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***NOTE*** Also coming soon the complete RSF COIN Manual on PDF format for download. This is the complete original 1975 version.
Preface

Anti-terrorist operations (ATOPS) are fought on a wide front: the army forces, various government departments and the civilian population all have a role to play. In implementing the anti-terrorist action contained herein, members of the army forces must appreciate the vital need for cooperation and the understanding of each other's characteristics and capabilities.

ATOPS warfare probably places a greater burden of responsibility on the individual than does any other form of conflict. It connotes small groups and light scales. Catch-words are: thorough training, self-discipline, skill at arms, initiative, guile, endurance and above all, the will to win.

Definitions

1. Insurgent: An indigenous or foreign national not recognized as a belligerent by international law, aiming to overthrow a government by force. In revolutionary war the terms "guerrilla," "revolutionary," "terrorist" or "insurgent" are used on occasion to indicate differences in the opposition. When it is not necessary to indicate specific differences, however, "insurgent" is used to cover all the roles implied by the foregoing terms. It is also taken to include such additional terms as "saboteur," "enemy," "insurrectionist" or "rebel," where applicable.

2. Terrorist: A supporter of a dissident faction (in fact, an insurgent), who is trained for or resorts to organized violence for political ends.

3. Insurgency: A form of rebellion in which a dissident faction instigates the commission of acts of civil disobedience, sabotage and terrorism, and wages irregular warfare in order to overthrow a government. In its ultimate stages it could escalate to a conflict on conventional lines. Although insurgency often starts internally, it has seldom been known to succeed without outside assistance, support and encouragement.

4. Counter-insurgency (COIN): All measures, both civil and military, undertaken by a government, independently or with the assistance of friendly nations, to prevent or defeat insurgency. (Refers to the Rhodesian Security Forces)

5. Counter-insurgency operations (COIN Ops). Counter-insurgency operations are the military aspects of counter-insurgency. These consist of: Anti-terrorist operations (ATOPS), Psychological operations (PSYOPS), operations in support of civil authorities (OSCA).

6. Anti-terrorist operations (ATOPS): Any military operation against terrorists.

7. Psychological operations (PSYOPS): An action conducted over a predetermined period of time and consisting of the application of various coordinated measures, directed at the population in general or the inhabitants of a specific area or social group, own armed forces, or at the enemy in accordance with determined doctrines and techniques. They are conducted by military forces, civil authorities or by both in conjunction with each other, to achieve an objective of psychological action.

8. operations in support of civil authorities (OSCA): Any military operation in support of civil authorities, which involves primarily the maintenance of law and
order and essential services, in the face of civil disturbance and disobedience.

9. **Military forces (MF):** All military, paramilitary and police forces engaged in counter-insurgency operations.

10. **Contact:** Any form of encounter between military forces and terrorists, other than a mere sighting.

11. **Incident:** A terrorist act resulting in a criminal offence being committed, or interference with the rights of others.

12. **Border control operations:** Border control or counter-penetration operations conducted with the aim of securing our own borders and preventing the enemy from crossing, or preventing supplies, reinforcements, etc. from crossing to support enemy elements that may have succeeded in penetrating. This includes the elimination of the enemy and the destruction of his transit facilities in border areas.

13. **Area operations:** Operations carried out with the aim of covering an area with a framework of military organizations, working in close cooperation with the civil authorities, in order to eliminate the enemy who may have established himself in the area, or who may have infiltrated the area.

14. **Military forces:** The forces of the army, air force and navy.

15. **Auxiliaries:** Individuals or groups of the local population who are organized and controlled by the military forces, to assist with and support counter-insurgency operations.

16. **Frozen area:** A clearly defined area, in which military forces are precluded from operating for a fixed period of time. Any military force already operating in the area to be declared frozen will be withdrawn from such an area at least four hours before the set period.

17. **No-go area:** An area from which all civilians are excluded by an order of the protecting-authority, to ensure that they do not become involved in operations conducted by military forces against terrorists. Only authorized members of the military forces will move in no-go areas. No action may be instituted against them for any death or injury caused to any person within the area by any act performed in good faith in the course of operations conducted during the time while the order is in force.
General Elements

SECTION 1: THE ENEMY

1. **General.** The insurgent threat to southern Africa is a real and complex one, aimed at removing the white man's influence on the sub-continent at all costs. Insurgents are trained, indoctrinated and equipped mainly by communist countries. This manual is only concerned with one aspect of this threat, namely the rural terrorists.

2. **Characteristics.** The enemy is usually careless of death. He has no mental doubts, is little troubled by humanitarian sentiments, and is not moved by slaughter and mutilation. His upbringing and standard of living make him well fitted to hardships. He requires little sustenance and comfort, and can look after himself. His standard of bushcraft is usually of a high order and he has a keen practiced eye for the country and the ability to move across it at speed on foot. He is usually physically fit, being able to cover long distances rapidly carrying a heavy load. He is capable of being trained to use modern and complicated weapons to good effect. He is taught to read a map, use radios and voice procedure and effectively employ simple but deadly booby traps.

3. **Tactics.** Enemy tactics are based on the following:
   i. Flexible, imaginative and unorthodox operations, relying above all on surprise.
   ii. Offensive action, even when temporarily on the defensive.
   iii. A high degree of foot mobility.
   iv. The ability to exploit the advantages of night operations.
   v. Detailed preparations before any attack; local superior strength and favorable conditions being a prerequisite.
   vi. Frequent use of all types of ambush.
   vii. Extensive use of booby traps. improvised mines, obstacles and field works using locally available material.
   viii. Evading decisive engagements.

4. **Arms.** The terrorists are normally well armed with modern automatic or semiautomatic rifles, submachine guns and machine guns. Hand grenades are in abundance. More sophisticated arms are in use on an ever increasing scale, e.g., grenade launchers, mortars, guns and even anti-aircraft machine guns. The use of mines is a favorite terrorist tactic. Most arms originate from communist countries, but the terrorists are also trained to use the military forces I own weapons against them, be they stolen or captured in combat. When forced to, he can revert to primitive weapons such as muzzle loaders, spears and bows and arrows.

5. **Equipment.** The terrorists are well equipped with modern items such as radio sets, plastic explosives, map reading aids, first-aid kits and rations. However, when forced to, his training allows him to fall back on primitive means in order to improvise and survive.

6. **Vulnerability of the terrorist.** The most important factors are the need for the support of the local population and external assistance. These should be exploited
by all concerned when countering the terrorist threat. If he is cut off from outside assistance, and finds no comfort or aid from the local population, his war will be over. It is also important to remember that the terrorist is normally disciplined by indoctrination to accept an ideology foreign to his own tribal background. Furthermore, the group is normally held together more by strong leadership than by common cause. Physical or psychological action aimed at these sources could easily undermine his discipline, and break his morale.

SECTION 2: TERRAIN AND CLIMATE

1. Theatres of operation in southern Africa are characterized by terrain and climatic conditions that adversely affect the deployment of modern armies.

2. Geographically, the terrain ranges from semi-desert to mountainous areas, and many areas are thickly vegetated. This causes the following restrictions:
   a. Mobility.
      i. Vehicle movement is normally restricted to an underdeveloped road network, paths and tracks.
      ii. Rivers in flood hamper mobility.
   b. Observation of the enemy and of support weapons fire is difficult, if not impossible, and may require increased air effort.
   c. Radio transmission and reception ranges are greatly reduced.
   d. Navigation is difficult and calls for improvised methods.
   e. Employment of arms is often restricted to infantry on foot.
   f. Liaison and control are difficult.

3. Southern Africa is known for its extreme climatic conditions and this calls for:
   a. A high degree of physical fitness and a period of acclimatization for all troops.
   b. Proper medical cover against tropical diseases and a high standard of personal hygiene.
   c. Protective measures and proper maintenance of all weapons and equipment.
   d. The rainy season reduces vehicle movement considerably, as roads and tracks become impassable in places, thus placing greater emphasis on air support.

4. Operational areas will cover vast areas and are normally remote from permanent base facilities. This causes long lines of communications and complicates logistical support.

5. Because of the large areas to be covered, units and sub-units are normally far apart. This calls for delegation of powers of command, and freedom of action to lower levels, necessitating good communications and liaison at all levels.

6. Wildlife, insects and reptiles are in abundance and call for proper training and precautionary measures.
SECTION 3: OTHER FACTORS

a. **General.** This section emphasizes those factors which have a special application to successful anti-terrorist operations.

b. **Cooperation.** The military must never lose sight of the paramount importance of close understanding and cooperation with civilian counterparts. This principle must be followed at all levels of cooperation, e.g., army/air force, military/police, etc.

c. **Hearts and minds.** Unless the trust, confidence and respect of the people are won by the government and the military forces, the chance of success is greatly reduced. If the people support the government and the military forces, the enemy becomes isolated and cut off from its supplies, shelter and intelligence.

d. **Intelligence.** Successful ATOPS depend upon an efficient integrated intelligence Organization, planned and controlled on a national or theatre of operations basis. Good intelligence is the key to successful operations. Very little of value will be achieved without timely and accurate intelligence, and commanders will often have to plan special operations and take considerable risks to obtain valuable intelligence. Before undertaking military operations against terrorists, the district in which they are operating should be thoroughly studied and a dossier prepared by the police or civilian intelligence unit, working in conjunction with the local civil authorities where necessary.

e. **Security of bases.** It is fundamental to the success of ATOPS that all bases are secure, whether it be a major base, mobilization center, installation, airfield, police post or patrol base. All members of the military forces, whatever their tasks, must be trained to take an effective and active part in the defense and protection of installations.

f. **Planned pattern of operations.** Operations must be planned on the basis of systematically gaining and maintaining control of the country or area concerned, by the establishment and constant expansion of controlled areas. By establishing controlled or safe areas, enemy freedom of movement is curtailed and a safe place is provided for the local indigenous people away from the influence and intimidation of the enemy.

g. **Seizing and holding the initiative.** A clear-cut political policy and offensive action by the military forces are essential for seizing and holding the initiative. Every effort must be made to dominate any area in which the military forces are operating.

h. **Speed, mobility and flexibility.** Military forces must be equipped, trained and accustomed to operating for long periods under the same conditions as the enemy, while full use must be made of air support to provide additional mobility, reconnaissance, air strike capability and a flexible administrative system.

i. **Surprise and security.** The strictest security in planning is essential if surprise is to be achieved. Loss of surprise probably means an unsuccessful operation and at least a temporary loss of initiative.
j. **Ground forces.** If success is to be achieved, it is essential that sufficient infantry, together with armor and other supporting arms, are deployed on the ground. The infantry must be highly trained, acclimatized and masters of modern techniques. Air mobility, modern weapons, good communications and fire support, as well as first class foot mobility are also essential.

k. **Training.** Success in ATOPS is only possible if troops are highly trained, supremely fit and sufficiently tough, cunning and skillful to outfight the enemy on his own ground. While full use must be made of technical superiority in firepower, mobility and equipment, all troops must nevertheless be trained to such a pitch that they are fully confident that man for man they are better fighters than the enemy. The two most important training requirements are supreme physical fitness and the ability to shoot accurately at fleeting targets at short and medium ranges.

l. **Air support.** Although air power in itself does not guarantee success in ATOPS, the tactical concept relies primarily on it for strategic and tactical movement, fire support and logistic support, with particular emphasis on the use of helicopters and light aircraft in reconnaissance, armed and support roles.

m. **offensive action.** The tactical concept is essentially offensive from the beginning. The commander must, however, bear in mind the protracted nature of operations, the great boost to morale of success and the corresponding danger of failure. He must avoid acting on too great a scale prematurely and he must ensure that his initial offensive operations are within the capabilities of the military forces he has available.

n. **Conclusion.** The outstanding lesson from recent revolutionary wars is that no single program--political, social, psychological, economic or military--will in itself succeed. It is a combination of all these elements, together with a joint government/police/military approach to the problem, which will counter the efforts of the enemy, and restore lawful authority.
Command and Control

SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

1. A principal requirement of success against terrorists is the ability to coordinate the actions of all the civil and military forces of the government. An adequate system is required to achieve concerted action. No standard Organization would be suitable for all situations. Any system of command and control must take into account the constitution of the country, the personalities of its leaders, the size and effectiveness of its security forces and many other factors. The system should ensure:
   a. That a common aim is determined and adhered to.
   b. That timely and accurate intelligence is produced on which sound decisions can be taken.
   c. That mutual consultations and sound planning occur among those concerned at all levels and at all times to effectively counter enemy action in all areas.
   d. That the economic life of the country continues.

SECTION 2: COMMAND

1. Command is defined as the authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination and control of military forces.
2. The general principles of command and control are applicable to the conduct of ATOPS but the application thereof must be adjusted to suit different circumstances and situations.
3. The most important aspects, however, regarding command during ATOPS are leadership, good discipline and the maintenance of control to ensure that all planned action is accomplished in order to achieve a given mission.
4. The responsibilities of commanders and their immediate associates and the relationship between senior commanders and their subordinates remain the same, whether conventional or anti-terrorist operations are conducted. However, during ATOPS the following are important:
   a. Detailed planning of tactical operations at a low level and where possible decentralized to commanders/units actually involved, including the deployment of reserves.
   b. Detailed coordination in the effort to obtain information.
   c. Detailed planning and coordination of all activities related to the civilian population.
   d. Integration of psychosocial activities into operational planning.
   e. Detailed planning and coordination of all logistic support in accordance with the tactical plan. This is to include air supply.
   f. Very careful and continual attention to standards and condition of men,
equipment and weapons.
5. To further ensure that command is exercised efficiently at all levels and with the minimum delay the following are also necessary requirements:
   a. Good channels of command, good liaison and good communications. This implies that provision must be made for first class telecommunications and, if possible, for rapid air, road or rail movement.
   b. Good standard operational procedures at all levels.
   c. Good cooperation between military forces and between military forces and civil organizations and representatives.
   d. A high standard of leadership with command being decentralized, therefore allowing maximum flexibility and initiative.
   e. A good Organization and balanced forces for the conduct of ATOPS.
   f. The selection and careful allocation of areas of tactical responsibility to units and commanders.
   g. The maintenance of high morale.
   h. The issuance of clear, concise and unambiguous orders.
6. In the event of military elements from one national force participating directly in the operations of another nation, or operating in concert therewith although remaining in their own country, this military involvement will take one or more of the following forms:
   a. Coordinated operations. No combined command and control Organization will be required since national forces will operate independently under their own organizations.
   b. Supported operations. The supporting forces will remain under the command of their own national commanders, but be under the operational control of the commander being supported.
   c. Combined operations. For combined operations, a Combined Forces Commander (CFC) will be appointed and will be provided with a staff for a Combined HQ. The CFC will have operational command of all forces allocated to the operation, and may be assisted by a Combined Air Forces Commander (CAFC).

SECTION 3: LEADERSHIP AND DISCIPLINE

Leadership

1. Because of the very nature of ATOPS and because of the many problems peculiar to these types of operations, very much more is expected from the junior leader than during conventional operations.
2. The enemy very seldom presents a good target to the military forces because he avoids contact but strikes violently, unexpectedly and at a time and place of his own choice.
3. To seek out and destroy this elusive enemy, the conduct of ATOPS is based on a pattern of small units or elements, i.e., patrols, who have the task of locating and subsequently eliminating the enemy. This results in the major share of operations
being conducted and led by junior leaders.

4. Frequently these small elements or patrols are required to operate on their own away from their main bases for long periods, or to man isolated lookouts or observation posts. This means that these junior leaders very often have to make rapid decisions, on-the-spot planning, and execute the task with whatever is available in the way of men, weapons and material.

5. Because of the nature of operations as described above, it frequently happens that the junior commander is the only authority representing the military forces in a large area. Thus the junior leader is not only a commander, but may also, because of his position, liaise with civil authorities, local population, etc. This is an additional responsibility and calls for a high standard of tact, understanding, diplomacy and sound judgment on the part of the junior leader.

6. For these junior leaders to be successful and to be able to successfully lead their men under these very trying conditions, the following are essential for good leaders and leadership:
   a. A very high standard of training and self-confidence.
   b. Rapid acclimatization to local conditions and circumstances.
   c. A high sense of responsibility and the ability to cooperate and communicate with other services, arms and civil authorities.
   d. The ability to think clearly and logically and a sound knowledge of procedures and battle drills at the appropriate level.
   e. The ability to instill confidence in subordinates.
   f. Sound initiative and flexible mind which will stand them in good stead under all conditions.

7. The ability to maintain a high standard of discipline and morale at all times under all conditions.

**Discipline**

1. This is an important aspect and must at all times be given very careful consideration. Because of the nature of ATOPS and because, very often, the military forces may operate under extreme provocation, a very high degree of self-discipline is essential at all levels. If of a high standard, it will guarantee the correct relationship between commanders and their subordinates and between the military forces and the population.

2. A high degree of discipline must also be exercised in respect to the following:
   a. **Security.** This includes the safeguarding of plans, orders, maps, future intentions, the correct use of radio, telephone and other means of telecommunications.
   b. **Movement.** Classification of roads, protection of military as well as civilian convoys and of airfields, railways, harbors and docks, etc.
   c. **Operational discipline.** Correct drills and procedures regarding men and commanders being adhered to in operational areas, i.e., during patrolling or ambushing or in the temporary or patrol base, etc. All personnel must be armed at all times and good spoor (track) discipline must be enforced.
SECTION 4: LOGISTICS IN ATOPS

Introduction

1. Sound logistics are vital for the successful conduct of any operation. Effective logistical planning can only be achieved if the logistic staffs have an intimate knowledge of operational thinking. Therefore, continuous and close liaison between operational and logistic staffs is essential.

2. This section of the ATOPS Manual is designed to give unit and sub-unit commanders a general understanding of some aspects of logistics in ATOPS operations, and to list responsibilities. The aspects covered are:
   a. Supply, which includes all commodities required by a unit to live and fight while deployed on ATOPS operations (rations, ammunition, POL, etc.).
   b. Maintenance and recovery.
   c. Casualty evacuation and hospitalization.
   d. Transportation.

3. ATOPS operations demand flexibility in logistics as well as a clear delegation of responsibilities because of:
   a. The wider dispersion of units and sub-units, which results in greater responsibilities being placed on commanders.
   b. The increased vulnerability of logistical units and lines of communication, which creates a need for stronger security measures.
   c. The high cost of supplying widely dispersed units, which creates the need to exploit local resources.
   d. The unsuitability of a system which provides supplies on a single commodity basis, and thus the need for a method which employs the principle of composite supplies.
   e. The vulnerability of and limitations to ground movement, which could result in the increased use of air transportation.
   f. The lack of immediate medical facilities for casualties, which could result in the increased use of air evacuation.
   g. The difficulties in replacement of defective items, which demand the meticulous maintenance of all stores and equipment.
   h. The mobile nature of ATOPS operations, which creates the need for elements to be self-sufficient for longer periods.

4. Unit and sub-unit commanders will be advised of logistics arrangements by means of administrative orders. During ATOPS operations units and sub-units will have logistics elements attached for immediate support, where such attachment is considered necessary.

Supply

1. A clear division of responsibilities is important if supply in the field is to function effectively.
2. The logistic staffs are responsible for determining:
   a. The means of distributing unit requirements.
   b. The frequency of resupply.
   c. The level of reserves to be held.
   d. The location and type of storage, including the establishment of dumps if required.
   e. The degree of local purchase possible or necessary.
   f. The source from which stocks are to be acquired.

3. The unit or sub-unit commander is responsible for ensuring that:
   a. He understands where and from whom the unit or sub-unit will be supplied.
   b. His unit or sub-unit holds sufficient reserves, bearing in mind the frequency of resupply. He provides adequate protected storage facilities to prevent loss of or damage to supplies.
   c. He determines the extent to which local resources can be utilized.

4. Resupply during ATOPS operations may become difficult, therefore the maximum conservation of all supplies must be exercised.

**Maintenance and Recovery**

1. Maintenance in the field includes both preventive measures against damage, and the repair of all unit and personal equipment. Due to replacement difficulties in ATOPS operations, every effort must be made to prevent damage and deterioration of equipment. Furthermore, defective vehicles and equipment should be repaired in situations wherever possible.

2. Recovery is the term applied to the back loading of defective vehicles and equipment which cannot be repaired "in situ." In certain cases where recovery is not practicable, consideration should be given to cannibalization and destruction so as to deny the enemy use of any abandoned material. An effort should be made to leave the "battlefield" clean, as damaged components may be of use to the enemy, even to the extent of gaining a psychological advantage from the knowledge of his own successes and also to deny public knowledge through the press media.

3. In addition to the foregoing, the logistic staffs are responsible for:
   a. Sending repair teams forward if first line resources are not capable of rectifying the defective items.
   b. The recovery of all vehicles and equipment that cannot be repaired "in situ."
   c. The back loading of unserviceable vehicles and equipment to the nearest repair agency.

4. In addition to the general responsibilities outlined, the unit or sub-unit commanders are to:
   a. Ensure that they are aware of the various repair channels and agencies available, including civilian contractors, and the procedures to be followed.
b. Provide protection for repair and recovery teams when necessary.

