts for his decision to stop the individual. Factors to be used in determining reasonable suspicion are—

- **Personal appearance.** Does the person generally fit the description of the person wanted for a known offense? Does he appear to have a recent injury? Does he appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs?
- **Actions.** Is he running away from an actual or possible crime scene? Is he otherwise behaving in a manner to indicate possible criminal conduct?
- **Prior knowledge of the person.** Does the person have an arrest or conviction record? What is the person’s reputation on post or in the unit?
- **Demeanor during contacts.** Does the person act evasive or suspicious or knowingly give false information when questioned? This behavior may be a basis for a stop after the initial contact.
- **Area of the stop.** Is the person near an area known for the commission of certain crimes? Is it a high crime area?
- **Time of day.** Is it a very late hour? Is it usual for people to be in the area at this time of day? Is it the time of day when criminal activity of the kind suspected usually occurs?
- **Police training and experience.** Does the MP making the stop have the training to determine if the pattern of conduct sets a *modus operandi* for that type of crime?
- **Source of the information.** Can sources of information be used to establish probable cause?

**EXECUTION OF AN AUTHORIZATION TO APPREHEND**

MP must have a search warrant to enter a third party’s residence to execute an apprehension. When MP are not authorized to apprehend there must be an emergency situation or consent must be given before MP may enter private quarters, bachelor officers’ quarters (BOQ), and bachelor enlisted quarters (BEQ), on or off post, to apprehend. Authorization is not needed to apprehend in barracks; however it is encouraged.

A commander, military judge, or magistrate may authorize an apprehension at private quarters, BOQ, or BEQ. The authorizing official must have jurisdiction to order such apprehension. There is no requirement to have both an apprehension and a search warrant unless the authorizing official has found both probable cause to search and probable cause to apprehend. There is probable cause to apprehend when there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offense has been committed. There also is probable cause to apprehend when it is believed that the individual to be apprehended has committed the offense. All commissioned officers, warrant officers, petty officers, noncommissioned officers, and DOD police officers and guards may apprehend persons when there is probable cause for such apprehension.

Timeliness of the information is a key factor in proving probable cause. For example, we may have reliable information from an informant who has proven reliable in the past. He obtained his information 30 days ago by personal observation. The fact that the offense was committed 30 days ago and was based on personal observation from a reliable informant gives us probable cause to apprehend. It does not give probable cause to search an area under the exclusive control of the offender. If a small quantity of drugs was seen in the offender’s possession 30 days ago in the company billets, this would not give probable cause to search the billets today. There would be no basis to
believe that the drugs are still present. However, a basis for apprehension and for a search incident to the apprehension still exists. Additionally, both the basis of knowledge test and reliability test must be satisfied in determining the existence of probable cause.

SEARCH IN RELATION TO AN APPREHENSION

During an apprehension the suspect is subject to a full search of his person. The search is lawful only if there is probable cause for making the apprehension. Any search has both time and geographical limits. During the apprehension, or immediately afterwards, the MP must tell the suspect he is being apprehended and state the specific offense. The apprehending MP may search not only the suspect but also the area immediately around the suspect. Searches are limited to the area in which a person can reach a weapon or destroy evidence. This includes any distance from which a weapon could be reached by a sudden lunge, leap, or dive from where the suspect is.

If a driver or passenger in an automobile is placed under apprehension, a search of the closed and locked trunk is not justified as incident to that apprehension. But the MP may search the passenger compartment of the automobile. This includes all containers found in the passenger compartment. ("Containers" denotes any object capable of holding another object.) This search may also include closed or open glove compartments or consoles. Other receptacles located anywhere within the passenger compartment, such as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and so forth, are subject to search.

Normally, MP do not make a full search of a traffic offender. However, if the offender leads MP to believe he may be armed or a threat to the MP’s safety, the person may be frisked. If MP believe the offender is concealing evidence of a crime, then MP have probable cause to search the offender and the offender’s car.

If a person is stopped for speeding and MP see him make a motion to place something under the front seat or grab something from under the front seat, it is permissible to frisk the person and check the immediate area. If, when issuing a traffic citation or making an apprehension, MP view items in plain view that they believe are evidence of a crime, they may seize, these items even though they are not on the person or in the immediate area.

Prior knowledge of past violent behavior may provide justification for searching an individual. Under unusual circumstances, search of the individual and the immediate area can be made at a different time or place. One reason for doing this is that a potentially unruly crowd may have gathered where the initial apprehension took place. The search could not be conducted at the time and place of apprehension for security reasons or for crowd control reasons. Lighting conditions are another valid reason.

Information gathered at the time of apprehension may indicate that seizable items are on the premises and in immediate danger of destruction, concealment, or removal. In this case the MP may immediately search for and seize these items.

When an apprehension is made at a person’s on-post quarters, the apprehending MP makes a cursory view of the premises to see if other people are present who may impede the apprehension. If, while making the cursory view, other items come into plain view that would aid in a criminal prosecution, these items are also seized.
A person who is apprehended at his quarters or place of business may have to obtain wearing apparel or a change of clothing for a stay at the detention cell. If the apprehended person requests permission to gather other things to bring with him, the MP may search the immediate area where the additional materials are located. This is done to protect the apprehending MP and to prevent the destruction of evidence. The MP may not, however, move the suspect throughout the home simply in order to search other rooms.

When an apprehended person has no reasonable expectation of privacy, the apprehending MP may make an inspection of the entire area. For example, an MP is investigating a break-in of the auto crafts shop. He finds the door jimmyed and enters to find an individual in the garage. The MP can inspect the entire crafts shop, looking for other evidence of a crime. This is because the suspect cannot have an expectation of privacy in the crafts shop.

When there has been a lawful apprehension and the person has been taken to the MP station or the person consented to go to the MP station, the following actions may be compelled:

- Fingernail scrapings if there is probable cause to believe that such scrapings will aid in a criminal prosecution.
- Fingerprints.
- Voice exemplars.
- Handwriting exemplars.
- Bite plates to identify teeth marks when there is probable cause to believe that such evidence will aid in a criminal prosecution.

The rights warning is not required to take these actions as the individual is not being interrogated and is not being asked to make a statement. The Fifth Amendment only covers “testimonial communication” and not the physical display of the body or similar actions.
Military working dog teams support a variety of MP operations. They are used in peacetime environments to extend MP resources. And on the battlefield, MWD teams can support MP tactical units involved in all MP missions. The MWD teams can prove an additional asset for security measures. MWD teams can be used to help MP deter and detect the enemy. In peacetime, MWD teams make a valuable contribution in the detection, investigation, or prevention of criminal activity.

Installation PMs can enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement operations by employing MWD teams.

**PATROL DOG TEAMS**

The functions of MWD teams focus on the skills of the dog. The patrol dog is the basic Army MWD. All of the MWD employment concepts that have been developed revolve around the basic skills of the Army patrol dog. Some patrol dogs may subsequently be trained in additional skills, such as tracking, narcotics detection, and explosives detection.

The decision to employ patrol dogs must be weighed carefully by the responsible commander to be sure that if patrol dog teams are committed, all lesser means of force have been reasonably attempted and have failed. PMs, security officers, or MP commanders will establish procedures governing the release of patrol dogs consistent with Army use of force policy (see AR 190-12 and AR 190-28).

Patrol dog teams are not generally used for traffic control or accident investigation duties. If exceptional circumstances require that they perform these duties, the dog is secured in the vehicle. The patrol dog is trained to perform the primary function of detecting the presence of unauthorized personnel and warning its handler. The secondary function of the patrol dog is to pursue, attack, and hold any intruder who attempts to avoid apprehension or escape from custody. Releasing the dog constitutes the conscious application of physical force. Patrol dogs may be released to apprehend an intruder who is suspected of committing a serious offense and tries to escape or use deadly force.

Patrol dogs must be used cautiously in confrontation situations, since their presence could aggravate a situation. Unlike people, a patrol dog does not fear an armed person and, if fired at, will pursue and attack. A patrol dog handler who is confronted (for example, in a club or housing area) avoids entering a building or a closed area alone with the patrol dog. The handler withdraws safely from a confrontational situation and then immediately reports the incident to his supervisor so that necessary actions can be taken.

Patrol dogs are not to be used for crowd control or direct confrontation with demonstrators unless determined to be necessary by the responsible commander. Use of patrol dog teams for direct confrontation with demonstrators is not recommended. The duty of the MP is to
prevent escape or effect a lawful apprehension of a person engaged in a criminal act. In a crowd situation, there is no certainty that a patrol dog will attack, pursue, and hold the person against whom the dog has been released. Therefore, under no circumstances will dogs be released in a crowd.

Using patrol dogs in dependent housing or in the vicinity of troop billets helps deter criminal actions. The team has the ability to move quickly from one area to another, but actual patrolling of housing and billet areas is done mostly dismounted.

**IN PEACETIME ENVIRONMENTS**

A patrol dog team may be used on gate duty or other entry control functions. The dog's primary function is deterrence and protection of the handler. Use of MWD teams for entry control, however, is not recommended because of the high volume of traffic, the large number of distractions, and the reduction of the handler's ability to maintain positive control over the dog.

If circumstances necessitate using MWD teams at entry control points, the dog is not confined inside a gate house where it cannot respond to its handler if needed. Further, the MWD team will need to be frequently moved to other duties to keep the dog alert and proficient.

The primary function of a patrol dog team on a fixed post is surveillance over an area or building. If used outside, the team is located downwind where the dog can detect an intruder by scent, sound, or sight. If this is not possible, the team is located so an intruder can be detected by sight and sound. When used inside, the dog depends mostly on his hearing. Other MP may be used with dog teams on fixed posts.

The patrol dog's contribution to the law enforcement effort is most effective when the team is used on foot patrol. Some of the law enforcement duties that a patrol dog team can do as a walking patrol include checking or clearing buildings and patrolling parking lots, family housing areas, and troop billet areas. Patrol dog teams used to escort and safeguard funds may deter some people from attempting to rob the courier.

Giving patrol dog teams a mobile capability significantly increases their potential area of coverage and allows the teams to perform a greater range of functions during a duty shift. The team is normally unaccompanied, but other MP may go with the team when the need arises.

Mobile patrols are most effective when the patrol dog team uses the ride-awhile, walk-awhile method. The team is able to help cover a large patrol area, and the periodic exercise helps to keep the dog alert.

The patrol dog team can check buildings visually while patrolling by vehicle. The patrol dog team can also stop and dismount so the handler can physically check doors and windows. To take maximum advantage of the dog's scenting ability, the handler approaches buildings from downwind.

To check identification or to apprehend, the handler always warns the person that if he or she displays any hostility to the patrol or to the handler, the dog will attack without command. Once the handler has been alerted by the dog, it becomes the responsibility of the handler to cope with the situation in the most appropriate manner. Frequently, the appropriate action is to keep the intruder or area under surveillance until other MP personnel can arrive. After an apprehension, a search is always done with the patrol dog in the guard position. A backup MP patrol is used to transport apprehended personnel.

Dog teams are useful to detect and apprehend thieves and vandals in vehicle parking lots. Also, the presence of the patrol dog team may deter potential acts of theft and vandalism. The team can be most effective by alternating between vehicle and foot patrol in a parking lot. During hours of darkness, when there is no activity in a parking lot, the team approaches the lot from the downwind side.
If a building is open or forced entry is evident, patrol dog teams may be used to track hidden intruders from point of penetration to their location. In responding to an alarm at facilities such as clubs, finance offices, or banks, the patrol dog team should be among the first MP on the scene.

When the need for tracking arises, personnel who are on the scene avoid the area and keep other personnel from entering the tracking area. This will reduce contamination of the area with extraneous or confusing scents.

The dog begins tracking as soon as possible because success often depends on the strength of the available scent. The passage of time, wind strength, and other environmental conditions will affect the strength of the scent. Human scent adheres well to grass and brush which can improve the chances of success. Paved or gravel areas and strong scents such as fertilizer, burned grass, or spilled oil or gasoline impede the tracking ability. Human scent remains longer on cool, moist ground. Direct sunlight, extremely dry ground, or heavy rain dissolves scent rapidly, making tracking more difficult.

The methods used to track lost personnel, especially children, are different from those used to track a fleeing suspect. Only dogs who have been trained to track successfully for lost personnel are used, to avoid any danger of harming innocent persons.

Not all patrol dogs have been trained to track. Among the dogs trained to track, not all have the same tracking ability. The kennel master must know which of his assigned patrol dogs are good trackers and use the best patrol dogs for tracking missions.

IN COMBAT AREAS

MWD teams provide support for crime prevention and law enforcement activities. MWD teams may be employed in routine patrol duties in heavily populated areas with safety and efficiency. They can be used to support police operations in searching crime scenes. They can track fleeing saboteurs. They can clear buildings of sympathizers or stay-behind pilferers. They can also apprehend criminal offenders. MWD teams can perform perimeter security duties at isolated activities. Patrol dogs may be employed on fixed security posts or in conjunction with security patrols. MWD teams can protect ammunition supply points and critical resupply areas. They can protect bridges, railway marshaling areas, and airfields. They can work with MP security units at remote communications sites and at isolated MP circulation control points. They are also highly useful in cordon and search operations. In fact, on the battlefield just as in a peacetime environment, MWD teams are useful wherever the dogs' highly developed senses of smell and hearing can be used to detect the presence and location of otherwise invisible intruders or enemy. (The use of dogs in the vicinity of petroleum, oil, and lubricant points must be infrequent and of short duration because of damaging effects on paws and to sense of smell.) In addition explosives detector dogs have been trained to discriminate the scent of explosives. They may be used in detecting, tracking, and searching buildings, aircraft, and vehicles to protect government property and personnel.

NARCOTICS DETECTOR DOG TEAMS

The abuse of drugs by military personnel, their dependents, and civilians, who may enter military areas for work, business, or recreation, presents a continuing problem for the Army. Every effort must be made to reduce the potential danger to society and particularly to the military community from those who sell or abuse drugs.

Narcotics detector dogs serve as effective investigative tools for trained personnel in detecting narcotics and other contraband
LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

and will be employed under the supervision of such personnel. The dog handler with his detector dog form a detector team.

The use of well-trained narcotics detector dogs is one of the most efficient means of detecting the possession or transportation of dangerous drug contraband. The narcotics detector dog is trained through a program of practice and reward to recognize the scent of drugs such as marihuana, hashish, heroin, cocaine, and other related substances. When the narcotics detector dog locates any of these substances, the dog will alert its handler.

The use of narcotics detector dogs during a health and welfare inspection must be authorized by the installation commander or a commander having control over the personnel and property to be inspected. There are several legal considerations in using the narcotics detector dog since the apprehension and possible criminal prosecution of offenders may be involved.

Commanders and supervisors should work closely with the command SJA to ensure that drug detection operations achieve objectives and comply with legal requirements. Whenever the operational situation may result in the apprehension and possible criminal prosecution of offenders, the procedural and record-keeping requirements defined in AR 190-12 apply to narcotics detector dog teams.

Court decisions and changes to existing laws and policy frequently alter the methods and procedures that must be followed for proper narcotics detection programs. Handlers must learn and apply the rules of evidence, search and seizure, and the procedures for collecting and preserving evidence.

EXPLOSIVES DETECTOR DOG TEAMS

Few other criminal acts create such concern and fear in the hearts of a nation's citizens as a series of bombings. It is no coincidence that organized crime and terrorist groups routinely use explosive materials as a means of achieving their violent goals. Whether the objective is murder, intimidation, extortion, or governmental disruption, the bomb is a favorite and effective weapon of the criminal element. One of the most effective countermeasures to the use of explosives is the deterrent value and the detection capabilities of the EDD team. EDD teams fill three distinct roles in MP operations in addition to their routine use as patrol dog teams.

The type of threat received and local policy determine the initial actions to be taken in response to a bomb threat. The procedures used during training rehearsals for bomb threats will be used during actual bomb threats.

Evacuation of the area may or may not be ordered by the responsible commander or his designated bomb scene officer. But the area must be evacuated if the EDD team is being used to perform the initial search. The area must be evacuated to minimize the distractions to the EDD team and to reduce the risk to area occupants in the event of an explosives detonation. The advantage of using the EDD team to conduct the search is that the EDD handler has specialized knowledge of explosives and explosive devices and search techniques.

Public knowledge that EDD teams are assigned to and are used at an installation acts as a deterrent to persons who may try to use explosives illegally on the installation. The knowledge that explosives can be detected by EDDs at installation gates or in places where explosives have been hidden can prevent a person from attempting to bring explosives onto an installation.
The most common use of EDD teams, and probably the most important, is to search areas or buildings against which a bomb threat has been made. A well-trained EDD team can conduct a significantly more effective search of any area or facility than almost any number of people. However, when persons who work in the specific, threatened area are available to identify unfamiliar objects, planners should consider their contribution to an EDD search. If the dog alerts during an actual search, explosives ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel are immediately notified of the location of the alert. EOD will dispose of any suspect devices or objects. Using EDD teams also helps to reduce the potential risk to persons who would otherwise have to do the search without benefit of the dog’s superior sense of smell. Neither the MP nor any other person attempts to move, open, or tamper with any object suspected of being an explosive device unless they have been specifically trained to do so.

EDD teams can be useful in many investigations involving almost any type of weapon, ammunition, or explosive. They are particularly useful if there is a need to locate one or more items which may have been hidden in an area.

The most frequent tasks performed by EDD teams are in response to bomb threats against military or civilian resources. The general requirements for providing EDD team support to civil authorities is stated in AR 190-12. However, many units are also using EDD teams in random searches at entry control points, for inspection of troop and family housing areas, and for checks of aircraft and aircraft areas; sensitive or high value equipment storage areas; and mail, baggage, freight shipments, and so forth. The expanded use of EDD teams for these functions presents many of the same legal problems for explosives searches that are characteristic of narcotics detector dog team searches for drugs. Whenever the operational situation may result in the apprehension and possible criminal prosecution of offenders, the procedural and record-keeping requirements defined in AR 190-12 apply to EDD teams. However, compliance with procedural requirements is not to be an obstacle to protecting life and property. The EDD handler is always prepared to establish the EDD team’s credibility with training, utilization, and proficiency records.
In some locales MP may be called upon to enforce US customs laws and regulations. MP may be tasked to visually inspect both incoming and outgoing mail at local Army post offices for customs violations. MP may be aided by military narcotics or explosives detector dogs in performing these customs inspections. Mail containing narcotics, explosives, or other contraband is processed in accordance with directives issued by Department of the Army.

MP may be required to operate control posts and border patrols and to supervise crossing points at international borders. Many countries control the movement of military personnel and civilians at their borders. Border control is maintained for reasons of security, customs and tariff enforcement, protection of the civilian economy, and apprehension of criminals, absentees, and persons of intelligence interest. Control is maintained through the establishment of authorized road or rail crossing points, border patrols, control posts, and, if feasible, liaison with authorities of neighboring countries. Prohibited or restricted zones are often used to help control circulation at borders.

In border control, MP normally coordinate with host country police, counterintelligence units, and civil affairs units. Border control posts and patrols are also furnished border alarms. They are to watch for individuals or items that may be involved in criminal and customs offenses. Normal procedures for checking personnel, luggage, vehicles, and documents at border crossing points include the following requirements for MP customs personnel:

- Establish the identity and purpose of US forces members crossing borders and examine vehicles and travel documents.
- Instruct US forces members to make oral or written customs declarations as required.
- Conduct searches of vehicles, luggage, and any other property being imported or exported by US forces personnel.
- Seize contraband items that are in violation of customs regulations. In all cases where property or contraband is seized, DA Form 4137 will be prepared in four copies.

MP customs personnel concern themselves with individuals subject to military authority who enter or leave an international port or control point of a host country. Members of US forces may be referred to MP customs inspectors by host country authorities for partial or final border processing.

MP in HNs may be tasked to enforce customs laws and regulations in support of local government officials. US military enforcement of customs laws of countries in which US forces are stationed is often part of agreements like the NATO SOFA between the United States and the host nation. Under agreements MP enforce customs laws of the host country with respect to US forces personnel and their dependents. MP help—

- Prevent the illegal sale or transfer into the local economy of US forces’ goods which enter the country free of customs duty and taxes.
- Authenticate and issue customs import documents to members of the US forces for importation of personal property (except for hold baggage or household goods which enter as official consignments of the US forces).
• Issue permits to transfer customs/duty-free personal property to nonmembers of US forces.
• Verify the status of retired US forces personnel residing in the country so that these personnel, who are not members of the US forces as defined in the SOFA, may apply to the host country customs authority for customs certificates. These certificates entitle them to purchase items in commissaries and post exchanges without payment of import duties or taxes.
• Work with host country border police and customs agents to prevent import/export violations by members of the US forces.

At overseas airports MP customs personnel may be tasked to provide customs control. They may make customs and antihijack inspections for all outbound military and civilian personnel and family members and accompanying baggage pending departure on Military Airlift Command (MAC) charter aircraft. They are also tasked to prevent contraband, unauthorized weapons, and illegal drugs and narcotics from being introduced into CONUS or the HN.

The enforcement of administrative MAC regulations is beyond the scope and range of MP customs inspector duties (for example, oversize baggage is rejected only by MAC counter personnel). Safety and security requirements, however, are enforced by the MP customs inspectors.

US military customs personnel assigned to duty at ports and control points are granted authority to apprehend and detain any person subject to the UCMJ who—
• Avoids, or attempts to avoid, a customs inspection.
• Fails to make a declaration required by law, or who is suspected of making a false declaration.
• Conceals, or attempts to conceal, any property or goods from a customs inspection.
• Illegally enters, leaves, or attempts illegally to enter or leave any area under US control or HN control.

MP custom inspectors must be familiar with the various types of US passports and other identification documents that are shown to them at ports of entry and border crossing points. AR 600-290, AR 640-3, and AR 630-5 provide pertinent information. Command directives may also provide special requirements, such as the US Army, Europe (USAREUR) requirement, that a “Certificate of Status” be stamped in the passports of dependents of members of the US forces or civilian component.

MILITARY CUSTOMS INSPECTORS

DOD Regulation 5030.49-R provides for the selection and training of military customs inspectors. These inspectors check household goods and hold baggage and certify them as customs-processed. They function under the supervision of designated commanders and in close cooperation with Transportation Corps personnel. They are trained and certified by the MP customs units which also monitor and spot-check their operations. A friendly and courteous attitude by MP customs inspectors is required for all public contact. Such an attitude promotes the cooperation of passengers, enhances enforcement, and fosters a favorable image of the MP. Before assuming MP customs inspector duties, personnel are trained and oriented to recognize various types of narcotic drugs. (See FM 19-20 for a detailed discussion on drugs.) Customs inspectors also receive annual refresher training and daily briefings before assuming shift duty.

As questions and special situations arise, all MP customs inspectors refer unresolved problems to their respective squad leader, the field office NCOIC, the detachment commander, or group headquarters, as required.
Information is available so that on-duty customs personnel can contact supervisory personnel on a 24-hour basis.

When personnel are apprehended, MAC counter personnel are notified immediately. Removal of Army personnel from a flight for a felonious act or for suspicion of a felonious act is coordinated through the MAC and the Army Aerial Port Liaison Office. Air Force personnel or other service personnel committing felonious acts or suspected of committing such acts are referred to the Air Force security police. Aggravated or uncorrectable offenses will be cause for the offender to be cited on DA Form 3975.

Military personnel who refuse to submit themselves or their baggage for inspection will be ordered to comply. If they continue to refuse, MAC counter personnel will be notified, an offense report issued for violation of Article 92, UCMJ, and the offender released to proper service police for return to unit or origin. Civilian personnel who refuse to have themselves or their baggage inspected will be advised that refusal can cause them to be deleted from the MAC aircraft passenger manifest. If they continue to refuse, MAC counter personnel will be notified, a written report issued concerning the incident, and the civilian concerned will not be allowed to pass the checkpoint.

Detailed searches will be performed on all personnel detected to be in possession of prohibited drugs, prohibited items, contraband, unregistered weapons, and/or personnel attempting surreptitious entry or engaging in actions to circumvent controls of customs checkpoints.

MP customs supervisory personnel will observe the influx and circulation of passengers to detect suspicious or evasive actions.

The technique of spot-checking is employed when necessary at the baggage checkpoint and whenever appropriate at the personnel checkpoint. Calculated, rather than random, judgment must be applied. Many factors must be considered. For example, hijackers often display nervousness and may attempt evasion at checkpoints. The neat, orderly-looking soldier is less suspect of carrying contraband than the sullen or boisterous one. Talking to a passenger undergoing customs processing is essential to detect nervousness or evasion. Experience, alertness, and the application of good judgment are the keys to proper enforcement techniques.

An amnesty box is made available to all passengers and crew members for deposit of prohibited or nonadmissible articles prior to inspection/examination. Transactions involving the amnesty box will not be challenged. In addition, personnel are made aware that the box can be used to discard explosives. In such an event, or if a suspicion exists, the area must be immediately cleared and Air Force and EOD representatives notified. The routine emptying of amnesty box contents will be accomplished in the presence of authorized personnel in strict accordance with command directives, maintaining detailed inventories.

CUSTOMS OPERATIONS PROCEDURES

Five MP customs inspectors are considered ideal coverage at an average size airport. One of the five MP inspectors should be a female to facilitate the search of female passengers and hand-carried baggage.

A baggage checkpoint and a personnel checkpoint are established within the main airport building to process passengers and their accompanying baggage. The baggage checkpoint is located near the entrance door.
All personnel who enter the main processing area of the passenger terminal are required to pass this checkpoint. Emergency doors providing bypass capabilities will be kept closed and posted to preclude unauthorized passage. The purpose of the checkpoint is to detect and prevent baggages contraband from being stowed in the cargo compartment of the aircraft.

All passengers presenting themselves for baggage inspection are asked if they have any weapons, contraband, prohibited items, or prohibited drugs. Declared items are then examined for proper documentation. Firearms and ammunition must be listed on orders and have all required treasury and customs forms or a certificate of prior CONUS possession attached. They must then be repacked in baggage to be stowed in the cargo compartment of the aircraft. Small arms ammunition must be packed individually in complete lots and must not exceed 1,000 rounds. Drugs must be consistent with prescriptions and be in reasonable quantities for use only during pending trip and related leave. Any contraband, prohibited items, or prohibited drugs will be seized, a receipt given, and an offense report rendered. Personnel who surrender prohibited drugs or explosives will be apprehended.

When possible all cargo compartment baggage is inspected. Under no circumstances will the customs checking procedure be the cause for delay in loading an aircraft. Spot checks may be performed when passenger volume exceeds the capability of MP customs personnel.

Before a customs inspection is done at baggage checkpoints and before passengers enter the main processing area, MP customs inspectors brief all departing personnel on the location of the amnesty box and its purpose. Passengers are told that once a customs check is done the amnesty box can no longer be used to discard prohibited items. Passengers also are told that detection that discloses an offense will result in the issuance of an offense report and subsequent disciplinary or administrative action.

The personnel checkpoint will be located at the entrance of a customs exclusion area. The checkpoint will be opened upon announcement by MAC personnel that processing for a specific flight is initiated. The purpose of the checkpoint is to detect contraband on the person or within items to be handcarried aboard the aircraft. The checkpoint provides a last, formal, predeparture, anti-hijack security check. Personnel will be required to enter the customs exclusion area through curtained booths. Their identification cards and passports will be checked. They will be given a body frisk or required to pass through a metal detection device as appropriate. Personnel in possession of prohibited drugs or weapons and explosives will be apprehended and MAC counter personnel notified.

Baggage which is offered for customs inspection will be thoroughly examined for contraband, prohibited items, prohibited drugs, and weapons. Probes may be used to help detect prohibited drugs. Discovered contraband, prohibited items, prohibited drugs, concealed weapons, and US government property, including undeclared, unregistered firearms equipment, will be seized if no proof of ownership is produced during customs checks. A receipt will be issued and disposition accomplished in compliance with command directives. Personnel who possess suspected prohibited drugs or explosives will be apprehended and MAC counter personnel notified. Personnel who possess other contraband and/or prohibited items will be permitted to proceed after being cited, unless a felonious act is involved.

Personnel processed into the customs exclusion area remain within this area until their flight departs. Personnel who exit the customs exclusion area prior to their scheduled departure must be rechecked upon their reentry.
A complete body search will be directed whenever the MP customs inspector suspects that a passenger has weapons, contraband, prohibited items, or prohibited drugs on his person. If a complete body or strip search is deemed necessary, this will be accomplished in a private area with at least one witness present.

Female passengers normally proceed into the customs exclusion area ahead of male passengers and are inspected by enlisted female customs inspectors. If valid suspicion exists, female MP customs inspectors will search female passengers. Male customs inspectors will not, under any circumstances, allow themselves to be inside a curtained booth with a female passenger. The hand-carried items of all passengers are subject to inspection.
Military police conduct official inquiries into incidents and crimes involving the military community. Such investigations are a primary means of protecting and enhancing the commander’s order and discipline.

All MP conduct preliminary investigations. MP routinely make inquiries to learn the facts about incidents to which they have been called. Based on their inquiry, MP help determine the outcome of an incident by resolving the problem, referring the problem to helping agencies, or determining the need for a full-scale investigation by a trained investigator.

Military investigators conduct systematic and impartial investigations to uncover the truth. They seek to determine if a crime has been committed and to discover evidence of who has committed it. They administer oaths pursuant to Article 136(b)(4), UCMJ (see AR 600-40 and MCM). They find, protect, collect, and preserve evidence discovered at the crime scene or elsewhere. They document their findings and their actions with careful records. They ensure evidence is accounted for by a complete chain of custody to allow it to be admissible in court. They conduct interviews and interrogations in a manner that ensures depositions, statements, admissions, and confessions can be accepted in court. And as professional fact finders they maintain unquestionable integrity in the course of conducting their investigations. They treat victims of and witnesses to a crime with dignity, courtesy, and consideration, and assist them in obtaining medical or social services if needed or requested. Their charter is to impartially find, examine, and make available evidence that will clear the innocent and allow prosecution of the guilty.

Full-scale investigations are conducted by MPIs and enlisted special agents (MOS 95D) or warrant officers assigned to USACIDC. Responsibility for the investigation depends on the nature of the incident and the elements of the crime. The MPIs work directly for the PM. Special agents support the local PM but are under the direct control of USACIDC. Close and positive liaison is maintained between the PM office and the USACIDC support element.

With the approval of the commander concerned, MPIs may provide assistance to USACIDC whenever USACIDC assumes responsibility for an investigation from MPIs. Additionally, when requested by a USACIDC unit commander or special agent in charge, a supported commander may provide MPI assistance to USACIDC on a case-by-case basis for a limited time. Likewise, MPIs may request and obtain USACIDC assistance on a case-by-case basis.

Joint MPI/USACIDC teams have been created at some installations for specialized investigative missions such as drug suppression, black market, and criminal information. Joint teams have increased the effectiveness of total community law enforcement efforts in areas that share overlapping investigative or enforcement responsibilities. Such joint teams are created by formal memorandums of understanding between the local PM and the responsible USACIDC supervisor.

In a peacetime environment, criminal investigations conducted by military investigators receive intense effort and support. During combat such investigations may not receive the same effort and support. HN authorities, if available, will also provide investigative support to the battlefield.

The PM directs when, what type, and under what circumstances to begin criminal
INVESTIGATIONS

investigations that fall within their purview. Although effort is made to adequately and thoroughly investigate such crimes, investigations are not allowed to interfere with accomplishment of a combat mission. USACIDC will maintain a dedicated investigative force on the battlefield to investigate serious crime affecting the battlefield capabilities of the supported commander. When combat operations take priority, MPIs and MP will only be able to gather the essential who, what, when, where, why, and how of the crime. The information will be passed to the PM operations section, where it will be reviewed and forwarded to the G1 and the appropriate unit commander. The operations section will also make appropriate referrals to USACIDC of reported crimes within their command. See FM 19-20 for more information on criminal investigations.

Two types of criminal investigations are performed by MP on the battlefield. Minor crimes are investigated by personnel from MP company operations sections. In a combat environment, few MP investigations of minor incidents will be required. Major incidents involve death, serious bodily injury, war crimes, and major property loss or damage. MP may verify such major incidents if operational priorities permit. These incidents will be referred, whether verified or not, to criminal investigators assigned to USACIDC.

The number of MP used for criminal investigation operations is directly related to the level and intensity of the battle. MPIs are assigned to MP companies in division and above to conduct criminal investigations. These MPIs are shown in their company’s TOE by the skill identifier V5. Although each company has trained investigators, in combat these investigators may not be available at all times. They may be on missions having higher priority. Therefore, every MP team must be able to gather basic information about battlefield crimes.

USACIDC investigators on the battlefield are usually collocated with MP unit HQ for ease of coordination and support. But command and control of these investigators usually stays within the USACIDC chain of command. Organization and employment of USACIDC investigators during combat operations is discussed in FM 19-1.

![MP Investigative Purview Diagram](image-url)
The investigation of disruptive or dangerous behavior is a necessary part of any command’s effort to maintain good order and discipline.

**INVESTIGATING DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES**

The role of MP in domestic disturbances is to restore order. MP are to stop the conflict and convince the individuals to regain control of their actions. The MP are to ensure that all family members are safe and have not been harmed. In incidents involving suspected spousal abuse see AR 608-1.

Domestic disturbances are one of the most dangerous types of activities in which the MP can become involved. Every year, a great many law enforcement officers are killed or injured in responding to domestic disturbances. MP know that each disturbance is different and must be treated individually.

MP are trained in methods of handling domestic disturbances. Their training gives them the specific skills and methods they need to handle crisis situations. The support systems available to MP enable them to intervene in domestic disturbances. Because communication and transportation systems are constantly available to MP, MP can respond immediately to disturbances 24 hours a day. MP also have the authority to physically intervene in domestic disturbances and to apprehend disputants if necessary.

In answering domestic disturbance calls, MP must have all available information on the family and the situation. When receiving a domestic disturbance call, the MP desk sergeant must obtain as much information as possible from the individual making the complaint before dispatching patrol units.

The desk sergeant—

- Obtains data from the complainant-who, what, when, where, and how, and if weapons are involved or available.
- Asks the caller to describe the situation. Encourages caller to remain on the telephone to report changing events.
- Checks weapons registration cards and advises responding MP as appropriate.
- Relays all information to MP answering the call. If unable to obtain a clear description of the situation, the responding MP must be informed.
- Assigns a backup vehicle when a one-MP vehicle is dispatched. MP will never enter a residence alone.
MP avoid making noise that will announce their arrival at the scene. The approach of an MP vehicle is usually the first sign to one or more of the disputants that the MP have been called. If disputants are prone to violence, sight of an approaching MP vehicle allows them time to obtain weapons or otherwise prepare for police arrival. Upon arriving at the scene of a disturbance, the MP vehicle is parked one house away from the address to which called.

There is always a danger that MP may be assaulted between the time of arrival and the time they reach the door. MP visually check windows and doors for unusual movements or objects while approaching the residence. At night, flashlights will not be shined in windows to avoid warning of arriving MP. Only the MP in front will use a flashlight to avoid silhouetting the other MP to the occupants.

MP will always stand to either side of the door, never in front of it. Before knocking, or using the doorbell if one is available, MP listen at the door for 15 to 30 seconds. They may be able to determine the nature of the disturbance and whether or not it is violent before announcing their presence. Before knocking, MP check screen doors to see if they are locked. Locked screen doors can create an unexpected barrier between the MP and the disputants if immediate action is required. When knocking on the door, MP do not sound aggressive. If there is no response at the door and the dwelling appears quiet, MP verify the address with the MP desk. If correct, they check the sides and rear of the dwelling for indications of the presence of the occupants. Neighbors may also provide useful information.

To ensure coordinated activity, patrol partners will decide before gaining entry what action each will take in separating the disputants and mediating the disturbance. When someone answers the knock, MP will identify themselves and state why they are there. If not invited into the dwelling, the MP request to move the interview inside and attempt to remove the dispute from view of the neighbors.

To avoid walking into an unknown situation, MP do not enter a dwelling even after being told by the occupant, “Come in, the door’s open.” MP allow the occupant to open the door for them. When entering a room or building, the senior partner positions himself on the side of the door that affords the greatest observation of the interior. The senior partner will direct who enters the dwelling first based on his observation of the situation. This provides for better command and control of the situation.

If entry is initially denied and the situation is temporarily calmed, the MP remain on the scene and work through the disputant’s chain of command to gain entry. If the situation appears violent, or if the MP have cause to believe a person is injured or in danger of being injured, they have a lawful right to force entry into the dwelling.

Once inside, the MP separate the disputants if necessary. MP suggest that everyone sit down. MP realize that people involved in domestic disputes may be hostile, abusive, and uncooperative. It is to be expected that some hostility may be directed toward the MP, who are viewed as intruders. Reactions of the disputants will often be directly related to attitudes of indifference, aggression, or concern as seen in the MP.

The attitude of the MP is important. The initial impression will determine the degree of cooperation. MP realize that unintended meanings and attitudes will be read into their words, facial expressions, and body positions by the disputants. The MP must display a calm, positive, and helpful manner. A sensitive and tactful approach can do much to create a positive environment in which the dispute can be mediated.

Observing conditions inside the dwelling while obtaining background information may give the MP ideas of
causes to the dispute. MP must be alert for sudden movements. They watch to see if subjects continually glance at closets or bureaus. Such actions may be the first indication that a subject has a weapon available. The MP must also observe—

- The disputants’ living conditions, clothing, and personal cleanliness.
- The location and number of disputants and any injuries requiring treatment.
- Any visible weapons and threatening moves.
- The emotional level of the dispute and the emotional condition of the disputants.

Apparent lack of food, broken furniture, and excessive amounts of liquor on hand can indicate neglect and instability. The condition of clothing and personal cleanliness can reflect the pride the family has in itself and the level of support provided. Facial expressions, eye movements, and body positions can provide emotional signs of fear, hate, depression, and embarrassment. Physical deformities or other handicaps affecting the family relationship may be noticeable if the afflicted person is being criticized or belittled by other family members.

After calming the disputants, the MP obtain information on the family structure and background before attempting mediation. MP will obtain—

- Names and addresses of all present and their ranks, social security numbers, and units if military.
- Relationship and legal status of the disputants: valid marriage, nephew-uncle, boyfriend-girlfriend.
- Length of residence in quarters and period assigned to the installation.
- Whether or not children are involved; if so, their ages and parental relationships.
- Whether or not MP or civil police have intervened in a domestic dispute before and if the disputants are receiving professional counseling.

If the parties can be separated, they are moved out of sight and hearing of each other. In separating the parties, the disputants are not allowed to come between the MP, are not left alone in another room, and are not moved to the kitchen because of potential weapons. The MP, if possible, are to remain within sight of one another at all times.

Once the disputants have been separated, seated, and have furnished basic background information, MP then interview each disputant. During the interview, MP may remove their hats and sit to further relax the disputants. MP must not assume that everyone is okay based on the word of one of the disputants. Each disputant is asked to define or explain the problem that caused the argument. The MP must appear interested and be good listeners. MP must carefully avoid giving opinions and making value judgments, as this will give the impression they are taking sides in the argument.

If a disputant refuses to discuss past events, his or her wishes are respected. Should a disputant be willing to discuss related facts or events, every effort is made to obtain as much information as possible. If the MP are being told obvious lies, it must be made clear that the lies are not believed. The interview must continue. Questioning, repeating the disputant’s statement, and evaluating apparent facts are methods that will aid in gathering sufficient information for mediation. After the problem has been defined, MP question each disputant about related problems to see if a pattern occurs.

Mediation, referral, temporary separation, and apprehension are four courses of action available to MP once order has been restored. As soon as the MP establish what has occurred, the MP must choose one of these courses of action. If the dispute is verbal only, the MP can mediate, make referrals, or suggest temporary separation. If a physical assault has occurred, they must effect an apprehension. In all cases, MP will inform unit commanders of domestic disturbances involving unit personnel.
INVESTIGATING DRUG AND CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE ABUSE

MP, in enforcing laws, orders, and regulations, may uncover information relating to sales, availability, and users of narcotics and dangerous drugs. Investigative operations for such cases are complex. Close coordination between USACIDC special agents and federal and nonfederal investigative agencies concerned with drug suppression is of the utmost importance in the enforcement and control of illegal narcotics and dangerous drugs.

The unauthorized use, possession, sale, purchase, and receipt of narcotics, marihuana, and dangerous drugs is a violation of federal law and Article 112A, UCMJ. "Dangerous drugs" is an administrative label applying to those nonnarcotic substances listed in Public Law 91-513 that have been found to have a potential for abuse because of their depressant, stimulant, or hallucinogenic qualities.

The Drug Enforcement Administration has the primary responsibility for investigating drug violations in the US, including military installations. The Drug Enforcement Administration has, however, delegated much of their authority on Army installations to USACIDC. The PM may assume responsibility for investigation of certain types of drug violations as determined by USACIDC. On all major Army installations and on many smaller installations, USACIDC and the PM conduct combined drug suppression operations. The focus of these operations is to stop the possession, use, and sale of illicit drugs on military installations.

PMs may request MP investigators or USACIDC special agents to develop information on the local drug situation. Within military installations, appropriate action will be taken to eliminate illegal sources of narcotics and dangerous drugs. When the source of supply originates in a civil law enforcement jurisdiction, coordinated operations will be required for detection and apprehension.

MPIs conduct investigations of offenses involving possession and/or use of nonnarcotic controlled substances (see AR 190-30). Notification that an investigation has been initiated will be made to the supporting USACIDC element without delay. They will be kept fully informed of the progress of the investigation. A copy of all initial, interim, and final DA Forms 3975 will be provided to USACIDC at the local level.

Investigations of offenses involving possession and/or use of nonnarcotic controlled substances will be transferred to USACIDC on request. Once the transfer is made, the investigation must be carried through to conclusion by USACIDC. It cannot be transferred back to the MPI.

Investigations involving possession and/or use of nonnarcotic controlled substances generated by another USACIDC investigation may be transferred to the MPI. This can be done with the concurrence of USACIDC and the unit commander involved.

INVESTIGATING POSSIBLE RAPE OFFENSES

The MP play an important role in handling rape cases. MP are often the first help available to a rape victim.

The crime of rape, under appropriate federal laws, is a capital offense punishable by death. It is a complex offense. It is not often sexually motivated. It is most often a crime of hate, anger, and violence in which the rapist uses sex as a weapon to inflict harm and humiliation upon the victim.
Sometimes the victim is a substitute target for the rapist’s anger against women as a group or even society itself. MP actions in rape investigations must accord with FM 19-20.

MP know that rape is both an emotional and a physical assault. The emotional shock of rape often does greater harm to the victim than does the actual physical assault. Rape victims may show fear, anxiety, anger, and shock, both physically and verbally; victims may laugh, cry, or shake while discussing the offense. Or they may appear controlled and calm, hiding their inner feelings.

Physical shock, exhaustion, or even strict self-discipline may cause a victim to seem calm and composed. But fear is present in all victims. Fear may last for hours or for months, depending on the victim and the ordeal she has experienced. The victim may have been threatened or come close to death. A victim may fear that the rapist knows her name and address and may harm her in the future.

MP ENCOUNTER AND AID VICTIMS

When MP encounter rape victims they react quickly to ensure the emotional and physical well-being of the victim. They check the physical condition of the victim. They must establish rapport with the victim. They are aware of the victim’s fears and know how to lessen them. The MP’s initial actions set the stage for the investigation and the subsequent recovery of the victim. MP know that victims treated in a callous, indifferent, disbelieving manner can undergo difficult and lengthy recovery periods.

The victim is told what is being done and why. The MP informs the victim of the evidence procedures that must be followed until the investigator arrives. The MP makes sure the victim knows that taking a shower is not allowed until after the physical exam.

The initial interview with the victim is brief. The role of the MP conducting the interview is to gather enough information for investigators to begin investigating the offense. Leading or sexually explicit questions are not asked. The MP at the crime scene learns from the victim exactly what took place and where. The victim is asked if she knows the offender, if she can describe the offender, and if she knows where the offender is or can be located.

The rape victim will relate to the incident more freely if only one person is present during the initial interview. Tact, compassion, and patience is used or the interview will fail. And more importantly, the victim may suffer emotionally. If the victim is made to feel guilty of the crime, the psychological damage may be significant.

Once enough information has been obtained to start processing the scene, MP escort the victim to the nearest facility for medical treatment and a thorough examination. Under no circumstances is the victim left alone. The MP remains with the victim until he or she is released to the USACIDC investigator.

Medical personnel are to preserve clothing and other items for evidence examination. The examining physician is advised of the areas of interest in the case and the evidence samples needed for the investigation.

MP TURN CASE OVER TO USACIDC INVESTIGATORS

When the victim is emotionally prepared, a follow-up interview is conducted by a USACIDC investigator. The USACIDC investigator will investigate all rape claims thoroughly and objectively. Rape claims are never assumed to be false.

The USACIDC investigator is told of all MP who have had contact with the victim. The investigator will want to interview them. The MP observations of the victim’s emotional state, the condition of her clothing, and the circumstances surrounding the crime can be important both to the investigation and to the future prosecution of the offender.
INVESTIGATIONS

INVESTIGATING POSSIBLE CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT

The MP are one of the main military agencies responsible for identifying and protecting abused and neglected children. The MP are most often contacted first when child abuse or neglect is suspected.

The PM office investigates suspected child abuse and neglect. The PM office participates in public awareness programs and activities. The PM office sets procedures for handling child abuse and neglect cases. The PM office sets up lines of communication with the Army Community Service, Family Advocacy Case Management Teams (FACMTs), and local civilian welfare and law enforcement agencies. The PM office, in accord with the installation FACMT, often publishes a local SOP setting out the role of each agency.

On US Army installations, the Army Family Advocacy Program (AFAP) and its action arm, the FACMT, are the key agencies for handling child abuse and neglect. The FACMT is legally mandated to ensure preventive, investigative, evaluative, and treatment programs are responsive, first, to the needs of the abused or neglected children and, then, to the needs of their families (see AR 608-1).

The FACMT is coordinated by a social services professional. The coordinator monitors the program and supervises the staff of the local AFAP. A team of medical and social work professionals, the AFAP officer, and the Army Community Service social worker are supported by other installation agencies and their personnel. Law enforcement personnel, civilian child protection workers, chaplains, and members of the SJA often serve on the FACMT. MP and USACIDC representatives on the FACMT work closely with team members to provide help and investigative support.

REPORTS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT

Reports of child abuse and neglect may come from hospital staffs, teachers, police officers, or neighbors. In accordance with AR 608-1 installation physicians, nurses, law enforcement personnel, school officials,
and child care/development personnel will report all incidents of suspected child abuse to the installation FACMT or the MP. The report may be received over the phone or in person. An MP may be sent to the child’s home after a report has been received by another agency.

A report of suspected child abuse or neglect is not an accusation. The report itself does not prove the existence of child abuse and neglect. But neither are reports from questionable sources necessarily invalid. All reports of child abuse or neglect must be investigated. Sometimes false reports of suspected child abuse and neglect are made by angry parents with marital problems, by quarrelsome family members, by feuding neighbors, or even by an angry or distressed child.

If the report is received by the MP desk sergeant, the MP will need to interview the source in the field. It is often difficult for the source to make the initial report. MP tell the source that, if requested, statements made in connection with a particular case of alleged child maltreatment will be kept confidential under the provisions of AR 340-21. Statements made by sources will be marked “confidential” in all case records. MP attempt to obtain information from the source:

- The date and time the reported incident was received.
- The source’s name, telephone number, and address if he/she is present and willing to provide this information.
- The type of source (for example, mandatory, permissive, anonymous).
- The relationship of the source to the child and family.
- The willingness of the source to share with the family his/her role in initiating the report, and his/her willingness to participate in the assessment process if appropriate.
- The action taken by the source or others including whether or not the child has been placed in protective custody.

- The motives of the source if possible to evaluate.
- The possible witnesses to the incident which caused the child’s condition.

Simple verbal reassurance, or a follow-up letter which expresses gratitude for the source having taken the initiative to call, can make the difference in the source’s future willingness to cooperate.

Witnesses to actual incidents of child abuse and neglect are rare. Most incidents occur within the confines of the home. Outside observers are few. However, there are usually persons who can furnish corroborative evidence of the child’s condition, the home situation, or conditions of family life. Witnesses who are afraid of becoming involved are allowed to express any concerns they may have about their participation in the investigation.

**SIGNS OF ABUSE**

MP are trained to recognize the physical effects of child abuse and neglect. When MP encounter injured or disturbed children, MP note if the condition could be the result of parental behavior. MP are alert to physical injuries like disfigurement, burns, broken bones, bites, lacerations, or bruises that may indicate cases of child abuse. They know

unsanitary living conditions, inadequate food, untreated illnesses, and inadequate clothing and shelter often mean parents or guardians are not providing adequate care for a child. MP act immediately to protect children whose physical or mental health and welfare has been threatened or harmed by the persons responsible for the child’s welfare.

As protectors of the military community, MP are concerned with the physical and emotional well-being of dependent children. At all times MP patrols—

- Respond immediately to a reported incident of child abuse and neglect.
- Report cases of suspected child abuse or neglect to the PM or appropriate civilian authorities.
INVESTIGATIONS

Take immediate action to protect a child in danger of further maltreatment.

Investigate allegations of child abuse or neglect and suspect conditions noted in the course of other investigations.

INVESTIGATION OF SUSPECTED ABUSE

The primary concern of the MP, when investigating cases of child abuse and neglect, is the protection of the child. To protect the child, MP must ensure the investigation determines—

- Whether or not child abuse or neglect is occurring.
- Whether or not the child is at risk in the home.
- Whether or not immediate intervention is necessary to ensure the child’s safety.

Once this immediate concern has been addressed, the investigator must then determine—

- Whether or not further police action is required by MPI or USACIDC.
- Whether or not the case should be referred to FACMT in accordance with AR 608-1.
- If the case is based on a false report and no further action is indicated.

Deciding whether or not a child is safe in the home is the most crucial step in the investigation. This decision can be reached through a review of past parental behavior, statements, and behaviors during an investigative interview, or from reports by others who know the family. If the child is in imminent danger, the investigator must take whatever steps are necessary to ensure the child’s safety before proceeding with the investigation.

In determining if protective custody is necessary, the investigator considers whether or not—

- Maltreatment in the home, present or potential, is such that a child could suffer permanent damage to body or mind if left there.

INDICATORS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT

MP LOOK FOR PHYSICAL AND BEHAVIORAL INDICATORS OF ABUSE OR NEGLECT THAT MAY EXIST INDEPENDENTLY OR IN COMBINATIONS.

PHYSICAL ABUSE—Unexplained injuries, bruises, fractures, lacerations, and/or abrasions

NEGLECT—Poor hygiene, inappropriate clothing, hunger, fatigue, lack of supervision, unattended physical or medical need.

EMOTIONAL MALTREATMENT—Emotionally or intellectually immature, inadequate coping skills, low self-esteem, antisocial or destructive behavior

SEXUAL ABUSE—Difficulty in walking or sitting, complains of pains in genital area, engages in fantasies, bizarre or sophisticated sexual knowledge
INVESTIGATIONS

- The child is in immediate need of medical or psychiatric care and the parents refuse to obtain it.
- The child’s sex, age, or physical or mental condition renders the child incapable of self-protection—or for some reason constitutes a characteristic the parents find completely intolerable.
- Evidence suggests that parental anger and discomfort with the investigation will be directed toward the child in the form of severe retaliation against him or her.
- Evidence suggests that the parent or parents are so out of touch with reality that they cannot provide for the child’s basic needs.
- Evidence suggests that the parent or parents’ physical condition poses a threat to the child.
- The family has a history of hiding the child from outsiders.
- The family has a history of prior incidents or allegations of abuse or neglect.
- The parents are completely unwilling to cooperate in the investigation or to maintain contact with any social agency and may flee the jurisdiction.
- The parent or parents may abandon the child.

If the investigator decides to place a seriously abused child in protective custody, the FACMT will be notified immediately. The child is immediately taken to the installation medical facility for examination. The child will remain in the medical facility for observation while the FACMT simultaneously acts on the case. If the child is not in imminent danger, then the decision to remove the child from the home should be made jointly by the investigating officer and the FACMT.

If grounds exist for temporary removal of the child from the home, the SJA must be consulted while the MP or responding agent remains at the scene until further guidance is received.

To conduct an effective investigation, MP or responding agents will need to visit the home, see the child, interview the parents, and collect evidence. Two types of information need to be gathered in order to corroborate or dismiss a report. Primary information includes records of the investigators’ interviews and their observations, photographs, and physical evidence. Background information is that which has been gathered from collateral sources such as medical records, school records, and other agency records.

A routine check of the family is the first step after receipt of the report. This check may include internal departmental records, court records, or FACMT records. In some areas central registers of reports of actual or suspected child abuse and neglect are maintained, often on a statewide basis. These central registers may be accessed directly by the law enforcement agency itself or, in some jurisdictions, indirectly through the local FACMT.

Information which may be revealed through a records check includes—
- Prior reports of suspected child abuse and neglect for this family and the outcome of those reports.
- Services being provided to the family because of a previous report.
- Information on the informant’s reliability based on any prior reports.

Evidence of child abuse and neglect may include the investigating officer’s observations, photographic evidence, and physical evidence. All evidence is important. Hearsay evidence can be of value to a social agency in its subsequent efforts to serve the family. Such evidence may even be admissible in later court actions. The MP or responding agent concentrates on obtaining—
- The name, age, sex, ethnic background, and permanent address of the child.
- Present location of the child and location where incidents occurred if different from permanent address.
• Name of person or institution responsible for the child’s welfare (and address if different from the permanent address of the child).
• Name and address of the person alleged to be responsible for the abuse and/or neglect.
• The names, sexes, and ages of siblings and other adults present.
• The nature and extent of the suspected abuse or neglect, including any available information of prior injury to the child or other siblings.
(See FM 19-20 for more information on physical evidence and photographing evidence.)

Home Visits

Investigators may not gain entry to the home on their initial approach to the family. Investigators must indicate concern and sympathy and explain their presence as ensuring the health and safety of the child to gain entry into the home. However, if investigators do not receive permission to enter, they have the right of forcible entry if—
• There is probable cause to believe a child in the home is in imminent danger.
• There is probable cause to believe that a crime is being committed in the home.

If the investigator feels entry is necessary but the family will not allow it and it does not appear that an emergency exists, a court order or search warrant must be obtained. The local SJA is contacted to determine the proper course of action.

Initial Observations

Upon entering the home MP or responding agents must record their observations accurately and in detail so that they will be able to testify effectively if the case goes to trial later. MP or responding agents must note the—
• Physical condition of all children, including any observable injuries or conditions such as disfigurement, burns, broken bones, bites, lacerations, bruises, or untreated illnesses.
• General appearance of all children, including the condition of their clothing (for example, worn, tattered, filthy).
• Safety of their surroundings.
• General condition of the home, including degree of cleanliness; availability of food and water; adequacy of sleeping, eating, and washing facilities; adequacy of heat, light, and space; and evidence of human or animal waste.

MP will also observe and record the behavior of parents and other children in the family, including their reaction to the MP’s presence. These observations can be used to confirm or deny parents’ statements. Nonverbal messages that can be observed are—
• Eye contact between family members.
• Facial expressions of love, support, anger, distrust, or rejection.
• Tones of voice that communicate various emotions.
• The presence or absence of communication.
• Willingness to listen.
• Willingness to express feelings and emotions.
• Physical closeness.

Interviews with the Parents

Interviewing the parents may be the most important step in the investigation. Due process rights granted by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution as well as those covered by Article 31, UCMJ, must be observed in conducting these interviews. The Miranda rights, or Article 31 rights, must be made known to the parents. Article 31 rights must be voluntarily waived before questioning begins. Any person accused of child abuse or neglect must be informed of their rights pertaining to information in the report or records generated from the incident.
In conducting interviews with parents—

- The interview is conducted in a comfortable setting free from distraction. Jargon is not used.
- The investigator will, if possible, interview each parent privately and separately.
- The investigator will tell the parents the reason for the interview, give the legal authority, and treat them with respect. Under no circumstances will the investigator display horror, anger, or repugnance.
- The investigator must be alert to any apparent vagueness or inconsistencies in the explanations each gives for the allegations contained in the report.
- The investigator will not respond to demands by the parents to be told who reported them.
- The investigator will not reinforce questionable parental actions by such statements as, "If he were mine, I'd hit him too." This may give a disturbed parent license to increase assaults upon the child.
- The investigator must not allow feelings of anger or revenge to impair his professional judgment.
- The investigator will not attempt to coerce a confession from a parent.

Contact and Interviews with the Child

The first contact the investigator has with the child is of greatest importance. This initial contact may take place in the home, medical facility, school, or a child care facility. The investigator must not assume that the victim is old enough or mature enough to cope mentally with the offense. The purpose of the initial contact with the child is to determine the validity of the accusation and to determine if the child is in imminent danger.

There are times when the child must be interviewed in order to learn what has happened. However, every attempt is made to minimize the need for interviews of child victims. Whether or not the child is interviewed depends upon factors such as—

- The child’s age.
- The child’s ability to understand and evaluate what has happened.
- The possible impact of the interview upon the child.
- The possibility of retaliation by a parent against a child who has "told."

The parents are informed of the need for the interview. But they are not present while the child is being questioned. Many children are afraid to speak in front of those who have hurt, abused, and neglected them. If the parents object strongly, it may be necessary to place the child in protective custody before proceeding with the interview to assure the parents will not retaliate against the child. If the child must be in the sole care of the military even for a short time, two investigators will be responsible for the child. If the investigators are both male, a female member of the armed forces must be provided to be with the child also.

Investigators must tell children that they are not in trouble and have done nothing wrong. Interviewing children in sexual abuse cases calls for particular sensitivity and skill. In addition to feeling confused and afraid, these children may also feel great guilt. The investigator/interviewer must convey to the child the understanding that he or she has done nothing wrong.

When conducting the interview, the interviewer must keep in mind that the child may be hurt, in pain, fearful, confused, or apprehensive. The child must be made as comfortable as possible under the circumstances. It is advisable to have a trained interviewer who is of the same sex as the child or at least to have someone of the same sex present during the interview.

When interviewing the child the interviewer must try to determine the emotional state of the child. Is fear, hatred,
defiance, shock, confusion, love, jealousy, or anger apparent? Is the child ready to tell the truth, lie, or exaggerate? The interviewer must attempt to gain the child’s confidence. The interviewer must act as a friend to the child rather than as a figure of authority. The interviewer must not take sides against the parents. The interviewer must conduct the interview in language the child clearly understands. The interviewer must permit the child to tell about incidents in his or her own way. The child must not be pressed for details that he or she may be unwilling or unable to give. Questions are limited to necessary information. Open-ended questions are asked whenever possible. The interviewer will tell the child what will happen next and how the investigator will use the information the child has given. The interviewer will inform an adolescent when a “person in need of supervision” petition or a similar order is necessary.

Prosecution

Prosecution of persons who abuse or neglect children can be difficult in all but the most serious cases. The purpose of prosecution is to establish the guilt of and impose punishment upon the person responsible for an incident of child abuse or neglect. Unsuccessful prosecution may result in increased risk for the child. An angry or disturbed parent may view a verdict of “not guilty” as approval of his or her conduct or as a license to continue maltreatment.