Casualty Evacuation and Hospitalization

1. In ATOPS operations the wide dispersion of units and sub-units will make the immediate treatment of casualties difficult. It will be rarely possible to decentralize available medical personnel to provide the requisite staff at sub-unit level.
2. The logistic staffs are responsible for:
   a. The general medical policy.
   b. The designation of evacuation routes and means.
   c. Hospitalization.
3. Unit or sub-unit commanders are to be fully conversant with:
   a. The procedure for the evacuation of casualties both by air and ground.
   b. The procedure for the resupply of medical stores.

Transportation

1. The replacement of transport during ATOPS operations may be a difficult as well as time-consuming process and one which may affect operational planning. The efficient maintenance of all modes of transport is therefore essential for ensuring maximum availability and efficiency.
2. It must be borne in mind that route classification and enemy obstacles may limit the use of road transport.
3. Where practicable, consideration is to be given to the use of inland waterways. This method of transport may, at times, be more economical and secure.
4. Logistic staffs are responsible for determining and providing transport requirements which units and sub-units need over and above their normal establishment. This could include:
   a. Road and rail transport.
   b. Air transport, including the necessary ground facilities.
   c. Sea and inland water transport.
5. Unit and sub-unit commanders are responsible for:
   a. The efficient maintenance of all modes of transport at their disposal.
   b. Understanding the procedures for requisitioning/hiring non-military vehicles.
   c. Providing route clearing and escort parties for the protection of resupply convoys.
   d. Understanding the procedure for requesting all forms of air transport. This includes being conversant with the preparation of landing zones (LZs), dropping zones (DZs) and airstrips. Further information is contained in this manual.
SECTION 5: CONCLUSION

During all ATOPS, the junior leader plays a very important role. The success of all ATOPS depends upon a high standard of leadership and a very efficient command and control system. Commanders at all levels carry heavy responsibilities, especially at the lower levels. Consequently, commanders and leaders must be specialists in their own right and must be very carefully prepared.
Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence

SECTION 1: GENERAL

1. This chapter deals with the more important aspects of intelligence and counter-intelligence during ATOPS.

Importance of Intelligence

1. During conventional operations the enemy is clearly defined and easily identifiable. The nature of his Organization and equipment, together with the relative ease of identification, facilitates the intelligence personnel's task of predicting future enemy actions. A major characteristic of ATOPS, however, is that the terrorist merges with or may be part of a local population. Enemy action is likely to be characterized by guerrilla tactics employing equipment requiring virtually no large-scale identifiable preparation.
2. During ATOPS therefore, a more intensive intelligence effort is demanded in order to provide commanders with the detailed and timely intelligence required. Intelligence concerning the local population becomes a prime requirement. An efficient intelligence system is essential to ensure that ATOPS are successful and there is no waste of time, manpower or resources.

Importance of Counter-Intelligence

1. The value of effective counter-intelligence cannot be overemphasized. To offset his inferiority in manpower, equipment and resources, the enemy relies on surprise to achieve success. The degree of surprise he attains is in direct proportion to the amount of intelligence he is able to collect. Unless the enemy's intelligence collection is countered, he will be able to concentrate his limited means with impunity against vulnerable areas and where reaction by forces will be weakest.
2. Effective counter-intelligence during ATOPS is again complicated by the enemy infiltrating the local population. This can facilitate his collection efforts and prejudice the counter-intelligence task. Sound cooperation between all affected forces, services and civil authorities assumes even greater importance.

Responsibility Of Commanders

1. Commanders at all levels are responsible for the coordination and processing of intelligence required for the planning and conduct of operations. This responsibility embraces the following:
a. The collection of information.
b. The collation of information.
c. The dissemination of intelligence to all levels.
d. Those counter-intelligence measures required to ensure military security within a commander's sphere of responsibility.

2. Commanders must decide whether to react immediately upon information/intelligence received, or whether to delay reaction until additional information is obtained. Commanders must ensure that their actions do not prematurely betray the information they have at their disposal, as untimely action could compromise the success of future operations. Successful utilization of intelligence requires experience and a thorough knowledge of the enemy in the area.

3. **Coordination.** The successful conduct of ATOPS dictates close cooperation and interaction between security forces, civil authorities and the local population. It also demands the coordination of the efforts of the various organizations and agencies contributing to the overall intelligence effort in the area. Duplication of gaps in the intelligence effort resulting from poor coordination could neutralize the effectiveness of the whole intelligence effort. Military forces are unable to collect all the information they require; on the other hand, they may acquire information which does not directly concern them. This emphasizes the need for the centralization and coordination of the entire intelligence effort.

**SECTION 2: INTELLIGENCE**

**Nature of Information**

1. In ATOPS the collection of information should concentrate on:
   a. The internal enemy and, if possible, the external support.
   b. Other important factors such as:
      i. Population.
      ii. Terrain.
      iii. Climatic and meteorological conditions.

2. **Internal enemy.** It is essential to know:
      i. 1. Organization and strength.
      ii. 2. Means at his disposal.
      iii. 3. Tactical doctrine and procedure.
      iv. 4. Operational capabilities.
      v. 5. Combat efficiency and morale.
      vi. 6. Intelligence and liaison systems. The means used, e.g., couriers, post office, etc.
      vii. 7. Standard of training.
   b. Leaders, their personalities, operational effectiveness, normal hideouts/bases, relatives, friends and lovers.
   c. Political, psychological and social objectives and activities; propaganda
methods and infiltration into various organizations.

d. Economic means and availability of food.

e. Physical condition and standard of health.

f. Professed or proclaimed ideology.

g. Secret organizations.

h. Bases which are, or could possibly be, used.

3. **External support.**

a. External aid its nature, importance and scope.

b. Training bases, their location and strength.

c. Procedures and routes used.

d. Contact and links with local population (personalities and method of communication).

4. **Population.** A thorough knowledge of the population, with emphasis on the following points, is necessary:

   a. Customs and dress.

   b. Tribes, languages and dialects.

   c. Religious, social and tribal organizations, including chiefs, advisers and organizers.

   d. Political tendencies.

   e. Causes of discontent and antagonism. Hopes and desires, fears and frustrations.

   f. Existing relations with the authorities, and with the enemy.

   g. Economic resources and limitations.

   h. Standard of health.

5. **Terrain.** In order to neutralize any initial advantages the enemy may have resulting from his "perfect identification with the terrain," it is vital to obtain, as soon as possible, a thorough knowledge of the terrain. Points which should receive consideration are:

   a. Areas most likely to be used as bases which would usually have the following characteristics:

      i. Difficult access.

      ii. Cover from aerial reconnaissance.

      iii. Locations favoring defense and offering covered withdrawal routes.

      iv. Availability of water.

   b. Most likely enemy target areas, e.g., installations.

   c. Roads, tracks and paths, including those leading out of the area with special reference to areas bordering on hostile countries.

   d. Location and capabilities of bridges, ferries and obligatory crossing points.

   e. Areas where troop movement will be difficult.

   f. Location of villages, farms and other settlements.

   g. Crops, their cycles and the possibility of being advantageously used by the enemy or by government forces.

   h. Possible sources of water. Suitable locations for military bases.

6. **Climatic and environmental conditions.** It is of importance to gather data concerning conditions which may restrict the mobility of troops or which may enable the enemy to carry out surprise actions. Information should therefore be
Sources of Information

1. There are numerous sources of information. Some of the more significant are:
   a. Population. The enemy will often live among the population, and thus these people (provided their confidence and trust is won through adequate and efficient protection) will be one of the best sources of information.
   b. Discontented elements. Civil servants, former chiefs or tribesmen who, for political or personal reasons, appear to be discontented or disillusioned with the subversive movement.
   c. Captured personnel, documents and material. These form vital sources of information. It is therefore essential that the circumstances of the capture should be recorded. Details of the record should include when, where, how, and by whom interrogated, as well as the gist of initial or combat interrogation. These sources of information should be handled as follows:
      i. Captured personnel. Personnel who surrender, or who are captured, are one of the most important sources of information in ATOPS, not only because of the knowledge they have, but also because of the documents or material they may have in their possession. It is important that prisoners be retained for the shortest possible time by the capturing unit before being sent back to undergo more detailed interrogation. Care should be taken that captured terrorists are not given an opportunity to communicate with each other.
      ii. Captured documents. These will not normally provide information for immediate exploitation by the troops who capture them. They may, however, be of great value to higher headquarters. Therefore, after a brief perusal they should be sent, as quickly as possible, to the next higher headquarters.
      iii. Captured material. Is generally of tactical and technical value, either of immediate or future interest. It is important to verify origin and manufacture.
   d. Maps and aerial photography. These are useful for obtaining knowledge of the terrain. Air photographs taken at periodic intervals are particularly useful for the detection of new tracks and changes in cultivation or settlements.
   e. Radio transmissions. These constitute another source of information of considerable value. Sophisticated equipment and well-trained specialists are necessary to exploit this source. in addition, radio intercepts from hostile neighboring countries may well provide information regarding terrorist activity.
f. Local authorities. These may be a valuable source of information by virtue of their detailed and intimate knowledge of an area.

Collecting Agencies

1. The collection and exploitation of information should be centralized at the level at which the ATOPS are planned and directed. Commanders at all levels must vigorously pursue an active policy of collecting information. Information will not be exclusively obtained by the military forces and should be acquired from all available collecting agencies. Some of these are:
   a. Reconnaissance patrols.
   b. Special agents.
   c. Local authorities.
   d. Observation posts (OP's).

2. Reconnaissance patrols. Reconnaissance is an excellent way of gaining information. The entire area of interest should be covered by means of land and air patrols. Special emphasis should be given to roads, tracks, possible areas for base camps, and supply/arms caches. Patrolling must be undertaken by day and by night and should be intensified not reduced, during periods of bad weather (rain, fog, etc.). All patrols should be in radio contact with the local population to gain information.

3. Special agents. The employment and control of special agents is normally a police function. The use of agents by military forces should be in full and constant cooperation and coordination with the police. Agents are infiltrated into or obtained from the enemy or from the population. Information gained from agents should be carefully compared with that received from other source. It is extremely important that the activities of specialized agencies be supplemented by units operating in the field, who would be trained to regard the collection and prompt reporting of information as one of their prime duties.

4. Local authorities. The knowledge which they possess of the terrain and population should be fully exploited. In addition they could be tasked with gaining specific information.

5. Observation posts (OP's).
   a. One method of operating clandestinely which has evolved from operations has been the use of observation posts. During the dry season, when the operational area is almost entirely burnt out, the use of OP's is difficult due to the lack of cover. During this period the use of OP's is reduced while the searching of kraals and isolated thick areas is increased. To do this effectively, African soldiers should be used to supplement European units wherever possible. This overcomes the communication problem when searching villages, questioning locals, and when doing listening patrols at night. Apart from this, the African soldier understands the local inhabitants better and is therefore more likely to pick up any unusual or suspicious actions.
   b. Because of the extensive use of OP's by military forces (14F), all locals and terrorists soon become aware of MF using high ground for OP's. Every
effort should therefore be made to remain clandestine and effective. To achieve this:

i. Choose unlikely OP positions (i.e., thick cover instead of high ground).

ii. When occupying OP's, walk in by night.

iii. Do not debus within 5,000 meters of OP positions to be occupied.

iv. Take precautions to ensure no tracks are left, i.e., use civilian footwear, wear socks over footwear, don't move over cultivated land or on well-used paths.

v. Do not stay in one OP for too long.

vi. Use small, lightly equipped groups. Only two men should occupy the OP while the remainder of the stick is concealed nearby.

vii. Restrict movement on OP's to a bare minimum.

viii. Observe something specific, e.g., suspect kraal.

ix. Where necessary, use two-man OP's in immediate proximity to kraals.

x. Use night-viewing equipment where possible.

xi. All listening OP's should have an African element, where possible.

6. Maximum advantage must be taken of a unit's detailed knowledge of an area. To achieve this it will be necessary for a unit to maintain detailed records of all information it has gained concerning its area. This will ensure continuity and will provide a valuable source of information when units are rotated.

Conclusion

1. One of the greatest difficulties that intelligence staff have to contend with during operations is incomplete and vague, and sometimes inaccurate and contradictory, reports on incidents or enemy activity. On other occasions reports are considerably delayed. Therefore, it cannot be too strongly stressed that the speedy and accurate passage of information from all levels can be vital to an operation.

SECTION 3: COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

Introduction

1. In the field of counterintelligence, military security is of the greatest interest and importance to the military forces. The security of the borders, harbors, airports, travelers and baggage, which also has great importance, is the responsibility of the police.

2. Security is a subject that is not purely the concern of experts, but that of everyone. The expert will make a specialist contribution to security, but the success of his work will depend largely upon the efficiency, alertness and common sense of the average officer and soldier.

3. It is not a practicable proposition to station specialists in every place where
classified information is held, where vital equipment or stores are located, or where people are susceptible to subversion. Great reliance is therefore placed on the cooperation of individuals who must perfectly understand the importance of counter-intelligence with respect to security.

Military Security

1. **Military security**, which is one of the facets of counter-intelligence, is concerned with the imposition of controls by the military within the military. These controls take the form of:
   a. Orders and instructions.
   b. Physical security means.
   c. Screening of service, personnel, when necessary.

2. **Constant vigilance** is necessary if security is to be preserved. The terrorist with his numerous informers will be quick to exploit any breaches by security forces. Thus the education of all ranks in the dangers of the indirect attack and in the reasons for security orders and physical security measures is essential. Certain measures are therefore necessary to prevent the enemy from gaining information:
   a. **Denial measures**. These are measures aimed at denying the enemy the opportunity of obtaining information. Some examples of denial measures, and circumstances which may lead to a breach of security, are:
      i. Every military person is responsible to his commander for the safeguarding of information.
      ii. Conversations on classified subjects which may be overheard in public places, or on the telephone or radio. Some of the worst examples have taken place in messes and bars within the hearing of barmen and other unauthorized persons. Individuals often boast of their position, achievements and knowledge.
      iii. Discussions of operational or classified matters with wives, relatives and friends are not permitted. All these are unauthorized persons and such matters are not their concern.
      iv. Routine should often be changed, e.g., relief of guards.
      v. The techniques and procedures in the mounting and execution of operations should periodically be modified, thus avoiding repetition which may facilitate the identification of military force activities.
      vi. The number of persons involved in the planning of an operation should be restricted. The "need to know" and "need to hold" principles with regard to classified material should be applied; this applies particularly to operation orders.
      vii. Avoid holding extraordinary conferences/orders which may reveal that an operation is to be mounted.
      viii. Prior abnormal air and land reconnaissance should be avoided.
      ix. Ensure that personnel participating in an operation do not carry any personal or official documents besides identification papers.
      x. Detain all persons encountered in the objective area, or its immediate vicinity until after the operation.
xi. Containers of classified documents should never be left unlocked and unattended.

xii. Classified documents should not be left unattended, thus permitting them to be read, stolen or photographed by unauthorized persons.

xiii. Classified documents should be controlled through an efficient registry system.

xiv. Classified documents should only be held in places where their security is guaranteed.

xv. Classified waste should be safeguarded prior to destruction.

xvi. The access to military establishments and buildings should be strictly controlled. All persons working within military installations should be security vetted and issued with identification cards. A visitors' registry should be maintained.

xvii. Keys to offices in which classified material is held or displayed should be strictly controlled.

xviii. Security clearance should be obtained for lectures and articles before their delivery or publication.

xix. No classified letters should be included in "Daily Files" which are circulated.

b. **Deception measures.** These are measures designed to mislead the enemy. Some of the steps which may be taken during the planning and execution of an operation are:

i. Start rumors, giving the enemy false information concerning your plans, which may justify preparations for the intended operation.

ii. Information concerning areas of interest should not be restricted to the area of immediate concern. Simultaneous gathering of information will help to conceal the real intentions.

iii. Guides or local trackers should be obtained as late as possible and should not be restricted to those who come from, or have knowledge of the objective area.

iv. Advantage should be taken of the night and unfavorable weather conditions to mount operations.

v. Deployments in false directions should be initiated. These could coincide with the deployment of the force which is to undertake the operation.

vi. Openly simulate the unloading of vehicles and secretly continue with the deployment.

vii. Carry out reconnaissance in areas other than the area of interest.

viii. Artillery or air force preparatory fire may be laid down in areas other than, but in close proximity to, the chosen objectives.

3. **Press.** Because of public desire for news, the presence or intrusion of the press must be expected. In the interests of security it is therefore necessary to control their activities. Detailed below is a guide for handling members of the press:

a. Whatever their level, commanders are to adhere to the directives issued by higher authority.

b. Press members should always present their credentials in the execution of
their duty. The purpose of their visit should always be made known by their higher authority. In all cases press representatives must be accompanied by a duly qualified officer or non-commissioned officer. c. They should only be granted freedom of action compatible with security. d. Relations with the press should be cordial without, however, divulging information on subjects which, for security reasons, should not be discussed. e. Unless authorized, press conferences should not be held. Questions asked should be written down and answers only provided after approval. f. Films and photographs should be strictly controlled. Restricted items and installations which should not be photographed should be predetermined.

   a. Censorship of correspondence of military personnel will only be implemented after a government decision.
   b. Personnel should be constantly reminded that they should not include details of a classified nature in their personal correspondence.
Employment of Forces

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SECTION 1: GENERAL

1. Military success in ATOPS is dependent on the correct use of well-balanced (but predominantly infantry) ground forces against the enemy. This force will need the support of the air force to fulfill its task, and, when applicable, that of the navy.
2. The primary role of the army is to seek out and destroy the enemy. This is done by isolating him from the rest of the community, and be preventing him from taking sanctuary in neighboring areas, thus forcing him out into the open and into battle.
3. In the initial stages of ATOPS, the army must be prepared to operate in sub-unit and smaller groups. This calls for good junior leadership, high morale and proper training. Success at platoon level will invariably determine the success of the whole operation.

SECTION 2: INFANTRY

1. Infantry will invariably be the dominant arm during ATOPS because:
   a. The inherent characteristics of infantry make them ideally suited for employment on any unconventional task, under any circumstances, with or without the support of other arms.
b. The nature of the operations, terrain, climate and the characteristics and tactics of an irregular enemy will often make the employment of other arms tactically impracticable and uneconomical.

2. The roles in which infantry are employed are described in detail in the following chapters of this manual.

SECTION 3: ARMOUR

General

1. Because of their characteristics, tanks are generally unsuitable for employment in ATOPS. Therefore this manual deals only with armored cars and infantry combat vehicles. It should be noted, however, that some of the tasks mentioned could equally well be carried out by tanks, especially in urban areas.

2. Restrictions. The use of armored vehicles in ATOPS is restricted by the following factors:
   a. Vulnerability. The nature of the terrain normally favors the use of even homemade weapons against armor. This calls for increased infantry protection.
   b. Dispersed deployment of units. This factor causes a heavy burden on the supply of fuel and complicates the proper maintenance of armored vehicles.
   c. Lack of mobility. In parts of the country, the vegetation is so dense that armored vehicles are restricted to roads and tracks. If forced to go cross-country, they have a very limited field of vision and movement will be very slow.

Armored Care

1. Tasks. Armored cars have been used successfully in ATOPS in various countries. Their tasks may include:
   a. Show of force. Armored cars can be used to show force in a certain area, or to make a sudden appearance at a trouble spot.
   b. Protection of sensitive points. Armored cars in cooperation with infantry can be used to protect sensitive points. Thorough coordination between infantry and armor is essential.
   c. Road escort duties:
      i. Armored cars are suitable for escorting convoys.
      ii. Armored cars used for this task provide protection and support.
   d. Patrolling. The following can be included:
      i. Road patrols to keep roads open.
      ii. Patrols in certain areas to carry out specific tasks, for example, control of the population of an isolated community.
      iii. Boundary or area isolation patrols, including mobile patrols during
border control operations.
iv. Patrolling of certain areas as part of an encircling cordon, curfew, or controlled area operation.
e. Road blocks. Armored cars will normally establish emergency road blocks, and road blocks which prohibit or control entrance, during a specific operation.
f. Offensive action. Armored car weapons can be used for neutralizing or destructive fire when offensive action is required. They can be used independently or in support of the infantry. Normal fire and movement tactics are used. The direct fire capabilities of armored car weapons are ideal to support infantry in close proximity to the enemy.
g. Illumination. Armored cars are provided with flexible and/or coupled spotlights and could also be fitted with other illuminating equipment, including infrared, if so desired.

2. Additional tasks. The following tasks can also be carried out where sufficient armored cars are available:
   a. The provision or supplementation of the communication systems.
   b. Traffic control.
   c. Reinforcement of threatened areas.
   d. Encircling operations.
      i. Form part of the encircling force.
      ii. Be employed as stops.
      iii. Patrol the area behind the main encirclement positions.
   e. Provision of a mobile reserve.
   f. Provision of fire support for infantry attacks and destruction of enemy strongholds.