There are times when apprehension of the parent, guardian, or caretaker is necessary. An apprehension may be made immediately, particularly when the incident is severe. Or it may be delayed, pending consultation with FACMT and others. An apprehension may be made when injury to the child is severe or evidence exists that a serious crime has been committed. When there is reason to believe that the parent, guardian, or caretaker will flee the jurisdiction, he or she may be apprehended. An apprehension may be made when it is necessary to preserve the peace or when the person believed responsible presents an immediate danger to others.

INVESTIGATING SUICIDE: THREATS AND ATTEMPTS

Suicide threats received at the MP station must be treated seriously. The desk sergeant, or any other MP answering the call, must show immediate concern and interest in the caller’s problem. The interest, concern, and reassurance shown by the MP on the telephone is important in keeping the individual on the line. The first priority is to obtain basic information from the caller, such as the caller’s name, address, and the telephone number of the phone from which the call is being made. Information obtained from the caller will also allow the MP to return the call if the connection is cut off. It is critical that the caller be kept on the telephone as long as possible while a patrol unit is being dispatched. Talking will distract the person, provide time for a change of mind, and allow for rescuers to arrive. Keeping the suicidal person on the telephone while a patrol unit is being sent will prevent many suicides.

When MP arrive at the scene before the threatened suicide attempt is carried out, they may find the subject emotionally upset. MP must avoid sudden, aggressive moves to avoid frightening the subject into committing suicide. Upon arrival, MP should try to start a conversation with the subject to help talk him or her out of committing suicide. If the subject is in immediate danger of jumping, safety precautions such as nets are used. MP carefully position themselves to restrain the subject. MP must keep crowds and onlookers away from the area. They must be patient and understanding with the subject. And they must not use abusive or threatening language.
When MP arrive at the scene and the subject has already attempted suicide, they must immediately take action to stop the subject from further self-injury. First aid is administered, if necessary, and medical help requested. If the subject has taken poison or an overdose of pills, any remaining pills, bottles, and related material are taken to the hospital, along with the subject. The immediate family, unit commander, clergy, or other personnel who might help the subject are notified.

When MP arrive at the scene of a suicide, they carefully approach it, so as not to destroy evidence. They immediately examine the subject for signs of life. If there are signs of life, MP should immediately begin lifesaving techniques such as cardiovascular pulmonary resuscitation. MP then request immediate medical assistance for continued rescue efforts.

If the victim is obviously deceased, medical assistance is still required to affirm the victim’s death. MP will secure the scene until medical and investigative assistance arrives. Suicide notes, weapons, and other evidence must be secured at the scene and released only to assigned investigators.

After securing the scene, MP identify witnesses, friends, and relatives in the area. They make notes of anything that might aid the investigators. Until proven otherwise, every suicide will be treated as a potential homicide. (See FM 19-20 for a detailed discussion of suicide investigations.)

INVESTIGATING REPORTS OF ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR

MP may be called upon to investigate reports of people exhibiting abnormal behavior. Each person encountered may require a different form of response from the MP. In all situations, the MP must not only preserve the peace and control disorderly incidents, but they must also protect individual rights and obtain help for those people who cannot adequately control their behavior.

People with abnormal behavior may react violently to stresses and problems. They can be dangerous and must be handled with caution. They may be easily influenced by others. They may be easily threatened by unfamiliar people, places, and events. The MP approach must be friendly and understanding. MP seek to handle these people as humanely as possible without endangering themselves, the person involved, or others. MP must—

- Not deceive.
- Use the least amount of force necessary.
- Allow the person time to calm down.
- Avoid threats and abuse.
- Ignore verbal abuse.
- Remain calm.

MP must be trained to identify abnormal behavior. Improper identification of behavior and subsequent treatment can result in serious illness or death. People with abnormal behavior might show changes in their behavior and personality that may help in identifying them. Characteristics of someone with abnormal behavior may be—

- Change in personality, behavior, and attitudes.
- Change in personal habits.
- Sudden change in job performance.
- Uncontrolled outbursts of temper.
- Distrust and hypersensitivity.
- A strong interest in weapons.
- Disorganized thinking.
- Hallucinations, delusions, and fears.

MP must be familiar with local agencies best able to assist people in need. MP do not take action unless the person poses a threat to himself or to the welfare and property of others.
INVESTIGATIONS

MP do not diagnose injuries and diseases. However, they must be alert for unusual symptoms and know that illness and other abnormalities may appear as intoxication. Local medical facilities can train MP in how to recognize and react to people with abnormal symptoms.

When MP encounter a person who has had an accident where the possibility of a head injury exists, or if an individual carries a medical alert notice, or where doubt exists over the person’s condition, examination by medical personnel must be immediately requested. Because it is often difficult to distinguish between the behavior and confusion caused by alcohol or drugs and that caused by injury or illness, all apparently intoxicated personnel are watched for other symptoms.

If the person has to be apprehended there must be a sufficient number of MP to restrain the individual. The procedures for searching and restraining do not differ from those used for other offenders. MP must consider that the individuals may be less aware of their constitutional rights and may not fully understand when rights are read to them. The police role is to initially interview the subject, gather evidence, and complete an objective investigation of the incident. Legal and medical authorities must then determine the individual’s level of responsibility and competence.

MP immediately notify parents, guardians, or next of kin of those people with abnormal behavior who must be removed from the scene of an incident or placed under apprehension. If the individual has committed a criminal offense, the parents, guardian, or next of kin are read the rights warning statement and notified of the charges. The parents, guardians, or next of kin must also be present during interviews and interrogations. They may be able to furnish important background information on the individual.

INVESTIGATING CUSTOMS VIOLATIONS

MP customs units conduct investigations of alleged or suspected violations of customs laws and regulations by members of the US forces. These investigations are conducted under the same rules and procedures, with appropriate reports, as are other MP investigations (see FM 19-20). Some of the investigations will be conducted jointly with host country customs and tax personnel or other official investigative agencies having an interest in the case. MP customs inspectors who possess MPI credentials may receive locally fabricated identification with data in the host language. All credentials are treated as accountable items. Since the investigator may be assigned to a surveillance operation, the commander can permit the wearing of civilian clothing while on duty. A duty roster of investigators is maintained to provide necessary investigation during nonduty hours.

Customs authorities periodically find unauthorized material such as contraband, explosives, ammunition, weapons, and property, some of which may be property of the US government. In order to determine if theft or government loss is involved, the procedures of the Bureau of Customs call for the notification of DA when weapons or material believed to be military property have been seized or are in customs custody under questionable circumstances. All such offenses will be reported to MP and investigated by USACIDC or MPIs, as appropriate (see AR 195-2, AR 190-30). Recovery of weapons and significant amounts of ammunition will be reported by the Army element receipting for them from the Bureau of Customs in accordance with AR 190-11.

MP will receipt, from US Customs personnel, for all confiscated US government
property and contraband shipped by US Army personnel. The property will be returned to Army supply channels if there are no legal requirements to retain the property before releasing it into supply channels. Items of contraband will be disposed of in accordance with AR 190-22. Property receipted for by MP will be accounted for and disposed of in accordance with evidence procedures outlined in AR 195-5.

All physical property seized by MP customs personnel will be processed, safeguarded, and disposed of in accordance with the guidance furnished in FM 19-20 and the provisions of AR 190-22 and AR 195-5.

Evidence custodians and alternate custodians are appointed on unit orders and perform the responsibilities as outlined in the publications previously cited. Prescribed depositories must be provided at appropriate locations and inspections and inventories performed as required.

When it is determined that the subject of one of these investigations is no longer a member of the US Army, the investigation will be terminated and a final report submitted indicating the subject has been released from the Army. An information copy of the report will be furnished to the appropriate civil investigative agency.
The investigation of crimes and offenses is a necessary part of any command’s effort to protect its personnel, supplies, and facilities. It is also essential to the command’s maintenance of good order and discipline.

DETERMINING PURVIEW

The purview for investigating crimes is divided among unit commanders, MPIs, and USACIDC special agents according to the type and seriousness of the incident under investigation. Procedures at the local level ensure mutual cooperation and support.

This close working relationship achieves optimum results in investigations, apprehension of offenders, acquisition and transmittal of police information, and the prevention of crime.

UNIT COMMANDERS

Unit commanders have authority to take appropriate action on all barracks larcenies of property with a value less than $1,000 and simple assaults not requiring hospitalization. Unit commanders ensure that these types of offenses are reported to law enforcement activities for statistical and crime reporting purposes. A law enforcement investigation of such an offense is usually conducted only when considered necessary by the PM/security officer or the appropriate USACIDC commander. But it may be requested by a field grade officer in the chain of command of the unit concerned.

Commanders report all criminal offenses to the PM office. The PM office will refer the case to MPI or USACIDC if appropriate. After the PM is notified, the commander secures the crime scene and separates and holds all witnesses and suspects until MP and MPIs arrive. Direct coordination between the commander and the MPI for investigation status and narcotics detector dog support is authorized. Direct contact with USACIDC concerning investigative status also is authorized.

The PM office provides commanders with a DA Form 3975 on offenses involving their personnel (see AR 190-45). On cases referred to the USACIDC, the commander will be provided with an initial report and a final report. Significant developments will be provided to the commander if appropriate. The final report will provide guidance for submission of a report of commander’s action taken. Commanders need not wait for a final report before taking action.

Commanders are encouraged to assist the MPI and USACIDC in apprehending criminals. A commander can have an individual in his unit serve as a source. The source acquires and releases information
Investigations concerning criminal activity to the MPI or USACIDC. Additionally, individuals in the unit may be asked to make buys from a drug dealer. These controlled buys, when there is an indication the suspected individual has been involved in some type of criminal activity in the past, do not constitute entrapment.

**MPI AND USACIDC**

Investigations of violent crimes are an inherent responsibility of the MP and the USACIDC. Such offenses may fall within the investigative purview of MPIs or within the investigative jurisdiction of the USACIDC.

MPIs normally investigate offenses as cited in AR 190-30. MPIs also coordinate and supervise the use of narcotics detector dogs in support of unit health and welfare inspections. USACIDC agents investigate criminal offenses that carry a maximum punishment of more than one year confinement. They investigate all narcotic offenses, sale/trafficking in marihuana and dangerous drugs, and larcenies of property valued at $1,000 or more.

**OTHER INVESTIGATORS**

In CONUS incidents occurring off post normally are investigated by civil law enforcement agencies, including state, county, and municipal authorities, or by a federal investigative agency. When an incident involving military personnel occurs off a military installation, coordination will be made with the appropriate civil court or law enforcement agency and the result reported on DA Form 3975. A copy of the civil police report will be obtained and attached to the MP report whenever possible. In overseas areas off-post incidents are investigated in accordance with SOFAs and/or US-host country agreements.

**CONDUCTING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS**

To effect the prosecution of criminals, military investigators must know the technical and legal requirements for a successful investigation. Generally, the art of an investigation lies in gathering and evaluating information and evidence, both testimonial and physical. (FM 19-20 addresses investigative methods and techniques.) Testimonial evidence, like sworn statements of eyewitness accounts and admissions of guilt, is obtained through communication with people. Physical evidence, like identified weapons and fingerprints, is obtained by searching crime scenes, tracing leads, and developing technical data.

Military investigators develop skills and techniques to recognize, collect, evaluate, process, preserve, and account for evidence. From this evidence a court-martial or jury forms its conclusions as to the guilt or innocence of an accused. Evidence is the means by which any alleged matter of fact is proved or disproved. It includes all matters, except comment or argument, legally submitted to a court to enable it to decide a question before it. Military investigators must understand the general rules of evidence.

Investigative steps for gathering evidence in juvenile offenses are the same as those used in cases involving adult suspects. But MP must ensure that juveniles are processed in accordance with Public Law 93-415. And they ensure that children are protected from unwarranted treatment.

If MP must detain juveniles, they ensure that juvenile suspects are not detained in
confinement facilities, detention cells, or hospital prisoner wards. Juveniles may be temporarily detained in the offices of the post commander or PM, but a check is made with SJA to ensure the proper conditions exist. Unless a juvenile is taken into custody for serious offenses, MP do not take fingerprints or photographs of them without written consent of a judge. MP routinely contact SJA to ensure they have the proper judicial authority. MP do not release names or pictures of juvenile offenders to the public.

Military investigators conduct their inquiries to find evidence and make it available for presentation in court. But something more than a mere collection of evidence is required of a successful investigation. The evidence must be admissible in court. Investigators must present to the court only admissible and reliable information upon which to base a proper decision. MP are always “evidence conscious.” The scene of any crime is itself evidence. And so is the testimony of trained investigators about observations and findings at a crime scene. Both testimonial and physical evidence are vital to the successful prosecution of a case.

TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE

Obtaining testimonial evidence requires skillful interpersonal communication with human sources of information, particularly with the persons directly involved in a case. Questioning victims, witnesses, complainants, suspects, and sources is the investigative method most often used to obtain testimonial evidence. It is also the method used to obtain background information that gives meaning to the physical evidence that is collected. Many crimes have been solved as a direct result of leads and testimonial evidence developed through interviews and interrogations.

PHYSICAL EVIDENCE

Collecting and evaluating physical evidence is an important technical part of any investigation. Physical evidence is one of the most valuable investigative assets. It produces leads to pursue to help bring the investigation to an end. And physical evidence can help establish the guilt or innocence of an accused person in a court of law. For example, as a general rule, a person cannot be convicted on the basis of an uncorroborated confession. There must be independent evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that raises an inference of the truth of the essential facts admitted in the accused’s statements. Physical evidence can be that necessary independent evidence. And, while the rule requiring independent corroborating evidence does not apply to a confession made by an accused to the court during his trial, nor to statements made before or at the time the act was being committed, having physical evidence to substantiate such a confession or admission of guilt is desirable.

One of the main duties of an investigator is to ensure that the evidence obtained is admissible in court. Investigators must be careful to seize, collect, and accept receipt of evidence in a legal manner. They know they must be able to identify each piece of evidence weeks, months, or even years after it was collected. They must be able to describe the crime scene and where each piece of evidence was located at the scene. They must be able to explain any change in the evidence that has occurred since it was collected. And they must be able to prove that the evidence remained in proper custody from the time it was collected until it is presented in court.

The final result in bringing a successful investigation to a close is often the investigator’s testimony in the courtroom. When preparing for trial, investigators coordinate with the trial counsel so there are no surprises in court. They develop a close working liaison with the trial counsel. They do not conceal information from the court. They know the accused has the right to a fair trial regardless of opinion. Investigators are professional in every way.
PRESERVING THE CUSTODY OF EVIDENCE

Investigations follow specific requirements in receiving, processing, safeguarding, and disposing of evidence and in preparation and disposition of property (see FM 19-20, AR 195-5, and AR 190-22).

To achieve the maximum benefit from physical evidence, investigators must be not only skilled in its collection, but careful in their handling of it to preserve it for laboratory examination and/or presentation in court. They must retain the item’s integrity by keeping the item as nearly as possible in its original condition. Consideration should be given to the ease of identifying the item and the cost of the item when it is collected. Unnecessary marking of evidence may result in claims against the government for diminution of value of the item. All MP in contact with evidence must maintain a chain of custody—a chronological, written record of who has control of the item from the time it is acquired as evidence until it ceases to have value as evidence and is released or destroyed—to assure accountability.

The investigator who first receives, recovers, or discovers physical evidence must be able to identify such evidence positively at a later date as being the specific article or item obtained in connection with a specific investigation. To be able to do this, investigators mark and tag evidence promptly at the time they obtain it. If they can, they place their initials, time, and date directly on the evidence. If the evidence cannot be marked, all identifying data are noted on the container in which the evidence is placed. A record of all details of the marking of evidence is made in the investigator’s notes. Photographs, sketches, and notes of the crime scene must show the exact places from which evidence was removed. This care is imperative to ensure the chain of custody of evidence is kept unbroken.

Evidence custodians control and account for all evidence received in an investigation. They are in charge of the evidence depository. When safeguarding, safekeeping, and transferring property, they ensure care is taken to guard property against loss, theft, pilferage, damage, alteration, or any change in its value or appearance other than by laboratory examination. They also maintain all evidence records.

Primary and alternate custodians are appointed, in writing, by the appropriate commander or PM (see AR 195-5). A copy of the appointing document must be kept in the depository files. These records must show who is responsible for evidence at any given time. The requirements for determining primary and alternate evidence custodian, and for recording and accountability of evidence, inspections, and inventories and security standards for evidence storage, are specified in AR 195-5. For more information on preparation of required forms and maintenance of evidence see FM 19-20.

Evidence custodians carefully maintain an evidence ledger. Corroborating entries in the ledger and on the custody document help assure accountability of evidence. The ledger is prepared with six columns spanning two facing pages showing—

- The document number assigned and the date evidence was received.
- The USACIDC or MPR sequence number.
- A brief description of the evidence.
- The date of final disposition.
- The final disposition.
- Remarks.

If an improper entry is erroneously made, the entry is lined through and the person’s initials written across the line. The ledger book is completely filled before starting a new one. In large offices it may be necessary to start a new ledger each year to accommodate anticipated evidence entries. The cover of the ledger book identifies the organization or activity responsible for the evidence depository and the dates spanned by entries in the ledger. If more than one
The evidence custodian is responsible for the disposition of evidence. He maintains continued and open communication with the supervisor and the SJA to ensure timely disposition of evidence. Consulting with the MP or special agent for pertinent information can assist in the timely disposition of evidence. If the SJA appoints his chief of military justice as the point of contact, plans are discussed with him. His assistance is requested in making timely disposition of all evidence.

To ensure prompt disposition of evidence, a suspense system can be established as an internal management tool. The US Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory (USACIL), adjudication, and pending disposition suspense files must be maintained. Other suspense files may be used, such as “Hold for Appellate Review,” when the SJA advises that this requirement exists. There can be many variations to suit the needs of your particular evidence depository operation.

DA Form 4833 can be used to assist in timely disposition of evidence (AR 190-45 contains additional information). If final action has not been accomplished, the form may be placed in suspense for 15 to 30 days. This simple method has proved an effective follow-up to ensure timely disposition of evidence.

When it has been determined that final administrative or judicial action has been taken in a known subject case, the original custody document is handcarried or forwarded to the SJA of the commander exercising jurisdiction in the case.

If the SJA says the evidence must be held for further adjudication, the final disposal authority portion of DA Form 4137 is not completed. A brief memorandum for record giving the reason for retaining the evidence is written and attached to DA Form 4137.

If DA Form 4137 must be mailed to the SJA, a letter or DA Form 2496 (Disposition Form) is substituted containing sufficient information for the SJA to render a decision. The return correspondence indicating disposition approval is attached to the original DA Form 4137 for file at USACRC.

If an item of evidence is made a permanent part of the record of trial, the trial counsel coordinates this action with the evidence custodian so that DA Form 4137 can be properly, annotated.

**DISPOSITION OF UNNEEDED EVIDENCE AND NONEVIDENCE**

Evidence connected with an investigation in which no subject has been identified may be disposed of three months after completion of the investigation without SJA approval. Consideration must be given to serious crimes when the probability exists that a subject may be identified. If a need to dispose of the evidence in less than three months is determined, the SJA must approve the action. In either case, the supervisor must approve the disposal and complete the final disposal authority section of DA Form 4137.
Items of evidence found at a crime scene that have no owner or are of no obvious value, such as matchbooks, beer cans, bottles, glass fragments, and wooden sticks, will be destroyed in the presence of a witness by crushing, burning, or any other method to render the items useless and harmless. The witness in such cases can be of any grade. If no trial results from the investigation, or if there is a trial and the SJA advises the evidence is no longer needed, then the appropriate return/release/destruction can be made. Items in the evidence depository which are determined by laboratory analysis and the SJA to be nonevidentiary in nature may be disposed of. The witness may be anyone.

DISPOSITION OF EVIDENCE BELONGING TO US GOVERNMENT

When disposing of US government property, the items normally must be returned to the organization to which issued. Sometimes the unit cannot be identified or the item has been dropped from the property book. In such instances, the property must be released to the installation accountable officer. AR 710-2 is the authority for government property disposition.

Recovered US government treasury checks and money orders stolen or obtained from an Army and Air Force Post Office (APO) facility must be returned to the responsible APO facility when no longer needed as evidence. Approval must be obtained from the SJA for this release or return.

US postal money orders not identifiable as the property of a specific individual must be forwarded to the Military Money Order Division, Postal Data Center, PO Box 14971, St Louis, Missouri 63182, with a letter of transmittal. (Include the case number, date of final report, offenses, identification of subjects and victims, and a remark that the final report is available and on file at the USACRC, 2301 Chesapeake Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland 21222.)

When it is not practical or desirable to retain items of evidence such as military vehicles, government food items, or other items determined mission essential, disposition may be immediately initiated. If it is not feasible to obtain written permission or approval before disposition of the evidence, verbal permission may be obtained from the SJA followed by written authority on DA Form 4137.

Known document standards are normally returned to the office or individual from whom received. Exemplars and other documents that have no value or which the agency does not desire returned must be destroyed. When such items are destroyed, there is no requirement for a witness.

US government firearms and ammunition retained as evidence must be returned to the appropriate military organizations. Normally DA Form 581 (Request for Issue and Turn-In of Ammunition) is used as an adjunct to DA Form 4137 for the turn-in of ammunition. Preparation of DA Form 581 is governed by AR 710-2.

Final disposition of post exchange items, commissary items, and items illegally introduced into a host country, connected with black market, customs, and postal investigations, must be in accordance with local regulations, SOFAs, and laws or customs of the host country. When evidence is released to an external agency to be permanently retained and disposed of by that agency, the final disposal authority portion of DA Form 4137 must be completed.

Limitation .0015 contingency funds held as evidence must be disposed of by depositing the funds with the local finance and accounting officer on DD Form 1131 (Cash Collection Voucher). Before depositing funds with the finance and accounting officer, the accounting classification must be the same as on the voucher on which the funds were originally disbursed. A copy of DD Form 1131 showing the return of the money to the finance and accounting officer must go to the appropriate certifying and approving officer. Another copy of DD Form 1131 must be attached to the original evidence/property custody document.
DISPOSITION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY

Items of personal property that are legal to own and possess are normally returned to the rightful owner. Personal weapons that are lawful to own and possess but have been impounded for minor infractions (such as failure to register in accordance with local regulations) must be returned to the rightful owner when the requirements of local regulations have been met and the item is no longer needed as evidence.

Money for which a rightful owner cannot be identified must be submitted to Army Finance with DD Form 1131. A copy of the completed form is attached to the original custody document and forwarded to the USACRC with the completed case.

Items of personal property belonging to deceased or missing military personnel must be released to the summary court officer in accordance with AR 600-8-1. If the death of a civilian or military dependent occurs on the military reservation, normally the personal property is released to the agency assuming jurisdiction of the investigation, such as the FBI. Consult the SJA for specific guidance in such cases.

Items that have obvious monetary value, and for which reasonable attempts to locate the owner have failed, must be released to the property reutilization and marketing officer. DD Form 1348-1 (DOD Single Line Item Release/Receipt Document) is prepared when these items are released. SJA approval must also be obtained. This authority is found in DOD Manual 4160.21-M.

DISPOSITION OF CONTRABAND, CONTROLLED, AND ILLEGAL ITEMS OF EVIDENCE

The disposition of contraband is governed by federal statutes. Therefore disposal of contraband must be in accord with applicable laws and regulations. Appropriate agencies should be contacted to determine if any other documentation is necessary for disposition of contraband.

Contraband firearms and ammunition or firearms and ammunition used or intended to be used in commission of criminal acts and retained as evidence (not US government property) must be released to USACIL-CONUS. Ammunition is relinquished to the nearest ammunition supply point, using DA Form 581.

Counterfeit currency or coins and the equipment necessary to print or make them are normally released to the nearest office of the US Secret Service (USSS). However, if the incident occurs outside the jurisdiction of the US, the counterfeit items will be released to the appropriate USSS office exercising jurisdiction over the host country. Coordination is effected with the USSS and SJA before making disposition of the items.

Controlled substances that are not associated with any ongoing investigation but were discovered or found on post may be immediately disposed of after it is determined that the substance cannot be connected with any ongoing investigation or suspect. Controlled substances or narcotics must be destroyed in the presence of a witness in grade E6 or higher. The witness may be any USACIDC special agent. The witness will not have been involved in the chain of custody. Destruction must be by burning or by methods that will permanently destroy the substance. Flushing the substance down a commode is not considered an appropriate means of destruction. Definitive guidance is found in AR 195-5.

DISPOSITION THROUGH NARCOTICS FIELD TESTING

Nonnarcotic controlled substances may be field tested when the commander exercising court-martial jurisdiction of a subject advises the PM or USACIDC supervisor that court-martial action will not be taken against the offender. Close coordination with the commander concerned is essential to determine the appropriate course of action. If the commander contemplates court-martial action, the evidence is forwarded to the supporting USACIL for
forensic analysis. Evidence consumed through field testing must be appropriately deducted from DA Form 4137 by annotating the chain of custody section to reflect disposition of the quantity consumed. In most instances the quantity consumed is estimated, or stated as “a few particles” if that is the case.

USACIDC Form 36 (Field Test Results) provides a record for field test results of nonnarcotic controlled substances. This form is prepared and signed by the person conducting the field test. The test results are provided orally to the action commander as soon as possible in addition to a copy of USACIDC Form 36. Copies are attached as an exhibit and the original is retained and ultimately forwarded to USACRC.

When definitive guidance cannot be found in AR 195-5 or AR 190-22, the SJA is consulted for guidance. It is the responsibility of the SJA to complete the final disposal action section of DA Form 4137.

FINAL DISPOSITION OF DA FORM 4137

After all items of evidence listed on a particular DA Form 4137 have been properly disposed of, the original and first copy of the form are placed in the case file to which they pertain. The original DA Form 4137 will be treated as any other original exhibit. It will be submitted to the USACRC along with the final ROI/MPR or other supplemental information. When the final report and all other supplemental information has been forwarded to the USACRC before closing the DA Form 4137, the DA Form 4137 is forwarded to USACRC as a single exhibit without a letter of transmittal. The USACIDC ROI number or USACRC report number, as applicable, must be reflected on the form when forwarded as a separate exhibit. The first copy of the form will be retained with the local file copy of the pertinent ROI or MPR and destroyed with the report. If the original DA Form 4137 is entered in the record of trial as a permanent part thereof, accompanies evidence released to an external agency, or is not available for any other reason, a copy from the suspense copy is made and substituted as the USACRC copy. A notation reflecting the disposition of the original will be made on the reproduced copy forwarded to USACRC. When DA Form 4137 pertains to items not connected with incidents or when a report is not forwarded to the USACRC, DA Form 4137 will be maintained in the local investigative case file to which it pertains until the file is disposed of in accordance with AR 25-400-2.

SUPERVISING MILITARY POLICE INVESTIGATORS

The military, police investigation supervisor (MPIS) is directly responsible for the supervision and control of all investigators assigned to the MP investigation section. To successfully supervise an organized, efficient operation, the MPIS must ensure that the regulations, policies, and procedures are complied with.

When an investigation is initiated and the case has been opened, the MPIS assigns the case a number and records the case on DA Form 3975. The MPIS assigns an investigator to the case and ensures a case file is opened and a progress report is initiated. The MPIS also ensures that an MP report number has been assigned and recorded.

The MPIS guides the investigation, checking case progress periodically. The MPIS ensures that each investigation is performed in a timely manner with entries recorded in the reading file in accordance with regulatory requirements and local policy. (See ARs 190-30, 190-40, and 190-45.) Each entry will reflect case progress, and if no investigation has been conducted, an entry will be reflected with a brief explanation. The MPIS ensures a first
progress report is initiated and dispatched to the commander of the suspect/subject on the day the investigation becomes three days old (counted from the date it was reported in the MP blotter and the MP report number was assigned). The MPIS ensures that additional progress reports are completed and initiated every 45 days thereafter until the case is finalized. The MPIS ensures that all MP reporting files/investigations are safeguarded against illegal disclosures. The MPIS also updates suspect’s commander and supervisor as necessary during the investigation. The MPIS supervises the investigators and provides technical and administrative guidance as needed throughout the investigation. The MPIS makes all proper notification and assists the investigators in preparing for judicial proceedings.

Once a subject has been identified, all leads have been exhausted, and SJA coordination has been accomplished, the MPIS ensures the final report is prepared. The MPIS checks the final report for content and errors. When all investigative leads have been exhausted and no subject has been identified, an administrative closing is appropriate until further leads are developed. All MPIs review the case and note their approval on the case log and the police report.

Supervisors of MP investigation sections should continually check on the quality of the performance of their investigators to ensure that the MPI mission is being effectively accomplished. An excellent example of a quality control method is outlined in FM 19-20. Other methods that could be employed are observations of interview situations through two-way mirrors, critiques of statements as they are obtained, and examination of statements during the final case review stage.

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KEY MPI PERSONNEL ACTIONS FOR MPI SUPERVISORS

- Screens applicants for the MP investigation section and ensures that they meet the requirements as shown in AR 190-30.
- Performs records review of the applicant's personnel training records.
- Interview the applicant.
- Performs a security clearance check.
- Generates a name check (per message format described in AR 190-30).
- Performs a local investigation of the applicant which consists of interviewing members of the applicant's unit.
- Prepares a personnel file if the applicant is accepted.
- Ensures that the credential control officer issues credentials to the applicant upon receiving a favorable national agency check (NAC).
- Assigns the new investigator to an experienced investigator to be trained. (Exceptions will be determined by the MPIS.)
- Ensures outprocessing investigators turn in their credentials to the credential control officer for final disposition. All other investigative material assigned will be turned in to the MPIS.
- Reports by message the issuance of MPI credentials within five days of issue (AR 190-30).
- Reviews open MP reporting files of outprocessing investigators normally two weeks before the outgoing investigator clears. Once this has been accomplished, conducts a debrief.
- Deletes outprocessing investigators from the duty roster the day their credentials are turned in for disposition.
- Requests by message the withdrawal of the credentials within five days from the date of withdrawal (AR 190-30).
- Ensures the completion of an enlisted evaluation report on all noncommissioned officers.
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GENERAL MPI SUPERVISOR RESPONSIBILITIES

- Maintains a case load and status board of current MPI investigations, as well as a case log book.
- Briefs the PM or his/her designated representative concerning all ongoing investigations and all aspects of MPI operations.
- Periodically reviews open cases, providing guidance concerning the investigations. Makes sure to record the results of the review in the case progress report.
- Reviews DA Forms 3975 to ensure that they are technically and administratively correct before forwarding to MP operations for signatures.
- Prepares monthly work load reports and forwards them to MP operations.
- Ensures incidents or complaints involving MPI personnel are brought to the attention of the PM.
- Ensures all very important person (VIP) security missions are carried out as directed by the operations section.
- Ensures all evidence is handled and maintained in accordance with the procedures outlined in AR 195-5.
- Assigns cases to the investigators, making sure that they are evenly distributed.
- Performs duties as a working investigator only when absolutely needed to do so.
- Maintains liaison with SJA for guidance.
- Maintains liaison with civilian authorities as necessary.
- Maintains an MPI duty roster and ensures proper notification of those scheduled.
- Ensures that the investigators receive professional training to enhance their knowledge of the many aspects of investigations.