**Armored Personnel Carriers (APC)/Infantry Combat Vehicles (ICV)**

1. Tasks. Mechanized infantry can be used to carry out all of the tasks required of normal infantry in ATOPS when dismounted. Due to their vulnerability in close country the employment of APCs/ICVs should be restricted. However, their characteristics permit them to operate as follows:
   a. Rapid movement into, through or near objectives or trouble spots. APCs/ICVs enable troops to be moved speedily and with comparative immunity from distant assembly or forming-up places and be delivered, fit and fresh, in or near the trouble spot.
   b. Use as a fire support base. When in close contact with the enemy and when the infantry have debused, the APCs/ICVs could be used to provide supporting fire to the infantry.
   c. Roving operations (mobile columns). During ATOPS, units will often be responsible for security duties over large areas in which disorders may break out simultaneously in several centers. Mechanized infantry can be used to provide mobile columns to:
      i. Show the flag and advertise the presence of troops in certain areas.
      ii. Suppress, by prompt offensive action, any disturbances beyond the
control of the local civil authority.
iii. Control an area in which troops are not normally stationed.
iv. Be a reserve.
v. Patrol an area or given stretch of road.
d. Protection of sensitive points. For this task the infantry will be debussed 
deployed while available APCs/ICVs can be used as follows:
i. By day.
a. To cover the sensitive point and/or approaches with fire.
b. To patrol certain areas or stretches of road around the 
sensitive point.
ii. By night. Sited in positions to illuminate the sensitive point, or 
certain approaches to it, with headlights and to cover these 
approaches with machine-gun fire.
e. Road escort duties. In large scale ATOPS, convoys, administrative 
echelons, or vehicles will invariably require some form of armored escort. 
APCs/ICVs fully or partially manned are suitable for the task.
f. Shock action. The appearance of mechanized infantry with their 
APCs/ICVs on the scene of a disorder may in itself have the necessary 
salutary effect on terrorists or rioters.

SECTION 4: CAVALRY

General

1. Characteristics. Experience has taught us that cavalry can be effectively used in 
fairly open country to reach inaccessible and remote areas. The characteristics of 
cavalry are:
a. Radius of action. An increased radius of action for patrols, especially 
where units have large areas of responsibility.
b. Speed. Mounted patrols have greater speed than normal foot patrols.
c. Surprise. The speed at which mounted patrols can move may lead to the 
achievement of surprise.
d. Shock effect. Speed of movement and surprise may have a shock effect on 
the enemy. This will also result in a psychological effect on the enemy, 
especially if the mounted men are able to engage the enemy with fire while 
on the move.
e. Ability to follow up. Because of greater speed, mobility and endurance, 
mounted units have a better follow-up capability than troops on foot.
f. Endurance. Mounted patrols, with the addition of pack animals, can be 
self-supporting for periods of up to ten days. It must be borne in mind, 
however, that the addition of pack animals will reduce the speed and 
mobility of the mounted patrols.
g. Psychological effect on local population. It is a generally accepted fact 
that a mounted man has a psychological advantage over a dismounted 
man.
h. **Dual role.** Depending on terrain and local conditions and the tactical requirement, cavalry units can be employed in the dismounted role. For example, the mounted unit can reach an area which is inaccessible to vehicles, etc., dismount and then carry out operations as a dismounted force.

i. **Adaptability to terrain.** The movement of mounted patrols need not necessarily be confined to roads, tracts, etc. They have the capability of moving rapidly over open terrain and with ease over most other types of terrain.

j. **Ability to sense danger.** The horses instinct will often provide the rider with early warning of danger or anything unusual.

k. **Carrying capabilities.** The horse is capable of carrying loads that are not usually carried by a man.

2. **Capabilities.** The capabilities of mounted patrols are as follows:
   a. Mounted patrols can operate up to distances of 150 to 250 kilometers with relative ease in most types of terrain.
   b. These patrols can move at an average speed of six to seven kilometers per hour in most types of terrain.
   c. Mounted patrols can be on the move for six to eight hours daily, giving a daily operational radius of approximately 30 to 50 kilometers. For maximum performance they should rest one day in four.
   d. They can be self-supporting for periods of up to five days. This period can be increased up to ten days by making use of pack animals.
   e. They are useful in capturing and/or rounding up scattered elements of the enemy or population.

3. **Limitations.** These are as follows:
   a. Difficulty in moving through dense bush.
   b. Difficulty in moving through marshy areas, swamps or muddy areas.
   c. Slowness in crossing major water obstacles, e.g., large rivers.
   d. Increased logistic support of cavalry units because of the quantities of fodder and water that have to be carried to provide for the horses.
   e. Difficulty in maintaining silence. Natural horse noises, such as blowing through their nostrils and the jingle of equipment, make a silent approach difficult.
   f. Certain geographical areas may be denied to horse-mounted patrols because of certain animal diseases or sicknesses, e.g., areas of tsetse fly infestation.

**Tactical Employment**

1. From experience gained it has been found that mounted units can be employed on the following tasks:
   a. Patrolling. This can be in the form of long-range or short-distance patrols either as fighting or reconnaissance patrols.
   b. Follow-up operations. Because of its characteristics, the horse can be effectively employed in the follow-up role.
c. In support of other units, mounted patrols can be used to support other units either as additional patrols in the normal patrol program or by patrolling normally distant and inaccessible areas.
d. Control of population. Because of their characteristics, mounted patrols may be used for certain aspects of population control and for visiting populated areas to maintain contact with the locals.

2. Troops employed as mounted patrols must be trained to fire their weapons while mounted. This will assist, should the enemy appear suddenly, in having a shock effect on the enemy and in gaining the initiative. In this case, elements not actually involved in the action can rapidly react and surround or pursue the enemy.

3. It must be generally accepted, however, that the horse is merely a means of conveyance and that normally the troops will dismount and fight on foot. In this case, adequate precautionary measures must be taken to safeguard the horses and men detailed to remain with them against possible enemy action.

4. Movement of mounted patrols must not be limited or restricted to roads, paths, etc. The commander must select his own routes, direction, etc., for normal patrolling. While moving, the patrol should not be bunched but spread out, the formation being dictated by the nature of the terrain. This will reduce the effect of ambushes, mines and booby traps.

5. Mounted patrols should always operate over a large front and in depth. It may often be necessary to superimpose their patrol program over that of the normal foot patrols, thereby ensuring better coverage and a greater area.

SECTION 5: ARTILLERY

1. **Advantages.** Field artillery offers certain distinct advantages over air support. These are as follows:
   a. The use of guns is not restricted by bad weather.
   b. Artillery can operate equally well by day or night.
   c. Artillery is capable of a more sustained effort, and when required, can give round-the-clock support over several days.

2. **Limitations.** The employment of field artillery in its conventional role will often be restricted by:
   a. The nature of the operations which:
      i. May render the employment of artillery impractical owing to the difficulty of locating suitable targets.
      ii. For legal reasons (minimum force), may preclude the use of artillery altogether.
   b. The lack of suitable roads and deployment areas. In difficult terrain this will prevent the placing of the weapon within firing range of the target, unless the weapon is air-transportable by helicopter.
   c. The problem of observation. The control of fire by means of ground observation will always prove difficult in bushy terrain. Therefore, more use would have to be made of air observation posts. Predicted shooting would become the rule and not the exception.
d. The proximity of own troops to the target, as infantry contact with the enemy is invariably made at distances within the danger zone of the weapon.

3. **Tasks.** Artillery can be employed in its conventional role to carry out the following tasks:
   a. **Flushing.** In difficult terrain the enemy can be flushed by artillery fire.
   b. **Harassing.** Harassing fire can be used to keep terrorists on the move when their whereabouts are known, or to harass them generally by methodically searching an area.
   c. **Blocking escape routes.** When troops are engaged in follow-up operations after a contact or incident, artillery fire can be used to dissuade the enemy from using certain likely escape routes.
   d. **Deception.** Artillery fire into an area away from that in which troops are operating may deceive the enemy as to army intentions, giving them a false sense of security and covering the noise of movement made by troops.
   e. **Destructive shoots.** Artillery fire can be used to destroy located enemy bases, hideouts, barricades, houses or huts.
   f. **Counter-bombardment.** Artillery fire directed against enemy mortar and artillery positions.
   g. **Illumination.** By firing illuminating shells at night, areas can be illuminated for short periods.
   h. **Target indication.** Colored smoke can be employed to indicate targets to strike aircraft.
   i. **Show of force.** The value of artillery in this role must not be forgotten. Guns located in populated areas and firing in full view of the inhabitants may have a marked effect on civilian morale.
   j. **Protection of convoys.** Artillery units can be employed to provide convoy protection by providing fire support to the convoy covering the whole route from a static position, or from preselected positions should it be a long route, or by accompanying the convoy. An artillery officer with the necessary communications and assistance will accompany the convoy, acting as a forward observation officer. His task will be to call for the required artillery supporting fire. This fire support can either be preplanned or impromptu.
   k. **Border control.** In certain cases and certain areas it may be possible to use artillery fire to cover possible crossing places or known areas through which the enemy normally moves once he has crossed the border. This type of task does create certain problems for the artillery such as finding suitable observation posts or accidentally firing across the border into the other territory. With the introduction of sensory devices to detect enemy movement, it is possible to have the artillery fire units linked to these sensory devices and providing responsive fire should movement be detected.
   l. **Weapon locating.** Mortar locating radar could be employed in the more advanced stages of ATOPS.
m. Leaflet dropping. The carrier shell can be used for the distribution of propaganda leaflets.

n. Covering fire. Under certain special and unusual circumstances for ATOPS, covering fire from field artillery may be possible. Particular consideration must be given to the need for security (e.g., ranging shots) and the proximity of stop groups.

4. Local protection. Security arrangements for the protection and security of gun positions, command posts, observation posts and wagon lines must always be made. Artillery personnel must be trained to undertake their own local protection.

SECTION 6: ENGINEERS

1. As in all other forms of warfare, the engineers will be in great demand, particularly as enemy activities expand.

2. Tasks. The primary tasks for the engineers are:
   a. Construction, improvement and maintenance of roads, bridges, and military bases.
   b. Construction and improvement of defensive works including minefields in and around sensitive points, including booby traps.
   c. Repair of damage caused by enemy sabotage.
   d. Water supply.
   e. Construction and maintenance of temporary landing grounds and strips.
   f. Assistance in crossing water obstacles.
   g. Clearing and neutralizing enemy mines and booby traps.

3. The engineers may also be called upon to repair and maintain public utility services such as waterworks, power stations, etc., and assist the civil administration in tribal areas to provide basic amenities to the local population.

SECTION 7: TELECOMMUNICATIONS

1. Units deployed over large areas, and the vulnerability of line communications, make the radio an essential means of communicating.

2. Dispersed deployment and the type of terrain call for great ingenuity on the part of the radio operator, and relay stations on vantage points (including aircraft) must be regarded as common practice.

3. Deployment of bases and headquarters are often dictated by communication requirements, and commanders at all levels must seek the advice of their signals representatives on this matter.

4. Climatic extremes adversely affect the life of radio batteries, and require proper planning and replenishing arrangements.

5. Voice procedure and security cannot be ignored in this type of operation. It is known that terrorists have been using standard commercial radios for interception purposes, and might very well be monitoring army transmissions.
SECTION 8: LOGISTICS

1. The logistic support of widely dispersed units in small groups cannot be done by conventional resupply systems, and the points listed below should be considered in planning operations against terrorists.

2. Each isolated unit, regardless of its size, must be made as self-sufficient as possible. This includes resupply, medical and maintenance aspects.

3. When possible, maximum use must be made of local resources, but not at the expense of the civilian population of the area.

4. All logistic moves in an area of operations will call for protection and escorts -- this may heavily tax a commander's combat resources.

5. The air force may be called upon to replenish supplies (air-landed or dropped) on a permanent basis to units deployed in inaccessible areas. Casualty evacuation by air will also receive a high priority.

SECTION 9: AIR FORCE

1. It should be the constant aim in all ATOPS to make full use of the advantages that stem from the ability to use air power with little enemy interference. During ATOPS the air force can provide a quick reaction to requests for offensive air operations, casualty evacuation and logistic support.

SECTION 10: PARATROOPS

1. Paratroops are basically infantry troops, but have the special capability of being deployed to their area of operation or onto their objective by means of the parachute. There are, however, a number of advantages and disadvantages when deployed by parachute.
   a. **Advantages**
      i. Surprise.
      ii. Shock action.
      iii. Mobility provided by the aircraft to reach distant objectives.
   b. **Disadvantages**
      i. Delay in regrouping and vulnerability during this phase.
      ii. Very limited transport; consequently all movement will be on foot and all stores and equipment manpacked. This immediately results in a limitation on equipment and ammunition carried.
      iii. Limit of duration of action unless immediate, and, if necessary, prolonged air support is available.
      iv. Employment subject to weather conditions and availability of air transport aircraft.
      v. Fire effectiveness almost entirely confined to small arms and mortar fire.

2. **Tasks.** Bearing in mind their limitations and that they are specialists in their own
right, paratroops will be tasked at the highest level to gain maximum benefit and results from their capabilities. Possible tasks could be the following:
   a. Securing special points of tactical or strategic value prior to major troop movements, e.g., passes, bridges, crossing places.
   b. Relieving or reinforcing pinned-down or surrounded military forces that may be difficult to reach in time or because of strong enemy opposition.
   c. Acting as stops or cut-off groups in positions that cannot be reached in time by ground forces.
   d. Employment as a force reserve.
3. It is considered that the dropping of parachute troops by parachute will be very rare, being used only when normal infantry cannot be deployed by helicopter.

SECTION 11: NAVY

1. General. The role of the navy during ATOPS assumes greater importance when it is possible to employ naval elements. Nevertheless the navy will carry out missions that may have a direct or indirect effect on ATOPS.
2. Tasks. During ATOPS, naval tasks can be:
   a. Security and coastal maritime defense by patrolling, and coast guard duties in coastal waters to prevent disembarking, resupply or evacuation of the terrorists by sea.
   b. Security and defense of coastal and inland shipping through control and protection.
   c. General transport and logistic support to the armed forces and civilian authorities by maritime or inland shipping.
   d. Amphibious operations, both primary and secondary, employing sea borne forces and appropriate naval means.
   e. Cooperation with the other services in land operations, employing sea borne forces, when the situation requires it.
   f. Supporting naval gun fire to land operations conducted adjacent to the coast.
   g. Psychological and socioeconomic actions in coastal and inland waters.

SECTION 12: POLICE

1. General. In both counter-insurgency and internal military operations, police essentially remain responsible for the maintenance of law and order and for the investigation of crime. The conduct of military operations against an armed enemy is outside this function.
2. Roles. In ATOPS, police functions will take the form of:
   a. Obtaining, collating and disseminating intelligence which is vital to the success of ATOPS.
   b. Detailed interrogation of terrorists to obtain maximum intelligence.
   c. Regular briefing of force commanders in regard to the terrorist threat, in particular, the presence and intention of terrorists.
d. Patrolling the fringes of the operational areas with the aim of:
   i. Checking reports of terrorist activity.
   ii. Checking movements, i.e., the establishment of road blocks and checking vehicles, tracks and public transport.
   iii. Dissemination of propaganda.
   iv. Allaying fears on the part of the civilian population.

e. Prevention or detection of unauthorized entry of persons through ports, airports and across the borders. Also to establish counter-sabotage measures to prevent the transmission or carriage of adverse information and/or subversive literature and propaganda and the smuggling of arms and explosives.

f. Investigation of crimes committed by terrorists.

g. Provision of guides and interpreters in support of the military forces.

SECTION 13: AUXILIARIES

1. Depending on their loyalty to the government, and degree of terrorist influence and control, the local population, could be of great assistance to the military, either as individuals or in groups:
   a. Individually
      i. Guides/trackers.
      ii. Interpreters.
      iii. Translators.
      iv. Intelligence agents or informers.
      v. Propaganda agents.
      vi. Workers.
   b. Collectively
      i. Labor units.
      ii. Units for self defense (militia).
      iii. Combat units.

2. It must be borne in mind that the training and arming of selected members of the local population for the defense of their own villages and other key points is not to be initiated at unit level, but is subject to military or government policy.
Types of Operations

SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

1. The aim of this chapter is to give guidance on the tactics and techniques to be used by military forces when conducting operations in rural areas against an enemy employing unconventional methods and tactics.

2. Once a unit has been mobilized and committed to its operational area and responsibilities, the commander of such a unit will find, on arrival, that he is required to:
   a. Provide for the security of his own base.
   b. Guard key installation's.
   c. When legally authorized, ensure control of the local population, perhaps by curfews, checkpoints, patrols, etc.
   d. Provide protection for movement of all kinds.
   e. Conduct area operations.
   f. Maintain a reserve to meet minor contingencies throughout his area and also possibly to react to the requirements of another force, operation or headquarters.

3. The commander's appreciation will establish the priorities for the above tasks should it not be possible to conduct them simultaneously. It is most important that a reverse not be inflicted on the military forces soon after their arrival, not only because of the serious effect it would have on civilian morale, but also on the unit's morale.

4. The desire to do everything at once with minimum resources must be balanced against the risk of defeat. The problem for the military force commander will be to decide what proportion of his resources he can afford to allot to the various tasks confronting him. He must decide his priority tasks and allocate his forces accordingly although, as operations develop, he will need to revise his priorities.

5. It should be remembered that the enemy will seldom present a static target. Consequently the commander, in his planning, must not expect to conduct operations against fixed objectives. Bearing in mind the enemy's characteristics, he must be flexible enough to cater for all situations.

6. The four main requirements for success are:
   a. **Encounter actions**. The absolute necessity for the adoption of the actions set out in Chapter 6. Experience shows they ensure maximum success against terrorists in contacts or incidents and, equally as important, they save casualties.
   b. **Snap shooting**. The vital importance of accurate and quick shooting from all positions and all types of cover.
   c. **Offensive action**. The need for immediate offensive action, both in planning at all levels and also in tactical engagements.
   d. **Discipline**. The necessity in operations of discipline and all that it stands
for. Terrorists will avoid action with disciplined troops but they can expect a measure of success against troops whose discipline is poor.

SECTION 2: BORDER CONTROL OPERATIONS

General

1. **Aim.** The aim of border control operations or counter-penetration operations is to make the border as secure as possible, thereby preventing enemy groups from crossing; or preventing supplies or reinforcements from crossing to support enemy groups that may have succeeded in crossing.

2. It is a known fact that part of the enemy's tactics and characteristics is to establish safe bases in neighboring countries from which they can launch their attacks across the border and to which they can return should the pressure applied against them by the military forces be too great. The very success of their operations is dependent upon these safe bases.

3. The enemy has no respect for international boundaries and is able to cross the boundary, whether it be an imaginary line through the bush, a river, a rugged bit of coastline or even a fence, at preselected crossing places.

4. There are thousands of kilometers of border which may have to be protected. Because of these vast distances, it will be impossible to cover every meter with troops. Bearing this in mind and making maximum efficient use of the manpower which is available, a very well-thought-out plan, Organization and system for border control must be determined and vigorously and effectively applied. In those areas where the enemy is more active, or where external support is more significant, higher priority of troop allocation should be given.

Factors Affecting Success

1. Factors affecting the success of this type of operation are as follows:
   a. Cooperation with the local inhabitants and also the local government administrative organizations.
   b. Maximum use of informers, particularly on the other side of the border. These informers are normally controlled by the security police and/or military forces.
   c. Flexibility in the planning and execution of all operations.
   e. Cooperation between all participating forces, i.e., military and police.
   f. A high standard of training, patrolling and physical fitness.
   g. The entire operation must have depth to it, therefore making it more difficult for the enemy to penetrate.
   h. Ability to be unorthodox and original in the planning and execution of operations. Avoid being stereotyped.
   i. Well organized and flexible logistical support.
j. Simplicity in planning and economical use of manpower.
k. A readily available reserve to be deployed either by air, road or on foot to assist wherever and whenever required.

Patterns of Operations

1. The following factors will determine the allocation of tasks and responsibilities:
   b. Extent of border.
   c. Enemy threat and activity.
   d. External support to the enemy.
   e. Availability of forces.
   f. Local population.

2. Areas are divided into unit and sub-unit areas of tactical responsibility. Boundaries between these areas must be well defined with no gaps. These boundaries must be changed from time to time to prevent the enemy from discovering the border protection plan. Troop density in these areas will be determined by enemy activity.

3. **Headquarters.** The main headquarters for such an operation will be located at a position from which effective command and control can be exercised and where all the necessary communication requirements exist, i.e., airfield, rail- and road head and communication centers, etc.

4. **Unit headquarters.** This should be centrally situated in the unit's area of responsibility, preferably where good or reasonable communication facilities exist such as an airfield, a rail- or road head and helicopter landing facilities. They should also be located close to or at the local administrative/police post, should there be one in the area. The main requirements remain, however, effective command and control of all forces concerned, accessibility and good communications.

5. Patrol bases and patrols. Permanent patrol bases should be established along the border and in depth. These bases can either be company or platoon bases. They should be so spaced and sited that patrols operating from them can effectively patrol the area, without having to cover long distances. These bases must be tactically sited and well protected against possible enemy attacks. Accessibility and natural water supplies must be considered when siting such bases. Patrolling from these bases can be done as follows:
   a. Border patrols. Strong, well-balanced patrols move on foot, their task or aim being to patrol the border to prevent penetration or to search for signs of recent enemy crossings and possible crossing places. They must be prepared to fight should they encounter any enemy. These patrols must have good communications with their bases and must be prepared to spend several days away from their bases. They must make contact with the local inhabitants in their areas in order to build up the confidence, cooperation and friendly relationship with the locals. This is vitally important because every local who is friendly towards the military forces is a potential informer who can or may be able to provide valuable information.
regarding the enemy. Although operating to a well-coordinated patrol program, these patrols must also be prepared to use their own initiative, e.g., to ambush possible crossing places which were not foreseen.

b. Standing patrols. Should the availability of troops and the terrain allow it, a series of small standing patrols can be used to maintain observation during the day over possible crossing places, or stores, that may be sources of supplies for the enemy. During the hours of darkness, these standing patrols could become listening posts with the dual purpose of ambushing likely crossing places. These patrols should be provided with communications. They must operate with the utmost stealth and frequently change their positions to avoid detection. They must be prepared to spend several days away from their base. If possible, they should contact any friendly forces moving through their area.

c. Motorized patrols. Should the terrain allow it, or should there be reasonable roads or tracks in the area, motorized patrols could be used. Use can be made of normal battalion, company, and platoon transport or armored cars. This type of patrol will normally not be very successful but it does serve as a deterrent and does afford the local commander and military forces the opportunity of visiting settlements in the area, therefore maintaining contact and building up good relations. With this type of patrol, regular routes and timings must be avoided because of the possibility of enemy ambushes. It is also a means whereby a commander can make contact with his foot patrols or standing patrols that may be operating some distance away from his patrol base.

d. Patrols in depth. These patrols operate from bases sited in depth to the actual border patrol bases. Their task is to search for and destroy enemy elements or groups that may have succeeded in penetrating inland. They may react to information passed on to them by the border patrols or to indications they may have discovered as a result of their own vigorous patrol program, or to information passed on to them by higher headquarters, security police or local informers. These are strong, well-balanced patrols that may be assisted by special trackers, tracking teams, or dog teams, with good communications to the patrol base and ground-to-air, because they may frequently call for air support when contact with the enemy has been made. They must be aggressive and must be prepared to spend several days away from the patrol base and, should contact be made with the enemy, to maintain contact until the enemy is eliminated.

e. The patrol program and pattern for the patrols operating in depth must be carefully coordinated and well planned. These patrols can either operate from a base line or natural features such as rivers, ridges, spurs, etc., patrolling laterally, forward and inward or radiating outward in all directions from a central point which is the patrol base.

f. Whichever system is used, regular patterns, routes and timing must be avoided.

6. Aids to border control. The physical protection of a long border with troops is not always possible because of the problem of manpower. There are, however, certain
aids that could be considered:

a. Aircraft patrols. These serve as a deterrent, and regular visual and photo reconnaissance of the border area could indicate the crossing of groups of terrorists.
b. Boat patrols. When the border is defined by a river, boat patrols could be used in much the same way as motorized patrols.
c. Sensory devices. Limited areas could be covered by using sensory devices, giving warning and approximate position of suspect movement in the area.
d. Restricted areas. When possible, certain areas of the border could be cleared of local inhabitants (if any) and all presence in that well-defined area restricted to the military forces only. Routine checking out of the area may indicate enemy activities. These areas provide complete freedom of action by military forces, e.g., bombing, artillery engagements, and the erection of barriers including minefields, barbed wire and booby traps.

Conclusion

1. Border control operations are long-term operations that require careful planning and coordination and the vigorous application of such plans. Invariably the border patrols are more of a deterrent than anything else, because it is normally the patrols in depth that physically get involved in action with the enemy; but the most effective measure for controlling the border is an active, well-planned patrol program executed by well-led, well-trained and well-armed patrols.

SECTION 3: AREA OPERATIONS

Method

1. A systematic approach is necessary to counter terrorists already established in an area. The territory should be divided into sectors and troops allocated according to requirements. Commanders of these sectors will be given their tasks in broad outline by the appropriate headquarters. Thereafter these commanders must determine their own objectives within their areas of tactical responsibility. They will be responsible for the planning and conduct of operations in these sectors, which implies that the decentralization of command is of utmost importance, allowing for greater flexibility. The aim should be to cover the area concerned with a framework of military organizations working in close cooperation with the civilian authorities.

2. Aim of area operations. The basic aim of this type of operation is to eliminate terrorists. In its simplest form it means searching for a small band of enemy who might have infiltrated into an area, while it could also indicate operations against numerous groups, well established in the area, with a certain degree of control over the local population. in this case it will be necessary to neutralize the enemy's influence, destroy their presence, regain the local population's trust and support
for the government and prevent the recurrence of enemy presence and influence.

Scope of Operations

1. Depending on the degree of the enemy's progress in establishing himself, the aim of area operations will not be achieved overnight and will call for a progressive approach over a period of time, in the following pattern:
   a. Establish a military presence in the area, and gain information concerning the enemy, local population and terrain, etc.
   b. Ensure that key points, villages and lines of communication are protected against enemy interference.
   c. Conduct PSYOPS aimed at the local population and the enemy.
   d. Conduct operations against known enemy bases and areas in order to break his military potential.
   e. Search for and destroy the remainder of the enemy.
   f. Maintain permanent contact with the population and dominate the area until the civil administration can do without military support.
   g. Conduct operations in support of civil authorities (OSCA) as required.

Employment of Forces

1. Area operations call for the employment of an infantry force capable of achieving its aim by making use of the necessary supporting arms and services. Armored fighting vehicles, artillery and engineers can all be used with great success in this type of operation. Air support is indispensable.
2. Forces allocated to an area must be sufficient to achieve the aim of the operation. A high degree of mobility under all conditions, and flexibility in the planning and execution of operations will assist in attaining better results. The presence of a large enemy group will sometimes necessitate the use of additional troops, allocated by higher headquarters for this specific operation.

Area Allocation and Subdivision

1. Deciding on or locating operational areas, or even sub-dividing a unit area, will always require an appreciation of the situation. The following paragraph includes the important factors to be considered in making this appreciation.
2. Factors.
   a. Characteristics of the operational area.
      i. Terrain. Mobility, observation and concealment are more favorable to the terrorist, and the use of arms and services other than infantry is directly dictated by the type of terrain.
      ii. Climatic conditions. The rainy season may restrict road movement considerably, and extreme temperatures will dictate the size of an area that can effectively be controlled by troops on foot.
      iii. Communication network.
I. Roads and railway lines are necessary for logistical support.
II. Roads and tracks help in deploying troops and committing reserves quickly.
III. Airfields determine supply bases and headquarter sites.
iv. Local resources. Availability of water, local purchase facilities, hospitals and clinics, accommodation and recreational facilities all have a bearing on allocating areas and siting of headquarters.
v. Local population. The presence of the local population is one of the most important factors in this type of operation:
   I. The number of troops required for the protection of the locals (when required) will restrict their area of responsibility.
   II. It is advisable to let military areas coincide with the ethnological grouping of the population.
   III. The density of the population may restrict the employment of artillery and the air force in certain of their roles. d. The degree of terrorist influence over the local population dictates the attitude, security and psychological action of the military forces.

3. Built-up areas. The presence of built-up areas will call for military forces to be committed on non-rural tasks, e.g., protection of key points and OSCA.
4. Enemy. When the enemy is well established in an area, the following points require consideration:
   a. The strength of the enemy and his Organization will determine the military requirement.
   b. If his own area division is know, it may be better to try and fit that of the military accordingly. It is much easier to collect information and operate against one enemy group, than having elements of two or more to deal with.
   c. Areas (countries) providing sanctuary or assistance and his logistical and intelligence systems are also to be considered.
   d. Measure of support by local population.
5. Friendly forces.
   a. The number of troops available, their standard of training and the availability of supporting elements (with any restrictions on their use) will determine the size of areas allocated.
   b. For ease of cooperation and coordinated action, it is advisable to have military boundaries coinciding with that - of the civil administration and police.

**Conclusion**

1. Area operations can only be successfully concluded if there is intimate cooperation between the civil administration, the police and the military. All actions should be jointly planned, pooling all available information.
2. An excellent joint intelligence system is a prerequisite for success and should be
developed at all levels.

3. The support of the local population is vital and the greater part of our psychological action plan should be directed at achieving this aim.

4. Military success can only be achieved by well-trained and well-motivated troops, inspired with an offensive spirit that reflects itself by constantly dominating the area with patrols, ambushes, road blocks and similar aggressive tactics.
Foot Patrols

SECTION 1: GENERAL

1. A common feature of rural operations is that, irrespective of whether an operation has been planned at brigade or at troop level, or whether it has been designed to:
   a. search an area of bush;
   b. disrupt terrorist food supplies;
   c. keep terrorists on the move;
   d. pursue a specific gang with the aid of trackers; or
   e. sweep progressively a large area of bush with a large number of troops,
   the troops taking part in it will almost invariably find themselves functioning in the role of a patrol which is out of visual contact with other troops and will have a local aim of contacting and eliminating terrorists.

2. The ability to carry out skillful patrolling, which will result in contacting and eliminating the terrorists, is the prime requirement for all troops engaged in rural operations. In this respect, therefore, commanders at all levels should consider patrol planning carefully and base this on a realistic appreciation, whether the situation be simple or complex.

Basic Aspects of Patrolling

1. Characteristics. A patrol must be small enough to move silently and yet have sufficient effective fire power. The strength of the patrol will be determined by the size of terrorist gangs known to be operating in the area. Patrons must almost invariably be "all purpose" operations, prepared to fight, ambush, pursue and reconnoiter.

2. Leadership and morale. Since patrolling is frequently done by patrols of approximately platoon and section strength, they will often be commanded by junior officers or non-commissioned officers. These junior leaders must be well trained and their leadership qualities developed to the full before they can command. Their leadership must be of the highest standard to achieve the aim of the patrol, thus instilling confidence and high morale.
3. **Patrol areas.** Whenever possible, a patrol commander must be given the limit and boundaries of his patrol area so that he knows the exact area of his responsibility, thereby minimizing the risk of patrol clashes. These boundaries must, wherever possible, follow clear natural features; for example, ridges, rivers, roads or tracks. If this is not possible, it is essential that all military forces are aware that operations are taking place in the area.

4. It should be made clear to patrol commanders what latitude is to be allowed regarding boundaries in the event of a patrol encountering fresh terrorist tracks leading out of its area.

5. Whenever possible, the maximum freedom should be given to patrols to follow up unexpected encounters rather than risk losing the chance of engagement. In practice, it is almost impossible for a patrol in the bush to pinpoint its position sufficiently accurately to hand over to another unit, and in any case the delay which such a course would involve would almost certainly result in the loss of contact with the terrorists.

6. If, at the start of any operations, it is possible that a patrol may have to cross the unit or sub-unit boundaries, clearance should be arranged before the patrol leaves base.

7. If, during an operation, a patrol needs to cross any unit or sub-unit boundaries, clearance will be obtained.

**SECTION 2: PLANNING, PREPARATION AND BRIEFING**

**Planning and Preparation**

1. **Strength.** The strength of the patrol depends on the following:
   a. The mission.
   b. The nature of the area to be patrolled.
   c. All available information about the enemy in the area.
   d. Attitude of the population.
   e. Distance to be covered.
   f. Duration.

2. Routes and timing.
   a. Only in exceptional circumstances should a patrol return by its outward route.
   b. "Time in" as understood in normal military patrolling must be elastic, as speed of movement is very difficult to estimate and the possibility of a contact makes it necessary to allow extreme latitude in this matter.

3. Security. This is an essential factor to consider when planning a patrol, as the introduction of patrols into an operation area without the loss of security is a major problem. Every means of avoiding observation by civilians must be used; for example, movement by night, the use of indirect routes and deception. Deception could include the use of civilian vehicles, watercraft and trains.
4. Casualty evacuation. The problem of casualty evacuation when troops are committed to thick bush in remote areas must always receive prior consideration by all concerned.

5. To obtain the maximum benefit from any patrol it is essential that:
   a. All patrols be sent out with a clearly defined mission. In a reconnaissance patrol this should take the form of a question or series of questions posed to the patrol commander. Fighting patrols will have tasks such as the search for and destruction of a party of terrorists or the prevention of contact between terrorists and civilians in a fixed area, e.g., in food control operations. The mission must be clearly stated and understood by the patrol commander and his men.
   b. Adequate preparation and planning be made by the patrol commander. c. The patrol is carefully and thoroughly briefed with all available information.

6. Information. The following must always be studied and passed on to a patrol commander before his patrol is sent out:
   a. Topography. Full use should be made of maps, air photographs, air reconnaissance and local knowledge. A patrol "going map" should be kept up to date and information should be handed over to relief patrols and passed back to superior headquarters at regular intervals. Whenever possible the patrol commander should be given the opportunity of prior meetings with military personnel having local knowledge of the patrol area.
   b. Terrorists. Information may be available from a number of sources; for example, captured/surrendered terrorists, air reconnaissance both visual and photographic, captured documents, informers, etc. The past history of terrorist activities in the area should also be studied.
   c. Military forces. Boundaries and movements of all military forces in the area should be considered. If applicable, patrols should be advised of defense-force tasks and the whereabouts of minefields, booby traps and restricted area.
   d. Population. Movement and habits of the population must be studied if movement by troops is to remain secure. The relationship between the local population and the terrorists should be established.

SECTION 3: FORMATIONS AND MOVEMENT

Patrol Formations

1. In operations so far, the patrol formation found to be most satisfactory is the four or five group pattern with the command group centrally placed. However, formations adopted by a patrol will vary and the patrol leader should constantly vary the information to meet the requirements of the terrain and the tactical situation.

2. The patrol should consist of four or five groups:
a. The patrol commander and his command group are positioned where control can best be maintained at all levels. The other groups are positioned to the front, flanks and rear. Each of the groups should be given their areas of responsibility for observation before the patrol moves out. In all cases the group system provides for flank and reserve groups, with a command group centrally situated.
b. Ideally each group should have a radio for control while either on the move or to deploy tactically on a contact.
c. No distances between groups are laid down as this will depend on the terrain. They should be sufficiently far apart to prevent an ambush of the entire patrol, but sufficiently close to be able to support each other with fire in the event of a contact.
d. With this grouping system the commander has the capability of maneuvering part or parts of his patrol in the event of a contact, depending on the tactics being employed by the terrorists.
e. Open or close formation are used depending entirely on the condition of the bush and ground being covered. Distances between individuals will vary according to visibility.
f. The group commanders must continually appreciate the ground and vary the formation of their group to suit it. Similarly the patrol commander must continuously appreciate the tactical position of the patrol. in relation to the ground to be able to take considered immediate action in the event of a contact. For example, there may even be occasions when the commander prefers to keep two-thirds of his patrol strength in reserve.
g. The allocation of positions to patrol personnel within groups is not rigid. Each commander has personal preferences, and factors of the various types of fire support available are also flexible; circumstances, together with personal preferences, override any attempt to dictate rigid drills. Leaders should therefore rehearse their own maneuvering in the bush.
h. The size of the patrol dictates the number of men in each group. As the strength increases, so the number of men in each group can be increased.

BASIC PATROL FORMATIONS
Movement of Patrols

1. **Silence.** This is essential at all times. Control is exercised by means of silent signals.

2. Tracks and track discipline.
   a. Circumstances may dictate the use of tracks, but patrols must realize that by doing so, they run the risk of being ambushed.
   b. When moving on tracks, leaving footprints in soft or sandy patches should be avoided.
   c. Stick track discipline must be enforced.

3. Halts.
   a. When halted, positions for all-around defense must be adopted.
   b. The usual halt of ten minutes in the hour should be observed.

4. The success of any patrol depends on good observation. Men must be taught to observe every movement, sign of tracks, broken foliage, smoke, noise, etc.

5. Troops must be trained to disregard the general pattern of the foliage and to look through, instead of at, the vegetation.

6. Positions of patrol members.
   a. **Commanders.** The patrol commander will normally be positioned to enable him to control his patrol and to influence a battle by using his reserve, which he should normally control himself. He must not become so involved in the forward elements during contact that he cannot control the battle.
   b. **Guides.**
      i. The word "guide" as used here means somebody with an intimate knowledge of an area or someone who can lead the military forces to a known terrorist location. These may be surrendered or captured terrorists or loyal Africans.
      ii. The correct position for a guide is with the patrol commander. The
patrol commander will make decisions as to direction and tactics, using the guide's advice as he wishes.

c. **Trackers.** The tracker team is so positioned that no trails will be obliterated by members of the patrol, but also to allow proper link up with the follow-up patrol.

7. Maintaining contact between groups.
   a. Although the attention of the leading elements is to the front, responsibility for maintaining contact between groups should be from front to rear and rear to front.
   b. If contact is lost, both portions of the patrol halt.
   c. The rear portion of the patrol casts forward trying to following the trail of the leading element.

8. Conclusion. Sound patrol formations are necessary in order that:
   a. Control is exercised.
   b. Movement is facilitated.
   c. The patrol is ready for immediate action.

**SECTION 4: METHODS OF PATROLLING**

1. The troop commander, or force commander, while planning his patrol program, must bear certain factors in mind which will help him in arriving at the best or most effective method that he should use to effectively patrol his allotted area. The factors that he should consider are:
   a. The nature of the terrain.
   b. The type of patrol, i.e., fighting or reconnaissance.
   c. The type of operation.
   d. The tactics or habits of the enemy, should they be known.
   e. The presence and attitude of the local population.
   f. Standard of training and combat efficiency of his own troops.

2. Having given careful consideration to the above-mentioned factors, the platoon or force commander has the following methods of patrolling which he may use:
   a. **Fan method.** In this case the patrols radiate outward from the patrol base or center point on a specific bearing for a specific distance, all turn in the same direction at right angles to the outward route and move for a specific distance, then turn again at right angles in the direction of the point of origin and return to the point of origin, i.e., patrols based on a specific bearing. This method is very useful when searching for specific enemy signs or when conducting search operations in very dense bush or forests. The diagram below illustrates this method.
b. **Baseline method.** In this method, patrols operate from a baseline which could be a path, track, river or feature. The patrols start from the baseline and all move in the same direction on a compass bearing parallel to each other for a specific distance and turn again at right angles in the direction of point of origin and move back to the baseline on a compass bearing. This method is useful when endeavoring to "cut" across possible enemy movement or tracks or when searching fairly dense bush or forests. Distances between patrols will be determined by the terrain. The diagram below illustrates this method.

c. **Stream or river line method.** In this method, the patrols follow the rivers or streams in the area. On the outward journey, the patrol moves on one side of the river/stream, and on the return journey, covers the other side of the river/stream, thus ensuring that both sides have been covered. The enemy, just like the military forces, requires water and this type of patrol should discover where the enemy's water point is or where he probably crossed the river or stream.

d. **Area method.** This is probably the more common method of patrolling that will be used. In this case the patrol is given an area and boundaries and a limitation, this being the furthest point to which it must patrol. It may also be given certain points of interest which it must have a look at. Further, the patrol commander is entirely responsible for planning very carefully and selecting a route that will be the best for him to enable him to carry out his task. He must plan to search all possible enemy hideouts, routes followed
by the enemy, possible water holes or springs in his area and at the same
time plan to avoid possible enemy ambush positions and difficult areas to
traverse such as deep ravines or cliffs. Although the patrol commander
carefully plans his route prior to commencing his patrolling, he need not
rigidly adhere to his planned route. He must be prepared to break away
from his planned route should he see or notice something that looks
interesting or suspicious some distance away. The secret of the success of
this method of patrolling is making the best use of the terrain, i.e.,
contours, spurs, ridges, rivers, etc., without unnecessarily tiring the men,
and yet covering the maximum amount of ground in the time laid down.
This is a far-ranging patrol and covers a greater distance and area than the
other methods.

SECTION 5: DRILL ON RETURN

1. Debriefing.
   a. Whatever the time of day or night, the troop commander or briefing officer
      must be available to debrief the patrol commander. The commander may
      require the information urgently to plan the next operation. b. Debriefing
      must be thorough and reports must be clear.

2. Drills for reception on return. A sound drill must be followed for the reception of
   patrols on their return to base. Points to be considered are:
   a. A hot meal and drink should be provided.
   b. Weapons must be cleaned.
   c. A bath, if possible.
   d. Clean clothes, if possible.
   e. Rest must be arranged.
   f. Discussion should be held on mistakes made and lessons learned.

3. Additional requirements are left to the discretion of the commander.

SECTION 6: ENCOUNTER ACTIONS

General

1. Encounters with terrorists are sudden, short, and often so unexpected that the
   opportunity to inflict casualties is lost. What is required is immediate, positive and
   offensive action.