NOTE: It is important that the MPIS ensures that the investigator is proficient in his/her soldier skills. There should not be any excuse for missing mandatory unit training in preparation for the annual skill qualification test.

- Ensures proper maintenance of offices/office equipment, vehicles, weapons, and other equipment under his/her immediate control.
- Ensures juveniles are properly processed. (See Chapters 6 and 10.)
- Ensures all assigned investigators are physically fit and meet the standards prescribed in AR 600-9.
- Submits civilian clothing allowance, when appropriate, as prescribed in AR 700-84 and AR 190-30.
- Ensures proper investigation of offenses involving use and possession of nonnarcotic controlled substances in accordance with AR 190-30.

NOTE: USACIDC is responsible for investigating the use, possession, sale, and trafficking of narcotic controlled substances and the sale or trafficking of nonnarcotic controlled substances, thereby making it essential that the MPIS ensures notification is made without delay to the supporting USACIDC element. Anytime a case is initiated on a controlled substance, notification of USACIDC is necessary in accordance with AR 190-30.

- Supervises the physical security of the MP investigation section.
- Supervises the overall safeguard of all records and files maintained in the section.
- Serves as the forms management officer.
- Performs other duties as directed by the PM.
The success of an investigation can depend on the local application of criminal intelligence that investigators, worldwide, gather and process about crimes committed by individuals or organized crime groups. This criminal intelligence helps investigators identify criminals and makes them aware of criminal activity and violations of criminal law. It also helps them prevent crime by allowing them to assess crime problems and trends.

The US Army uses criminal intelligence to reveal criminal activities affecting the US Army. Only data that are needed are collected. Data solely about political activities are not collected. DA policy, stated in AR 380-13, forbids collection and retention of data on non-DOD personnel except for data about crimes where DOD has responsibility to investigate or prosecute.

Criminal intelligence is more than just data documented in ongoing investigations. It is any information observed or obtained by investigators that may be of value when added to the criminal intelligence already possessed. The process by which investigators change the raw data from untried, undeveloped information into a useful form for investigative needs is called the criminal intelligence process. It is an ongoing cycle of planning, collecting, evaluating, collating, analyzing, reporting, disseminating, and reevaluating. The process, undertaken continuously both at local levels and at higher HQ, ensures that a broad spectrum of criminal intelligence is available to aid the investigator. The intelligence that is gathered is processed and disseminated to all levels.

GATHERING CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE

At command level, the Investigative Operations Directorate, USACIDC, supervises the US Army's criminal intelligence effort. It sets information priorities for worldwide collection. And it disseminates processed criminal intelligence to local levels. USACIDC sets guides for two types of criminal intelligence: essential elements of criminal intelligence (EECI) and other criminal intelligence requirements (OCIRs). OCIRs are data that may be useful, but often are not needed right away. EECI, on the other hand, are critical items of data on criminal activities and crime areas to be collected at all levels. When EECI data are correlated and disseminated to local units, this information can be used to reach conclusions and make decisions.

At installation level, USACIDC offices and certain MP elements supervise the planning and collection of criminal intelligence. The criminal intelligence coordinators in local units plan and collect information of criminal functions within command boundaries. They then forward it on request or on their own initiative. They also set local priorities within the overall program. They keep in touch with criminal intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
At investigator level, data are planned and collected for input to the criminal intelligence system. Collecting criminal intelligence is a continual duty of all investigators, not just those assigned directly to a criminal intelligence section. The investigator is the key to a successful collection effort. The investigator is usually the person in direct contact with local human sources of criminal intelligence. During daily activities the investigator looks for EECI and OCIRs. He does this continuously and aggressively. Although priority is placed on EECI needs, he must not overlook other useful criminal intelligence.

The local criminal intelligence coordinator helps the investigator sift, sort, review, and analyze data. Sources of criminal intelligence are developed. Criminal intelligence is gathered from both overt and covert sources. Overt sources may be citizens, workers in private and government agencies, members of police agencies, and unit commanders. Postal workers, news media, phone books, and public records are also good, overt sources of criminal intelligence. Covert sources include criminal elements willing to be sources and surveillant and undercover investigators. Development of sources of criminal intelligence is limited only by the imagination of the investigator.

After data have been collected, collated, and analyzed, they must be reported. Because some data being reported are sensitive, criminal intelligence is usually reported on USACIDC Form 97 (Criminal Intelligence Report). Reports are tailored to the needs of the main user. Positive information is given. Reports are prepared objectively. Conclusions drawn from the data are included in the report. After the reported information is further analyzed at higher levels, criminal intelligence is disseminated back to local levels. The criminal intelligence is disseminated to reach the principal user—the local investigator.

Criminal intelligence must be accurate and relevant. Usually the investigator who collects the details is most able to assess the reliability of his or her source. That investigator can determine reliability by recalling past experience with that source, as well as comparing the data with that gathered from other overt or covert sources. But even when the reliability of a source or accuracy of the criminal intelligence collected is questioned, it is not considered useless. It is reported. The immediate need for an item of criminal intelligence may not be seen. But this does not mean that item is not of value.

Higher USACIDC levels, having wider sources of criminal intelligence than lower levels, may assess the accuracy and usefulness of an item of data by comparing it with a variety of other known data and circumstances. When seemingly useless bits of criminal intelligence are fitted together, the many separate bits may, like jigsaw puzzle pieces, form a recognizable picture. The criminal intelligence collected on every new case must be coordinated with the criminal intelligence center.

To bring together collected data to decide their importance and relation to other criminal intelligence, data must be collated and analyzed. The data must be combined with other related data and then analyzed to allow sound theories and judgments to be derived. The analysis of criminal intelligence can be done at the same time as collation. The same data may be analyzed many times and by a variety of methods. The methods of statistical, system, computer, or operational research analysis may be used. However, when an analysis is done at any level of command, it is done to see if a pattern can be shown and to see if more data are needed. An analysis also serves as a tool to reevaluate collection plans.

Reevaluation is the final stage of the criminal intelligence process. It is a review at all levels of the potential use and benefit.
of the collected criminal intelligence. Reevaluation serves to show where changes need to be made. It ensures that the information to be gathered reflects the needs and goals of local investigative units and of such units in general. It ensures the criminal intelligence reflects current targets of interest, as areas of concern vary over time. And it ensures the information is obtainable from the contacts and sources of criminal intelligence that are available.

**USING AND PROVIDING CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE**

To be useful, criminal intelligence must be available and easily retrievable. Only if the investigator can get to the criminal intelligence can he see if any exists that will aid him in an ongoing investigation.

Three files are required by regulation to be maintained at each local USACIDC office. These are the name index card file, the *modus operandi* file, and the offense file. The name index card file contains criminal intelligence cross-indexed by subjects, victims, witnesses, and organizations. The *modus operandi* file contains criminal intelligence on distinct manners of operation cross-indexed by subjects and cases. And the offense file contains criminal intelligence indexed by the type of crime committed.

But a unit's investigative file system is not limited to these. Other useful files may include criminal intelligence indexed by unit, location, nicknames, stolen property, or type of vehicles. Criminal intelligence may be indexed by any topic which would benefit the investigative needs of a given office.

When an investigation is initiated, the criminal intelligence files are checked for information regarding offenders, victims, witnesses, *modus operandi*, similar offenses, and, perhaps, even locale. And while working on the case, the investigator must remain aware of the value of continuing to cross-check leads or other aspects of the case against the available criminal intelligence. When an investigation is complete, and the investigator drafts his report of investigation, he makes a last review of the criminal intelligence. This action will ensure the thoroughness of the report. And it will allow criminal intelligence gained in the investigation to be checked against any unsolved cases and, perhaps, aid in solving them.

When acting on a request for criminal intelligence the investigator coordinates with the local Freedom of Information Act officer. The right to obtain information and the right to refuse to release information are limited by regulation and by the Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act. AR 340-17 gives guidance on USACIDC and MP law enforcement criminal intelligence systems. It exempts some law enforcement investigative files from disclosure. These files include source files and investigative working files.

As a participant in the criminal intelligence process, the investigator must understand and comply with legal and regulatory restrictions on collecting, maintaining, and releasing information.

**CONDUCTING INTERVIEWS AND INTERROGATIONS**

Most investigations depend heavily upon the ability of the investigator to obtain criminal intelligence. The solution to many crimes has been the direct result of leads and evidence developed through interviews and interrogations.

Before MPIs can hope to develop interviewing and interrogating skills, and before supervisors can guide their subordinates, they must know the fundamental techniques of interviews and interrogations. Basic understanding and
Attitudes must precede the development of communication skills.

Interviews and interrogations are an investigator's means of obtaining criminal intelligence from or about persons connected with an incident. Investigators interview persons who they believe are willing to give information about a case. In an interview they help people give, in their own manner and words, their account of the matter. After they give their account, the investigator reviews it with them to be clear on key points. Or the investigator asks questions to have them clearly explain matters not covered before, depending on the elements of the offense under investigation. Investigators may have to question a number of people to get the criminal intelligence needed. They may need to question people who know a victim, a suspect, or a witness. These people can help investigators understand the reasons and actions of those involved in an incident they are investigating. These interviews, often conducted in the office, home, or place of business of the person being interviewed, rarely result in an interrogation. Investigators interrogate only persons suspected of having committed or helped commit an offense, or persons believed to be withholding criminal intelligence about an offense. In an interrogation investigators rigorously question persons unwilling to give the criminal intelligence they are seeking. They avoid interrogating anyone who can be successfully interviewed.

Investigators may find that some persons questioned are only “distracters.” They have no real connection with the crime, but they seek to present criminal intelligence. They may be publicity seekers who say they witnessed the crime. Or they may be emotionally disturbed persons claiming involvement in the crime. Despite the distraction these people create, investigators should not ignore them. Investigators must make every effort to handle these persons so that neither the investigation nor the reputation of the armed forces suffers.

Investigators listen to their stories. They check what the people say in relation to the known facts. Then they take the necessary action.

Procedures for preparing, planning, and conducting interviews and interrogations are found in FM 19-20.

Every investigation involves the gathering of evidence, both physical and testimonial. The collection and evaluation of physical evidence is an important part of the MPI's job. However, without interpersonal communication, the items of physical evidence have little or no practical value. It is through communication with other individuals that background data, giving evidence meaning, are obtained. Therefore, it is important that MPIs become effective communicators. The military investigators will find that a heavy percentage of the work load will be directly related to the gathering, evaluating, and recording of criminal intelligence resulting from interviews and interrogations. The questioning of suspects, witnesses, complainants, victims, and informants is the investigative procedure most frequently used by police officers. As a result of these activities, the investigative supervisor will find that the majority of the work load will consist of evaluating interview and interrogation results.

It is essential to the investigative process that the MPI supervisor ensures that during and immediately following an interview, MPI personnel strive to evaluate the individual interviewed, any criminal intelligence obtained, and the investigator’s performance. These evaluation steps must be accomplished to ensure that complete and accurate reports are subsequently written. For example, the number of false complaints, especially in cases of sex crimes, is very high; victims of thefts often exaggerate; homosexuals will, at times, name other homosexuals with whom they have had contact or nonhomosexuals whom they dislike for another reason. Eyewitness accounts are frequently not reliable, and no
two witnesses are likely to give the same account of an incident. If they do, the investigator should scrutinize the information carefully and make certain that deception has not occurred. The investigator who is conscientious about improving his or her ability to interview persons successfully evaluates performance during and after each interview or interrogation. An evaluation should include approach, manner, and success of the interview. This procedure is particularly necessary when the investigator has been successful in obtaining from the individual all the criminal intelligence that was believed to be available. When a suspect confesses and a written statement has been completed, it can be of great assistance in engaging the suspect in casual conversation and asking him what was said or done that caused him to confess. Through use of such means, the investigator can improve knowledge and techniques each time an interview is conducted.

Not only does the investigator have an enormous responsibility, but the investigative supervisor must assure that the procedures are being effectively applied by their investigators and that all necessary criminal intelligence relating to the investigation is being obtained. Therefore, it is important that MPs and their supervisors know how to effectively conduct themselves in interview and interrogation situations and how to evaluate the criminal intelligence obtained.

A criminal surprised and apprehended in the act of committing a crime is sometimes interviewed at the scene while still under considerable emotional strain. Properly handled, this interview may often produce an admission or confession that will help to establish the guilt of the criminal and other accomplices. These instances, however, are rare. Normally the interview is conducted at the MP investigation section, either in an interrogation room or in individual investigative offices, where the emotional feelings of guilt have to be cultivated by the investigator using established techniques. The proper environment for this type of interview is just as essential as the skills of the investigator. (Refer to FM 19-20 for complete discussion of interviews and interrogations.)

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<th>OBJECTIVES OF INTERVIEWS AND INTERROGATIONS</th>
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<td><strong>INTERVIEWS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Investigators interview persons who are willing to give information. The aims or goals include—</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ GATHERING INFORMATION</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ DEVELOPING LEADS</td>
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<td>□ AIDING IN LOCATING PROPERTY</td>
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<td>□ ASSISTING IN CLEARING SUSPECTS</td>
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<td>□ VERIFYING SUSPICIONS</td>
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<td>□ CONDUCTING INTERROGATIONS</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ GATHERING CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE NEEDS</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>INTERROGATIONS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Investigators interrogate only persons suspected of having committed or helped commit an offense. The aims or goals include—</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ LEARNING THE TRUTH</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ OBTAINING AN ADMISSION OF GUILT</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ RECOVERING EVIDENCE/PROPERTY</td>
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<td>□ DISCOVERING CRIMES</td>
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<td>□ OBTAINING ALL THE FACTS</td>
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<td>□ ARRIVING AT A CONCLUSION</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ DEVELOPING CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION</td>
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Depending on the situation at the time, many locations are used as appropriate facilities for interviewing individuals having knowledge of an incident being investigated. However, when interrogating, the best facility to use is an interrogation room to ensure that the proper psychological atmosphere exists. The following guidance should be followed:

- If any type of recording equipment is employed, the interviewer must follow the procedures in FM 19-20.
- Desks, tables, and other furniture should be located neither where they will impair the interviewer’s observation of the subject, nor where they will constitute a psychological or physical barrier to the communication between the interviewer and subject.

PERFORMING SURVEILLANCE AND COVERT OPERATIONS

As investigators develop their special skills they may be called on to work on a surveillance or covert operation. Surveillances and covert operations are undertaken to learn about a suspect’s activities and relationships. In these operations investigators attempt to watch suspects or associate with them without their becoming aware of police interest. But for the operations to be successful, the investigators conducting them must be trained and experienced. And sometimes they must have special skills. They may even take on entirely different identities. There may be total, and in some cases dangerous, involvement of the investigators. Because of this, surveillances and covert operations are used only if there is no other way that will work as well to get needed criminal intelligence.

SURVEILLANCES

Police surveillance is the systematic observation of persons, places, or things to get criminal intelligence. Surveillants make notes of actions they see performed by subjects under surveillance. If there is more than one surveillant, the notes can be compared for accuracy. Normally, surveillance deals with persons. Places and things are watched if they relate to people or missions. Surveillance can provide information about a person’s activities. It can show where persons under surveillance go. Or it can show where criminal activity takes place. It can verify the reliability of a source’s information. (FM 19-20 discusses surveillance operations in detail.)

COVERT OPERATIONS

A covert operation is an investigative process where the investigators use pretexts and disguises in order to get as close as possible to suspects, their associates, and criminal activity. An important purpose of a covert operation is to obtain circumstantial evidence.

While all investigations do not require a covert operation, a number of investigations depend primarily on investigators operating in a covert status to some degree. An investigator may be put in a covert status to determine if a crime is being planned or has been committed, to determine the location of
INVESTIGATIONS

the crime, and to identify persons involved in the crime. Probable cause can be developed by the investigator so that apprehension warrants and search warrants can be obtained when necessary.

The first step in the planning process for a covert operation is to determine if a covert operation is needed. The needs may be identified through a number of actions such as—

- Criminal intelligence.
- Liaison with other agencies.
- Observations.
- Crime prevention.
- Statistics.

Liaison is a must when coordinating a covert operation. If relationships are bad, it will be difficult to obtain good results from the operation. A covert operation, in most cases, requires coordination with the SJA, federal investigative agencies, and civil authorities.

The number of investigators required for a covert operation must be determined. A covert operation may last for a long period of time. Therefore, investigators selected must not be scheduled for PCS, TDY, or to go on leave.

On occasion, it may be advantageous for the covert investigator to use public transportation such as buses, trains, taxis, or subways. However, during most covert investigations, the investigator is provided a vehicle of some type. The means of transportation chosen is tailored to the selected cover identity of the investigator as well as the nature of the operation. The type vehicle chosen will vary according to the operation.

Weapons are carried by a covert investigator when there is imminent danger or if an apprehension might be necessary. If an investigator is to carry a weapon, it is a nonstandard issue-type weapon.

The carrying of any type of illegal weapon, such as a switchblade knife, by a covert investigator is not authorized without prior approval. Prior approval must be obtained in writing from appropriate military or civil authorities or both.

An investigator must be provided communication equipment and a point of contact. At a minimum, the investigator must be provided a telephone and a 24-hour contact point, preferably another investigator or supervisor. The investigator does not go through official channels such as

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<tr>
<th>INVESTIGATOR CHARACTERISTICS FOR PERFORMING COVERT OPERATIONS</th>
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<tr>
<td>□ Be experienced.</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Have the ability to work with others.</td>
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<td>□ Be able to handle fear.</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Dress as the mission requires.</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Know what personal possessions he has and be aware that certain possessions might identify him as a covert investigator.</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Be able to speak the language of the area.</td>
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<td>□ Know that his morals and integrity will constantly be tested.</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Have common sense.</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Use good judgment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Have self-confidence.</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Be intelligent.</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ If necessary, know street terminology.</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Have pride in his work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Have the ability to listen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Be physically fit.</td>
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<tr>
<td>□ Be able to control his emotions.</td>
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the MP desk sergeant unless it is an emergency.

An investigator must keep his background story as close as possible to his actual history. This makes it easier for the investigator to remember the background story, and it also prevents mistakes that might occur.

The investigator must memorize his background story to prevent the story from changing if questioned by different members of the criminal element. An investigator must assume that criminals will try to trick him to find out if he is the person he claims to be. An investigator must always anticipate questions that the criminal element might ask. The criminal element will ask questions, knowing the correct answers, to see if the investigator is telling the truth. The investigator must never admit to the criminal element to being an MP.

Once a background story is presented to the criminal element, it is not unusual for the criminal element to check out the story. The investigator must ensure that data are maintained in offices where the background story might be checked.

If apprehended, the investigator must have specific instructions on what to do. The investigator never identifies himself as an MP in the apprehension unless there is reason to believe that he will be hurt by the authorities. Once at the jail, the investigator must tell the jailer that he is a covert investigator. The investigator must know of a name of a police official, other than the police chief, whom the jailer might recognize.
PART FOUR

CONFINEMENT OF US MILITARY PRISONERS

The Military Police Corps' role in the confinement of US military prisoners is an integral part of the MP law and order mission. MP confinement operations assist in maintaining discipline and unit strength. The confinement of soldiers who transgress the laws and regulations of the military helps commanders ensure that discipline is upheld.

MP are responsible for the confinement of US military prisoners in both wartime and peacetime environments.

Military police detain, confine, protect, and sustain US military prisoners. MP evacuate prisoners when it is necessary. MP play a major role in the Army's correctional system for US military prisoners. From detention to confinement and correctional treatment, MP carry out Army policy by ensuring that persons held in Army custody are accorded humane care and treatment. The means, methods, and facilities used to carry out this operation differ with the environment. But the MP's just exercise of custody and control and their humane treatment of prisoners remains a constant.

Military police participation in the Army's confinement and correctional system—
- Assists the commander in maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces.
- Promotes efficiency and effectiveness in the military criminal justice establishment.
- Strengthens the national security of the US.
CHAPTER 16

Field Confinement of US Military Prisoners

On the battlefield MP provide for the temporary confinement and swift evacuation of US military prisoners. MP confinement operations parallel, but are separate from, the MP EPW internment and evacuation system. Members of the US armed forces cannot be confined in immediate association with enemy prisoners of war, civilian internees, detainees, or other foreign nationals who are not members of the US armed forces.

On the battlefield MP operate field detention facilities (FDFs) and field confinement facilities (FCFs). When the decision is made by the theater army commander that prisoners are to be retained in theater, FDFs may be set up in the combat zone and an FCF may be set up in the communications zone (COMMZ).

OPERATING FIELD DETENTION FACILITIES

Military police use FDFs in the combat zone. FDFs are temporary facilities set up to detain soldiers placed in custody. FDFs are used to hold soldiers in custody only until they can be tried and sentenced to confinement and evacuated from the area.

Whenever possible, soldiers awaiting trial remain in their units. Only when they present a hazard to the mission, themselves, or others are they placed in pretrial confinement and detained by MP. MP companies assigned to corps and TAACOMS are responsible for the detention of US military prisoners in their areas of operation. Convicted military prisoners are moved when possible to confinement facilities outside the area of operations.

In the combat zone, US military prisoners are detained in two ways. They may be placed under the control of a squad or a team already performing another operation, such as an EPW collecting point or a TCP. Or they may be placed in a separate, temporary FDF. When small numbers of US prisoners are on hand, the squad operating the EPW collecting point can best take on responsibility for US prisoners. But military prisoners must be physically separated from EPWs. When large numbers exist, an MP team or squad may be given the mission to set up a detention facility. The PM decides when a detention facility is needed. The PM plans the detention of US prisoners and assigns the mission to the company commander. The company commander tasks an MP element to perform this operation, or he coordinates the removal of the prisoners to a corps detention facility. If there are many prisoners in the company’s area of operations, a confinement team may be required to set up a temporary detention facility in the division area.

Unit commanders are encouraged to use unit assets to detain soldiers accused of crimes as long as feasible. But they may take them to an FDF if this is necessary. Procedures are provided in commanders’ policies for detaining and confining soldiers. If it is not feasible for the unit commander to retain control, MP will temporarily detain the prisoners.
Either a team or a squad can operate an FDF. A team operating a detention facility may organize so that the team leader controls the operation and spells the guards, and the other team members perform guard duty in alternating 12-hour shifts. When operating an FDF, MP sign a receipt for each prisoner on DD Form 629 and for the prisoner’s property on DA Form 4137. Policies and procedures on the care and treatment of prisoners and the safeguarding of the prisoners’ personal effects apply to FDFs to the same extent that they apply to other Army confinement facilities. The physical criteria for housing the facility in permanent and temporary structures are basically similar. Maximum use should be made of existing structures to house confinement facilities. If a tent is used, it should not be smaller than the general purpose medium tent. Field expedient facilities must be approved by the Medical Corps Officer, who also conducts periodic inspections.

Plans for establishing an FDF should include the following list of equipment and supplies which represents minimum requirements:

- Barbed wire—roll.
- Barbed wire—concertina.
- Fence posts.
- Gates and doors.
- Floodlights and spotlights, complete with wiring.
- Emergency generator.
- Mess equipment and equipment for cleaning mess gear.
- Water cans and/or lister bag.
- Typewriters.
- First aid equipment and supplies.
- Spare clothing and bedding.

OPERATING FIELD CONFINEMENT FACILITIES

Convicted US military prisoners are usually only held for a short time in a theater of operations. Then they are evacuated for correctional treatment out of theater. However, they can be confined in theater if circumstances warrant.

An FCF is maintained within the theater of operations when the prisoner population requires it, the distance to CONUS is too great, or the lack of transportation to evacuate prisoners to CONUS demands it. A separate MP confinement battalion is assigned to the Personnel Command (PERSCOM) to support the theater of operation’s confinement of US military prisoners. It provides the theater with trained confinement personnel. And it provides a place capable of handling 1,500 US military prisoners.

Military police temporarily confine soldiers in custody in tactical situations in an FCF. FCFs are used to hold soldiers in custody only until they can be evacuated to a correctional facility. An FCF can be a temporary, semipermanent, or permanent structure located in the COMMZ. Policies and procedures on the care and treatment of prisoners and the safeguarding of prisoners’ personal effects apply to FCFs to the same extent that they apply to Army confinement facilities in peacetime environments.

Although conditions within an FCF may be austere, military prisoners of the US forces are given the benefit of shelter and sustenance like that provided duty soldiers in the area of operations. The MP confinement battalion commander selects the general location of the confinement facility. The battalion commander must ensure the location of an FCF is not adjacent to the base perimeter, ammunition supply point, or any other area where the safety of the prisoners is imperiled.
The MP confinement battalion commander is the FCF commander and maintains command and control of the facility. Battalion HQ is assigned a number of MP guard companies to confine, protect, sustain, and evacuate US military prisoners. Confinement teams are deployed within the combat zone for pretrial detention purposes only as needed.

**EXPEDITING DISPOSITION**

The command PM seeks to expedite actions involving military prisoners in pretrial confinement as well as those who have been sentenced. Coordination with the USACIDC field element is undertaken to prioritize and expedite investigations on those persons held in pretrial confinement. And continuing coordination with Corps Support Command administrative services elements and transportation elements is necessary. When possible, prompt action is taken to ensure sentenced prisoners are expeditiously evacuated to the rear. Military prisoners are moved from corps detention facilities through the COMMZ confinement facility to confinement and correctional facilities in CONUS with a minimum of delay. The confinement facility commander, if one is required in a COMMZ, coordinates with the Assistant Chief of Staff, PERSCOM, to ensure prompt administrative action. Assets of the Transportation Command must be requested to support movement of military prisoners from corps to COMMZ and from COMMZ to CONUS. Coordination is made with TAACOM elements to provide subsistence for those military prisoners kept within a COMMZ for brief periods. Close and continuous coordination is maintained between the PM and the Commander, Medical Command. This facilitates the security and segregation of military prisoners undergoing medical treatment or being evacuated through medical channels.
CONFINEMENT OF US MILITARY PRISONERS
CHAPTER 17
Installation Confinement and US Army Correctional Facilities

Outside a theater of operations the MP accomplish the confinement of US military prisoners through their operation of the Army’s correctional system. The long-range goal of the Army correctional system is to help as many prisoners as possible become responsible, productive citizens when released to civilian life or returned to military duty. The philosophy of the Army correctional system is to administer discipline on a corrective rather than a punitive basis. The services and programs employed by the Army correctional system are designed to prepare prisoners for return to civilian life or to military duty, whichever is prescribed by the needs of the Army. This philosophy governs all phases of confinement and correctional treatment. The Army correctional system provides for the differing confinement needs of persons held for short, medium, and long periods. It does this by maintaining a three-tiered correctional system.

At the local level are the installation confinement facilities (ICFs), which hold pretrial detainees and short-term posttrial prisoners. Army ICFs provide limited services and custodial supervision. On the second and third levels are the US Army Correctional Activity (USACA) and the US Disciplinary Barracks (USDB). Both the USACA and the USDB are full-scale correctional facilities. Although the mission at all levels of the Army correctional system is to confine US prisoners and to provide correctional treatment, the mission emphasis differs at each level. The differences in mission emphasis are based on the length of time prisoners are to be confined and the facilities and services such confinement requires.

The MP mission of confining US military prisoners is accomplished by maintaining prisoners in custody and under control. MP maintain custody of US military prisoners from the moment of custody to final release. The maintenance of custody and control is the basic purpose for which MP operate the Army’s confinement and correctional facilities. Facility personnel achieve and maintain custody and control of prisoners by employing a number of custody and control measures. Prisoners are subject to custody and control measures 24 hours a day in all aspects of their lives in confinement both inside and outside the facility.

To maintain custody, limits are placed on prisoners’ freedom of movement. Custody is maintained within a facility by the presence of guards, walls, fences, protective lighting, alarms, and locking devices. Custody is maintained outside a facility by the presence of guards or supervisors.

INSTALLATION CONFINEMENT FACILITIES

MP operate ICFs to confine pretrial detainees, posttrial prisoners awaiting transfer to another facility, and prisoners serving short-term sentences. Accused prisoners in pretrial confinement are informed of the nature of the offenses for which they are being confined. This is done at the time the prisoner is confined. Individuals are accepted for confinement only on receipt of a court-martial order, a
valid DD Form 497 (Confinement Order) or a report of the result of a trial. Specific procedures for pretrial restraint and pretrial confinement can be found in the MCM Rules for Courts-Martial 304 and 305 and local supplements to AR 27-10.

The staffs at ICFS provide administrative services, custodial supervision, and limited counseling. Other important ICF functions include screening prisoners for transfer to another facility, processing prisoners whose adjudged punitive discharge is ordered, and coordinating with the installation Adjutant General (AG) for the reassignment of prisoners when they are released from confinement.