2. For this reason it is essential for simple encounter actions to be taught and
   thoroughly practiced. It is impractical to attempt to cover every contingency by
   committing to paper numerous "drills," because not only would they tend to
   cramp initiative but they would not be read or digested or remembered in the
   stress of action. It is, however, important to teach an action to cope with any
   situation commonly met. The principles underlying the action must be simplicity,
   aggression, speed and flexibility.
3. Before a patrol leaves its base, the commander in his briefing should include directions for encounter action. This is necessary each time because patrols vary in strength and organization according to the nature of their tasks. In addition, the mention of the encounter actions applicable to the operation will act as a reminder to the troops taking part and so help them to avoid being surprised.

4. A high standard of weapons training, marksmanship and a thorough understanding and instinctive awareness of weapon capabilities and limitations will ensure that encounter actions are successfully executed.

The Encounter Actions

1. It is important to note that although encounter actions are usually taught on a section basis, they can be adopted for use by a platoon. These actions are applicable to the varied forms of terrain and in all cases normal infantry minor tactics or section and platoon battle drills usually apply after the initial contact. These encounter actions are a sound framework on which leaders at all levels should build as their experience dictates. It should be remembered, however, that no action, drill or order will achieve success unless the leader and men have practiced them to a stage of instinctive action, reflex and immediate reaction to firm and confident initiative on the part of the leader.

2. If a patrol is accompanied by persons who have little or no knowledge of encounter actions, e.g., guides, informers, surrendered terrorists, etc., the patrol leader should keep them strictly under control and in his view. These persons should be briefed as thoroughly as possible before the patrol starts. It may prove as well to rehearse encounter actions for these persons or even for inexperienced troops before a patrol moves out on operations.

3. Encounters with enemy could fall under one of the following headings:
   a. **Situation A.** The initiative is with the military forces (terrorists seen first). **Reaction:** Immediate ambush.
   b. **Situation B.** The initiative is split between the military forces and the enemy (simultaneous sighting). **Reaction:** Immediate offensive action.
   c. **Situation C.** The initiative is with the terrorist (military forces are fired on with small arms or are ambushed). **Reaction:** Immediate offensive action to an enemy ambush.

4. Action for Situation A.
   a. This will be used for situations when terrorists are seen first by the military forces.
   b. Explanation of action.
      i. Leading elements give silent signals.
      ii. Depending on the cover and distance, military forces make any reasonably silent attempt to go to ground in the best possible fire position. Minimum movement and silence may prove vital. Fire will be opened only on the orders of the patrol commander or in the event of the position being detected by the enemy.
      iii. The commander now makes a quick assessment and issues silent signals/orders accordingly. His aim must be to eliminate as many
terrorists as possible using the closest range and the best selected killing ground.

Note: The above actions are in effect a minor ambush. At troop level it is not normally possible to deploy into a particular area. At section level it may be possible to move everyone into specific positions if movement is acceptable and the terrorists are approaching along a definite route, i.e., a track, river bed or game trail.

5. Action for Situation B.
   a. Immediate offensive action may be taken when military forces:
      i. Encounter sentries outside a terrorist base perimeter;
      ii. Encounter part of the terrorist base perimeter;
      iii. Encounter a moving terrorist group;
      iv. Encounter a visible static terrorist group (in a base, at a resting place, drawing water).
   b. Explanation of the action.
      i. Elements in contact or in close proximity put down a heavy volume of controlled fire with the aim of winning the firefight and eliminating terrorists. It may be possible for these elements to execute immediate skirmishing. The maximum use of grenades and light mortars should be made.
      ii. Patrol commander makes a quick appreciation and plan and issues orders for the required action.
      iii. If an assault is to take place, the route taken for deployment and assault depends on the ground. Consideration must be given to the deployment of cut-off groups, possibly using the patrol reserve. The assault plan must include covering fire.
      iv. Throughout the preliminary stages of this action, the patrol commander must ensure that the firefight is won and the cut-off groups are moved into positions if at all possible.
      v. Normal reorganization should take place after all-around defense, clearance/security patrols, thorough search of the area, reporting the contact. But, if at all possible, contact with the enemy should be maintained with immediate follow-up action.
6. Action for Situation C.
   a. This action may be used when military forces are ambushed and in situations where part of the military force patrol is pinned down.
   Note: In the case of most situations detailed below, the military forces will not be able to confirm, until much later in the resulting action, the strength of the enemy.
   b. Explanation of the action.
      i. Elements under fire or in close proximity go to ground and put down a heavy volume of controlled fire with the aim of winning the fire-fight and eliminating terrorists. It may be possible for these elements to execute immediate skirmishing. The maximum use of grenades and light mortars should be made.
      ii. Patrol commander makes a quick appreciation and plan and issues orders for the required action.
      iii. If an assault is to take place, the route taken for deployment and assault depends on the ground. Consideration must be given to the deployment of cut-off groups, possibly using the patrol reserve. The assault plan must include covering fire.
      iv. Throughout the preliminary stages of this action, the patrol commander must ensure that the firefight is won and the cut-off groups are moved into positions if at all possible.
      v. Normal reorganization should take place after the assault, i.e., all-around defense, clearance/security patrols, thorough search of the area, reporting the contact. However, contact with the enemy should be maintained with immediate follow-up action.
   c. However, where the whole patrol is pinned down, the group will have to extricate itself by maximum fire and maneuvering. Only then can subsequent action be taken as a result of an appreciation and plan, which may be either offensive action, or a withdrawal, depending on the casualties sustained and the strength of the enemy.
7. When a battle is at close range, the side that opens fire and applies the heavier and more accurate weight of fire will win. Skirmishing movement will consolidate the firefight. The encounter actions, therefore, are normally "Go to ground, win the firefight.

8. Subsequent action is based on the commander's initiative.

9. To some extent, the application of the actions explained above is affected by a patrol formation. If the formation has a leading element of approximately one-third of the local strength and the patrol commander moves into a position from which he can command and control any battle, the normal principles of fire and maneuver can be successfully applied. In all cases, the basic principles of a platoon in battle must be applied by the commander to the circumstances of the situation.

10. It is most important to emphasize that there are three main actions that take place:
   a. Go to ground.
   b. Win the firefight.
   c. Concurrent with a. and b. above, the commander must quickly assess the situation and give appropriate orders. Whenever possible, the patrol Commander is to keep his superior headquarters fully informed about the contact, i.e., what has happened, where it is, what the terrorists are doing and what the military forces are intending to do.

Reorganization

1. After an encounter action, reorganization should be carried out as in normal battle drills. However, in ATOPS some actions are needed in addition to normal reorganization procedures. The following sequence of action should be adopted for the reorganization phase after encounter actions:
   a. Take up all-around defense.
   b. Attend to own casualties.
   c. Sweep and search the immediate area for terrorist casualties.
   d. Secure live terrorists and ensure no terrorists are feigning death.
   e. Submit immediate radio report on the contact.
   f. Trackers should carry out a 360-degree security patrol about 200-300 meters from the scene of contact to establish three requirements:
      i. Secure the area from counter-attack and establish sentries.
      ii. Find out what direction was taken by fleeing terrorists.
      iii. Select a landing zone for helicopter requirements.
   g. Organize the follow-up, if required.
   h. Organize a sweep of the target area to look for hiding terrorists, arms, documents, caches, caves, etc.
   i. Consolidate all actions taken and plan an ambush of area after a full appreciation.
   j. Report by radio all action being taken. k. During f. (above) it may be possible to:
      i. Submit the initial contact report to cover the rough outline of the contact and situation.
ii. Call in specialists, e.g., interrogators/interpreters.
iii. Evacuate casualties and resupply ammunition.
iv. Interrogate captured terrorists and compare numbers of bodies, packs, sleeping places, if any, to estimate terrorists' strength.

SECTION 7: PATROL BASES

General

1. It is seldom that a rural patrol can be finished in one day. Basing up, by day or night, is therefore a part of most patrols. Provided there is a drill for establishing and breaking a base, there should be no waste of time or confusion.

2. The bases may be patrol, troop or company bases, and the general principles to be followed are the same. Irrespective of size, a base is a secret camp from which patrols operate. It may be in existence for one night or for months, depending on the size and tasks of the forces occupying it. It is difficult to keep the presence of a base secret for any length of time due to the normal base noises such as radios and vehicles. It must, however, be secure against attack at all times.

Siting a Base

1. Well-trained and hardened troops can make a base practically anywhere, but obviously some places are better than others. The following are the main factors involved in siting a base:
   a. Position.
   c. Radio communications.
   d. Resupply.
   e. Hard standing.
   f. Availability of water.
   g. Avoidance of game tracks.

2. Position. The base must be so sited that the operational task may be carried out. No difficulty should be experienced by a patrol in leaving or returning to base in order to accomplish its aim.

   a. Deception. This should always be planned. Some suggestions are as follows:
      i. The hours of darkness should, when possible, be used to cover the approach march.
      ii. It may sometimes be necessary to detain local inhabitants who have blundered into patrols during the approach march.
      iii. During the approach march, centers of population should be avoided.
      iv. False airdrops can be made to give the impression that troops are
present in an area where in fact there are none.

v. Do not use the obvious place for a base.

vi. No more than one track should lead into a base. A suggested manner in which to lay a deceptive track is to allow it to pass the base at an angle. This would allow the occupants of a base to hear persons approaching and so act as a warning.

b. Silence. The base must be established silently, and the use of machetes, entrenchment tools, etc., must be kept to a minimum. On occasions, in thick bush, it may be necessary to clear a perimeter path or internal paths to permit quick and silent movement within the base.

c. Fires. The use of cookers should be limited as they can be smelled for some considerable distance. Fires should be smokeless, and it is desirable that they be extinguished before last light.

d. Dress and equipment. Members of a patrol base should not be allowed to leave items of dress and equipment lying around, nor should they be allowed to lounge around in a state of undress. A white towel or t-shirt, or even the whiteness of a person's body can be seen from a considerable distance and prejudice the security of the base. All items of clothing and equipment should be colored jungle green, khaki or black. White articles must be covered or splashed with mud.

e. Stand-to. It is essential in operations against terrorists for all men to be alert when initially basing up and just before first and last light. During these periods, the commander satisfies himself that all precautions have been taken to ensure the security of the base. (See paragraph h. below.) Additional reasons for this stand-to procedure are:

   i. It enables every man to check that he knows exactly the disposition of his neighbors to the flanks, front and rear. This is the best safeguard against confusion should the base be attacked.

   ii. It ensures that every man rises in the morning, retires for the night and goes on sentry duty properly equipped and with all items of arms, ammunition and equipment ready at hand.

   iii. Evening stand-to may be conveniently used by the commander to check arms, equipment and stores.

   iv. Sub-unit commanders detail day and night sentries and can check at stand-to that every man knows his tour of duty and his orders.

   v. Commanders can check that each man knows what to do in case of alarm, and knows what troops, if any, are outside the patrol base and their expected time of return.

   vi. Commanders are able to ensure the strict observance of medical precautions, and to inspect men and weapons.

f. Sentries by day.

   i. Sentries must be posted, particularly to observe tracks leading past or into the base.

   ii. Their positioning should be such that a timely warning may be given to the base on the approach of any person(s).

   iii. Sentries should also be posted near latrines and water points when
in use.

**g. Sentries by night.**

i. Double sentries should always be posted if the patrol has sufficient men.

ii. Sentries must have some means of waking their commander silently.

iii. Timings for sentry duty for double sentries should overlap, e.g., one man on from 0100 to 0300 hours and his colleague on from 0200 to 0400 hours. If there are only single sentry arrangements, the sentry coming on duty should arrive 30 minutes early to adjust to night vision and get accustomed to salient features in the vicinity of the base.

**h. Patrols.**

i. **Security patrols.** A security patrol must be sent out to ensure that the area surrounding the selected site for a base camp is clear of terrorists. This patrol should go out each day at first light and last light. Stand-to should be maintained until the patrol returns to report the area clear or otherwise. This patrol is vital to avoid any chance of surprise attack by terrorists, and could pick up spoor laid during the night.

ii. **Normal patrols.** Patrolling must be carefully controlled by the commander so that tracks in the area of the base are kept to a minimum.

**i. Carrying of weapons.** Every man must be armed at all times. The reason is obvious, but only strict discipline will ensure that this rule is observed.

**j. Alarm scheme.**

i. When firing starts, or the alarm signal is given, every man moves silently to his stand-to position. There must be no further movement in the base until stand-down is given. This system ensures that anyone moving during the period of the alarm must be a terrorist and can be dealt with accordingly. It is essential that the alarm scheme be practiced by day and by night.

ii. There should be no firing at night until the terrorists are a certain target.

iii. Shell scrapes should be dug whenever possible and should serve the dual purpose of being the alarm position and sleeping position.

**k. Leaving a base.** When leaving a base, every effort must be made to obliterate any signs of occupation and in particular any tell-tale marks of the time of occupation. Any shelters should be destroyed before the base is vacated.

4. **Radio communications.** A base must have good facilities for radio communication. Although it would be preferable for good communications to site a base on high ground, this will not always be possible from a tactical point of view, and therefore the commander of a base must compromise in the selection of his base site.

5. **Resupply.** When operating in remote areas, the only method of resupply may be
Air. Air supply, with the incumbent selection of a dropping zone, must not be allowed to affect the tactical siting of the base. The proximity of the dropping zone to a base is prejudicial to the security of a base. Therefore, a long carry is preferable to forfeiting security. An alternative is to vacate the base and move on after taking an airdrop.

6. **Hard standing.** The base must allow men to sleep in comfort. Do not select an area which is wet underfoot and do not expect to sleep comfortably on steep slopes. Flat and dry ground that drains quickly is the best.

7. **Availability of water.** The base should be sited near water. Excessive movement from the base to the water-point may well prejudice the security of the base unless there is an extremely well-covered route. The decision as to whether to site the base close to water or some distance away will be influenced by the local situation. Terrorists, for example, frequently site their bases some distance away from water in order to obtain maximum security.

8. Avoiding game tracks. As these tracks are not only used by game, but may well be utilized by terrorists, a base should not be sited across or in the vicinity of such tracks. Should game use such a track and scent humans, they are likely to leave the track and create a new track, so giving an indication to the terrorists that humans are in the vicinity.

### Sequence of Establishing a Base

1. A suggested sequence for the establishment of a base is as follows:
   a. The patrol commander and escort will move to the area where he considers he will site his base.
   b. When he has selected his site, he calls forward the remainder of the patrol. The patrol, in coming forward, is to exercise caution in using the track and route used by the patrol commander.
   c. When the patrol arrives, the patrol commander indicates on the ground 12 o'clock and 6 o'clock positions for the base and details positions for each group.
   d. Groups, under their commanders, move into their indicated positions according to the clock system, and make contact with the groups on their left and right.
   e. At the same time the patrol commander orders stand-to and sends out local security patrols to ensure that the area within hearing distance is clear of stray local population and terrorists. These patrols should circle the base about 400 meters out searching for spoor and listening for foreign sounds.
   f. While the local security patrols are searching the area, the patrol commander quickly goes around making adjustments to group positions to ensure all-around defense is established and the men are alert.
   g. The patrol is to remain at stand-to until the local security patrols return.
   h. On return of the local security patrols, and before stand-down, the patrol commander holds an order group and orders are issued. The following points may be covered:
      i. Sentries, passwords, stand-to, stand-down and alarm scheme.
ii. Base security and search patrols.
iii. Routing for next day.
iv. Maintenance of weapons.
v. Water.
vi. Cooking, fires and smoking.
vii. Latrines.

i. No matter how tired the men may be or what the situation, the sequence suggested above should be followed as near as possible. Appropriate security arrangements listed in this section should also be taken for semi-permanent base camps.

j. Should a temporary base be occupied in daylight, it may be desirable to first secure the area by means of patrols to minimize the chance of enemy interference during occupation.

Administration of a Base

1. If base administration is not of a high standard, patrolling from the base will deteriorate, because living in it will be unpleasant and tiring. Some of the points which require attention are:
   a. **Latrines.** These are normally outside the base and will be protected by the sentry layout.
   b. **Disposal of refuse.** Refuse must be disposed of in such a manner that scavengers (e.g., baboons, jackals, hyenas, etc.) will not dig it up. It is suggested that a likely method of disposal is to dig the latrine pits deep enough to accommodate excreta and refuse. This will usually deter wild animals and scavengers from digging up the pits.
   c. **Tins.** All tins should be punctured before burial so as to render them useless.
   d. **Water purification.** The patrol commander is responsible for ensuring that all water is sterilized before use.
   e. **Cooking.** Arrangements for cooking will depend on the situation and the instructions of the patrol commander. Experience has shown that cooking in pairs has many advantages. However, this is not the only method and depending on the situation it may even be necessary to cook away from the base and then bring the food to the base for consumption. Alternatively, the situation may permit centralized cooking in the base.
   f. **Duties.** Under normal conditions, when a patrol of platoon strength is committed for a long period, it has been found that two section patrols deployed and one in base is the most efficient method of rotating duties. The sections rotate on a daily basis with the one in base responsible for the security of the base and fatigues.

Conclusion

1. A patrol commander must appreciate not only the importance of establishing a
base, but also of establishing an efficient one, whether it be a framework deployment base or a semi-permanent base. An efficient base is one in which:

a. The security arrangements are sound and known to all.
b. Duties are evenly distributed and rest is organized.
c. Strict hygiene rules and water discipline are laid down and observed.
d. A high all-around standard of discipline and routine is maintained.

SECTION 8: POACHING PROCEDURE IN FRIENDLY FORCES AREA

General

1. During operations, there will be occasions when a patrol following up a terrorist party, e.g., after a contact or by tracking, reaches the limit of its boundary and wishes to continue the follow-up in another unit's or sub-unit's area.
2. To avoid delay in the follow-up, quick clearance for a patrol to operate in another unit's area is necessary.

Principles

1. When clearance is required, the following principles will be observed as far as possible:
   a. *Within a battalion.* Should a company request clearance to operate in the area of another company of the same battalion, authority to do so may be given by battalion headquarters. Battalion headquarters must inform the second company of the extent of the clearance, and that company must in turn inform the platoon(s) involved.
   b. *Inter-battalion.* When a battalion wishes to operate in another battalion's area, prior clearance from the second battalion must be obtained, either direct or through formation headquarters. If clearance is obtained direct, the formation headquarters must be advised as soon as possible.
   c. *Inter-formation.* Under no circumstances will a patrol cross into the area of another formation without the authority of that formation. Clearance in these cases will be obtained at formation level.
   d. *Boundaries.* Whenever clearance is granted, the cleared area will be bounded by easily recognizable natural features. Grid lines will not be used to define a cleared area.

Emergency Poaching

1. In an emergency, when communications are impossible, a patrol commander must decide whether the target is worth the risk of a clash with the military's own forces. Should he decide to cross, it is incumbent upon him to ensure that:
a. Any terrorists seen are positively identified as such before fire is opened.
b. He is confident that he can identify himself to any friendly forces encountered before fire is opened by them.

2. When entry into another unit or sub-unit's area has been made, full particulars of the reason for and extent of the entry will be given to the appropriate headquarters as soon as possible.

SECTION 9: PATROL ORDERS AIDE MEMOIRE

1. Situation
2. Terrain.
   a. Any information about ground.
   b. Use of maps, air photos, visual reconnaissance and patrol "going" maps.
3. Enemy.
   a. Strength.
   b. Weapons and dress.
   c. Known or likely locations, activities, habits and background.
   d. Threat and capabilities.
   a. Attitude towards own troops and enemy.
   b. Relationship with the enemy.
   c. Daily routine.
   d. Traditional authorities.
5. Own forces.
   a. Activities of other patrols.
   b. Air and artillery tasks, if any.
   c. Fire support available.
6. Mission. The mission must be specific and clearly defined. It takes the following forms:
   a. Reconnaissance patrol -- question.
   b. Fighting patrol -- definite aim.
7. Execution
   a. Strength and composition of patrol.
   b. Individual tasks.
   c. Time of leaving and anticipated time of return.
   d. Routes out and in. If helicopters are to be used, location of landing points.
   e. Specific area of interest.
   f. Boundaries.
   g. Probable bounds and rendezvous.
   h. Formations.
   i. Fire discipline.
   j. Deception and cover plan.
   k. Authority to enter another unit's or sub-unit's area of responsibility.
   l. Action to be taken on meeting terrorists.
   m. Action to be taken on meeting local population.
   n. Action if ambushed.
o. Action if lost.
p. Do not:
   i. Move in file in open country.
   ii. Move through defiles.
   iii. Return by the same route as that used for outward move.
   iv. Relax because you are nearing base.
9. Administration and Logistics
   a. Rations and water.
      i. Type and number of days to be carried.
      ii. Cooking and eating arrangements.
      iii. Water discipline and quantity.
   b. Equipment and dress.
      i. Change of clothing, if required.
      ii. Large or small pack.
      iii. Important items such as maps, compasses, binoculars and air photos.
      iv. Footwear.
      v. Poncho capes.
      vi. Torches, etc.
10. Weapons.
    a. Type.
    b. Proportion and distribution.
11. Ammunition.
    a. Type and distribution.
    b. Signal cartridges.
    c. Explosives and booby traps.
    d. Illuminating aids.
12. Medical.
    a. Medical arrangements.
       i. First field dressing and first-aid kits.
       ii. Medical orderly and haversack.
       iii. Water-sterilizing tablets.
       iv. Salt tablets. Han,
       v. Anti-malaria prophylactics.
       vi. Snakebite outfits. 102
       vii. Insect repellent.
       viii. Foot power.
       ix. Use of medicines.
    b. Casualty evacuation arrangements.
       i. Friendly forces -- wounded/killed.
       ii. Enemy -- wounded/killed.
13. Special equipment.
    a. Camera.
    b. Fingerprint outfits.
    c. Electronic direction-finding equipment.
d. etc

16. Resupply.
   a. Preplanned.
   b. Emergency.
17. Command and Signals
   a. General instructions.
      i. Radio net and frequencies (including air).
      ii. Schedules.
      iii. Special instructions.
   b. Codes.
      i. Net identification signs.
      ii. Codes.
      iii. Passwords.
      iv. Authentication tables.
   c. Check and test sets.
      i. Antennae.
      ii. CW keys.
      iii. Spare batteries.
   d. Ground/air communications.
      i. DZ panels and DZ letter
      ii. Ground/air signal code.
      iii. Steel mirrors/lamps.
18. Location of commander and second in command.
19. Final check. Check thoroughly that all points have been understood by patrol members.
20. Hand Signals

These signals are in addition to the normal conventional signals, that is, advance, halt, close in, turn around, run, etc.:

   a. Enemy seen or suspected. Thumb pointed towards the ground from a clenched fist.
   b. No enemy in sight (or All clear). Thumb pointed upwards from a clenched fist.
   c. Light machine-gun group. Clenched fist.
   d. Rifle group. Two fingers pointed upwards.
   e. Section commander. Two fingers held against arm.
   f. Platoon commander. Two fingers held on shoulder.
   g. You. Point at man concerned.
   h. Me. Indicate at own chest.
   i. Give covering fire. Weapon brought into the aim, indicating direction. Be prepared to give covering fire, if necessary.
   j. Track junction. Arms crossed.
   k. House, hut or building. Hand formed into an inverted "V" indicating the
shape of roof.
l. Reconnaissance. Hands held up to the eyes as if using binoculars.
m. Attack. Clenched fist swung vigorously over shoulder and point to
direction attack is required.
n. Immediate ambush. Open hand placed over the face followed by pointing
to the ambush position.
o. Reconnaissance group. Clenched fist with forefinger upright.
p. Water (river, stream, etc.). Give the sign for waves with the hand.

SECTION 10: PATROL DEBRIEFING PRO-FORMA

1. General.
   a. Area.
   b. Aim.
   c. Strength and composition.
   d. Duration (with times and dates).
   e. Routes followed.
2. Terrain.
   a. Was the information accurate? if not, what inaccuracies were discovered?
   b. Was the map accurate? If not, what were the inaccuracies?
   c. If air photos were used, were they helpful?
   d. What was the condition of the tracks followed?
   e. Did the tracks show signs of recent use?
   f. Where rivers were crossed, or followed, were there:
      i. Any bridges (including type)?
      ii. Fords?
      iii. Any recent tracks near crossing places?
   g. Crops and cultivation -- old and new?
3. Population. If any local inhabitants were contacted outside their normal areas:
   a. What was their physical condition?
   b. Were they friendly?
   c. Why were they in that area?
   d. Tribal affiliation?
   e. What information did they provide?
   f. Influence of political groups?
   g. Influence of chiefs/village headmen?
   h. Influence of spirit mediums?
4. Hides or camps found.
   a. Grid reference?
   b. Was it occupied? If so, by how many? If not, how long evacuated?
   c. Number of huts/shelters and estimated number of occupants?
   d. Installations of a temporary or permanent nature?
   e. Any sentry posts? If so, how were they sited?
   f. Any warning signals or booby traps?
   g. Details of entry and exit tracks.
   h. Any food dumps in or near the camp?
i. Any arms or ammunition found? If so, what condition and quantity?

j. Were there any radio or press facilities?

k. Any documents found? If so,
   i. Where were they found?
   ii. Has the place of finding been indicated on each document?
   iii. Where are they now?

l. Any indication of direction taken by terrorists when leaving the camp?

5. Contacts.
   a. Where was contact made?
   b. How many were there and of what race?
   c. How were they dressed? If in uniform, give details.
   d. Details and condition of arms.
   e. Estimate of quantity of ammunition.
   f. Indication of condition of ammunition. e.g. Indication which could lead to
      the identification of the leader.
   g. How were the orders given and how was liaison maintained?
   i. What formation did they adopt in:
      i. Attack?
      ii. Defense?
   j. Snipers?
   k. Any automatic weapons or weapons manned by a team?
   l. Did they appear healthy?
   m. What was their morale like?
   n. Was language spoken identified?
   o. Did they use any system of signals (including radio)?
   p. Any casualties:
      i. Own troops?
      ii. Enemy?
   q. Any captured enemy?
   r. Any surrendered enemy?
   s. Have the enemy dead been identified? If not:
      i. Were photographs taken?
      ii. Were there any recognizable identification marks?
   t. When engagement was broken off:
      i. In which direction did the enemy disappear?
      ii. Did they use known tracks?
      iii. Where were you when the enemy's tracks could no longer be
          followed?

6. Comments.
Tracking

SECTION 1: GENERAL

1. Tracking plays a special and very important part in maintaining contact with the enemy, in locating their camps and hides, and in following up after a contact or an incident.
2. Without considerable practical experience no man can become an expert, but with a little basic knowledge, well applied, most men can become "bush minded." As bushcraft, which includes the ability to track, is essentially a practical subject, no amount of theorizing can make an expert. Practice in the field is essential. As with most skills, bushcraft must become an automatic action which will be of the greatest value in actual operations.
3. The aim of this chapter is to give some guidance to troops employed in ATOPS in the techniques of tracking.

SECTION 2: TRACKING TECHNIQUES

1. To assist troops in the tracking of individuals or bands of enemy, some suggested techniques are listed below.
2. Action on finding tracks.
   a. Unless it is possible to follow the spoor with either a civilian tracker or a tracker team, anyone finding spoor should isolate the scene and keep that area free of military forces until the arrival of trackers. An immediate report should be made to higher headquarters giving the following information:
      i. Estimated number of terrorists.
      ii. Estimated age of spoor.
      iii. Direction.
      iv. Any other useful information such as location, terrain, type of tracks, etc.
   b. It is absolutely essential that the spoor is not obliterated or disturbed by the discoverers. The spoor and surrounding area must remain untouched until the arrival of a tracker or tracker team. It is not possible to follow one preserved spoor when the remainder of the area has been trampled flat by military forces.
   c. It frequently pays to backtrack when very fresh tracks are found, particularly early in the morning when they may lead from a camp.
3. Action when tracking.
   a. Work in pairs when possible.
   b. Use a pointer to indicate the tracks. This can be a stick or even a rifle.
   c. When a trail is faint, leapfrog the trackers.
   d. The tracker who has the run of a track must keep on it and only change
when the run is broken.
e. In the interests of speed, track ahead where possible and not at your feet.
f. Depending on conditions, use ground or aerial tracking, but if possible, use aerial tracking for speed.
g. Think ahead and listen for bird and game alarms which could indicate movement or presence of humans ahead.
h. Bear in mind minor details which aid tracking, e.g., sand on rocks, overturned leaves, etc.
i. Patrol members not employed with the actual tracking will adopt an open formation and be on the alert for enemy action.
j. The person or persons doing the tracking most at all times be protected by members of the patrol.
k. Tracking in overcast weather and around midday will be difficult due to lack of shadow which gives depth.
l. Track by "feeling" over dead leaves on damp ground for indentations if all else fails.
m. Do not talk -- communicate by means of hand signals.
n. To ascertain whether gangs are in the area, look for signs at fruit-bearing trees, water holes, trapping sites, beehives or observation points. Also watch for signs of fires, particularly in the early morning or late evening.
o. If the track suddenly becomes well-hidden but not lost, circle downwind and try to pick up scent, smoke or firelight, especially at night.
p. Be constantly aware of the possibility of trickery or deception; for example, men turning towards water, then going from tree to tree in the opposite direction; hiding underwater or underground in a wild animals burrow; shoes tied on backwards; grass bent back; walking backwards or on the side of the feet; or tying cattle hooves onto the shoes or feet.
q. Study the enemy's habits at every opportunity.

4. Action should the trail split. Trackers must be trained to report immediately to the patrol commander any attempt by the enemy to split up. The patrol commander then decides, on the advice of the tracker, which track will be followed. The splitting point should be marked so that the trackers can return to it and, if necessary, start again. To assist the trackers in picking up the tracks again a few hints are listed below:
   a. Examine any logs, stones, etc., in the immediate vicinity of the track for sign of disturbance.
   b. Examine leaves and grass on either side of the track for signs of disturbance.
   c. Attempts at deception, unless done by an expert, will often give a clearer indication of where the track is located.

5. Action when the track is lost.

When the track is lost, the leading tracker should indicate that he has reached the last visible sign of the track he is following. Trackers must be trained never to pass beyond this point without first informing the patrol commander of its exact location. A simple drill for the search is:
   a. Leading tracker halts the patrol and indicates the position of the last visible
sign to the patrol commander.
b. The sign is marked for future reference.
c. Flank trackers do a circular cast working towards one another in the hope of picking up the spoor again.
d. While the flank trackers are carrying out the search as described above, the tracker who was on the spoor carries out a 360-degree search up to approximately 15 meters to his immediate front.
e. Once the spoor has been relocated, the tracker who found the spoor then takes over as main tracker. The remainder of the team fall into an appropriate tracker formation.

6. Use of aircraft for tracking.
   a. Light aircraft and/or helicopters can actively assist patrols during the tracking of terrorist groups by:
      i. Spotting terrorists from the air, bearing in mind that the terrorists are likely to take cover on hearing aircraft. Aircraft may also break security and indicate to terrorists that they are being followed.
      ii. Slowing down the terrorists as they attempt to keep under cover, thereby enabling the trackers to close with them.
   b. Visual air reconnaissance will provide valuable information concerning the nature of the country ahead of the follow-up group. This information should enable the patrol to assess:
      i. Likely routes taken by terrorists.
      ii. Ambush positions.
      iii. Camps.
   c. Helicopters may be used to uplift trackers in the leapfrog role (explained in greater detail in Section 4 of Chapter 8: Follow-up Operations).

SECTION 3: ANTI-TRACKING MEASURES

1. Detailed below are a number of points which should be taken into consideration:
   a. Think when moving. Do not relax.
   b. Do not become regular in habit.
   c. Avoid the obvious.
   d. Watch the nature of the country carefully and use types of ground which are difficult to track in.
   e. Use weather to advantage, that is, move in rain.
   f. Carry a stick with which to bend grass and branches back.
   g. On special operations, to increase deception, wear smooth-soled shoes which leave less distinctive prints, or go barefoot or use motor-tire sandals.
   h. Walk on the side of the foot when necessary as this leaves no heel or toe marks.
   i. Cross tracks, roads or streams by crossing in trees or on rocks. if this is not possible when crossing a wide sandy track or road, cross at one place, each man stepping carefully on the footprints of the leading man, thereby leaving only one set of prints.
   j. Be careful with Smokey fires, tobacco smell, soap in streams or rivers,
bird and game alarms or insect or frog silences.
k. Do not be too tempted to use water as a line of movement, as this is where
the enemy will probably search or look for signs of security forces in the
area.
l. With a large party, where possible, avoid moving in single file as this will
leave definite signs and a track. move in open formation instead.

SECTION 4: HINTS ON TRAILS AND TRACKING

1. General.
   a. It is extremely difficult to move silently and quickly in most parts of the
bush and consequently this requires a lot of practice and concentration.
   b. There are many paths in the bush made by game during their nightly or
seasonal movements. These animals avoid steep or slippery slopes, and
therefore game paths will normally provide easy going. Terrorists and
military patrols use these trails when quick silent movement is required.
Troops should therefore exercise extreme caution when using these trails
as they might well be ambushed.

2. Tracking spoor.
   a. There are two distinct types of spoor, ground spoor and aerial spoor. The
ground sign is normally made by a boot- or footprint, and aerial spoor is in
the form of trampled grass, broken bushes, broken cobwebs, etc.
   b. The following are signs the experienced tracker looks for when tracking
spoors:
      i. Crushed and bent grass and vegetation.
      ii. Broken twigs and leaves.
      iii. Overturned leaves and stones.
      iv. Mud displaced from streams.
      v. Broken cobwebs.
      vi. The state of the dew on a trail.
      vii. Mud or scratches on stones and logs.
   c. Man. Barefoot prints are soft rounded impressions formed by the heel, ball
of foot, or toes. Women's tracks are generally smaller and have on the
whole two characteristics. Firstly, they tend to be pigeon-toed, and
secondly, their toes are more splayed out than men's.
   d. Running men. Points to observe are skid marks, depth of impression,
running on balls of feet and toes, splayed out toes and badly damaged
vegetation, with resultant lack of concealment of trail.
   e. Loaded men. Short footsteps, deeper impressions than normal in soft
ground, and toes splayed out.
   f. Animals. Due to the fact that most animals have cloven hooves, the
impressions formed on the ground have sharp, clear-cut edges.

3. Judging the age of tracks.
   a. Weather. The state of the weather -- rain, wind, sunshine -- should always
be borne in mind as it is one of the most important points in deciding the
age of a track.
b. Obliteration by rain or light rain. By remembering when it last rained, more accurate judgment of the age of tracks is possible. If the tracks are pock-marked, obviously they were made before the rain, and if they are not pock-marked they were made after the rain. Similarly, by looking to see if the tracks have been pock-marked by light rain dripping from trees, the age can be established.

c. The state and position of trodden vegetation. Various grasses have different grades of resilience, and only practice and experience will enable a tracker to use this factor to judge accurately the age of the spoor.

d. Bent grass or leaves. An indication of the age of a track may be gained by its dryness. Bent grass will be green initially but after a few days will turn a brown color. Again, the amount of sunshine and rain during the last few days should be taken into account.

e. Impression in mud. Always note the state of dryness of a track in mud or soft ground. If the track is very fresh, water will not have run back into the depression made by a foot. Later the water runs back, and later still the mud which has been pushed up around the depression, and the mud kicked forward by the food leaving the ground, begins to dry.

f. Game tracks. Remember that most animals lie up during the day and move about at night. Therefore, if human prints on main forest game trails have at least a double set of animal spoor superimposed and these spoor show that the game has moved in both directions, any human prints are probably at least one night old. If the animal spoor show that game has moved in one direction only, then the human prints were probably made during the night, after the game had moved down to water but before the game moved back.

4. Information regarding terrorist methods of concealing tracks and camps should also be sought.

5. Factors affecting tracking. There are certain factors which affect tracking.
   a. Whether the ground is hard or soft, stony or muddy.
   b. The type of country.
   c. The weather -- things lack depth in overcast weather.
   d. The position of the sun relative to the direction of travel. The most suitable position is when one has to track towards the sun.
   e. The footwear of the human quarry. A distinct boot pattern is obviously easier to follow than a plain-soled spoor.
   f. The extent to which other similar tracks may confuse and possibly blur the spoor.
   g. Concentration and the effect of weariness.

6. Things the tracker must look for.
   a. Footprints and impressions of footwear: the rhythm of the spoor or the length of stride of the quarry. This is a guide to where the next footprint may be found.
   b. Trampled grass, soil, and marks in the soil where indirect pressure may have left no impression.
   c. Disturbed stones, sticks or so.
   d. Leaves which have been turned, crushed, kicked or pulled off trees;
branches and twigs bent or broken and vegetation pushed aside; the reflection of light from grass or leaves displaced at an angle; the color of bent and broken vegetation; and scratched or chipped bark.

e. Discarded wrapping and masticated vegetation.
f. Cobwebs broken or wiped off onto a nearby tree or bush.
g. Urine and excrement, frequently indicated by house flies and yellow butterflies, and dung beetles during the rains.
h. Snares and traps, robbed bees' nests and smoke.
i. The state of dew on the spoor.
j. Mud displaced from streams or mud on stones and logs.
k. Squashed animal or insect life, and whether it has been attacked by ants.

7. A tracker has many things to consider while tracking. He must possess certain qualities, such as above average eyesight, memory, intelligence, fitness, anticipation and understanding of nature. Patience, persistence acute observation and natural instinct are the basis of good tracking. There are times when pure instinct alone will draw a tracker in the correct direction. All units should ensure that training in aggressive bushcraft is maintained at the highest possible standard.

SECTION 5: USE OF DOGS IN ATOPS

General

1. **Aim.** The aim of this section is not to instruct on the handling and training of dogs, but to provide an infantry commander with sufficient background information to enable him to usefully deploy any dogs and dog handlers that may be placed at his disposal.

2. Under no circumstances will a dog be attached to an army formation without the service of a handler also being provided. The dog and handler are a highly trained team, and a dog cannot be handled by another person.

3. The handler is an expert in his own field and can give advice on the capability of his dog and the conditions under which it can be used to best effect. He is not, however, responsible for the tactical deployment of his dog. The decision, how and when to use the animal and its handler, rests with the local army commander.

4. To obtain the maximum value from trained war dogs, it is essential to have an understanding of the conditions best suited for their employment. Dogs, like the rest of the animal kingdom, are subject to outside influences which have a direct bearing on their behavior. It follows, therefore, that the performance of any dog, no matter how highly trained, is not constant and it cannot be expected to work efficiently under every type of condition. This is often not fully appreciated, and instances have occurred where adverse criticism has been leveled against a dog simply because the person responsible for its employment was ignorant of its limitations. Full value will only stem from a full knowledge and better understanding of the capabilities and characteristics of the dogs. It must be remembered that a dog tires easily and consequently must be used sparingly and to the best possible advantage.
5. The efficiency of a dog is in direct ratio to that of its handler. It is, therefore, most important to select suitable men for training as handlers. Handlers must, therefore, only be changed if absolutely essential.

6. War dogs are a valuable weapon which, when properly used, provide an advantage over the enemy. The fullest use should therefore be made of them.

7. The types of war dogs that are in common use are:
   a. Patrol dog.
   b. Tracking dog.
   c. Mine detection dog.
   d. Guard dog.
   e. Dogs for use in crowd control purposes will not be discussed in this section.

8. Limitations. Certain limitations must be stressed:
   a. The dog is apt to become perplexed when large numbers of people are in a small area, e.g., when opposing forces are in close contact.
   b. The dog is apt to become bewildered when the magnitude and number of extraneous sounds are abnormal, e.g., when the battle is intense.
   c. The dog cannot differentiate between enemy and its own troops. Full briefing to a patrol is essential to prevent "pointing" on scattered elements or groups of troops.

**The Patrol Dog**

1. **General.** A patrol dog works by "air scent" and hearing, and is trained to give silent warning of any individual or group of individuals by pointing. He is not taught to attack and cannot be used as a tracker. The patrol dog is therefore useful for giving silent warning of ambushes, attempts at infiltration, and the presence of any "foreign body," before such presence can be detected by a human. He can be worked either by day or by night, in most kinds of weather and country.

2. The distance at which warning is given depends upon the following factors:
   a. Ability of the handler to "read" his dog.
   b. Wind direction and velocity.
   c. Concentration of scent.
   d. Humidity.
   e. Density of vegetation.
   f. Volume of noise in the vicinity.
   g. Condition and fitness of dog.
   h. Individual inherent ability.

3. Operational employment. The patrol dog can be employed in two ways:
   a. On a lead.
   b. Loose in front.

   In both cases, the dog is controlled by a handler.

4. When moving to an operational area, the dog is kept at heel -- while in this position, the dog knows he is off duty and is not on the alert. When on duty, the collar is removed and either the "pilot rope" is put on and the dog is told to seek,
or the dog works loose and the command "seek" is given.

5. Both handler and dog have to be more highly trained to work with the dog loose.

6. The dog points by one or a combination of the following signs:
   a. Raising of head and pricking-up of ears.
   b. Tensing of body.
   c. Tail wagging.
   d. Keenness to investigate.

7. Uses. The patrol dog can be used:
   a. On reconnaissance patrols.
   b. On fighting patrols. c. As a sentry outpost.
   c. Guarding forward dumps.
   d. With static security groups.
   e. In isolated positions.

8. On patrol. The handler and the dog will normally lead. However, if the dog is
   being worked loose, it may be possible for the dog to lead followed by the armed
   scout of the "recce group" with the handler (who is constantly in sight and in
   control of the dog) next. This makes the handler's job a trifle less hazardous. In
   any case, close contact must be maintained between handler and patrol leader. The
   normal procedure is:
   a. The patrol commander indicates to the handler the mission, disposition of
      own troops, the general direction of advance and any special location
      instructions.
   b. The patrol is ordered to move out.
   c. The patrol dog and handler with one escort precedes the patrol at a
      distance which will permit immediate communication with the patrol
      commander. At night this would be about an arm's length. In daylight the
      distance will be greater, but within easy visual signaling distance.
   d. The patrol dog and handler move off, keeping generally in the indicated
      direction. He must be allowed to take advantage of wind and other
      conditions favoring the dog's scenting powers without endangering the
      patrol.
   e. When the dog points, the handler indicates by silent hand signal "enemy in
      sight."
   f. The patrol halts and takes cover.