Installation PMs are responsible for staff supervision of the operation and administration of ICFS. They also are responsible for the custody and control of prisoners confined in hospitalized-prisoner wards. The installation PM guides and assists the facility commander and his staff in training the prisoners and the staff, implementing emergency plans, and obtaining people, equipment, and supplies to operate the facility. The installation PM also is responsible for ensuring that prisoners receive proper medical care.
ICFs are arranged with the primary goal of safely controlling detainees and prisoners. Special consideration is given to cells and living quarters, fire protection devices, and locking devices. ICFs must meet specific requirements for location, site, and the amount of space allotted for confinement areas in which prisoners are quartered. The inmate population is segregated into detainees, enlisted prisoners, and officer prisoners. Each group is further segregated by sex. Workshops and recreation areas are constructed in facilities large enough to accommodate them. All ICFs must meet the physical requirements for the confinement of both sexes (see AR 190-47 for details).

Usually the prisoner capacity of a facility is based on 1 percent of the troop strength of the area being served. In some cases, the prisoner population of a facility may be very small, or the size, location, or troop strength of an installation may not warrant a facility. Under such circumstances and when the installation commander so decides, prisoners of one service may be confined in confinement facilities operated by another service. The services coordinate a local written agreement. The agreement is called an interservice support agreement (ISA). It is based on the particular needs of the services in the area the facility serves. The rules, regulations, laws, and procedures that apply to the confinement of Army prisoners also apply to the confinement of members of the other services. (See FM 19-60 for a complete discussion of ICFs.)

When access to an ICF is not available, military prisoners may be temporarily confined in federally approved local, county or city jails or in MP detention cells. For a detailed discussion of temporary confinement of military prisoners, see AR 190-47.

In a peacetime environment PMs of tactical units tenanted on an installation (refer to FM 19-60 for configuration information/requirements) exercise staff supervision over confinement facilities that are set up by the units in the field. When in garrison and when facilities are provided by the installation on which the tactical unit is stationed, tactical unit PMs advise their commanders and staffs on current policies and procedures pertaining to prisoners. Tactical unit PMs also maintain liaison with the installation PM.

US ARMY CONFINEMENT AND CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES

The US Army operates two “permanent” full-scale correctional facilities. The missions and functions of the USACA and the USDB are similar. Both facilities provide a safe, secure environment in which to confine prisoners. At both facilities the mission emphasis is on correctional treatment and educational and vocational training. And both facilities are staffed with carefully selected, well-qualified correctional, supervisory, and professional personnel. The USDB and USACA provide the professional evaluation, counseling, training, custody, and personnel administration needed to prepare inmates for return to civilian life or military duty. The USDB, however, because it confines long-term prisoners, can and does provide specialized correctional programs. For more information on USDB and USACA, see FM 19-60.

Although federal civilian penal institutions are not a part of the Army correctional system they are sometimes used by the military to confine prisoners. Military prisoners whose disciplinary and adjustment records indicate a need for the treatment available in a federal penal institution may be so confined. Military prisoners who are to be confined in a federal institution are first confined at the USDB. From there they are transferred to the federal institution. For further guidance on procedures involving federal penal institutions, see AR 190-47.
Terrorists employ the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain political, religious, or ideological goals. Because military personnel and military police serve as protectors of society, terrorists consider them to be their adversaries. Terrorists believe successful attacks against military targets show the vulnerability of the established society. They also believe successful attacks help show terrorism to be a means of effective change. Throughout the world the MP endeavor to ensure that US Army personnel and facilities are perceived as undesirable targets.

Terrorists are extremely dedicated and must not be underrated. They are formidable adversaries. The use of terrorist tactics worldwide has increased over the years, and this upward trend is not expected to abate in the near future. Terrorists are becoming more daring, ruthless, and willing to go to violent extremes to accomplish their goals. Terrorists prefer operations that have a high probability of success and escape. But terrorists may choose a hardened, well-defended target, especially if success is likely and if they can justify the end result as worth the risk.

Terrorist groups have active cadres who train other terrorists. These trainers emphasize tactics that have been proven successful. Terrorists reconnoiter and maintain extensive surveillance to gather detailed intelligence. They plan and rehearse their attacks. The trainers teach measures to counter response actions and innovations. And as governments take action to counter terrorism, terrorist organizations often alter their tactics.

The many existing terrorist organizations constitute a threat for both peacetime and wartime. The probability of terrorism and other acts of sabotage and subversion is heightened during periods of hostilities.

Terrorism can be a means for a nation to project power. Terrorism may be used to exhaust or deplete another nation’s will or the resources of its armed forces. Terrorism, when used to cause governments to react repressively, can foment feelings of hatred toward government leaders and institutions.

The structure of most terrorist groups prevents intelligence sources from infiltrating. But it is known that terrorist cadres often carry out orders from higher level leaders. And the groups are often maintained by strong political support. Terrorist groups are capable of diverting resources and disrupting the operations of government agencies using only a few persons and small amounts of equipment. In time of war, it is expected that these groups will use their skills, resources, and terror tactics to further their objectives.

The MP role in terrorism counteraction is clear: prevent when possible, respond and resolve when required. In both peace and war MP deter, deny, detect, delay, and respond to terrorist attacks. On the battlefield MP help protect units and facilities against the Level I threat of spies, saboteurs, terrorists, and enemy forces as part of their area security mission. (See FM 19-4 for details on MP terrorism counteraction on the battlefield.)

In peacetime MP help protect personnel, equipment, and facilities against spies, saboteurs, and terrorists as part of their law and order mission. Terrorism always entails criminal activity. Terrorist goals are achieved through intimidation, coercion, and instilling fear. Terrorist groups often hold hostages or undertake kidnappings to obtain material or political demands. Common terrorist tactics include bombings, hijackings, arson, and ambush. MP undertake peacetime terrorism counteraction to help suppress crime and maintain order.
At Army installations worldwide, terrorism counteraction is being planned, practiced, assessed, updated, and carried out. Ideally, the total Army community helps develop and implement installation plans for terrorism counteraction. And MP are involved extensively. MP help develop and they can help implement both the antiterrorism and the counterterrorism components of terrorism counteraction.

ANTITERRORISM

Antiterrorism measures are developed to reduce vulnerability to terrorist attack. They are used to prevent or to defend against terrorist acts. Antiterrorism measures are used to defend US personnel, equipment, and facilities. They may be used to defend allied personnel and facilities, but such use must be specifically requested and approved. MP antiterrorism measures include collecting intelligence, analyzing vulnerabilities, and taking preventive measures. And MP are active in installation antiterrorism planning. The PM, his representative, or his staff—

- Participates in the development and periodic update of the installation’s Threat Assessment.
- Develops the installation’s physical security plan and crime prevention plan.
- Conducts appropriate inspections, surveys, and vulnerability assessments.
- Participates in the overall assessment of installation vulnerabilities.
- Coordinates with USACIDC for personal security vulnerability analysis of high-risk personnel.
- Participates in designating mission essential vulnerable areas (MEVA) and the orientation of planned protection for these areas.
- Reviews antiterrorism programs to ensure OPSEC programs and the like developed by other agencies on the installation complement those developed by the PM office.
- Participates in developing memorandums of understanding with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.

COLLECTING INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYZING VULNERABILITIES

Obtaining intelligence and analyzing vulnerabilities are prerequisites to planning preventive measures. A well-planned, systematic, all-source intelligence program is essential to knowing the threat. The role of intelligence is to identify and quantify the threat. It also provides a timely evaluation of terrorist capabilities, tactics, and targets. As knowledge is gained, a threat assessment can begin. All available information is examined to develop intelligence indicators of future terrorist activities. Analyzing the threat is an essential step in preventing or reducing vulnerability to terrorist acts.

Intelligence activities in terrorism counteraction are a team effort. Many federal agencies are actively involved in countering terrorism. These agencies provide technical
support and evaluation. And they share information. And controlled liaison with civilian and HN police and intelligence agencies is essential. Exchanging information prevents duplication of effort and reduces the likelihood of compromising ongoing intelligence collection efforts.

US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) is the lead Army agency for Army, foreign, and counterintelligence activities against terrorism. INSCOM coordinates with appropriate US and HN agencies when initiating any intelligence activity. It also provides overall direction and coordination for the Army counterintelligence effort. Local INSCOM offices provide area coverage at all levels of command. The Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (ITAC) is an agency of INSCOM. It disseminates specific threat warnings to applicable commands and activities. Periodic regional threat packets are provided to supported commands and activities. On request, ITAC provides current intelligence data on terrorist groups and individuals.

The MP serve as a major source of information in support of terrorism counteraction. Terrorists violate the law when they commit terrorist acts. MP agencies maintain information on known criminal incidents within their jurisdiction. (See section on criminal intelligence earlier in text.) This information is of vital interest to intelligence efforts. MP activities and USACIDC units collect and evaluate criminal intelligence. Local units and higher headquarters coordinate the development and dissemination of information. USACIDC disseminates terrorist-related information to installation and activity commanders within the affected area and to INSCOM.

Successful efforts to counter terrorism depend on successfully providing commanders timely, user-specific information of the terrorist threat. Integrating information provided by civilian, military, and governmental agencies produces a composite. This permits a commander to see what is happening or is about to happen and to plan accordingly.

Coordination of information among MP units, USACIDC area offices, military intelligence units, and civilian police agencies is active. In the US, MP and USACIDC field offices exchange information and intelligence with installation security and INSCOM elements. Outside the US, liaison is conducted by MP, USACIDC, and INSCOM elements with HN and allied law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Liaison is conducted in accordance with SOFAs. Regardless of locale, any information and intelligence exchange includes briefing the local commander. And wherever located, MP elements, in coordination with military intelligence elements, investigate and report illegal terrorist acts against the US Army. They also conduct liaison with civilian police agencies as required.

**TAKING PREVENTIVE MEASURES**

Properly planned preventive measures, when resourced and employed, reduce vulnerability to terrorist attack. Vulnerability assessments identify existing or potential conditions conducive to terrorist or criminal activity. Physical security surveys and inspections, crime prevention surveys, personal security surveys for high-risk personnel, the installation vulnerability determination system, and OPSEC surveys are among the tools available to installation commanders/staff personnel. They are used to determine the vulnerability of installation personnel, equipment, and facilities to terrorist attack or criminal activity.

The Army’s programs for OPSEC, personnel protection, and physical security are all excellent means for reducing vulnerability. Each helps to protect operations, activities, installations, and resources from hostile exploitation. But maximum benefit from these measures is gained when all of these programs are
implemented in concert. Each of the
programs seeks to reduce installation
vulnerability to criminal or hostile acts. Each
of the programs focuses on a different level of
vulnerability or type of risk. Thus the
programs can complement each other. When
all of the programs, goals, objectives, and
requirements are integrated, a synergistic
prevention effect is realized. This is the key to
a strong prevention program. The effect of
the total interaction is far greater than would
be expected of the sum of the parts.

OPSEC denies adversaries information
about friendly military operations. This
denies terrorists information about potential
targets. Terrorists select targets that offer the
most opportunity for success. Information
passed unknowingly by military personnel
and family members is used by terrorists in
their planning efforts. OPSEC reduces the
availability of this information. OPSEC
procedures—

- Protect itineraries, travel plans, and
  personnel rosters.
- Eliminate established patterns.
- Protect building and facility plans,
  billeting assignments, and VIP guest lists.
- Ensure discussion of classified or sensitive
  information only on National Security
  Agency approved, cryptographically
  secured telephone or radio circuits; for
  example, automatic secure voice
  communications system.
- Protect personal or family information
  from nonacquaintances.
- Coordinate physical security measures to
  protect personnel and prevent
  unauthorized access to equipment,
  facilities, materiel, and documents.

Personnel protection measures help to
protect personnel from criminal and terrorist
acts. Personnel protection programs provide
protective measures. They also create a
threat awareness in people, especially those
considered high-risk potential targets.
Personnel protection includes protective
services provided to high-risk persons by
specially trained personnel. (See the chapter
on protective services.) And it includes
protective measures to be taken by the high-
risk persons themselves. These latter
measures help persons decrease their
vulnerability to terrorist attack. Such
measures reduce the likelihood of terrorist
success. And they act as deterrents to
terrorist activity.

Physical security measures also protect
and safeguard personnel from terrorist acts.
Physical security programs mesh human
resources and mechanical systems to
prevent unauthorized access to equipment,
facilities, materiel, and documents. Program
managers plan and evaluate courses of
action that improve physical security of
quarters, offices, and installation facilities.
Physical security programs help deter or
reduce the chances for successful terrorist
attacks. They complement other installation
programs like crime prevention and OPSEC.
(See FM 19-30 for specific measures. See
AR 500-50 and FM 19-15 for policy and
guidance for the control of terrorist acts in
civil disturbances.)

Some antiterrorist measures are active
defense measures. Aggressive counter-
surveillance is fundamental to countering
terrorism. Persons, and certainly high-risk
persons, and installation security forces
must be trained to be aware that
surveillance is possible. They must
understand the need to counter it. They must
become able to detect and report it. And
countersurveillance measures and
equipment must be available to them. When
gate personnel are equipped with cameras
they become a more effective counter-
measure. They can photograph persons or
vehicles suspected of surveilling an
installation.

High-visibility deterrent measures can
convince terrorists they will be unable to
accomplish their "attack sequence" of
surveil, plan, execute, escape. Highly visible
security forces and aggressive measures can
convince terrorists that the security of an
installation is too effective for them to succeed. If terrorists believe they cannot succeed, they are not as likely to attack. But sometimes a deterrent does not reduce the likelihood of attack. Instead, it may only cause the terrorists to change their methods or their target. And terrorists deterred from their well-defended primary target may decide to attack a more lightly defended target. Use of high-visibility measures requires a frequent reassessment of total target vulnerability.

Providing a high level of security at all times is costly. Using a random application of measures and procedures reduces costs. At the same time, it reduces the attractiveness of the target. Terrorists generally want to avoid the unexpected. Unpredictable coverage patterns can be used for guard and security patrols. On a larger scale, varying an installation’s operating schedule may be useful. Even just varying the time, day, and locale of staff meetings can be useful.

**TERRORISM COUNTERACTION**

**COUNTERTERRORISM**

Counterterrorism measures are undertaken to resolve terrorist incidents. Army policy stresses deterrence of terrorist incidents through preventive measures. However, when a terrorist incident occurs, military resources respond to gain control of the incident quickly. MP or security patrols on duty at the time of a terrorist incident are the initial response force. And the PM, his designated representative, or his staff should, as a minimum—

- Provide input to the development of the installation’s crisis management plan.
- Develop the special threat plan. The plan should include contingency plans to control installation access, response to hostage barricade situations, response to bombings, response to arson, and the like.
- Establish and train an SRT.
- Train selected personnel in protective services operations as required.
- Serve as a member of the installation’s crisis management team (CMT).
- Serve as commander of the installation’s threat management force (TMF).
LEAD-AGENCY CONCEPT

The US government terrorism counteraction policies are characterized by the lead-agency concept. Terrorist acts that occur within the US are managed by the Department of Justice (DOJ). So are acts within the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and US possessions and territories. The lead agency for the operational response to a domestic terrorist incident is the FBI. The Federal Aviation Administration is the lead agency for actions affecting the safety of persons aboard aircraft in flight. ("In flight" is defined as that period of time beginning the moment all outside aircraft doors are closed after embarkation. It lasts until the moment when one such door is opened for disembarkation.)

The lead agency for terrorism against US personnel and facilities not within the US or its possessions and territories and for the foreign relations aspects of domestic terrorism is the Department of State. HNs have responsibilities in accordance with international law and applicable SOFAs. Coordination between the US and HN governments is accomplished by the Department of State.

Military personnel support the lead agencies in accord with federal laws or memorandums of agreement. Command and control of military forces for counterterrorist operations resides with the DOD. Army regulations require that procedures, guidance, and policies for the protection of US resources be established for all Army installations or activities. Such contingency plans must contain specifics for terrorism counteraction.

The installation commander is responsible for command and control of installation resources during a terrorist incident. Command and control actions, however, are typically planned, coordinated, and directed by the emergency operations center (EOC). This center is activated immediately when terrorist/special threat incidents occur. The EOC controls or assists in directing the military response and coordinates with higher, lower, and adjacent military headquarters and organizations. The CMT is composed of selected representatives from the installation staff. It is formed to assist the commander in controlling the incident. The CMT provides advice to the commander and the TMF through the EOC. The TMF is the tactical element of the EOC. The TMF commander has operational control of all installation military forces at the incident site. (See the chapter on special reaction teams for further discussion.)

RESPONSE OPERATIONS

Counterterrorist response operations on military installations within the US and its territories and possessions are characterized by three phases. The occurrence itself institutes the first phase.

MP respond to isolate, contain, and evaluate the incident. MP—
- Provide the initial patrol response.
- Determine the scope of the incident.
- Determine the motives of perpetrators.

MP provide the initial report to the PM. If the incident requires it, MP direct inner/outer perimeter forces and implement the special threat plan. If the incident is declared to be a possible terrorist act, the installation terrorist threat response contingency plan is implemented. In such a case the FBI, the Army Operations Center, and higher headquarters are notified immediately.

Phase II begins with the commitment of FBI or military forces from outside the installation. (Requests by an installation commander for additional military forces are coordinated through DA channels if the FBI has not assumed jurisdiction.) The FBI has primary jurisdiction for domestic terrorism. It assumes jurisdiction if the incident is of significant federal interest.
Installation personnel continue under the direct control of the military even when the FBI assumes jurisdiction. The military provides support to the FBI based on provisions of the DOD and DOJ Memorandum of Understanding. When the FBI assumes jurisdiction of the incident, military personnel continue to support the FBI as needed. Command and control of military personnel remains with the military.

The commitment of additional military forces by the National Command Authority to resolve the terrorist incident initiates phase III. If the FBI has jurisdiction of the incident, requests for these additional resources are accomplished through DOJ channels in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding between the DOD and DOJ. If military forces are committed, the secretary of defense directs military operations according to law enforcement policies determined by the attorney general. If the installation commander retains jurisdiction (no FBI involvement), requests for additional military forces are accomplished through DA channels.

Upon termination of the incident, certain key military personnel, if requested by the FBI, remain at the site to protect the integrity of the investigative process. USACIDC special agents, in conjunction with the FBI, collect and process evidence for possible criminal prosecution. Investigation results are coordinated with local military intelligence elements who, in turn, forward them to ITAC.

**RESPONSE OPERATIONS WITHIN HOST NATIONS**

In response operations outside the US and its territories and possessions the basic responsibility lies with the HN. SOFAs, however, may grant the right (not the responsibility) to US forces to do whatever is necessary to maintain order and security on the installation. US procedures for responding to terrorist incidents on the installation are established according to US and HN law and SOFAs and in coordination with HN governmental agencies.

The military response on installations outside the US might consist of an initial response by installation law enforcement, other military resources, and HN law enforcement agencies. The installation commander is responsible for the initial response to a terrorist incident. Notification of the incident is made in accordance with applicable SOFAs and Army regulations. As a minimum, higher headquarters, the HN, and the Department of State (country team) are notified. Phase II starts when US military forces from elsewhere in the country are brought in or HN forces are committed. Phase III starts when the HN commits specially trained counterterrorist forces. Augmentation by US forces from outside the country requires HN consent. Coordination between the US and HN governments is provided by the Department of State.
CHAPTER 19

Protective Services

The structure of the American democratic society depends on the intimate association of the people with their chosen leaders. But the dissidents and the disaffected of either extreme, left or right, attempt to isolate public figures from the people. In the face of impeded movement or attempts to embarrass, kidnap, or even assassinate them, many leaders have courageously continued to meet and communicate with the public. They do this despite demonstrations, threats of violence, and assaults. Such violent incidents generate widespread fear. They endanger life. And they interfere with the conduct of business and diplomatic relations. The rights of public and private officials must not be violated: Leaders must be able to communicate with the people. Leaders must be able to function freely and safely. One means of preventing or reducing exposure to violence and of increasing personal safety is through the provision of “protective services.”

US ARMY

PROTECTIVE SERVICES

US Army commanders are responsible for protecting dignitaries and other high-risk individuals in the commanders’ areas of responsibility. Commanders must be able to provide professional, personal protection commensurate with the threat. The vulnerability of visiting dignitaries, designated high-risk persons or their families, and other persons needing personal protection must be offset. When threat condition, grade, position, or location of a person; or special conditions presenting a danger to an individual create a need for protective services, resources must be available. And they must be committed in a graduated response to provide sufficient personal protection to counter potential adverse action.

One of a commander’s principal resources to counter the possible danger to an individual is the presence of a protective services (PS) detail. A PS detail may be composed of USACIDC, MP, or other law enforcement personnel. The detail provides an “enhanced response” to developed threats against persons within the commander’s area of responsibility. Usually, the PM is responsible for organizing, training, equipping, and maintaining the PS detail.

Some installations may require a PS detail on a full-time basis. But a permanent detail is
likely to be the exception rather than the rule. Most installations only require protective services on a part-time basis. And in some instances, such as when the secretary of defense visits an area of military responsibility, a local commander may only be requested to support the PS detail that accompanies the visiting dignitary. But all US Army installations should have identified and trained personnel available for protective services when they are needed.

Specific missions and responsibilities are set by the nature of the circumstances. US Army conduct of a PS mission is limited, in part, by HN responsibilities, Department of the Treasury and Department of State authority, legal and political restrictions, and appropriate regulations. Specific response capabilities are limited by the threat, by availability of resources such as personnel and equipment, and by training time. Sometimes protective services are limited by the personal desires of commanders and protectees.

PS operations in the Army are divided into two categories: those conducted by USACIDC and those conducted by MP assigned to a local PM office.

Headquarters, USACIDC (in accord with AR 1-4, AR 10-23, and AR 190-10) provides security for particular persons designated by higher authority. The chain of command for most USACIDC agents conducting PS remains within USACIDC. USACIDC field elements conduct PS operations only with permission of the Commanding General, USACIDC, or the Chief, Protective Services Activity, USACIDC. But if commitments and availability of resources permit, field elements may be called upon for advice or planning assistance.

Protective services other than those required of USACIDC remain the responsibility of the installation or area commander in whose area a dignitary resides or is visiting. The commander of a geographical area is responsible for the safety and security of all dignitaries and high-risk personnel traveling through his area. (See AR 190-10.) Traditionally, the installation PM is tasked by the commander to provide security for the dignitary. The PM tasks his MP investigators to provide personal security for the designated persons. The MPIs, in turn, are usually augmented by other MP. MP conducting protective services normally report to the PM who, in turn, reports to the installation commander.

The commander controls the resources used for protective services within areas of his military jurisdiction. Funding for protective services is the responsibility of the commander who directs his personnel and commits his assets to such a mission. The Joint Travel Regulation provides funds for persons engaged in protective services in a temporary duty status. For expenses incurred by PM personnel or USACIDC special agents providing protective services, AR 195-4 permits advance funds to cover anticipated expenses or allows recovery of personal funds expended during the mission. Coordination with the local USACIDC element is required of the PM prior to the obligation or expenditure of .0015 funds by PM personnel.

**PROTECTIVE SERVICES DETAILS**

In a PS operation the main participants are the person being protected, known as the principal, and the PS detail. The PS detail has a detail leader (DL), a personal security officer (PSO), an advance team, a protective team, a residence watch, a baggage team, and such other security teams as may be required. Individual members of a PS detail may be involved in more than one element during a particular operation.

Personnel being considered for PS assignments should be in excellent mental and physical condition. They should conform to established Army height and weight standards. The detailed description must be specific and complete, including the nature and scope of the duties involved, the qualifications and work history of the candidate, and any other relevant information that will aid in the selection process.
standards as prescribed in AR 600-9. They must be reliable, presentable in appearance, intelligent, and articulate. They must qualify as expert on assigned weapons. A knowledge of police unarmed self-defense tactics is desirable. Knowledge of the principal’s language, if foreign, is desirable but not essential; interpreters or translators are usually provided by the host. The candidate must be aware of the inherent dangers and adversities of the assignment. He or she must be willing to sacrifice personal safety to protect a principal at the risk of serious personal injury or even death.

Members of details must be thoroughly familiar with protocol requirements, personality information, and itineraries. And they must be fully briefed on all aspects of the mission. They must be able to act quickly and appropriately in an emergency situation. And they must be completely experienced in all aspects of PS operations.

When adverse action is directed against a principal, it is the smooth, professional, and organized actions of the PS detail that will most effectively counter the threat. Security personnel must be trained so well that in an emergency, despite the excitement and emotion involved, they will instinctively act correctly. Security personnel must be proficient in special techniques. They must be able to protect the principal when he is walking or traveling by motor vehicle, train, aircraft, or boat. They must be able to protect the principal when participating at public assemblies.

Although difficult, and in some cases impossible, PS details should ideally train together, much as special reaction teams and other small Army units do. Protection demands teamwork. A PS detail functions as a unit. Each person on the detail must be fully aware of his responsibilities and reactions as well as what he can expect from his detail members. Currently, most PS training is not geared to team training. It is difficult for each Army agency to release five to seven people at a time, because there are many other commitments that are also being met by these individuals. But once personnel are identified as part-time or full-time PS personnel, it is recommended that they train as a team to refine their individual skills and coordinate teamwork.

**EMPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS**

Of primary importance for a PS detail is the anticipated use of weapons. The employment of weapons is made with the following considerations in mind:

- Availability of weapons.
- Threat analysis.
- Location of the mission.
- Desires of the chain of command.

The employment of weapons must be consistent with established Army policy and with local and foreign laws. PS personnel armed with automatic weapons must have successfully qualified with these weapons. Supervisors must ensure that firearms training is well documented and made a matter of permanent record.

**CARRY AND USE OF FIREARMS**

PS personnel are armed with a US Army sidearm. When required by the mission, they have access to riot shotguns, rifles, or automatic weapons. Riot agent grenades or dispensers are carried and protective masks are available for members of the official party and security personnel when threat conditions warrant.

USACIDC agents are authorized to carry concealed weapons in the performance of their official PS and investigative duties in accordance with AR 190-14. MP assigned to PS details carry their assigned firearm during the performance of their official duties by authorization under AR 190-14. They must have a DA Form 2818 (Firearms Authorization) in their possession. MP who are authorized to carry concealed firearms in the performance of official duties have a great moral responsibility to themselves, the principal, and the US Army.

PS personnel may be authorized to carry concealed firearms outside the US. But they
must have prior approval from the country to be visited. Approval may be obtained through the US embassy or through official agencies of the host country. But the approval may be revoked at any time by the host country.

After permission has been obtained from local authorities, PS members may have to arrange to obtain their weapons from local US agencies in the host country. Or they may have to have the weapons delivered to them aboard the principal’s official aircraft. If permission to carry weapons is not granted, guidance must be obtained from the local commander.

Aboard aircraft the weapon must be carried concealed or locked in a briefcase retained by the individual. Personnel carrying a concealed weapon aboard an aircraft must notify appropriate airline officials of the presence of the weapon before boarding. Federal law enforcement officers are exempt under 49 USC 1472(1) from surrendering the weapon to the airline representative. However, final authority rests with the commander of the aircraft. Upon request, personnel must give up control of the weapon to the aircraft commander. Usually when escorting a principal aboard an aircraft, the weapon is not surrendered; however, exceptions to such policies are governed by the circumstances of the mission. The weapon may be transported in locked luggage stowed in the baggage compartment of the aircraft in accordance with AR 190-14. The weapon must be unloaded.

When it is necessary to carry firearms aboard a military aircraft, prior coordination must be made with the appropriate flight commander, the operations officer, or the pilot in command of the aircraft.

PS detail members must be familiar with AR 190-28, which governs their use of firearms. All weapons must be used in accordance with this regulation and its supplements; local, federal, and foreign laws; and the mature judgment of PS personnel.

The response to firearms presented against a principal does not include members of the protective team returning fire. The return fire may cause death or grievous injury to innocent bystanders. PS personnel maintain a defensive posture and evacuate the principal from the “kill zone.”

There are situations when the immediate use of firearms is the proper response. This would occur in extreme circumstances. If the principal’s vehicle is disabled in a kill zone of an ambush, return fire is appropriate. If organized attack occurs by multiple assailants, return fire is appropriate.

Supervisors coordinate weapons employment with participating law enforcement agencies when PS missions involve interoperability with other agencies. They ensure full understanding of the guidelines for weapons deployment and use.

Although no definitive rules of engagement exist, it is generally agreed that any defensive actions taken by members of the protective team are undertaken for protective reasons or in self-defense rather than for law enforcement. In making this determination, one should consider if the subject constitutes a present or a continuing threat to the principal. Or circumstances may indicate that the subject might repeat the unlawful act that is considered to be a threat to the principal. When restraining the subject, only that force necessary to accomplish restraint is used. The incident is then immediately reported to the appropriate federal, state, or local police or foreign authorities. And the subject is remanded to their custody. The action taken by the protective team must be shown to have been necessary under an emergency situation. The restraint used must have been minimal. And the restraint must have been only to the extent needed to deliver the subject to the custody of civil authorities. The action taken must have been in self-defense or to protect the principal. And the protective team must have acted properly in fulfilling their official responsibilities and statutory duties as officers of the federal government.
PROTECTIVE SERVICES PRINCIPLES

The goal of a PS mission is to protect the principal from all hazards. This includes hazards caused by personal design, accident, or negligence. But absolute protection is never possible. Thus the objective of a PS detail must be to operate in a manner that minimizes the likelihood of an attack and its chances of success.

The “deterrence factor” offered by the presence of a PS team is invaluable. If the protective force is alert and firm in dispatching its responsibilities, the apparent control will be evident. Voluntary cooperation on the part of the public usually follows. The acquired atmosphere of command frequently prevents the need for further action. Sometimes ostentatious display of protective equipment and personnel is needed under some circumstances, such as in a combat zone or a hostile fire zone, to bolster the deterrent factor.

Every element of protection must be thoroughly planned in advance. Every actor movement of the principal and the protective detail must be scrutinized to ensure maximum security. All personnel must be well briefed on emergency procedures. They must be able to react instantly and correctly. Good preventive measures may save the life of the protector as well as the person protected.

Planning is critical to success. Every phase of a protective mission must be carefully planned. The possibility of unexpected changes requires flexibility in planning such missions. Alternate and contingency plans should be prepared. They should cover such circumstances as inclement weather, possible threats, or any other actions that may affect the security of the principal. Coordination with the host agency as well as other persons involved in the visit is essential.

In all cases, advance work is the key to success. Advance work is the coordination of all security arrangements before the arrival of the principal at each location being visited. For some missions, advance work is extensive and complex, while other missions may require less. The extent of the work depends on the threat, the availability of resources and manpower, and the personal desires of the principal or the local commander.

As far as possible, protective personnel should adapt themselves to the convenience of the principal. They should avoid interfering with the principal’s official or private functions. The protection must not unnecessarily interfere with the principal’s freedom of action. His privacy must always be respected. And every effort must be made not to embarrass him or interfere with his activities. Protective measures and personnel should always be as unobtrusive as circumstances permit.

The resources used to protect the principal depend on the duration of the principal’s travels. They also depend on the kind of public exposure desired by the principal or required by circumstances. The modes of transportation used, the locations visited, and the ideologies of the population with which the principal will have contact also influence resource use. So too does the analysis of inherent threats obtained during advance threat information collection. Support of local police is important. They may be integrated into the security in depth, and they can provide valuable threat information.

Release of personal information about the principal and other members of his party is closely controlled. Certain details of the itinerary and the security procedures to be employed are also closely controlled. Security personnel do not discuss or release this information to other than authorized persons. Particular care is taken with regard to representatives of the press. Release of information can adversely affect the integrity of the mission. Current guidelines
stress that the itinerary of a general officer is at least marked “FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.” It may be upgraded when needed.

Generally, PS personnel wear clothing like that worn by the principal. Conservative business suits are appropriate when escorting a principal wearing a class A uniform. Unconventional styles or colors should not be worn during PS missions. Sports jackets and slacks of conservative cut and color may be appropriate for informal occasions. Formal wear, such as a tuxedo, may be required for the PSO and some members of the team. Sometimes specialized clothing like swimsuits or ski clothing is needed. If not available, these items may be rented or purchased, when specifically authorized. Standard equipment for a PS mission is listed in Appendix D.

PROTECTIVE SERVICES DEFENSE FUNDAMENTALS

The Army concept of personal security is based on the principle of “defense in depth.” Coordination and flexibility are the watchwords to organizing a defense in depth. A series of protective cordons is established around the principal. The cordons are designed to prevent an attack or absorb its shock to such an extent that the results will not be tragic. They control the space above, below, and on all sides of the principal. Movement control within these cordons is normally established by an identification system. The system may use personal recognition, passes, badges, or even unobtrusive lapel pins.

The inner cordon should be manned by the PSO and protective team members. This includes the shift leader on larger PS details.
These people are those who have been school-trained and are experienced enough to occupy the positions of PSO and shift leader.

The middle cordon should be manned by USACIDC or MP personnel who have PS training offered in basic USACIDC and MPI courses and by local law enforcement personnel.

The outer cordon should be manned by MP and local law enforcement personnel. This cordon comprises surveillance posts, such as observation posts, listening posts, sniper positions, static posts, and response teams.

These cordons are fluid in nature and must be flexible to adjust to the situation at hand. There are no defined areas for these cordons with regard to distance from one to the other. The distance between cordons is established on a case-by-case basis. It is based on the threat, location, crowd, personality of the principal, and desires of the chain of command. The PSO or the DL will adjust the cordons to fit the situation.

Sometimes, particularly overseas where there is shared responsibility between the US and the host nation governments, changes to the positions in these cordons are made.

PROTECTIVE SERVICES OPERATIONS

The axiom “know the enemy” is basic to successful PS operations. PS details must vary the kind and degree of protection accorded the principal to suit the kind and degree of danger presented by the threat.

LOW-PROFILE OPERATIONS

Sometimes it may be advantageous to modify classic PS procedures to reduce the notice paid to the principal and his need for protection. At these times a detail undertakes a “low-profile” operation. A low-profile operation employs only the protective measures that do not draw unnecessary attention to the principal. Such operations do not necessarily lessen manpower commitments, nor are they less costly. The protective coverage becomes more discreet, involves considerable planning and ingenuity, and generally is more difficult to conduct than a high-profile operation. Often the middle and outer cordons of protection are strengthened, allowing the inner cordon to be less obtrusive.

Low-profile operations do not provide much visible protection close to the principal. This differs from a high-profile operation. Keeping a low profile may be, however, the best course of action. Sometimes the political situation requires it.

Sometimes a principal desires a low-key security operation.

LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT OPERATIONS

More and more US military personnel are being called upon to provide protective services in areas in which circumstances approach combat conditions. Such low-intensity conflict (LIC) situations require changes in the appearance of PS operations. A change may be only the implementing of a dress code. Or it may mean an upgrading of weapon systems and the understanding of rules of engagement with ostensibly hostile personnel.

In areas outside the US, it is imperative that coordination be made with the US Embassy as well as the major military command responsible for the area. Diplomatic as well as military rules and guidelines differ with the locale. PS personnel planning to travel to an LIC area must know the ground rules before entering the area.

The overriding concern in an LIC area is the need to conform to the tactical rules governing travel into the area. The “how to” perform protective services does not change.
Advance work is still required. Threat analysis is done and updated. Itineraries must be prepared and safeguarded. Routes must be examined and safe havens identified. Plans for evacuation must be considered. And special attention must be given to the potential for injuries and the ever-present possibility of capture.

The major concern of PS personnel in an LIC area is to carry out the mission in accord with established policies of the US government.

**PREPARATION AND PLANNING**

When notified of an impending mission, a chronological events journal is started. It is used to record all information about the mission. And it is used to retain all information produced as a result of the mission. The journal is considered to be an official document. It serves to record actions by the PS detail. It helps in preparing the after-action report. And it may be acceptable for presentation to a board of inquiry if an incident occurs adversely affecting the security of the principal.

The planning of the mission is done in two stages. The results of preliminary information received with the notice of the mission become the basis for a written personal security plan. This plan is the documentation that gives authority for the mission. It serves as a basis to fix responsibilities. It allows the measuring of resources against tasks to be performed. And it provides a standardized format for conveying information and instructions. The mission DL is responsible for preparing the security plan. The plan is given to all members of the security detail. The original is retained on file. The plan is for official use only. It is controlled in the same manner as the principal’s itinerary.

Coordination between the protective services chain of command and a member of the visiting dignitary’s staff is tantamount to a successful PS operation. A visiting dignitary must be informed that a PS detail will be assigned to him upon his arrival at the receiving commander’s area of responsibility. This information can be transmitted from PM to PM, or from PM to aide-de-camp or executive officer by telephone or by message.

The second stage of planning requires an on-site survey by the advance security team of all areas to be visited by the principal. The itinerary for the proposed visit should be obtained from the principal’s office or the host agency as soon as it is prepared. It should be reviewed to determine if sufficient information has been furnished to permit advance security arrangements to be made.

A threat collection effort should begin as soon as practical after receipt of the itinerary. This is normally accomplished by coordinating with the US Secret Service, FBI, State Department, USACIDC, military intelligence, and other local, federal and foreign law enforcement or intelligence-gathering agencies. Efforts to identify possible threats to the principal at all locations to be visited will be undertaken by these agencies. Should information considered prejudicial to the safety of the principal be developed, the developing agency will notify the mission DL of the PS detail. Frequent contact with intelligence-gathering agencies should be maintained throughout the mission to ensure a current threat analysis.

**EXECUTION**

This portion of the mission commences with the implementation of all prior planning. Often the information developed by the advance team is used in preparing the operations annex to the security plan. Execution is effected using the proper methods and techniques suited to the mission at hand. The execution phase ends with the completion of the visit or event, or upon order of competent authority.

**REVIEW**

A critique is held in the final stage of a PS operation. The purpose of the critique is to discuss the success or failure of the mission.
It is conducted so that all participants will have a clear, orderly idea of what was done correctly and incorrectly. To improve PS operations, intelligent, tactful, and constructive criticism is necessary. A critique is most effective if it is held as soon as possible after the mission is completed. The critique is so important that it must be considered a phase of the PS operation itself. The effectiveness of a critique depends on the flexibility with which the reviewer employs it. In conducting the critique, the reviewer presents criticisms. He comments in a straightforward, impersonal manner. Participants should leave the critique with a favorable attitude toward the PS operation and a desire to improve the next one. Examples of personal initiative and ingenuity and types of errors and ways to correct the errors should be covered. PS personnel should be encouraged to participate in the discussion to ensure the critique is a learning experience and not an “admonishment.”

Supervisory personnel can take notes to guide the critique, but detailed planning is not practical. However, coverage of essential elements includes—

- Restating objectives of the mission. This enables the participants to start on a common ground. Participants who were concerned with a particular aspect of the subject may have forgotten the overall objectives.
- Reviewing procedures and techniques employed, briefly summarizing the methods used to attain the objectives.
- Evaluating PS detail performance. This is the most important part of the critique.

**KINDS OF PROTECTIVE SERVICES OPERATIONS**

**THREE KINDS OF PROTECTIVE SERVICES OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY ARMY PERSONNEL:**

- Those conducted for senior military officials at their permanent duty locations by PS personnel assigned to that home station.
- Those conducted by PS details traveling with their principals away from their home stations.
- Those conducted for officials visiting the PS detail’s duty station.

**ALL PROTECTIVE SERVICES OPERATIONS FOLLOW A STANDARD SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FROM NOTIFICATION TO TERMINATION OF THE OPERATION:**

- **NOTIFICATION OF MISSION.**
  - Assignment of responsibilities.
  - Receipt of itinerary and biography of the principal and control of the information contained therein.
  - Initiation of a threat collection effort.
  - Identification of logistical needs.
  - Identification of travel requirements.
  - Preparation of the operations order.

- **EXECUTION.**
  - Deployment of advance team.
  - Implementation of advance work.
  - Accomplishment of the mission.

- **REVIEW.**
  - Critique.
  - Preparation of the after-action report.
• Using notes taken during the mission, the DL points out and discusses the strong points, then the weaker points, and makes suggestions for improvement. All remarks must be specific and impersonal. Detail members cannot profit from generalities.
• Controlling the discussion to keep the critique to issues at hand and yet ensure thorough review.
• Summarizing. The critique is concluded with a brief but comprehensive summation of the points brought out.

The critique culminates in an after-action report. Written in narrative form, this report relates the highlights of the PS mission. It is written by the mission DL as soon as possible after the mission. He uses his notes and those of security team members and the journals and comments of the principal, his staff, the personal security officer, and the residence watch. Personnel other than the protective force who were instrumental in the execution of the mission should be fully identified. A file with this information is maintained for future reference. Emphasis is placed on problem areas encountered and on the procedures necessary to eliminate them. Recommendations are written in detail for improving, planning, coordination, personnel, and equipment. A file copy is kept for use in improving future operations.

EXAMPLE OF AN AFTER-ACTION REPORT

MEMORANDUM FOR: CG, FT MASON, MT
SUBJECT: After-Action Report (Visit of

1. MG John A. Smith, Deputy CG, Ft Mason, Montana, traveled to Ft McClellan 3-5 Mar 87. A copy of his itinerary is attached as Enclosure 1.*

2. Based upon a request for security from the CG, Ft Mason, the Provost Marshal directed that the MPI Section provide for the personal security of MG Smith on the occasion of his official visit to Ft McClellan.

3. An intelligence collection effort was established with appropriate law enforcement and intelligence agencies and was maintained throughout the duration of the mission. No adverse information was received.

4. All advance security arrangements were completed at each location of the visit prior to the arrival of MG Smith. An operations order outlining specific mission requirements and instructions was prepared together with the advance security work sheet.

5. Identified problem areas and recommendations for future resolution were identified and discussed.

6. Provost Marshal responsibility for the security of MG Smith terminated without incident 5 Mar 87 upon his return to Ft Mason, Montana.

FRANK L. TAYLOR
SPC
Detail Leader

* Not shown.
PROTECTIVE SERVICES DETAIL RESPONSIBILITIES

Individuals assigned to PS details must be constantly aware of the proper techniques they must employ to successfully accomplish their mission. Fulfillment of a mission requires close teamwork on behalf of the detail. This requires a thorough understanding of the individual and collective responsibilities of the members of the detail. The safety of a principal in a threat situation can only be guaranteed by team members who are physically fit and mentally alert and who possess sufficient expertise to perform their duty in an overall planned response to an emergency situation.

Responsibilities must be clearly defined and individuals should be assigned a specific responsibility for each phase of the mission. Project officers, protocol officers, and hosts of the activity that the principal will visit should be identified and their responsibility established in conjunction with the PS mission requirements. Coordination between all these persons must be established to ensure complete protection of the principal. When two or more agencies are protecting distinguished persons, the agency protecting the senior official has overall responsibility for security measures.

Principals have a responsibility to contribute to the success of the mission by respecting the purpose of the mission and the responsibility of the detail assigned to carry it out. The education of the principals to this responsibility is critical to the overall success of PS missions. Many designated principals inherently feel that being combat leaders serving in command positions exempts them from a real need for a PS detail. Persons in the chain of command responsible for establishing the PS detail must ensure that the principal, his staff, and his family are fully briefed. The briefing includes the responsibilities of the detail and how the close working relationship between all persons contributes to the smooth execution of the PS mission.

The relationship between the principal and the PS detail has a professional and definitive basis. Principals should be encouraged to recognize and respect the professional distance kept by the detail. Members of PS details—

- Keep all contacts with the official party formal. Detail members do not attempt to develop close relationships with the official party, nor do they accept favors from the official party.
- Except in emergencies, make all contacts with the official party through the PSO.
- Avoid presuming on protocol or escort prerogatives.
- Avoid attracting notice, calling attention to themselves, or trying to impress people.
- Respect the principal’s privacy. Whenever possible, detail members adapt themselves and the protection they provide to the convenience of the principal. They make every effort to avoid interference with the principal’s personal freedom.
- Abstain from any activity which could reduce their mental or physical capabilities. Alcoholic beverages are not consumed during nor for a minimum of eight hours prior to the execution phase of the mission.

DETAIL LEADER

The DL establishes a close working relationship with the principal’s staff and the project and protocol officer of the host agency. He obtains detailed itineraries, biographical sketches, protocol information, and any other protective type information. The mission DL discusses with host agency officials such matters as press policies and the amount of public exposure desired by the principal, funding considerations, and any other matters of mutual concern. He establishes liaison with the staff of the officials involved, transportation agencies,
and civil and military police. He collects, evaluates, and disseminates threat information. He coordinates the utilization of available manpower and equipment resources. He reviews the security plan formulated by the advance team. He disseminates copies of the plan to appropriate agencies. During the execution phase of the mission, he supervises and provides guidance and leadership to participating subordinates. In the final review, he conducts a post-mission critique. And he supervises the preparation of the after-action report.

DLs have a responsibility to help detail members maintain peak performance. The long hours, day after day, of a PS operation, the requirement for prolonged absences from home, and the ever-present need to be constantly mentally and physically fit place tremendous stress on PS personnel. PS operations are jeopardized if a detail member suffers “burnout” from being overstressed. Supervisors must understand and help control the stress in which detail members operate. Time off can be critical in controlling stress.

Supervisors must make themselves available for guidance on matters of tact and good judgment. Normally, security personnel should not accept gifts even though they are presented in gratitude by the principal. If gifts cannot be refused without offending the principal, they should be accepted and the DL notified. Under no circumstances should the feelings of the dignitary be offended. Supervisors must ensure that a brief written statement is prepared that gives the circumstances of acceptance, a description of the gift, and an estimate of its value. Many times the principal or a member of his official party will give each member of the protective force a souvenir or memento of his visit. Caution must be exercised to ensure that these items do not have high intrinsic value nor place a financial burden on the giver.

The nature of PS inherently lends itself to close interpersonal relationships. Often a PS member endears himself to his principal through mutual respect and admiration and a meshing of personalities. Such a relationship can tremendously enhance the relationship between the principal and the entire PS detail. As long as this relationship remains within professional parameters, the overall success of the PS mission is virtually assured.

PERSONAL SECURITY OFFICER

The PSO is responsible for the close-in security of the principal and normally accompanies him whenever he is away from his residence. To ensure continuity, unity of effort, and control, the PSO is usually the only point of contact between the members of the PS detail and the principal and his staff. The PSO and the DL may be the same person.

Upon initial contact with the principal, the PSO briefs him and his staff concerning the security arrangements. The PSO is prepared to discuss any areas of particular concern to the principal. It is essential that the PSO obtain the confidence, respect, and cooperation of the principal as rapidly as possible.

A close working relationship must be maintained between the PSO and the mission DL. This can be accomplished by communicating on a daily basis whenever necessary. While overall control of the mission remains the responsibility of the mission DL, it is imperative that the PSO be afforded adequate authority and sufficient freedom of action to accomplish his assignment.

Effective communications are vital to an efficient PS detail. The PSO must be in constant communication with other members of the security force and the security control room or command post. (In many cases the security control room and the command post are one and the same.)
Two-way radio equipment should be available. This can be accomplished with hand portable radios. However, these radios should be equipped with surveillance kits to enable security personnel to use the radios quietly when near the principal. Radio noise should not be heard by or allowed to disrupt the activities of the principal and party.

Hand-held and portable base station frequency modulation radios provide appropriate communications within the PS detail. Communications between vehicles is maintained by vehicular-mounted radios supplemented by portable radios. When air cover is provided, special provisions to ensure effective communications between air and ground units must be made.

**SHIFT LEADER**

On larger PS details, a shift leader is designated for a given protective team. He works for the PSO and is responsible for his shift of personnel. The shift leader position is useful where there are sufficient PS personnel assigned to a mission to warrant three eight-hour shifts. A shift leader is actually another management position to maintain maximum command and control. He is analogous to the squad leader in a typical Army platoon.

**ADVANCE TEAM**

The mission of the advance team is to precede the principal and conduct on-site security surveys. The team effects necessary security coordination, making all security arrangements. When the PSO arrives at each location to be visited, a member of the advance team meets him and provides information concerning local security arrangements. When appropriate, the advance team provides the PSO with details of the visit, including maps, sketches, names of people involved, telephone numbers, and so forth.

After receiving an assignment for a PS mission, the DL designates a member to be in charge of the advance work. In most cases, more than one person is assigned to the advance team. But in all cases there must be one person designated as the controlling advance man at each location to be visited.

Advance work begins as soon as the mission is assigned and the DL receives the basic information. The advance team starts a workbook for recording all advance team activities. The workbook also contains checklists to be used.

In addition to the standard requirements that must be accomplished by the advance team, there are other intangible considerations that must be evaluated and discussed before and during an advance. These include the personality of the principal and consideration for his family members. They also include personal information (sometimes more than is available in a biographical sketch), that is, physical fitness training programs, religious preferences, medical problems, hobbies, language capabilities or lack of them, physical impairments that may affect travel or lodging, and any other unusual traits that could affect the mission. Much of this information can be obtained from the principal, his aide-de-camp, or his staff.

Once the advance team has gathered all available information, they go to the places to be visited by the principal well ahead of his scheduled arrival. Sometimes they go as much as weeks in advance depending on the duration of travel by the principal. Upon arrival at these locations, the advance team contacts identified points of contact, commanders, protocol officers, and other people designated to assist with the advance work.

Duties of the advance team at each locality include, but are not limited to, establishing effective working relations with the host agency and conducting security checks of places and equipment with which the principal will be involved.

At military reservations and facilities the advance team coordinates with the commanding officer, the PM, the public
affairs officer, the intelligence officer, the engineer, the transportation officer, and the communications officer to—

- Obtain a map or plan of the reservation or base showing the entrances, exits, or docking area to be used by the official party.
- Select quarters for party (if applicable).
- Review jointly the security aspects of the activities that the principal will view or in which he will participate, such as reviewing troops, witnessing demonstrations, and inspecting or examining devices and equipment.
- Ascertain the availability of communications, such as radios, telephones, telegraph, and so forth, including secure voice capability.
- Review the accommodations, that is, food, refreshments, recreation facilities, and the like.

RESIDENCE WATCH AND BAGGAGE TEAM

When traveling with a principal, the residence watch and baggage team are normally part of the advance team. However, a residence watch functions at all times for a permanently located detail.

One of the most sensitive areas is the principal’s residence. The residence watch is normally responsible for the security of the residence. It also establishes the command post. It is responsible for organizing and coordinating security arrangements with the responsible individual from each facility under its charge. The residence watch also performs advance actions at hotels, motels, and military reservations and facilities.

The primary purpose of the baggage team is to maintain accountability of all items of personal and official property belonging to the principal and to members of the official party who are traveling with or closely associating with the principal. The primary function is to protect all items from loss or theft and to prevent the introduction of foreign objects or explosives into the principal’s aircraft, vehicle, or residence.

PROTECTIVE TEAM

The protective team is normally composed of the PSO and the other members of the PS detail in the closest proximity to the principal. On larger details the protective team would normally form a protective formation for routine walking movements around a principal.
The protective team should remain close to the principal at all times, changing their relative position frequently. Security personnel must ensure that an assailant is unable to get between the principal and the protective detail.

Before any person is allowed to approach the principal or his personal property, he should be checked to establish his identity and the authority for his presence. This is especially true at the principal’s residence, at public and sporting events, and near the principal’s means of transportation. Whenever possible, the protective team should obtain advance lists of expected guests, visitors, press representatives, and people performing services for the principal.

The protective team and residence watch should quickly learn to recognize all employees, regular visitors, members of the official party, and any public figures who are expected to call. No stranger should be admitted without the permission of the principal or a member of his staff.

Although the security of other members of the official party is secondary to that of the principal, some degree of safety should be provided these persons. If a member of the official party is injured, the entire mission could be adversely affected. In some situations, it is an additional responsibility of the protective detail to provide limited protection for other members of the official party when traveling with the principal. When members of the principal’s family accompany him on trips, it is not uncommon for members of the protective team to provide security and escort for female members and minor children. Proper planning for manpower and vehicular support is necessary to accomplish this phase of a mission.

Because a protective team is usually small, effective security often depends on the voluntary cooperation of the public. Friendly consideration for the public, especially the press, and a clear portrayal of the need for security stimulates the cooperation of the public and the press. Inquiries or requests not related to security matters should be referred to the appropriate member of the official party. Security personnel should refrain from unnecessary conversation with the public and, most of all, with the press.

OTHER SUPPORT

There are many other individuals and agencies who may be called upon to support a PS operation. A typical PS operation includes support from local civilian law enforcement personnel, law enforcement personnel from other branches of the armed services, EOD units, military intelligence offices, civilian intelligence-gathering agencies, fire department personnel, medical personnel, pilots, aircraft crews, ground support personnel, translators and interpreters, and drivers. This support is routinely requested by the organization responsible for the PS operation. Most military and civilian law enforcement and intelligence agencies have supported PS operations in some capacity and are very responsive to requested support. The best way to assure acquiring this support is through good continuing liaison with all agencies concerned.

PROTECTION ON FOOT

In a majority of instances, the safety of a principal is most critical when he is among the public and walking through crowds, into buildings, and to public events in which he will participate.

If possible, the selection of walking time and routes should be varied. Accompanying PS detail members should be dispersed so they can cover all avenues of access to the principal. They should continually adjust their relative positions to ensure that no attacker is able to get between the protectors and the principal. During outdoor walks, the principal’s motorcade should cruise in the immediate vicinity. The automobile can
block any vehicle that may threaten the principal’s safety. It can also be used to transport the principal in case an emergency develops, or it appears necessary to seek a safer location.

Escorting a principal requires being highly alert to surrounding areas. Particular emphasis is placed on people in crowds who are either participating in the event or are drawn to the area out of curiosity. Close-in security should be established immediately around the principal. Additional concentric cordons of defense are added to the greatest possible extent.

At indoor assemblies, typical defense cordons should be formed immediately around the principal. They are also formed around the confines of the room occupied by the principal and around the grounds where the building is located. The personnel manning the defensive cordons should take control of the area before the arrival of guests or the general public. A careful search and an inspection of the area should be made at the time protection is established. The area is then secured until opened to the public.

**PROTECTION ON-SITE**

No two sites are exactly alike. Therefore, it is virtually impossible to establish a set of rules that will be completely applicable to all sites. There are, however, specific guidelines that must be applied to ensure that minimum acceptable standards are applied in each situation. PS personnel should refer to FM 19-30 when formulating a security plan. The intricacy of the plan depends on site configuration and the mission.

Security plans must prescribe specific responsibilities for all actions required to protect the principal and the site. They must consider the need for personnel, materiel, and vehicle control. They must also consider the use of protective alarms and devices. The plans must designate priorities of protection based on analysis of criticality and vulnerability after considering available threat information. Plans must include consideration of assistance available from military units in the area, as well as civilian sources. All plans must be coordinated with civil authorities because civil authorities have primary responsibility for the protection of all private, public, and federal property.

**PROTECTION DURING TRAVEL**

Protective services during travel are designed for the method of transportation used. The DL or his designee contacts the appropriate transportation authority to obtain pertinent information needed for planning.

Maximum personal protection during travel is the product of a comprehensive program. That program integrates the mode of transportation with security measures, such as—

- Varying daily routes.
- Being alert to any changes in the locality.
- Developing defensive driving skills.
- Being constantly vigilant.
- Employing other measures, weapons, and equipment.
CHAPTER 20

Bomb Threats

The MP response to a bomb threat is to minimize injuries, damage to property, and disruption of operations. MP respond to a bomb threat by securing the building, controlling traffic and pedestrian movement, and obtaining initial information.

Each unit or activity on an installation will have a bomb threat search and evacuation plan. The plan describes the actions to take when a bomb threat is received. When explosives detector dog teams are available, they will be included in these plans (see Chapter 11).

The initial moments of a bomb threat are crucial to the evaluation of an incident. To assure the successful resolution of a threat, bomb threat contingency plans provide prior planning and training in procedures to take on receipt of a bomb threat.

BOMB THREATS

When a telephone bomb threat is received, someone has actual knowledge that a device has been planted or a prankster wishes to disrupt an operation. Noting what is said and how it is said during a bomb threat call can help determine which of these reasons is true. The person receiving the call may be the only person to ever have contact with the potential bomber. This is why bomb threat contingency plans must address the need for training persons most likely to receive a bomb threat call. When a bomb threat is received, the receiver must know what to do and how to do it, or valuable information will be lost. Proper training provides the person with the skills to pick out important facts.

Signaling another employee to listen in on the call is worked out in advance where working arrangements allow observation. The second person concentrates on the characteristics of the caller and any background noises. The receiver of the call concentrates on the exact words of the caller. The receiver must try to keep the caller on the phone as long as possible to allow time to recognize background noises and gain additional information.

The receiver asks the caller for specific information as shown on FBI Form 6-136 (Bomb Threat Checklist). See DA Pam 190-52. If the caller describes what it looks like, how it operates, and its general characteristics, this is known as a descriptive bomb threat. A descriptive bomb threat is probably real. The receiver documents the exact wording of the threat. For example, if the caller says, “Specialist Jones, there is a bomb planted on your floor. You and your six coworkers have 20 minutes to clear out,” the receiver must note all of that information. If the person receiving the call only indicates that a bomb threat was received, an important investigative tool and important information is lost.
EXAMPLE OF A BOMB THREAT CHECKLIST

CALLER'S VOICE:

- Calm
- Angry
- Excited
- Slow
- Rapid
- Soft
- Loud
- Laughter
- Crying
- Normal
- Distinct
- Slurred
- Whispered

If voice is familiar, who did it sound like?

BACKGROUND SOUNDS:

- Street
- Crockery
- PA System
- Music
- House
- Motor
- Office
- Other

THREAT LANGUAGE:

- Well spoken
- Foul
- Irrational

REMARKS:

Report call immediately to:

Phone number

Date __/__/__

Name

Position

Phone number

BOMB THREAT

SEX OF CALLER: _____  RACE: ______

AGE: ______  LENGTH OF CALL: ______

NUMBER AT WHICH CALL IS RECEIVED: ______

TIME: ______  DATE: __/__/__
Recording the exact date and time of the phone call is important. By determining the time of the bomb threat, identification of the bomb site by background sounds may be possible.

As part of the bomb threat plan, a bomb threat checklist is developed to be placed near telephones. FBI Form 6-136 is a good example and can be placed beneath a telephone for easy access. If this form is not available, then a copy of the form should be used to develop a locally produced form. A bomb threat report form is in most local installation telephone directories.

The person receiving the bomb threat call immediately reports to the designated supervisor or security person with the completed bomb threat checklist. This action will facilitate proper emergency notifications and help lessen the possibility of panic. The receiver does NOT spread the word about the bomb threat before notifying the supervisor who then notifies the MP.

MAIL BOMBS

A small number of explosive devices have been mailed over the years resulting in death, injury, and destruction of property. Contingency planning is required to help prevent mail bomb disasters. Contingency planners first consider which organizations are possible targets. A bomb can be enclosed in either a parcel or an envelope, its outward appearance limited only by the imagination of the sender. However, past mail bombs have exhibited some unique characteristics which can assist in identifying a suspect mailing. To apply these factors, it is important for planners to know the type of mail normally received by an organization. Motives for mail bombs often are revenge, extortion, terrorism, or business disputes.

The information contained in the postal pamphlet Bombs By Mail should be available to all mail handlers. A copy of this pamphlet should be in each unit mail room.

A mail handler or recipient of mail who is suspicious of a letter or parcel and cannot verify the contents with the addressee or sender, must not open the article or put it in water or a confined space like a desk drawer or a filing cabinet. Mail handlers and recipients must isolate the suspected mail and evacuate the immediate area. If possible, windows are opened in the immediate area to help vent potential explosive gases. The MP or postal inspector is immediately contacted to report the suspected mail bomb.