9. Patrol commander proceeds quietly, utilizing available cover, to the handler and
   dog, and makes his plan.

10. Sentry outposts. The main value of the dog is to give timely warning of approach
    of, or attempts at infiltration by, the enemy. The handler and dog are placed a
    short distance from the sentries: this distance will be within easy visual signal
    range in daylight, but much closer at night. A simple means of communication
    between handler and patrol commander at night is a piece of cord or string, which
    is jerked to alert everyone. When alerted, the patrol commander proceeds
    immediately to the handler to receive any information concerning the distance and
    direction of the enemy.

11. Guarding forward dumps, static security groups and isolated positions. The use of
    patrol dogs on these rare occasions is the same as for a sentry outpost with local
modifications. In all cases the local commander should take the advice of the handler as to the best employment of the dog or dogs.

The Tracking Dog

1. **General.** Tracking dogs are trained to follow human ground scent. The principle on which the dogs are trained is one of reward by food. The dog is never fed in kennels but only after work, i.e., a successful track.

2. **Tracking conditions.** The ideal tracking conditions may be listed as follows:
   a. Air and ground temperatures approximately equal.
   b. A mild dull day with a certain amount of moisture in the air with slow evaporation.
   c. Damp ground and vegetation.
   d. Ground overshadowed by trees.
   e. Blood spilled on trail.
   f. A running enemy who gives off more body odor than one who has walked away calmly.
   g. An unclean enemy.

3. Factors which adversely affect tracking include:
   a. Hot sun.
   b. Strong wind.
   c. Heavy rain.
   d. Roads (tarmac) on which cars travel.
   e. Running water.
   f. Bush fires.
   g. Animal scent.

4. Heavy growth of vegetation helps to combat the heat and retains more scent. Furthermore, a greater amount of vegetation is damaged by a running enemy, thus producing an increased aroma.

5. **Operational employment.** The most important single factor in the successful employment of a tracking dog is time. The dog must be brought to the scene of the incident with all possible speed and not used as a last resort. It is suggested that tracking dogs be held at a base or some central point until a call for their services is made and then taken as near as possible to the scene of the incident by transport or helicopter in order that they may arrive fresh. The degree of fatigue a tracking dog has reached will determine its usefulness.

6. Once it has been decided to use a tracking dog, the less fouling of the area with extraneous scent the better. Objects liable to have been in contact with the person to be tracked should not be touched and movement over the area restricted to a minimum.

7. Great care must be taken to keep the use of tracking dogs as secret as possible. If the enemy know they are likely to be tracked by a dog, they will very probably take counter-measures.

8. Use of tracker dogs on night follow-up. Tracking dogs have successfully worked night trails and have shown that they are capable of working night trails in fairly difficult terrain. There are, however, certain facts which detract from the use of
dogs on a night follow-up; they are:

a. The dog, when on a trail, moves at a brisk pace and while military forces can maintain this pace during the hours of daylight, it is most difficult to maintain the formation and contact with one another when moving at this pace at night. There are certain inherent difficulties attached to a night follow-up, all of which are aggravated if one has to move at a fast pace.

b. In daylight hours the handler can see his dog and very often from its behavior can determine whether or not it has left the human trail. When this happens the handler is in a position to correct the dog and put it back on the trail it should be following. At night it is more difficult for the handler to establish whether the dog has left the trail and therefore it will be necessary for the handler to more frequently check the trail being followed. The use of a torch or naked light is undesirable, but this can possibly be overcome by the use of infrared equipment. An additional assurance would be the use of an expert tracker in conjunction with the dog.

c. In thick bush it is very difficult for military forces to maintain contact with each other and a great deal of noise is also made.

d. The greatest danger of this type of follow-up is the fact that the chances of walking into a prepared ambush are very much increased. The points raised in the paragraphs above can be overcome with constant practice.

9. In the event of a terrorist attack during hours of darkness, tracking dogs can be of great assistance in locating the trail and being permitted to follow this trail for approximately half an hour or so to establish clearly the line of flight of the terrorists. It is suggested that in this case the dog and handler be backed by a small number of men merely for local protection and not as a follow-up group in the true sense. once this has been established, the controlling headquarters can plan stop lines and follow-up action.

Mine Detection Dog

1. This animal is trained to detect mines, booby traps, tunnels, hides or ammunition caches. The scout dog is trained to detect and sit within two feet of any hostile artifact hidden below or above ground, to discover tripwires, caches, tunnels and "punji pits," and to clear a safe lane approximately eight to ten meters wide.

2. A commander who properly employs a scout dog team can rely on the dog to safely discover approximately 90 percent of all hostile artifacts along his line of march. This depends, naturally, on the state of training of the animal.

3. Since this animal is a specialist in its own right, it is vitally important that this team be provided with adequate protection while working. It may be necessary to make use of the patrol dog to give this added protection.

Guard Dog

1. General. The role of the guard dog is to give greater security to guarded
installations. Because the dog's senses are more acute during hours of darkness and when distracting influences during these hours are reduced to a minimum, its use should be directed towards the replacement or supplementing of night sentries or guards.

2. Employment. They can be used to protect sensitive points and other installations. When on duty these dogs can:
   a. Be on a leash under direct control of a handler and used as a prowler guard within the installation or along the perimeter of the installation being protected.
   b. Be allowed to run loose within a building or fenced-in area.
   c. Be attached to a "run wire" whereby the animal can move freely within the area of its beat.
   d. Run loose in dog runs on the perimeter of the key point or installation.

3. They can alert the guards or dog handler by barking, or the more vicious type is taught to attack any intruder immediately.

Conclusions

1. Dogs may be transported by helicopters or other types of light aircraft. The animals travel well and do not suffer any discomfort. Do not expect too much of a dog; it must be borne in mind that the dog can be defeated easily by the ingenuity of man.

2. A very important point to remember is to ensure that the right type of dog is requested when required. Do not ask for a patrol dog when a tracking dog is required.
Follow-up Operations

SECTION 1: GENERAL

1. The aim of the follow-up or pursuit is to track down, attack and destroy an enemy group that may or may not have had contact with the military forces.
2. From the above paragraph it is apparent that a follow-up is mounted when the enemy has been detected by the security forces or the population, or through tracks, and an operation has to be planned to make contact with the enemy and to destroy him. It will also be obvious that the enemy will eventually become aware of this follow-up and will do everything possible to conceal his tracks and to disrupt and delay the follow-up by employing delaying tactics such as ambushes, snipers and perhaps booby traps.
3. Maximum use must be made of expert trackers, tracking teams and tracker dog teams. Helicopters and light reconnaissance aircraft can be and must be effectively employed during the operation. Helicopters can be employed to leapfrog follow-up teams, thereby keeping the follow-up troops relatively fresh. Once the general direction of the enemy's movement has been determined, helicopters can be used to deploy troops ahead of the fleeing enemy to ambush and cut him off.
4. Although it may be difficult to determine the enemy's movement pattern beforehand, the follow-up force must endeavor to establish this pattern as soon as possible to be able to cut the enemy off, close with him and destroy him within the shortest possible time.
5. The main factor to remember is that the enemy must not be given a chance to rest up or to organize a well-defended position/ambush. Pressure must be applied relentlessly and every opportunity of harassing and inflicting casualties on the enemy must be taken.

SECTION 2: METHOD OF OPERATION

1. It is difficult to lay down in this manual exactly how the operation must be conducted. It is basically a tracking operation to seek the enemy out and, once he has been located, to then attack and destroy him.
2. The first requirement is to locate the enemy's tracks and try to determine the age and direction of the tracks and the strength of the enemy.
3. As soon as the tracks are located, the patrol is to indicate the age and direction of the tracks and the estimated strength of the enemy. If the patrol has no tracker and a tracker team is available, they are to report the tracks and await the arrival of a tracker team. The patrol must not attempt to follow the tracks and must confine its search to the immediate vicinity so as not to inhibit the work of the trackers. However, when a tracker team is not available, immediate follow-up action must
be taken by the patrol.

4. Depending on the strength of the terrorists, a platoon or more is to be deployed for the follow-up. If the tracks are at a distance from the operational headquarters, it may be necessary to establish a field headquarters with army/air force and police representation at a nearby landing zone, airfield or road head. The field headquarters is then tasked with the control of the follow-up, and is allocated the required troops, police and aircraft.

5. The force adopts the follow-up formation incorporating the tracker team and moves at best tracking speed. As soon as possible after the follow-up has commenced, the follow-up group is to confirm the age, direction and strength of the tracks and report progress as often as possible. Changes in direction, the splitting of the tracks, hides and resting places are to be reported immediately.

6. During daylight, the follow-up group will, if possible, be supported by an armed light aircraft which is also to operate in the reconnaissance and communications role. However, if the tracks are over 48 hours old, an unarmed light aircraft can be used, but should be replaced when a contact is considered reasonably imminent. When tasking the supporting aircraft, commanders must assess whether it should remain behind the follow-up group in the hope of achieving surprise or whether it can range ahead in order to slow down terrorist movement and to spot likely marching points, water holes and routes through escarpments, rivers, etc.

7. Depending on the age and direction of the tracks, the following procedures can be adopted:
   a. Leapfrogging.
      i. If the tracks are assessed as being several or more days old, the follow-up group can be helicoptered from 1,000 to 5,000 meters forward (depending on the terrain and the estimated line of movement) and then fanned out to relocate the tracks. If successful, leapfrogging is repeated until the tracks are considered to be fresh enough to follow on foot (from 24 to 48 hours old).
      ii. The procedure for the search for tracks after leapfrogging is similar to airborne tracking (detailed below). That is, on landing, troops cast up to several hundred meters on either side of the landing zone. If the tracks are relocated, their age and direction are assessed and, if necessary, another leapfrog is made; if not, the helicopter repositions the troops in another search arc until the tracks are found.
      iii. When possible, leapfrogging should always be supplemented by keeping an additional force on the original trail so that a marked change in direction, the splitting of tracks or a hide can be spotted. This force is also conveniently placed to reinforce the follow-up groups in a contact. This force will also be able to determine whether any reinforcements may have joined the enemy.
   b. Stop groups.
      i. As many stop groups of patrol (section) strength as possible should be placed astride the estimated line of advance, at a distance ahead of the follow-up group dictated by the terrain and the age of the
tracks. Should time allow it and there be sufficient troops available, the stop groups should be double banked, thereby ensuring greater depth to the stop line. These stop groups should be allocated specific areas with well-defined boundaries. Depending on the situation, the commander should be prepared to continuously readjust his stop positions.

ii. Immediately on positioning, the stop groups may patrol, if directed, to the area of the next stop position, i.e., a sidestep, to check whether or not the terrorists have crossed the stop line. (This precaution may be necessary as the estimation of the age of the tracks could be wrong.)

a. If tracks similar to those being followed are found, a leapfrog is made and the follow-up continues from the last spoor. Again, the bound covered by the leapfrog should be followed on foot for the reasons given in paragraph a.3. above.

b. If no tracks are found, the stop groups either remain in ambush until contact is made, or a sidestep back to their original positions is ordered, or the stop line is readjusted on information received.

iii. When the stop groups remain in position for any time, they may be directed to sidestep at first light, just before last light and more frequently if necessary. When static, particularly at night, they are to ambush the most likely route in their area. 4. When all stop groups have been positioned and if a helicopter is available, it may be possible to mine or booby trap other routes. The following considerations must be taken into account:

a. Coordination between the mine-laying teams and follow-up group.

b. Availability of specialists and equipment.

c. Provision to lift the mines as soon as possible or when necessary.

c. Backtracking. As soon as possible after the follow-up starts, an additional force should be tasked with back-tracking from the original point where the tracks were found. Their mission is to check that no other gangs/groups have split before the follow-up started and that the terrorists have not left stay-behind parties in bases along their route. This force may also fulfill an important intelligence-gathering role such as the location of the crossing point (if not already known), hides, resting places, etc., which may help establish a movement pattern, and the recovery of abandoned documents, kit and equipment.

8. The follow-up will normally take place during daylight with the follow-up group basing up on the tracks at last light. Although the terrorists may move at night, it is hoped that they will either contact the stop line or their movement will be slow enough and their tracks less concealed for them to be overhauled on foot or by leapfrogging.
SECTION 3: AIRBORNE TRACKING

1. This system of tracking is used when quick results are important or when a large area must be checked with few troops. Naturally, the use of helicopters is desirable, but their availability may restrict the use of airborne tracking to essential occasions only.

2. The method adopted depends on the area to be covered and the number of helicopters tasked. In a reasonably safe area a single helicopter can be used, but it is preferable to use two, one of which should be armed.

3. Each helicopter carries four men: two trackers and two tracker guards. If, however, one of the helicopters is a "gunship" (20mm or heavier), only one helicopter should provide top cover.

4. Ground is covered by cross-graining, with one helicopter landing at each likely route, e.g., game trail, clearing, pan, river bank, ridge line, etc. The other helicopter should provide top cover.

5. On landing, a tracker and guard deplane on each side of the aircraft and cast for spoor right and left for 100 to 500 meters depending on the nature of the ground.

6. If no tracks are found, the process is repeated until the area is covered, with the helicopters landing alternately so that the trackers are rested.

7. If tracks are located, the second stick is deplaned (resulting in a tracker combat team of four and four guards) to either start the follow-up or await the arrival of reinforcements.

8. Each stick is to carry at least one radio to maintain contact with the helicopter and for use in the follow-up action.

SECTION 4: MOVEMENT

1. It is important that the fleeing enemy be given no respite and chance to consolidate. Movement of the follow-up force, therefore, becomes important and it must be carefully controlled and executed so that the follow-up troops are not unnecessarily worn out and that casualties to own troops are kept to an absolute minimum.

2. During the follow-up it is imperative that the follow-up force commander continually study the ground ahead, using his eyes and map, and making a careful appreciation of the terrain. This will assist him in deciding on the best formation to use and the possible route followed by the enemy. It may also indicate to him natural obstacles to be avoided and likely places where the enemy may decide to make a final stand or site ambushes.

3. Movement during the follow-up is done at the best tracking speed or fastest speed that the terrain and enemy delaying tactics will allow. Precautions must be taken against blundering into an enemy ambush, but the follow-up force must not be over-cautious, because every minute lost gives the enemy more time and a better chance to conceal his tracks and make good his escape.

4. The follow-up will invariably be done during daylight hours because it will be extremely difficult or even impossible to do tracking at night, especially in
difficult terrain. This means that the follow-up will commence as soon as possible after first light when the tracks or signs become discernible, until it is too dark to follow or pick up any signs.

5. During the day it will be necessary for the troops to rest up for a while and have something to eat. Should the force be large enough, the leapfrog system will be introduced so that, while a group is resting or having a quick meal, another continues the follow-up, thereby maintaining the pressure. The group that has rested will then have to catch up later with the rest of the follow-up force. At section or patrol level, rests and breaks for meals will have to be restricted to the absolute minimum, if at all, so that the pressure can be maintained. Should the follow-up operation continue over a number of days, it will be necessary to rotate the troops, thereby ensuring that fresh troops are always on the enemy's tracks.

6. Formations during the move will be determined by the nature of the terrain, best or safest traveling speed and enemy tactics or delaying methods. Scouts and trackers will probably work in pairs, relieving each other. The protection group will most probably have to move abreast of each other to be able to give maximum protection to the scouts and trackers and also prevent the main body from walking into an ambush.

7. Probably the most difficult aspect of the follow-up operation is that the troops may have to carry all their equipment and kit. As the follow-up may last several days and cover a considerable distance, it will not be feasible to dump the kit and equipment 'somewhere and then return at a later stage to collect it. It is therefore important to ensure that a follow-up force is equipped as lightly as possible, carrying only the bare necessities, sufficient ammunition, water and rations, and perhaps a lightweight blanket. In order to maintain the momentum and to prevent unnecessary delays, it may be necessary to resupply the follow-up force.

8. Should the follow-up force lose the enemy's tracks or contact altogether, the suggested action is as follows:
   a. Establish a temporary base, adopt all-around observation and provide all-around protection. The enemy may be very close.
   b. Determine an effective patrol pattern and warn two or three reconnaissance patrols, with trackers, if they are available, to stand by for immediate patrolling.
   c. Having issued orders, send out two or three reconnaissance patrols to patrol forward and laterally, according to the patrol pattern, with the aim of finding the enemy's tracks or to look for signs and sounds of the enemy. These patrols should be restricted in the distance that they move away from the temporary base, probably a thousand meters at the most.
   d. Should they find signs, the patrols will return as quickly as possible to the temporary base, inform the commander and resume the follow-up as soon as possible.
   e. Should no further signs of the enemy be found, the force commander could either remain in his present position and start on a deliberate patrol program to search the area more thoroughly, or he could move his temporary base forward in the original direction of movement for approximately a thousand meters, and repeat the searching and casting
forward system with small reconnaissance patrols. In this case the decision could be made for him by his next higher headquarters, depending on how close he was behind the enemy.

f. The important point to remember is not to cast about aimlessly with a lot of troops when the enemy tracks are lost. This will create additional tracks and signs, confusing the entire issue and probably obliterating traces of the enemy.

SECTION 5: CONTACT PROCEDURE

1. As soon as it is assessed that the tracks are fresh and a contact imminent:
   a. Available helicopters are concentrated at the nearest troop concentration, e.g., field headquarters.
   b. An armed aircraft is tasked to replace any reconnaissance aircraft supporting the follow-up group.

2. Depending on the situation and the number of helicopters available, one helicopter may be tasked for airborne control. It is essential that this aircraft be fitted with an extra headset, and has the means for the army controller to communicate with ground forces and supporting aircraft.

3. Any remaining helicopters are tasked for reinforcement or the positioning of stop groups. The force is broken down into sticks, stick commanders appointed and all are placed on immediate standby. Again it is essential to have the extra headset so that stick commanders can be briefed by the pilot or controller in flight. One of the helicopters tasked to fly in reinforcements/stops will also carry ammunition for resupply to the contact group, if necessary.

4. On contact, the follow-up commander must relay "contact, contact" to the pilot of the supporting aircraft and as soon as possible give a brief SITREP. The pilot relays the information to the control headquarters and then stands by to give air support. He is to try to pinpoint the contact area, the positions of own troops and likely escape routes, landing zones, etc.

5. The situation will determine whether it is necessary to deploy an airborne controller (ABC). The backup helicopters could be called forward immediately, depending on the urgency and the magnitude of the contact.

6. There are certain problems associated with airborne controlling which should be taken into account by the local army commander, i.e., disorientation, air sickness, aircraft noises associated with airborne radios and maps being blown around in the helicopter. Subject to these considerations, and should an ABC be considered necessary and practical, the following procedure should apply:
   a. In flight to the contact area, the ABC is to receive a brief from the supporting pilot and then the contact commander and obtain the latest SITREP. This is to include the need for reinforcement and, if so, the direction of the approach of the reinforcements and/or the need for stop groups. In addition, an ammunition state should be given.
   b. Once overhead, the ABC, the pilot and gunner must try to visually pinpoint the terrorist and own troop positions as quickly as possible. This may be difficult in thick bush, in which case the ABC is to call for FLOT
and target indication.
c. During orbit of the contact area, the ABC is to select a suitable landing zone for reinforcements, if required, and select stop positions and adjacent landing zones. He will then give an in-flight briefing to the stick commanders in the backup helicopters and direct their deployment.
d. While orbiting the contact area, the ABC helicopter may well be able to influence the battle with supporting fire or engage escaping terrorists. The decision to fire the helicopter-mounted weapon is the prerogative of the pilot, but no fire is to be opened until the ABC is satisfied with the target in relation to own troops.
e. The ABC helicopter should, if possible, remain over the contact area until the contact has ended. This may necessitate changing helicopters at a nearby landing zone if the original aircraft runs out of flying time. Alternatively, in a large-scale contact, when more troops are needed as reinforcements/stops, the ABC should deplane and assume command of the ground forces.
f. Once the backup helicopters have positioned their sticks, they are to return to the control base for more troops, if required, or are to remain on standby for further deployments and/or casualty/terrorist evacuation.
g. Depending on the situation, a light aircraft may be used for ABC.

7. Air strikes are employed as follows:
a. If the contact commander considers that an air strike is needed before the arrival of the ABC and reinforcements, he is to communicate his request directly to the supporting aircraft. The laid down procedure is then effected, but in addition the pilot of the supporting aircraft is to inform the control base or, if in flight, the ABC, that a strike has been called for.
b. However, once the ABC is overhead the contact area and has established communications with the contact commander, the ABC assumes responsibility for requesting an air strike. The procedure is then the same as laid down for requesting air strikes, and the ABC will monitor communications between the pilot and the contact commander.