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CHARACTERISTICS OF MAIL BOMBS

- Mail bombs may bear restricted endorsements such as "personal" or "private" when the addressee does not normally receive personal mail at the office.
- Addressee's name and/or title may be inaccurate.
- Mail may reflect distorted handwriting.
- The name and address may be prepared with homemade labels or cut-and-paste lettering.
- Mail may have protruding wires, aluminum foil, visible oil stains, and/or they may emit a peculiar odor.
- Mail may have an excessive amount of postage stamps affixed.
- Mail may feel rigid or appear uneven or lopsided.
- Parcel bombs may be unprofessionally wrapped with several combinations of tape used to secure the package and may be marked "Fragile—Handle With Care" or "Rush—Do Not Delay."
- Parcel bombs may be an irregular shape or have soft spots or bulges.
- Parcel bombs may make a buzzing or ticking noise or a sloshing sound.
- Pressure or resistance may be noted when removing contents from an envelope or parcel.
SUSPICIOUS ITEMS

Employees must be alert to determine if a suspicious item belongs in the area. An employee should know if a certain briefcase belongs, if a flower arrangement is new, if a recently delivered package is expected, or if a package in the corner is someone’s lunch. One way to do this is to keep clutter to a minimum.

When a bomb threat occurs, all personnel must quickly scan their immediate areas and identify anything out of the ordinary. This may be the only way to discover a bomb device. Personnel know that if a suspected bomb device is discovered they DO NOT touch the device. Instead, they make sure that the device does not belong. They ensure that no one touches it. And they report the discovery to a supervisor, security officer, or MP. Supervisors know that if a suspected bomb device is found, they consider immediate, total evacuation of the building, and they await arrival of MP and explosive ordnance disposal personnel before attempting to reenter the building.

PERSONNEL TO NOTIFY

The MP desk sergeant is the first person to notify when a bomb threat has been received. The desk sergeant then notifies personnel as shown in the local station SOP. In some locations it might be the responsibility of the personnel in the building receiving the bomb threat to make the notifications. Prior planning must be done to determine who is responsible for notification.

As a rule, the MP are notified first. MP will respond as the initial investigating agency for a bomb threat. MP will cordon off the target area, provide traffic control, and obtain facts for the initial investigation. MP do not conduct a bomb search, because they are not familiar with the search area. Then other personnel are notified as dictated by local SOP like higher commanders, public affairs personnel, or staff duty personnel. Then fire department personnel are notified.

Fire department personnel normally respond to the scene and stand by. Fire is a common occurrence in connection with an explosive detonation. Early notification of the fire department personnel can assist in minimizing property damage and injury should a device detonate. Then EOD personnel are notified. Under normal situations, EOD personnel do not respond to a bomb threat unless a suspicious item is located. But they may be able to tell if other threats of a similar type have been received and if a bomb was subsequently discovered. They may also give guidance if a device is located. (AR 75-15 identifies EOD responsibilities.) Then medical personnel are notified. The potential for injury with any bomb threat is high. Time can be saved by having trained medical personnel stand by with an ambulance in case of injuries.

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER

It is necessary during any bomb situation to have a bomb threat EOC located at the bomb site. Having an EOC as a control point for search teams, communications, access lists, and release of information will prevent confusion as to who is in charge.

The post commander may designate a bomb scene officer and an alternate to be in charge of the bomb site operation. Both the bomb scene officer and the alternate must have special training in bomb threats and emergency situations. The bomb scene officer or the alternate represent the commander and will respond to all bomb threats.

The only person who may authorize release of information from the scene is the
TERRORISM COUNTERACTION

bomb scene officer. And the only person who can release the information to the public is the public affairs officer. Keeping tight control on information can prevent a wave of bomb threats. For example, in a recent bombing incident in a major US city, after the initial release of the information, 400 bomb threats occurred in a one-hour time period.

During a bomb threat, the commander or his designated bomb scene officer—
- Decides if the facility will react to the threat or conduct business as usual.
- Determines if a supervisor's search will be conducted without evacuation.
- Decides if the building will be evacuated and searched.
- Serves as the primary person responsible for the search team.
- Executes control of operations within the EOC.
- After the search, if no bomb is discovered, determines if and when normal operations will resume.
- If a bomb is discovered, immediately clears the area and notifies EOD.

COMMUNICATION

Reliable communication from the bomb scene is essential. The bomb scene officer will continually keep the command post updated and informed of ongoing actions. However, radio transmissions, except for those of extremely low power, should not be used within 100 meters of the affected area. If possible, all elements of the bomb scene operation should use the telephone to maintain contact with the EOC.

Types of communications which may be used to maintain contact with the teams within a building or facility are—
- Runners.
- Whistles.
- Field phones, TA 312.
- Hand signals (if one point is visible by all).

EVACUATION

Evacuation is not necessary for all bomb threats. Evacuation is determined by the bomb scene officer only after a thorough evaluation of all available information. The results of the bomb threat checklist, information from support agencies, and the criticality of the mission of the targeted facility are considered. The bomb scene officer also considers that just disrupting operations serves the purpose of the bomber. If the bomber describes in detail the type of device, its location, and/or the placing of the device, then the bomb scene officer may have more reason to believe that the device has, indeed, been planted.

BOMB THREAT PROCEDURES

- All persons will make a preliminary search around their immediate areas for suspicious items.
- All persons, as they leave, will remove those items that they brought in (briefcases, thermos bottles, lunch bags), turn off radios, and unplug office machines.
- Windows and doors will be left open to help dissipate any explosive force.
- All cabinets and drawers will be left unlocked (classified cabinets may be an exception) to make it easier for the searchers.
- When evacuation of a building is accomplished, only authorized personnel are permitted entry until the threat is resolved.

If a device is actually discovered, either as a result of a bomb threat or during routine operations, evacuation procedures should be carried out expeditiously. All persons will evacuate to a predetermined assembly area. But this area must be at least 100 meters from the structure. This distance takes into account items like propane bottles, natural gas lines, or welding equipment that could contribute to the explosive force of a bomb within a facility. All personnel at the
assembly area must be accounted for to
determine if anyone is still in the building.
And a contact point can be determined in
case an item cannot be verified as belonging
in that area.

Depending upon the mission of the
facility, it may be necessary to evacuate a
building in sections. Some areas where
partial evacuation may be necessary are—

- Hospitals.
- Special weapons areas.
- Classified storage areas.

Partial evacuation involves risks. There
are no guarantees as to what damage will
occur if a device should detonate. Therefore,
total evacuation is desirable when possible.

SEARCHES

There are two types of search: a super-
visor’s search and a search team search.
Both types of search move from the outside
in, from the lowest level to the highest, and
from public access areas to more restricted
access areas.

Supervisor’s Search

A supervisor’s search can be conducted by
a few of the activity’s personnel using a
quick-paced method to look for suspicious
items. It can be useful only if all areas are
orderly. If the area to be searched is
cluttered, then a supervisor’s search will not
be effective.

In determining if a supervisor’s search will
be used, it should be remembered that
supervisory searches can be up to 60 percent
effective. They also have the advantage of
limiting the disruptions of the operation,
because the search can be done without
evacuation of personnel.

Search Team Search

A search team search requires that the
building be evacuated until after the search
has been accomplished. The search for an
explosive device is one of the most important
actions involved in the bomb threat
procedures. Two-man teams composed of
persons assigned to and familiar with the
activity should search the building where a
bomb threat has been received. Preferably,
these persons should be volunteers. It must
be stressed that the searchers must know or
be able to determine if an item actually
belongs in the area; thus they should be
persons assigned to that activity. For this
reason MP and EOD personnel should not
search the area.

It is imperative that persons forming
search teams be well trained. Training
accomplishes more than just preparing the
members of a search team; it increases their
confidence and morale. MP must make every
effort to help provide local training. And
search team members must be willing to
practice periodically to maintain
proficiency.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAMAGE CONTROL MEASURES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Search teams must know the actions to take on discovery of a device and measures to reduce damage. They must learn that if a suspicious item is actually located, it requires concise and immediate action. They must learn—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ NOT TO TOUCH THE DEVICE UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ If evacuation is not already accomplished, to immediately evacuate all nonessential personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Even if there may be more than one device, to discontinue the search until EOD personnel arrive to supervise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They must also know the measures to take to reduce damage if EOD determines that time allows. They must know to—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Disconnect or shut off any gas lines leading to the facility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Open windows and doors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Remove items which may add to the explosive force (gasoline, lubricants, paint).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Sandbag the area around the device but never place any item on the device itself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>□ Evacuate personnel further than the 300 meter range, preferably behind a windowless structure.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The search team looks everywhere and at everything. Unless a specific area is indicated in the threat, the search team begins with the exterior and moves to the interior. Then they move into public access areas like lobbies, restrooms, waiting areas, and snack machine areas. And finally, they check limited public access areas, like basements, roofs, and storage rooms.

The external area must be searched first. The search must cover all feasible areas where a device may be planted. It must be done systematically. Special consideration must be given to—

- Window ledges.
- Bushes.
- Garbage cans.
- Flower arrangements.
- Air conditioner units.
- Automobiles. (Extreme caution must be used when search involves automobiles.) Any item usually not found in the area or any item noted as being out of place should be viewed with suspicion.

Most often a bomb device is thought to be hidden somewhere inside a facility. But a device may be planted against a facility. Depending upon the nature of the device, an enormous amount of damage can be caused by a device planted outside a facility. Both the exterior and interior of the bomb site area must be searched.

After the exterior search is completed, the search inside the facility is begun. Interior searches are conducted from the lowest level of the facility to the highest and from common access areas to more restricted access areas.

First, all public access areas are searched. Then offices with public access are searched. And finally, offices, storage areas, and areas with restricted public access are searched. Rooms that have been searched should be marked with crepe paper or colored tape to ensure efficiency and to speed up the process.

The searchers enter a room, stop, remain still, and listen for any unusual sounds. (In the evacuation phase, all machines are to be unplugged.) Searchers will make a quick visual scan of the room for obvious, unusual items. They divide the room in half and then into four levels. Their first search includes...
items such as desks, chairs, and garbage cans that lie within the area from the waist to the floor. Their second search includes items such as filing cabinets, table tops, and lower shelves that lie within the area from the waist to the top of the head. Their third search includes items such as picture frames, shelves, cupboards, windows, and vents that lie within the area from the top of the head to the ceiling. Their fourth search includes checking all vents, pipes, and ceiling supports beyond the ceiling.

AFTER-ACTION PROCEDURES

After a device has been rendered safe or it has detonated, the area is sealed off by the MP until criminal investigator and EOD personnel thoroughly investigate the area. If a device detonates, the most minute fragments are retrieved in order to determine the composition of the device. All persons not directly involved with the investigation are restricted from the scene. After-action reports are completed and must contain specific information such as—

- Nature of incident.
- Action taken.
- Outcome.
- Additional information.

### INFORMATION IN AN AFTER-ACTION REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOMB THREAT</th>
<th>BOMB DISCOVERY</th>
<th>BOMB DETONATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATURE OF INCIDENT</strong>&lt;br&gt; □ Who received call?&lt;br&gt; □ Where was call received?&lt;br&gt; □ What was the telephone number of line to which call was made?&lt;br&gt; □ What was date and time of call?&lt;br&gt; □ What did caller say, and what was the response of the receiver, if any?&lt;br&gt; □ Was caller male or female?&lt;br&gt; □ What was approximate age of caller?&lt;br&gt; □ Were there any unusual speech characteristics of the caller such as lisp, accent, dialect?</td>
<td><strong>NATURE OF INCIDENT</strong>&lt;br&gt; □ How was bomb discovered?&lt;br&gt; □ Where was bomb discovered?&lt;br&gt; □ Who discovered bomb?&lt;br&gt; □ What was date and time of discovery?&lt;br&gt; □ Was it established that only one bomb existed?&lt;br&gt; □ What is the description of the device?</td>
<td><strong>NATURE OF INCIDENT</strong>&lt;br&gt; □ Where did bomb explode?&lt;br&gt; □ What was the date and approximate time of explosion?&lt;br&gt; □ Who reported incident?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACTION TAKEN</strong>&lt;br&gt; □ Who was notified immediately after call was received?&lt;br&gt; □ What was time of evacuation, if applicable?&lt;br&gt; □ What search techniques were employed?&lt;br&gt; □ What was discovered, if anything?&lt;br&gt; □ What time did personnel reenter the building, if there was an evacuation?</td>
<td><strong>ACTION TAKEN</strong>&lt;br&gt; □ What members of the search and EOD team arrived on the scene?&lt;br&gt; □ What time did they arrive?&lt;br&gt; □ What was the disposition of the device?</td>
<td><strong>ACTION TAKEN</strong>&lt;br&gt; □ What members of the search and EOD teams arrived on the scene?&lt;br&gt; □ What time did they arrive?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 21
Special Reaction Team

Commanders must provide an installation SRT capable of providing an enhanced response to developed threats in their area of responsibility within two hours of initial notification (see AR 190-52). The PM normally is responsible for organizing, training, equipping, and maintaining the SRT. The SRT is a specially trained team of military or security personnel armed and equipped to isolate, contain, gather information for, and, if necessary, neutralize a special threat. Specific missions and response capabilities are determined by the threat and availability of equipment and training time.

When major disruptions or special threats occur (to include acts of terrorism), resources must be committed in a graduated response to resolve the situation and restore law and order. SRTs are one of the commander’s principal response forces in the event of a major disruption or special threat, and as such, are an integral part of an installation’s security.

Some situations requiring SRT employment may include, but are not limited to—
- Barricaded criminals.
- Barricaded criminals with hostages.
- Sniper incidents.
- Counterterrorist operations.
- VIP protection (as a response force).
- Threatened suicide incidents.
- Barricaded, mentally disturbed persons.

During hostilities, SRTs may be required to perform similar missions in a combat environment.

SRT priorities during an incident are—
- Protecting lives, to include hostages, law enforcement personnel, bystanders, and suspects.
- Securing the safe release of hostages.
- Isolating/containing the incident.
- Gathering information/intelligence. This is an ongoing responsibility from the beginning of an incident until its resolution.
- Protecting property/equipment.
- Preventing escape.
- Apprehending offenders.
- Conducting an assault (only if all other alternatives have been exhausted, no other assistance is expected, and a threat to human life exists).

These mission priorities apply in all special threat situations. They must be stressed, planned for, and given the necessary command emphasis to ensure success. However, during a special threat situation involving a nuclear weapon, recovery of the weapon is the overriding consideration (AR 50-5).

To successfully meet mission requirements, it may be necessary for the SRT or SRT member to replace or augment the initial responding MP on the inner perimeter around the affected site.

PMs must ensure commanders understand the limitations of SRTs. Training scenarios used to test and evaluate SRTs must be consistent with team purpose and missions. Post crisis management teams, controllers, evaluators, and observers must be aware of team limitations and those circumstances under which more qualified forces will assume responsibility for an incident.
US Army involvement in terrorism counteraction is limited by HN responsibilities, Department of Justice and Department of State authority, legal and political restrictions, and appropriate regulations. US Army support to civilian law enforcement agencies during civil disturbance operations is limited by DOD Civil Disturbance Plan (Garden Plot), 18 USC 1385 (Posse Comitatus Act), and applicable laws and regulations.

Each installation has unique needs as determined by a current threat analysis and the installation’s vulnerabilities. A detailed threat analysis is essential to support the process of identifying the desired level of SRT response capability. On one end of the spectrum the threat analysis may reveal the existence of only a low-level external threat requiring a general SRT manpower/equipment response capability. At the upper end of the spectrum the threat analysis could indicate a sophisticated threat posed by groups having unique abilities and seeking specifically identified targets. This would require an SRT of highly trained personnel possessing specialized training and equipment. However, the need for SRT response capabilities cannot be based entirely on the external threat, but must be approached within the framework of the definition of special threats found in AR 190-52. Action is taken to ensure that the installation and its personnel are prepared to meet any potential threat.

The knowledge and understanding of the existing threat is a viable tool essential to evaluating the installation’s vulnerability. A survey outlining both the strong and weak points in an installation’s ability to defend against a threat will assist commanders in training, equipping, and planning for the desired response levels for their SRTs. Available resources, materials, and personnel are factors that influence planning and establishing a workable SRT and initial response team. Resource availability will impact on the immediate SRT response capabilities. The long-range action is to plan for the unexpected, counter the threat, harden the installation’s possible targets, and deal with special threats.

While the SRT will usually be the installation’s response to special threats, consideration must be given to the requirement for an expanded response. Since it is impossible to predict the magnitude and peculiarities of incidents, installations identify, train, and equip personnel from outside existing MP assets to augment the initial response force. SRT actions in response to threats are determined by the EOC.

**EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER**

Command and control actions pertaining to SRTs are planned, coordinated, and directed by the EOC which is activated immediately when a special threat occurs. The TMF, the tactical element of the EOC, is drawn from installation resources that respond to major disruptions on the installation. The TMF commander, normally the installation PM or his representative, is the on-site commander and has operational control for all response forces. The TMF commander gathers and disseminates information/intelligence about the incident and provides it to the EOC. Strategic planning decisions are developed at the EOC.

The TMF includes the initial response force, inner and outer perimeter security elements, SRT, negotiation team, and investigative team:

- The initial response force, normally on-duty law enforcement personnel, isolates, contains, and evaluates the incident, and provides the initial report to the PM.
• Inner and outer perimeter security elements secure the incident site, control access to the area, and provide security to the remainder of the installation.
• The SRT provides an enhanced response capable of controlling the situation. During initial employment, the SRT begins preliminary tactical planning to resolve the situation. (Rescue and assault missions are performed only under special circumstances.)
• The hostage negotiation team sets up direct communication with the perpetrators. Negotiations are conducted to further develop the situation for key decision makers.
• The investigative team investigates the incident while it is ongoing and concludes the investigation after the incident is resolved.

When selecting SRT personnel, the most qualified volunteers are those persons who—
• Have at least one year of military service as MP,
• Are in the pay grade of E4 or above.
• Are highly disciplined and morally sound.
• Are mature and able to handle pressure.
• Have passed the Army Physical Fitness Test.
• Have a minimum qualification of sharpshooter with assigned weapon.
• Possess individual special skills (that is, demolitions, emergency medical treatment, and the like).
• Have prior combat and/or small unit operations experience.
• Have prior law enforcement experience.
• Exhibit an ability to work with others.
• Possess good eyesight.
• Can be retained (one year recommended).
• Have had no derogatory data revealed during the background investigation.

Additionally, all volunteers considered for selection to SRTs are psychologically screened before assuming their duties. This screening can be done through command channels without any adverse effects to individuals or their military careers.

A suggested SRT consists of not less than nine people. This team composition best conforms to and allows for the suggested rank requirements contained in most MP unit TOEs and TDAs.

Ideally, consideration is given to training one or two nine-man teams per installation. The goal is to have one SRT available at all times. Additionally, as situations dictate, it may become necessary to alert or employ more than one team and combine or augment teams to meet threats beyond the capabilities of one nine-man team.

**SPECIAL REACTION TEAM**

The suggested nine-man SRT composition is as follows:

**ENTRY ELEMENT**
- **ONE TEAM LEADER**
  - E6 or Above (Civilian Equivalent)
- **ONE POINTMAN**
  - E4 or Above
- **TWO DEFENSEMEN**
  - E4 or Above
- **ONE REAR SECURITY**
  - E4 or Above

**COVER ELEMENT/SECOND ENTRY ELEMENT (If Needed)**
- **TWO MARKSMEN**
  - E4 or Above
- **TWO OBSERVERS OR RECORDERS**
  - E4 or Above

It is critical to SRT functions that all team members be cross-trained in at least one alternative position within the team. The team leader must be familiar with all aspects of each member’s duties.
TERRORISM COUNTERACTION

SPECIAL REACTION TEAM DUTIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TEAM LEADER</th>
<th>POINTMAN</th>
<th>DEFENSEMAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Organizes and supervises an SRT.</td>
<td>- Conducts reconnaissance.</td>
<td>- Provides security for the pointman during movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Coordinates planning, implementation, and training.</td>
<td>- Recommends primary and alternate routes of approach.</td>
<td>- Acts as pointman when necessary and protects the entry element from ambush during approach and entry into the objective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Establishes SRT SUP. Records and logs all training that team receives.</td>
<td>- Leads entry element during approach.</td>
<td>- Covers the entry element during withdrawal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Controls cover and entry elements.</td>
<td>- Carries any special equipment and employs pyrotechnics at the command of the team leader.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Determines special needs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ensures team weapons and equipment are accounted for.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REAR SECURITY</th>
<th>MARKSMAN</th>
<th>OBSERVER OR RECORDER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Provides rear security for the entry element during movement.</td>
<td>- Maintains surveillance on the subject area from a fixed position.</td>
<td>- Records all events prior to, during, and after the incident for use as evidence and information in the after-action report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Covers the entry element during withdrawal.</td>
<td>- Provides intelligence and information to team leader while in the surveillance role.</td>
<td>- Provides security for the marksman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Serves as second in command to team leader.</td>
<td>- Neutralizes hostile fire with well-planned shots at command of team leader.</td>
<td>- Assists marksman in locating hostile personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Carries additional equipment as necessary.</td>
<td>- Provides cover for the entry element during initial entry.</td>
<td>- Relieves marksman as necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Employs CS at the command of team leader.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EQUIPMENT

Selection of equipment used by SRTs is important to the total effectiveness of the team in accomplishing assigned missions. Specific missions and response capabilities are partially determined by selection, availability, and assignment of equipment.
It is suggested that an SRT SOP, including an equipment list, be included as an annex to installation security plans. This action will assist in procuring and programming funds for SRT equipment not organic to the installation.

Equipment authorized by CTAs, TOEs, and TDAs is used to the maximum extent to equip SRTs. Additional government supply sources include Self-Service Supply Center, Training and Audiovisual Support Center (TASC), US General Services Administration (GSA) Supply Catalog, GSA Federal Supply Schedule, The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS), and source selection advisory council (SSAC).

Local procurement or one-time purchases may initially be necessary to obtain some specialized equipment until appropriate authorization documents are revised. Equipment not listed in an authorization document at present, but required, is identified and submitted for evaluation and approval to the US Army Military Police School, Directorate of Combat Developments, ATTN: ATZN-MP-CM, Fort McClellan, AL 36205-5030, using DA Form 2028 in accordance with AR 310-34.

Individual equipment such as load bearing equipment, heavy body armor, survival vests, and the like, is determined by the commander using common sense, careful analysis of the opposing threat, and specific mission assignment. The basic suggested SRT uniform is composed of—

- Work gloves with liners.
- Battledress uniform (BDU).
- Cap, woodland pattern (BDU).
- Brown T-shirt.
- Black combat boots.
- Lightweight body armor.
- Eye protection.
- Hearing protection.

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**SRT COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>NSN/LIN</th>
<th>AUTH DOCUMENT/REF SOURCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Telephone set TA 312</td>
<td>V31211</td>
<td>MTOE/TDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disposable cable MX-6895/TT (specify number of feet)</td>
<td>3895-00-089-7279</td>
<td>MTOE/TDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial hand-held radios with secure/secureable capability surveillance package</td>
<td>G18575</td>
<td>MTOE/TDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>MTOE/TDA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The equipment listed is intended to assist commanders in identifying and procuring equipment tailored for the installation SRT. Communications equipment may be added or deleted based upon current analysis information. Communications equipment organic to the installation is used to the maximum extent. All commercial radio equipment is required by AR 530-2 to be secure or secureable. Most tactical radio systems have this capability. The commercial radio listed is endorsed by the National Security Agency as meeting regulatory requirements. SRTs should be assigned a dedicated operating frequency.
## SRT EQUIPMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>NSN/LIN</th>
<th>AUTH DOCUMENT/REF SOURCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light, safety</td>
<td>6260-00-106-7478</td>
<td>CTA 50-970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luminous tape, reflective barricade</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Federal Supply Schedule 93-II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camera set SP KS-99C, 35-mm</td>
<td>6720-00-602-5099</td>
<td>TASC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloves, leather</td>
<td>C85494</td>
<td>CTA 50-900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portable PA system</td>
<td>8415-00-268-7870</td>
<td>TASC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goggles, protective</td>
<td>J68064</td>
<td>GSA Supply Catalog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hearing protection</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>CTA 50-970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tape recorder</td>
<td>4240-00-816-3819</td>
<td>Commercial purchase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manhole hook</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>TASC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDU</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Commercial purchase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDU cap</td>
<td>Basic issue</td>
<td>Unit made/TASC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boots, black combat</td>
<td>Basic issue</td>
<td>CTA 50-900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lightweight body armor</td>
<td>Basic issue</td>
<td>CTA 50-900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mask chemical-biological without hood</td>
<td>80592N</td>
<td>CTA 50-900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disposable handcuffs</td>
<td>80593N</td>
<td>CTA 50-900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work gloves with liners</td>
<td>4240-01-143-2017</td>
<td>TAAVS/MTOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watch, wrist</td>
<td>M11895</td>
<td>Commercial purchase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knife, pocket</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>CTA 50-900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flashlight, with red lens</td>
<td>Basic issue</td>
<td>TAADS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tape, pressure sensitive</td>
<td>Basic issue</td>
<td>GSA Supply Catalog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirror, inspection</td>
<td>Basic issue</td>
<td>CTA 50-970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wedge, door</td>
<td>5110-00-526-8740</td>
<td>GSA Supply Catalog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6230-00-161-6422</td>
<td>CTA 50-970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7510-00-266-6710</td>
<td>GSA Supply Catalog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5120-00-618-6901</td>
<td>CTA 50-970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5340-00-907-8277</td>
<td>GSA Supply Catalog</td>
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</table>

*CONTINUED NEXT PAGE*
### SRT EQUIPMENT—CONTINUED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>NSN/LIN</th>
<th>AUTH DOCUMENT/REF SOURCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case, first-aid</td>
<td>8465-00-935-6814 D64043</td>
<td>CTA 50-900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White chalk</td>
<td>7510-00-223-6706 NA</td>
<td>GSA Supply Catalog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-inch by 5-inch index cards</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>CTA 50-970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Load bearing vest (pilots)</td>
<td>88853N</td>
<td>CTA 50-900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The equipment listed is intended to assist commanders in identifying and procuring equipment tailored for the installation SRT. Team equipment may be added or deleted based upon current analysis information. Selection of items should be the responsibility of the SRT leader.

### SRT ENTRY EQUIPMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>NSN/LIN</th>
<th>AUTH DOCUMENT/REF SOURCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ladder, straight (8 feet)</td>
<td>5440-00-242-7151</td>
<td>CTA 50-970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hammer, sledge (10 pounds)</td>
<td>5120-00-243-2957</td>
<td>GSA Supply Catalog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hammer, hand</td>
<td>5120-00-892-5485</td>
<td>CTA 50-970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutter, bolt, rigid, heavy duty</td>
<td>5110-00-596-9156</td>
<td>GSA Supply Catalog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bar, wrecking</td>
<td>5120-00-242-0762</td>
<td>CTA 50-970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Axe, single bit</td>
<td>5110-00-293-2336</td>
<td>GSA Supply Catalog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutter, glass</td>
<td>5110-00-222-4400</td>
<td>CTA 50-970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grapple hook</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>GSA Supply Catalog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rope, fibrous nylon 600 feet, 1/2 inch</td>
<td>4020-00-968-1357</td>
<td>Commercial purchase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snaplinks (locking)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>GSA Supply Catalog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rappelling harness</td>
<td>83421N</td>
<td>Commercial purchase</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The equipment listed is intended to assist commanders in identifying and procuring equipment tailored for the installation SRT. Most of this equipment can be purchased through GSA Supply Center. Entry equipment may be added or deleted based upon current analysis information. The rope identified is primarily for rappelling and fabrication of rappelling seats.
### SRT WEAPONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>NSN/LIN</th>
<th>AUTH DOCUMENT/REF SOURCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pistol, .45-caliber automatic (M1911A1)</td>
<td>1005-00-726-5655 N96741 R91244 P98152</td>
<td>AR 310-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolver, .38-caliber special, 4-inch</td>
<td>1005-00-214-0934 R94977</td>
<td>AR 310-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistol, .9-mm semiautomatic (M9)</td>
<td>1005-01-118-2640 P98152</td>
<td>AR 310-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, 5.56-mm (M16A2)</td>
<td>1005-00-073-9421 R94977</td>
<td>AR 310-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, 7.62-mm sniper (M21)</td>
<td>1005-00-179-0300 R95422</td>
<td>AR 310-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launcher, grenade, 40-mm (M203)</td>
<td>1010-00-179-6447 L44595</td>
<td>AR 310-34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shotgun, 12-gage riot, 20-inch barrel</td>
<td>1005-00-921-5483 T39223</td>
<td>MTOE/TDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shotgun (M520-30)</td>
<td>1005-00-677-9130 T39223</td>
<td>MTOE/TDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shotgun (M620A)</td>
<td>1005-00-677-9140 T39223</td>
<td>MTOE/TDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shotgun, pump (MOD 1200)</td>
<td>1005-00-921-5483 T39223</td>
<td>MTOE/TDA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The weapons listed are available for use by SRTs and are organic to most TOE units. Weapons and weapons systems organic to the organization responsible for SRT are used to the maximum extent possible. When the 9-mm pistol is fielded it will replace both the .45-caliber pistol and the .38-caliber revolver.

### SRT WEAPON ACCESSORIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>NSN/LIN</th>
<th>AUTH DOCUMENT/REF SOURCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Telescope (M49) with equipment</td>
<td>6650-00-530-0960 V35477</td>
<td>MTOE/TDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binoculars (M17A1)</td>
<td>6650-00-530-0974 B67218</td>
<td>MTOE/TDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night vision (AN/PVS-2B)</td>
<td>5855-00-760-3869 N04730</td>
<td>MTOE/TDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night vision goggles (AN/PVS-5)</td>
<td>5855-00-150-1820 N04456</td>
<td>MTOE/TDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrared aiming light (AN/PAQ-4) (must be used with AN/PVS-5)</td>
<td>5855-01-107-5925 A34938</td>
<td>MTOE/TDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pouch, ammunition, with speed loader</td>
<td>Weapon dependent</td>
<td>MTOE/TDA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# SRT Configuration and Suggested Weapon Assignments

## Entry Team

### TEAM LEADER
- .45-caliber (M1911A1) or .38-caliber revolver
- (9-mm [M9] pistol when fielded)
- Rifle (M16A2) or 12-gage shotgun

### POINTMAN
- .45-caliber (M1911A1) or .38-caliber revolver
- (9-mm [M9] pistol when fielded)
- Rifle (M16A2) or 12-gage shotgun

### DEFENSEMAN
- .45-caliber (M1911A1) or .38-caliber revolver
- (9-mm [M9] pistol when fielded)
- Rifle (M16A2) or 12-gage shotgun

### DEFENSEMAN
- .45-caliber (M1911A1) or .38-caliber revolver
- (9-mm [M9] pistol when fielded)
- Rifle (M16A2) or 12-gage shotgun

### REAR SECURITY
- .45-caliber (M1911A1) or .38-caliber revolver
- (9-mm [M9] pistol when fielded)
- 12-gage shotgun

## Cover Team

### MARKSMAN
- .45-caliber (M1911A1) or .38-caliber revolver
- (9-mm [M9] pistol when fielded)
- 7.62-mm sniper rifle (M21)

### OBSERVER
- .45-caliber (M1911A1) or .38-caliber revolver
- (9-mm [M9] pistol when fielded)
- 40-mm grenade launcher (M203)

### MARKSMAN
- .45-caliber (M1911A1) or .38-caliber revolver
- (9-mm [M9] pistol when fielded)
- 7.62-mm sniper rifle (M21)

### OBSERVER
- .45-caliber (M1911A1) or .38-caliber revolver
- (9-mm [M9] pistol when fielded)
- 40-mm grenade launcher (M203)
APPENDIX A

MP STATION DESIGN

The public must have access to MP station activities to conduct legitimate business. These areas must be easily accessible and clearly marked. However, controls must be established to prevent visitors and unauthorized personnel from wandering through the station. Such controls must not interfere with personnel conducting business with the various PM sections. Visitors can be controlled by electronically operated doors to gain access to the information desk.

The desk must be located so desk personnel have an unobstructed view of the station entrance and the area around the desk. The area directly behind the MP desk is closed to the general public.

The desk is constructed so that desk personnel, when seated, are on eye level with a person standing in front of the desk. The height of the desk may vary, but it must be high enough to prevent anyone from reaching desk personnel with the intent of harming them. If a restraining bar is not used in front of the desk, the desk must be sharply inclined outward from floor level to the desk top to make it more difficult for anyone to climb over the desk. The front of the desk is reinforced to provide protection from small arms fire and shrapnel.

Proper location of the MP station desk can afford desk personnel a clear and unobstructed view of the detention cell area, eliminating the need for a guard to prevent persons in detention from self-inflicting wounds or injuries. Space for detention cells must be in accordance with AR 190-38 structure criteria. Waivers of design requirements require complete justification. Job order requests for structure upgrade of existing detention cells must be approved by local engineers and submitted as an enclosure to the waiver request.

The back side of the desk can be designed as a storage area for forms and desk supplies. The work area behind the desk must be large enough to permit use of a typewriter and telephones.

MP STATION REQUIREMENTS

Mission requirements determine the need for specific station features. To support the basic MP mission, space is required for—

- The PM or officer in charge and the duty officer.
- Station desk.
- Processing offenders.
- Radio communications.
- Office space.
- Conference and interrogation/interview rooms.
- Storage of arms, evidence, and property.
- Briefing/debriefing patrols and reserves.
- Detention facilities.
- Public waiting room.
- Latrine facilities.
- Parking for employees, visitors, MP vehicles.
- Impounded vehicles.
- NCIC terminal room/infrared discrimination systems monitor.
- Storage area for riot control and other equipment.
- Shower facilities.
Specific station features should include—

- Outside lighting 360 degrees around the station and a 50-foot “stand off” area free of private vehicle parking.
- Controlled or monitored access to the station on all doors. Special entrances provided for MP.
- Interior and exterior doors with plexiglass windows for maximum observation, with the exception of the door leading from the public waiting area to the detention area which must not permit observation. This door is electrically operated.
- Maintenance free internal surfaces.
- A minimum of exterior windows. Where required, either plexiglass or triple glass substituted for plate glass.
- Emergency lighting and power.
- Separate latrine facilities provided for public and station personnel.
- A field safe for storing property and evidence during nonduty hours when a custodian is not readily available.
- Interview rooms with one-way mirrors where possible for identification purposes.
- Private work area for duty officer. This area can also serve as an interview room.
- A break area, out of public sight, for MP.

Break areas may contain vending machines.

- A communications room with intrusion detection alarms for the post exchange, finance office, bank, and so forth for rapid response.
- Furniture (in public areas) inconspicuously secured to the floor to prevent its use in a scuffle.
- Access to detention facilities free of items that can cause prisoner injury.
- Offices that require frequent coordination, such as operations and administration, located close to one another.

Efficient design can enhance the security of the station, reduce personnel requirements, and ensure effective use of station facilities. The general planning guidance in each example design is based on programming factors such as staff composition, organizational structure, and physical development requirements consistent with a hypothetical set of functional and operational objectives. Space organization principles are based on established organizational and functional needs and on requirements for the design and construction of MP facilities. For more information on designing MP facilities, see the Design Guide: Military Police Facilities.

![Planning Diagram for a Large MP Operations Facility](image-url)
EXAMPLE OF A SMALL MP OPERATIONS FACILITY

KEY:
A—ZONE 3—REGISTRATION
B—ZONE 4—TRAFFIC
C—ZONE 2—PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
D—ZONE 1—PM ADMIN
E—ZONE 4—OPERATIONS OFFICE
F—ZONE 5—OPERATIONS SUPPORT
G—ZONE 5—DETENTION/AWOL
H—ZONE 5—MP DESK
I—ZONE 5—PHYSICAL SECURITY

INVESTIGATIONS

GUARDMOUNT/SECURE PARKING/IMPOUND LOT

STAFF POV PARKING

OPERATIONS EQUIPMENT STORAGE

KEY:

PRIMARY FACILITY
1 PM OFFICE
2 COMMUNITY RELATIONS
3 PM ADMIN SUPPORT
4 PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
5 COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES
6 REGISTRATION
7 TRAFFIC
8 OPERATIONS OFFICE
9 ADMINISTRATION
10 LIAISON
11 COMMUNITY SERVICES
12 DETENTION/AWOL
13 INVESTIGATIONS
14 PHYSICAL SECURITY

15 MP DESK AREA
16 BRIEFING/TRAFFIC
17 LOCKERS/SHOWERS FOR MALE AND FEMALE
18 OPERATIONS STORAGE
19 PUBLIC ENTRANCE/LOBBY
20 PUBLIC RESTROOMS
21 STAFF TOILETS
22 STAFF LOUNGE
23 STAFF ENTRANCES
24 MAINTENANCE AND OPERATIONS SUPPLY AREA
25 MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT
Military Police Firearms Qualification

Military police personnel must be trained in the use of the weapon that they carry in the performance of their duties. The weapon may be the M16, the M1911A1 (.45-caliber pistol), the .38-caliber revolver with 4-inch or a 2-inch barrel, or the M9 9-mm parabellum semiautomatic pistol. FM 23-9 provides marksmanship instruction on the M16. USACIDC Regulation 195-19 provides instruction on the .38-caliber 2-inch barrel weapon. The Military Police Firearms Qualification Course (MPFQC) described in this appendix provides marksmanship instruction for the .45-caliber pistol, the .38-caliber revolver with 4-inch barrel, and the 9-mm parabellum semiautomatic pistol.

Commanders at all levels are responsible for ensuring that personnel entrusted with weapons are trained to use the weapons as intended and in a safe manner. AR 190-14 and AR 190-28 establish the requirements for granting authorization to carry firearms and to conduct training. DA Pamphlet 350-38 authorizes ammunition for MP personnel to qualify yearly with their assigned weapon. Yearly qualification includes protective mask firing. (See DA Pamphlet 350-38 for the protective mask firing requirements.)

The MPFQC is designed to provide realistic and effective police marksmanship training. The MP engages single targets at various ranges using the standard service weapon. The six tables of the MPFQC require the firer to fire from 7, 15, 25, and 35 meters. The firer uses both the strong and weak hands in the standing and kneeling positions, and the strong hand in the prone and crouch positions. The MPFQC standards are—

- Expert, 48 to 50 hits.
- Sharpshooter, 45 to 47 hits.
- Marksman, 35 to 44 hits.
- Unqualified, 34 or fewer hits.
A locally reproduced record of qualification should be used and must be forwarded with departing personnel as proof of weapons qualification at the gaining unit. DA Form 88 (Combat Pistol Qualification Course Scorecard) should not be used for the MPFQC because this course does not provide combat pistol qualification.

### MPFQC REQUIREMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>RANGE</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>NO. ROUNDS</th>
<th>9-mm/.45-caliber</th>
<th>.38-caliber</th>
<th>INSTRUCTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>35 m</td>
<td>Prone</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1 min, 45 sec</td>
<td>2 min</td>
<td>9-mm/.45-caliber—Holster weapon. Draw weapon, pull slide to the rear, chamber a round, and fire five rounds. Change magazines at own speed, and fire five additional rounds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.38-caliber—Fire revolver single-action, and reload at own speed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>25 m</td>
<td>Standing without support (strong hand)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1 min, 45 sec</td>
<td>2 min</td>
<td>9-mm/.45-caliber—Load one 5 round—magazine into the weapon initially. On command draw the weapon, chamber a round, and fire 5 rounds. Change magazines at own speed, and fire five additional rounds. Use the two-handed position. Use the weak hand for support. As an alternative use the weak hand to support the strong hand by grasping the weapon’s grip over the strong hand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.38-caliber—Fire revolver single-action, and reload at own speed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>25 m</td>
<td>Standing with support (left hand) Standing with support (right hand)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>45 sec</td>
<td>45 sec</td>
<td>9-mm/.45-caliber—Load one magazine into the weapon initially. On command draw the weapon, chamber a round, and fire five rounds from the support position behind the left side of the barricade, using the left hand. Then, from behind the barricade, reload the weapon, move to the right side of the barricade, and fire five rounds with the right hand from a supported position.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.38-caliber—Fire revolver single-action and reload behind the barricade at own speed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>RANGE</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>NO. ROUNDS</th>
<th>9 MM / .45 CALIBER</th>
<th>.38 CALIBER</th>
<th>INSTRUCTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>15 m</td>
<td>Standing without</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>40 sec</td>
<td>40 sec</td>
<td>9-mm / .45-caliber—On command draw the loaded weapon, chamber a round, and fire from the standing position without support. Use only the strong hand and do not support it with the nonshooting hand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>support (strong</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.38-caliber—Fire revolver double-action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>hand)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>15 m</td>
<td>Kneeling with</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>40 sec</td>
<td>40 sec</td>
<td>9-mm / .45-caliber—On command draw the loaded weapon, chamber a round while assuming kneeling position, and fire five rounds with the support left hand over the top of the barricade. Reload at own speed before firing five more rounds. Use the right hand and again fire over the top of the barricade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>support (left hand)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.38-caliber—Fire the revolver double-action, and reload at own speed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kneeling with</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>40 sec</td>
<td>40 sec</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>support (right</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>hand)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>7 m</td>
<td>Crouch</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12 sec</td>
<td>12 sec</td>
<td>9-mm / .45-caliber—On command move forward from the 15-meter line with a locked and loaded weapon. On command obtain the crouch position and engage the target with five rounds, using two hands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.38-caliber—Fire revolver double-action.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| TOTAL | 50   | 7 min, 12 sec | 7 min, 42 sec | A summary of the MPFQC. |

NOTE: When the revolver is fired, the firer is issued the number of rounds required to fire a specific table. Reloading is done at the firer's own speed during the table. Loading done prior to the beginning of each table is controlled by the range officer or range NCO.
# EXAMPLE OF RECORD MPFQC RESULTS

## DISPOSITION FORM

For use of this form, see AR 340-15, the proposer agency is TAGO.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL</th>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XXXX-XX-X</td>
<td>Record of Military Police Firearms Qualification Course Results</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO</th>
<th>FROM</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>CMT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XXXXX</td>
<td>XXXXX</td>
<td>XX XXX XX</td>
<td>XXXXX/xx/XXXX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1. Reference:

a. DA Pam 350-38, Standards In Weapons Training.

b. FM 19-10, Military Police Law and Order Operations.

### 2. The individual listed below completed the Military Police Firearms Qualification Course on 14 Dec 87 at Fort Blank, AL and qualified **(sharpshooter)** with 47 hits out of 50 possible hits.

- **Name:** Kenneth B. Lewis
- **Rank:** Staff Sergeant
- **SSN:** 257-52-0014
- **Unit:** B Company, 952d Military Police Battalion, Fort Blank, AL

### 3. The individual **(did/did not)** complete a protective mask fire for record course in accordance with reference la.

- **Signature:**
  - **John Jones**
  - **CPT, MP**
  - **Company Commander/Range Officer**
Statistical data can be depicted in a frequency distribution table. This data can be prepared in a logical order, condensed and simplified, and essential details can be retained.

Three steps are required in construction of a frequency distribution table.

- Step 1. The collection of raw data. The graphic illustrates raw data on the number of offenses per month for different age classes from 17 to 38. Data arranged in this manner make it difficult to determine which age class has the highest total number of offenses for the year.

- Step 2. This step involves totaling the items in each class and arranging them in order of magnitude. Such an arrangement (whether ascending or descending) is called an array. This graphic shows an array with yearly total offenses for each age listed in descending order. The range of total offenses is from 220 to 10 with a concentration of offenses in the younger age classes and comparatively few offenses in the older age classes.

- Step 3. Finally, in preparing a frequency distribution table, classes are combined into class intervals or groups. In this graphic two-year class intervals have been used making it easier to see a large concentration. (The largest concentration is 423 or the 19-20 age interval.) Other data suitable for frequency distribution tables include—
  - Accident frequencies.
  - Accident fatalities or injuries.
  - Offenses by categories; that is, assaults, robberies, and so forth.

Data taken from a frequency distribution table can then be depicted in a chart or graph. A vertical or horizontal bar chart may be used to depict the information. Or a circle graph or pie chart may be used. A pin map chart is another way to graphically present the data.
The curve or line chart is probably the most widely used form of graphic presentation. It is very simple to construct and is most effective when the emphasis is on movement, rather than amount. The curve chart is normally used for data covering a long period of time. It is also possible to compare two or more series on the same chart. The curve or line chart may be used to show trends in various enforcement activities, such as total AWOLs, vehicle registrations, offenses, apprehensions, and so forth.

Another chart frequently used to depict enforcement data is the vertical bar or column chart. This chart is also used to depict numerical values of a given item over a period of time. It may be used for months of the year, as shown, for days of the week, for hours of the day, or for all three. The chart is simple to construct and readily understood. The vertical bar chart is preferable to the curve chart when a sharper delineation of trend is to be shown.
HORIZONTAL BAR CHART

The horizontal bar chart is the simplest form of graph. Its primary use is to compare different items as of a specified date. In MP work, the horizontal bar chart is used to break down offenses by units, traffic violations by specific violation over a given period and for a specified date. and similar categories.

CIRCLE GRAPH OR PIE (SECTOR) CHART

The circle graph or pie (sector) chart compares various components with each other and with the whole. This chart serves to direct attention to extreme areas. The primary disadvantage of the pie chart is that where many segments are involved the chart will appear confusing. The small sections of the chart will be difficult to label in such a case. A bar chart is recommended when dealing with numerous components.
PIN MAP

The pin map is another way of graphically presenting data pertaining to frequency, type, and location of accidents or incidents. This chart is also considered to be an essential element of selective enforcement planning. A map of an area is mounted on a board capable of holding pins. Locations of accidents or incidents are indicated by pins stuck into the map at the location where the incidents or accidents occurred. Different types of accidents or incidents (that is, injury, fatality) may be depicted by different colored or marked pins. The pin map may be used as a yearly record and, if photographed, may be compared with succeeding years.
APPENDIX D

EXTRACT OF A LOCAL PROTECTIVE SERVICES DETAIL EQUIPMENT LIST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>NSN/LIN</th>
<th>AUTHORIZED DOCUMENT SOURCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*Revolver, 2-inch .38-caliber</td>
<td>1005-00-937-5840 1095-01-070-9454</td>
<td>MTOE/TDA  CTA 50-900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holster, pancake with thumb break</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio, hand-held</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First aid kit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binoculars, M17A1 (7x50)</td>
<td>6545-00-922-1200 6650-00-530-0974 B67218</td>
<td>MTOE/TDA  CTA 8-100  MTOE/TDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pouch, ammunition, .38-caliber/speedloader</td>
<td>86301N 8465-00-242-7860 K08204</td>
<td>MTOE/TDA  CTA 50-900  MTOE/TDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handcuffs with case and keys</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shotgun, 12-gage 20-inch barrel, riot</td>
<td>1005-00-921-5483 T39223</td>
<td>MTOE/TDA  CTA 50-900  MTOE/TDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credentials holder</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto. sedan, subcompact</td>
<td>2310-01-090-7738 B04725</td>
<td>MTOE/TDA  CTA 50-900  MTOE/TDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flashlight, 5-cell</td>
<td>6230-01-169-1611</td>
<td>CTA 50-900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spare batteries, D-cell</td>
<td>6135-00-930-0030</td>
<td>Self-service supply center, Commercial</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vehicle radio</td>
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<td>GSA contract</td>
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<tr>
<td>Surveillance kits</td>
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<td>GSA contract</td>
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</table>

*Pending change to 9-mm pistol.*
## ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT

This equipment may not be available to all details. Many PS missions, based on the threat, location, rank, and position of the principal, will not require such sophisticated equipment.

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<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>NSN/LIN</th>
<th>AUTHORIZED DOCUMENT SOURCE</th>
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<tr>
<td>Frequency modulation radio system, voice secure with base and repeater-portable system</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<td>Protective vest, MP-1, level II</td>
<td>80593N</td>
<td>CTA 50-900</td>
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<td>Oxygen tube with mask, 24-gallon</td>
<td>6505-00-965-2439</td>
<td>CTA 8-100</td>
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<tr>
<td>ID lapel system</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Section 3 to TDA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hardened vehicle for principal, 7.62 protection</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Commercial lease only</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partially hardened follow vehicle kit form to upgrade vehicle</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mask chemical-biological</td>
<td>4240-01-143-2017</td>
<td>TAADS/MTOE</td>
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<td>Body alarm system transmitter</td>
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<td>Fluoroscope, portable</td>
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<td>Metal detector, hand-held</td>
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<td>AF TA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobile telephone</td>
<td>35500D</td>
<td>Section 3 to TDA or augmented TDA</td>
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<td>Submachine gun, 9-mm</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Commercial</td>
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<tr>
<td>Submachine gun, closed bolt mini 9-mm</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shotgun, 12-gage, pump with folding stock, pistol grip</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shoulder holster, 9-mm submachine gun</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>AF TA 538</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shoulder holster, closed bolt mini 9-mm submachine gun</td>
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<tr>
<td>Briefcase, 9-mm, for 9-mm submachine gun</td>
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GLOSSARY

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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<td>admin</td>
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<td>ADP</td>
<td>automatic data processing</td>
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<td>Air Force</td>
</tr>
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<td>AFAP</td>
<td>Army Family Advocacy Program</td>
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<td>AG</td>
<td>Adjutant General</td>
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<td>APO</td>
<td>Army and Air Force Post Office</td>
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<td>Army regulation</td>
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<td>alcohol safety action program</td>
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<td>auth</td>
<td>authorization</td>
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<td>AWOL</td>
<td>absent without leave</td>
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<td>BCC</td>
<td>battlefield circulation control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDU</td>
<td>battledress uniform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEQ</td>
<td>bachelor enlisted quarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BER</td>
<td>budget execution review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIP</td>
<td>budget increment package</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMG</td>
<td>budget and manpower guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOQ</td>
<td>bachelor officers’ quarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>commercial activities</td>
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<td>cal</td>
<td>caliber</td>
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<td>CDR</td>
<td>commander</td>
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<td>centimeter</td>
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<td>crisis management team</td>
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<td>command operating budget</td>
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<td>communications zone</td>
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<td>COR</td>
<td>contract officer’s representative</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Correctional Reporting System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>chlorobenzalmalononitrile</td>
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<td>common table of allowances</td>
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<td>Department of the Army</td>
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<td>DCSPER</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel</td>
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<td>Department of Defense (forms)</td>
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<td>Directorate of Engineering and Housing</td>
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<td>DL</td>
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<td>DOC</td>
<td>Directorate of Contracting</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
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<td>DPM</td>
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<td>DRM</td>
<td>Directorate of Resource Management</td>
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<td>DWI</td>
<td>driving while intoxicated</td>
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<td>EDD</td>
<td>explosives detector dog</td>
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<td>EECI</td>
<td>essential elements of criminal intelligence</td>
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<td>EOC</td>
<td>emergency operations center</td>
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<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosives ordnance disposal</td>
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<td>EPW</td>
<td>enemy prisoner of war</td>
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<td>FACMT</td>
<td>Family Advocacy Case Management Team</td>
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<td>FAR</td>
<td>Federal Acquisition Regulation</td>
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<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>FCF</td>
<td>field confinement facility</td>
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<td>field detention facility</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>fiscal year</td>
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<td>gal</td>
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<td>government</td>
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<td>GSA</td>
<td>General Services Administration</td>
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<td>HGNT</td>
<td>horizontal gaze nystagmus test</td>
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<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>headquarters</td>
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<td>hour</td>
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<td>IAW</td>
<td>in accordance with</td>
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<td>ID</td>
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<td>installation confinement facility</td>
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<td>IDS</td>
<td>infrared discrimination system</td>
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<td>intel</td>
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<td>INSCOM</td>
<td>United States Army Intelligence and Security Command</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<td>ISA</td>
<td>interservice support agreement</td>
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<td>ITAC</td>
<td>Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center</td>
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<td>m</td>
<td>meter</td>
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<td>MAC</td>
<td>Military Airlift Command</td>
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<td>major Army command</td>
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<td>major activity director</td>
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<td>MCA</td>
<td>Major Construction, Army</td>
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<td>MCM</td>
<td>Manual for Courts-Martial</td>
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<td>military occupational specialty</td>
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<td>MPFQC</td>
<td>Military Police Firearms Qualification Course</td>
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<td>Military Police Management Information Systems</td>
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<td>MSR</td>
<td>main supply route</td>
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<td>modification table of organization and equipment</td>
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<td>military working dog</td>
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<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>not applicable</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>National Agency Check</td>
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<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>National Crime Information Center</td>
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<td>NCO</td>
<td>noncommissioned officer</td>
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<td>NCOIC</td>
<td>noncommissioned officer in charge number</td>
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<td>NSN</td>
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<td>OALE</td>
<td>Office of Army Law Enforcement</td>
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<td>OCIR</td>
<td>other criminal intelligence requirement</td>
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<td>OCONUS</td>
<td>outside continental United States</td>
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<td>OIC</td>
<td>officer in charge</td>
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<td>OMA</td>
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<td>OPA</td>
<td>Other Procurement, Army</td>
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<td>operations security</td>
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<td>Offense Reporting System</td>
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<td>PA</td>
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<td>Public Affairs Officer</td>
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<td>PCS</td>
<td>permanent change of station</td>
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<td>PDIP</td>
<td>program development increment package</td>
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<tr>
<td>PERSCOM</td>
<td>Personnel Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PI</td>
<td>protected identities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>provost marshal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POC</td>
<td>point of contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POM</td>
<td>program objective memorandum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POV</td>
<td>privately owned vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPBES</td>
<td>planning, programming, budgeting, and execution system</td>
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<tr>
<td>PR&amp;C</td>
<td>purchase request and commitment</td>
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<td>PRAC</td>
<td>program resource advisory committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>protective services</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>personal security officer</td>
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<td>QSTAG</td>
<td>Quadripartite Standardization Agreement</td>
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<td>ref</td>
<td>reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>rept</td>
<td>report</td>
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<td>RMO</td>
<td>Resource Management Office</td>
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<td>ROI</td>
<td>report of investigation</td>
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<td>ROTC</td>
<td>Reserve Officers’ Training Corps</td>
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<td>SGT</td>
<td>sergeant</td>
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<td>SIR</td>
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<td>SJA</td>
<td>Staff Judge Advocate</td>
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<td>SOFA</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>standing operating procedure</td>
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<td>SOW</td>
<td>statement of work</td>
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<td>SRT</td>
<td>special reaction team</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSAC</td>
<td>source selection advisory council</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Amnesty box. A container into which personnel may place any item, without penalty, before customs processing.

Antihijack security. All measures taken to reduce the risk of hijacking aircraft, with particular attention to the exclusion of weapons from the passenger compartment of an aircraft. (See Air Force Regulation 60-14.)

Closed evidence voucher. An evidence voucher concerning evidence from which final disposition has been made by the custodian.

Controlled substance. A drug or other substance, or immediate precursor thereof, listed in 21 USC 812. General categories included in this section are narcotics, derivatives of the cannabis sativa plant, amphetamines, barbiturates, and hallucinogens.

Crime control. The detection and investigation of crimes and offenses and the apprehension and protection of offenders.

Crime repression. The reduction of crimes and offenses through such measures as patrolling, physical security and crime prevention surveys and inspections, observation of persons and places considered crime-producing, and employment of off-limits procedures to preclude military personnel from participating in activities conducive to crime.

Criminal complaint. An alleged criminal offense reported to or observed by military or civilian police personnel or USACIDC personnel, whether subsequently determined to be founded or unfounded.

Crisis management team (CMT). A team found at a major command or installation level concerned with plans, procedures, techniques, policies, and controls for dealing with terrorism, special threats, or other major disruptions occurring on government installations or facilities. The team considers the local, national, and international implications of major disruptions and establishes contact with the Army Operations Center as the situation escalates, requiring higher level involvement and guidance. Normally
at installation level, the CMT is established at or in proximity to the designated emergency operations center.

**Customs exclusion area.** Clearly defined area into which cleared customs personnel enter before they depart.

**Evidence ledger.** The bound ledger or record book kept by the evidence custodian to provide double accountability control through cross-reference with the evidence vouchers.

**Evidence voucher.** The original DA Form 4137 which, upon presentation to the evidence custodian, becomes an evidence voucher.

**Evidence subvoucher.** A carbon or reproduced copy of the original evidence voucher used to effect the temporary release of evidence for any reason.

**Founded offense.** A criminal offense that has been proven to have been committed. The determination that a founded offense exists is made by the appropriate police agency and is not dependent upon judicial process.

**High-risk personnel.** US personnel who, by their grade, assignment, symbolic value, or relative isolation, are more likely to be attractive or accessible terrorist targets.

**Identified offender.** An individual identified by police action as the subject or perpetrator of a criminal offense.

**Nonintoxicating malt beverage.** Any alcoholic malt beverage having an alcoholic content of less than 3.2 percent by weight.

**Open evidence voucher.** An evidence voucher concerning evidence for which the evidence custodian has accountability.

**Referral.** A process in which the parties in conflict are led to consider some specific form of professional counseling service.

**Strategic information.** Information that has no immediate applicability but may be used in some future investigation or program. Strategic information gathering is a long-range continuous process.

**Tactical information.** Information that has immediate applicability to the employment of units in combat.

**Total obligational authority (TOA).** The total financial requirements of the five-year defense program or any component thereof required to support the approved program of a given fiscal year.

**Unfounded offense.** A criminal complaint in which a determination is made that a criminal offense was not committed or did not occur. The determination is based on police action, not on court-martial or civilian court verdict.
# REFERENCES

Related publications are sources of additional information. They are not required in order to understand this publication.

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Army Public Affairs, Public Information
Community Relations
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Acquisition and Storage of Information Concerning Nonaffiliated Persons and Organizations
Automation Security
Natural Resources: Land, Forest, and Wildlife Management
Civil Disturbances
The Army Specialty Proponent System
Army Casualty and Memorial Affairs and Line of Duty Investigations
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2085  NATO Combined Military Police
2154/539  Regulations for Military Motor Vehicle Movement by Road
2155/561  Road Movement Bid and Credit
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* NATO STANAGs/QSTAGs are available, upon request, from Naval Publications and Forms Center, 5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19210.
55-1680-348-10 Survival Kit, Cold Climate, Individual

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Form 97 Criminal Intelligence Report
Pamphlet 195-7 Personal Security Assessment Briefings: Action Officers Guide
Regulation 195-19 Carrying, Using, Safeguarding, and Qualifying with Weapons

MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICATIONS

Air Force Regulation 60-14, Preventing and Resisting Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking)

Bombs By Mail, Document Control Division, Room 2810, US Postal Service Headquarters, Washington, DC 20260-1561


Design Guide: Military Police Facilities, Office of the Chief of Engineers, Military Programs Directorate, Engineering Division, Washington, DC 20314

FBI Form 6-136, Bomb Threat Checklist

Guide for Writing and Administering Performance Statements of Work, Associate Administrator, Major Systems Acquisition and Procurement Strategies, Office of Federal Procurement Policy, 726 Jackson Place, NW, Washington, DC 20503


Miscellaneous Publication 8-1, Joint Travel Regulations: Volume 1: Members of the Uniformed Services


Uniform Code of Military Justice

United States Code


Work Schedule Design Handbook: Methods for Assigning Employees' Work Shifts and Days Off, US Department of Housing and Urban Development, HUD User, P.O. Box 280, Germantown, MD 20874

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