8. The following post-contact action is necessary:
a. Immediately after the contact, the contact commander is to split his force (including reinforcements and/or stop groups) and detail one group to thoroughly search the contact area. The other group is to move out from 500 to 1,000 meters and conduct a 360 degree search around the contact area. This group is to search for the tracks of escaped terrorists and for secondary hides and rendezvous.
b. Unless the whole terrorist gang was eliminated, an area ambush is to be set on the contact area in the hope that some terrorists may return in search of kit or food, or to reorientate themselves if lost.

9. As already mentioned, the enemy will employ various tactics and ruses to delay the follow-up force once he becomes aware of it. The follow-up troops must be well drilled in their immediate action drills, and the follow-up force commander must be able to decide almost instantaneously whether his force has walked into a deliberate ambush, is being sniped at by an individual or two, or has encountered
booby traps. Quick decisions of this nature will enable the commander to give the necessary commands to counter the enemy action immediately.

10. The point to remember is that, by means of his delaying tactics and harassing of the follow-up force, the enemy is trying to buy time to make good his escape. Consequently, the follow-up force's reactions to these delaying tactics must be immediate and executed as well-rehearsed drills, thereby only losing minimum time. The encounter drills as described in Chapter 6 could, under certain circumstances, be used. Remember that time must not be wasted.

11. Immediate actions executed boldly but with a certain amount of caution will unsettle the enemy and force him to abandon his delaying positions more quickly. It is the commander on the spot who will have to decide what the best course of action will be and, having decided, to react immediately.

SECTION 6: COMMUNICATIONS

1. The controlling headquarters must have and maintain good communications with the follow-up forces. This is essential for planning purposes. If necessary, relay facilities should be provided.

2. The follow-up force will also have to be provided with good ground-to-air communications, as the air arm can play an important role and can only be used effectively if there are good communications with the ground forces.

SECTION 7: CONCLUSION

1. The follow-up operation is essentially a practical application of tracking techniques, but with the force so organized that it is well balanced, relentless and determined to come to grips with the enemy and to attack and destroy the enemy once he has been contacted. Main factors leading to a successful conclusion of such an operation are as follows:
   a. Correction grouping of the force.
   b. Determination and maintenance of pressure.
   c. A high degree of physical fitness.
   d. A high standard of bushcraft.
   e. Good communications.
   f. Effective employment of the air arm.
   g. Well-planned and coordinated movement.
   h. Careful appreciation and route planning of terrain which the force must move over.
   i. A high standard of battle drills that will stand the force in good stead and minimize casualties when contact is made with the enemy.
   j. Aggression and flexibility in the planning and execution of the follow-up.
Attacks on Terrorist Camps

SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

General

1. It is difficult to lay down a uniform drill for a preplanned attack which will apply on all occasions, because terrorist tactics and the type of location used vary considerably from area to area. On the other hand, the suggested drills can easily be amended to suit different circumstances and can be used as a basis for initial planning.

2. Deliberate attacks are prepared from information gained from air photographs, prisoners, informers or patrols. There are occasions, however, when a deliberate attack can be an immediate reaction to an unexpected favorable situation. Deliberate attacks may therefore be preplanned or immediate.

3. The main considerations to be borne in mind are surprise and speed.
   a. Surprise can be achieved by:
      i. Security in all stages of planning.
      ii. Detailed planning and preparation.
      iii. Preparing an alternative method of execution.
      iv. Concealment of approach and positioning of forces.
      v. A well-executed plan with maximum aggression.
   b. Speed is essential to obtain surprise and can be achieved by:
      i. Avoiding unnecessary delay in the planning stage.
      ii. Rapid deployment of troops. (It may be necessary to use helicopters, but alerting the enemy by such movement should be avoided.)

4. The probability of eliminating large numbers of terrorists by means of a deliberate attack is fairly small. Their mobility, the lack of information concerning their combat and resting positions, which are essentially flexible, and the aid which they receive from the population, make it difficult to plan in detail. Their efficient system of intelligence also makes it extremely difficult to achieve surprise.

5. Although the example outlined below is concerned with a daylight attack on a terrorist camp, this does not preclude the possibility of attacking at night. The basic principles remain the same, although follow-up actions are normally only feasible during daylight hours.

Terrorist Tactics

1. It cannot be assumed that terrorists will automatically abandon their camp. Experience has shown that on occasions terrorists have opposed attacks in an aggressive manner from well-prepared positions.
2. The main factor to be borne in mind is that terrorist sentries will be alert and will give warning of any suspicious movement. By day it will be difficult to get past them. A study of terrorist habits has revealed that they position their sentries as follows:
   i. Usually, sentries are posted on likely approaches to the camp.
   ii. At night, sentries are posted in close proximity to or within the perimeter of the camp.

The terrorists have been known to mine and booby trap possible approaches as an additional precaution.

SECTION 2: PLANNING AND PREPARATION

1. **Introduction.** To ensure a successful operation, the planning and preparation for such an operation are most important. When speed is essential for success, it may be necessary to sacrifice security to a certain extent. The commander concerned must carefully consider this aspect when making his appreciation.

2. **Appreciation.** Depending on the time available, the commander responsible for the operation must make a careful, detailed appreciation based on the task. This appreciation must include such factors as the enemy, the local population, the terrain and own forces.

3. **Enemy.** In the appreciation, points regarding the enemy which must be taken into consideration are the following:
   b. Routes both in and out normally used by the enemy.
   c. In and out timings normally used by the enemy for his movement to and from the objective.
   d. Security measures such as location and routine of sentries, defensive system, patrols, sighting of weapons, alert and alarm systems, etc.
   e. Normal reactions to security force presence.
   f. Possible additional or external support that may be provided.

4. **Local population.** When considering the local population, the following aspects must be considered:
   a. Density and concentration.
   b. The nature and type of the village or settlement and its location in relation to the objective.
   c. The attitude of the local population towards both the enemy and security forces.
   d. The daily routing of the local population and routes or paths normally used by them to their cultivations and water points.

5. **Terrain.** When considering terrain, the following aspects must be borne in mind:
   a. Nature and size and exact location of the objective.
   b. Nature of the terrain around the objective, this to include:
      i. Position in relation to the objective.
      ii. Observation and fields of fire.
      iii. Obstacles, either natural or man-made.
iv. Cover and concealment.
v. Approaches and exit/escape routes.
vi. Check points.

6. **Sources of information.** The above information about the terrain can be obtained by the following means:
   a. Patrolling.
   b. Air and ground reconnaissance.
   c. Maps and air photographs.
   d. Local population, police, informers or captured enemy, etc.

7. **Timings.** In determining H-hour, the following aspects must be considered:
   a. Time available in which to carry out the operation.
   b. Distances to be covered by attacking force.
   c. Using cover of darkness for approach march for maximum security.
   d. Enemy sentry routine, i.e., early morning when sentries may not yet have been posted or are still sleepy from the night before, or at last light when sentries may be withdrawn.
   e. Taking advantage of bad weather conditions, rest and meal times.
   f. The possibility of attacking during the hours of darkness, bearing in mind the attendant advantages and disadvantages.

8. **Routes.** When considering the approach and withdrawal routes, the following should be borne in mind:
   a. Distances to be covered by the various groups.
   b. Secrecy and security.
   c. Nature of the route, i.e., easy or difficult going.

9. **Own forces.** In dealing with own forces, the following must be considered:
   a. Aim and nature of operation.
   b. Enemy strength, security measures and possible external support.
   c. Nature and size of objective.
   d. Forces available, their experience and standard of training.

10. **Plan.** As a result of this appreciation, the plan could include the following:
    a. Employment of troops.
    b. Timings.
    c. Approach and withdrawal routes.
    d. Strength, equipment and additional support which may be required.

11. **Standard of planning and preparation.** only with good planning and preparation can the success of the operation be ensured.

12. **Security.** These activities must be carried out under strict discipline in order to maintain secrecy and to provide the force involved with a detailed knowledge of the operation.

13. **Training, leadership and initiative.** Notwithstanding the fact that an operation may be well planned in all its detail, the unexpected may often occur and then the standard of training, leadership and initiative are of prime importance. Should the presence of the military forces be discovered before all groups are in position and the assault is ready to commence, then clear direction must be given to each group as to what actions it should take.
SECTION 3: COMPOSITION: ATTACK FORCE

1. **Groups.** On each occasion when a deliberate attack is being planned, there is a requirement for the military forces to be broken down into a number of groups. Ideally the attacking force should consist of the following groups, which can, normally, be found in a rifle company:
   a. Stop groups.
   b. Fire/cover groups.
   c. Assault group.
   d. Command group.
   e. Follow-up group.
   f. Reserve.

2. **Essential/combined groups.** It may not always be possible to achieve this breakdown with the troops available. The command and assault groups will always be necessary. Through necessity other groups can combine certain of their roles, e.g., the fire group could also be detailed as the follow-up group.

3. **Employment of groups.** All plans should be based on the correct use of these groups. Examples of their employment and handling are as follows:
   a. Stop groups.
      i. **Task.** To prevent the enemy from escaping.
      ii. **Deployment.**
         A. They must be deployed at such a distance from the camp so as not to prejudice the secrecy of the operation.
         B. The strength and number of stop groups to be deployed is dictated by the terrain, the enemy and circumstances prevailing at the time, but, if possible, they should be based on sticks of four or five men covering all likely escape routes from the objective.
         C. Careful briefing is necessary and the following should be borne in mind:
            I. If possible, before a target is engaged it should be identified.
            II. Stops should be in concealed positions.
            III. Each stop group should know the position of its neighbors.
            IV. Individual stops should not move from their positions until ordered to do so. However, should this, for some reason, become necessary, the stop or stops must ensure that those on their flanks know what is happening.
            V. Stop groups should be equipped with radios.
            VI. The stop groups should always be positioned before the assault takes place. If this is not possible, simultaneous positioning is acceptable.
            VII. The best position for the stop groups will normally dictate the direction of assault.
b. The fire/cover group.
   i. Tasks.
      A. To open fire on the objective with every available weapon.
      B. To give fire support to the assault group.
      c. If necessary, to prevent interference from external reinforcements.
   ii. Deployment.
      A. The fire group should approach as near as possible to the camp, undetected.
      B. The principle of bringing maximum fire to bear on the camp must be balanced against the difficulty of moving too large a body of men through the bush without alerting the enemy, and it may, on occasions, be necessary to reduce the strength of this group and increase the ratio of automatic weapons.

c. The assault group. A proportion of the enemy will normally survive and it is therefore essential to have an assault group, which has not been tied down by the initial firefight, for the assault. Its tasks and Organization are as follows:
   i. Tasks.
      A. To eliminate the sentries who guard the objective.
      B. To skirmish forward and penetrate the objective to kill or capture terrorists, and, if necessary, conduct an immediate limited follow-up to maintain contact with, and pressure on, escaping enemy. In this event careful control and coordination with stop groups is essential.
      C. To search for hidden personnel, documents or material.
      D. To ascertain by a 360-degree search of the perimeter whether any terrorists have escaped.
      E. To demolish, if necessary, enemy explosives and booby traps.
   ii. Organization. Bearing in mind the above tasks, the assault group should be organized into the following teams:
      A. Sentry eliminating team.
      B. Assault team (the strength depends upon the nature of the objective).
      C. Support teams.
      D. Demolition teams.
      E. Search team (including trackers).

      The above Organization is temporary and may not be necessary in every case. one team, having accomplished its task, can reinforce another team or receive another task.

d. The command group. A small command group should be positioned so as to control the attack. This group will consist of the commander accompanied by an escort, his radio operator, medical orderly and interrogator, if one can be made available. It may be necessary at some stage of the battle for the commander to get airborne in order to assess and
control the overall situation.

e. Follow-up group. The task of the follow-up group is self-explanatory. However, before any follow-up is commenced, sufficient time must be allowed for the assault group to complete its 360-degree search for tracks and for any terrorists who escape to reach the stop positions. Any follow-up should be carefully coordinated and the stop troops warned of the direction. This group may well be found from the assault group, fire group or reserve. This group should not be less than one section in strength. It must have a radio, tracker and responsible commander.

f. Reserve. A reserve is desirable and, if possible, should be positioned nearby to enable a rapid deployment by any means including the use of helicopters. Tasks are as follows:

   i. Reinforce the assault group, if necessary.
   ii. Reinforce any of the stop groups who may become involved in a prolonged engagement.
   iii. Act as a follow-up group.
   iv. Cover the withdrawal of the attacking force, if necessary.
   v. Act as additional stop or fire groups.
   vi. Collect and escort prisoners.

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Legend

1. Objective terrorist camp in heavy bush.
2. Enemy sentries (assault group closes as close as possible).
3. Direction of possible enemy reinforcements.
4. Platoon commander and observation team.
5. Assault group - two or more teams.
6. Stop groups.
7. Fire cover groups - to stop reinforcements.
8. Reserve group - to assist assault group or stop group.
9. Follow-up group.

Any of the groups to also secure rear of command.

4. **Air support.** When planning a deliberate attack, cognizance must be taken of the air support which is available. However, it must be remembered that the use of air support, prior to the attack, may prejudice surprise.
   a. Light aircraft. This type of aircraft is particularly useful and can be employed in the following roles:
      i. Armed air support. In certain circumstances, the initial assault on the objective may be more effectively carried out by aerial attacks using guns and/or rockets, bombing or, at a later stage, in support of stops or follow-up groups.
      ii. Reconnaissance.
      iii. Radio relay.
      iv. Airborne control.
   b. b. Helicopters. Roles to be considered are:
i. Aircraft and stick(s) of troops on immediate standby as a mobile reserve for redeployment to counter unexpected moves by terrorists or to reinforce, deploy or redeploy stops.

ii. Airborne control.

iii. Evacuation of casualties, terrorists and material.

iv. Fire support.

v. Preventing the enemy from escaping in selected area.

c. Fighter ground attack or bombers. In certain circumstances, the initial assault on the objective may be more effectively carried out by aerial attack using front guns and/or rockets or bombing. An attack of this nature requires detailed coordination, particularly regarding timing and safety distances. All groups should be equipped with ground-to-air communications.

5. Fire support. If available, artillery and mortar support should be considered. In the event of their being used, fire controllers should accompany the command group. Safety and loss of surprise are, however, limiting factors.

SECTION 4: SEQUENCE OF ACTION

1. **Sequence and timings.** In ideal circumstances the following sequence of action and timing is recommended:

   a. The force commander issues detailed orders to all participants, ensuring that every man knows precisely what his task or tasks will be, as well as those of other groups.

   b. Night D-I/D. During the night the force moves to a waiting area preselected at a suitably secure distance from the objective. The stops move off and take up their positions; in some cases this might be difficult and final adjustments might have to be made to their positions just after first light.

   c. D-day.

      i. Stops use the fifteen minutes (or more if necessary) just after first light to adjust their final positions. All other groups move forward to their selected positions before first light.

      ii. At H-hour, fire is opened on the objective on the order of the force commander.

      iii. The assault group skirmishes forward and clears the camp area. They carry out a thorough search and also try to ascertain whether any terrorists have escaped and in which direction.

      iv. The stops engage any escaping terrorists who approach their positions.

      v. Immediate interrogation of captured enemy and local population must be carried out.

      vi. The force commander must then decide from the available information to:

         A. Start following up tracks from the camp while the stops remain in position.
B. Withdraw the stops to a prearranged rendezvous and then start the follow-up.
C. Order the stops to patrol either left or right to the next stop position to check whether the terrorists have crossed the stop line. If tracks are found, to start an immediate follow-up.

vii. The force commander should, if necessary, plan an area ambush on the camp area.

2. **Platoon attack.** Manpower limitations within the platoon will normally prohibit the formation of all the groups detailed above. Nevertheless, at times it may be necessary to carry out a deliberate attack at platoon level.

3. **Platoon follow-up.** If a follow-up becomes necessary, this should, in the average case, be undertaken by the entire platoon. Further troops would then be required for ambushing the objective, if necessary.

### SECTION 5: DELIBERATE ATTACKS AIDE MEMOIRE

#### Situation

1. **Terrain.**
   a. Nature of ground.
   b. Details regarding the objective.

2. **Enemy forces.**
   a. Expected strength.
   b. Weapons carried and possible fields or arcs of fire. Include light machine-gun positions if known.
   c. Objective routine and location of sentries, if known.
   d. Possible escape routes.
   e. Names of key enemy personnel., if known.

3. **Local inhabitants.**
   a. Location of villages, settlements, etc.
   b. Attitude towards security forces or enemy.
   c. Habits and movements.

4. **Friendly forces.**
   a. Other troop movements in the area, if applicable.
   b. Tasks of other forces engaged in the operation, if on a large scale.

5. **Attachments and detachments (if applicable).** Attached to the attacking force for the duration of the operations, e.g.:
   a. Helicopter or light aircraft in support.
   b. Special trackers or tracking teams, including dogs, for the follow-up, etc.
Mission

1. To kill or capture all the terrorists occupying the camp at grid reference.

Execution

1. General outline. A brief outline or general description as to how the plan is to be executed.
2. Detailed tasks.
   a. Positions of groups.
   b. The specific task of each group.
   c. Direction of fire, and arcs of fire of each group.

3. Coordinating instructions.
   a. Timings. Including:
      i. H-hour.
      ii. Waking time.
      iii. Time to assemble for last minute check/briefing.
      iv. Departure times for each group.
      v. Time when groups must occupy final positions.
   b. Assembly area for the force, if necessary.
   c. Dispersal point (frequently in the assembly area).
   d. Assembly area for the assault group.
   e. Routes for whole force and for each group to its final position.
   f. Formations and order of march from assembly area to dispersal point and to final position.
   g. Final actions and instructions at dispersal point.
   h. Security and deception plan.
   i. Action should local inhabitants be encountered during move in.
   j. Orders to commence firing, to fire cover group, stop groups and assault group.
   k. Orders for cease firing.
   l. Action if discovered by enemy sentries and warning is given.
   m. Orders for follow-up.
   n. Details regarding search of areas of enemy camp.
   o. Rendezvous for assault force after completion of attack.
   p. Action should enemy resistance be stronger than anticipated.
   q. Posting of sentries after attack during mopping up and search phase.
   r. Immediate interrogation of captured terrorists. (Interpreters should be available.)
   s. Use of air.
   t. Limit of follow-up.

Administration and Logistics

1. Dress, equipment, weapons and ammunition to be carried.
2. Use of transport, if applicable.
3. Rations and water.
4. Medical.
   a. Treatment and handling of own and enemy casualties.
   b. Evacuation of own and enemy casualties.
   c. Medical personnel and stretchers to assaulting force.
5. Handling of enemy captured and killed, including method of evacuation.
6. Handling of all enemy equipment, weapons and documents captured.
7. Establishing an administration area, if necessary, for extra equipment and kit and members who may not be required for the actual assault.
8. Final inspection and checking of personnel, weapons and equipment.

**Command and Signals**

1. Radio communications.
   a. Frequencies, establishing contact and switching on.
   b. Call signs, including air.
   c. Final test of radios and check of radio net.
2. Location of commander or headquarters.
   a. Prior to the assault.
   b. During the assault.
   c. After the assault.
3. Signals. Signals for the:
   a. Attack.
   b. Cease-fire.
   c. End of operation; all close in to rendezvous.
4. Identifications for follow-up group.
5. Nickname and/or code words.
Ambushing of Terrorists

SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

1. **Aim.** The aim of an ambush is to surprise and eliminate the enemy on ground and in circumstances of the military forces' own choosing.

2. **Intelligence.** The majority of ambushes are laid as a result of:
   a. Intelligence gained through direct or indirect information from surrendered or captured terrorists, agents and informers.
   b. Chance information.
   c. An appreciation of likely terrorist movement and activity based on familiarity with an area, coupled with the pattern of terrorist movement in the area concerned.

3. **Purpose.** An ambush may be designed to eliminate either individuals or groups of the enemy. Enemy movement may not take place at the time anticipated, and the enemy may use civilians to watch for signs of military forces activity and ambush positions. Commanders must always remember this and not become discouraged if a carefully laid ambush fails to achieve its objects. A clear distinction must, however, be drawn between such failures and ambushes that are in the right place at the right time, but fail because of mismanagement.

4. **Composition.**
   a. Ambushes may vary in size from a small four-man affair laid as part of a patrol operation, to a major operation involving a platoon/company group. The guiding principle will be economy of force. The smaller the force, the easier it will be to introduce it into the ambush area, to control the operation and to extricate the ambush force after contact.
   b. It is essential that the best possible team is chosen for each ambush. This may frequently entail a troop/company commander commanding an ambush group, although it may only consist of a handful of men. Men especially selected for their marksmanship or other particular qualities should be drawn from any element of the unit. The overriding consideration in selecting the ambush party should be to choose the troop most likely to succeed in that particular case.

5. The **principles of ambushing.** Instantaneous coordinated action against a surprised enemy held within a well-covered killing ground is essential for success. This requires fulfillment of the following conditions:
   a. A high standard of training in ambush techniques.
   b. Careful planning and execution.
   c. First-class security in all stages.
   d. Concealment of all signs of the occupation of the position.
   e. An intelligent layout and siting.
   f. A high standard of battle discipline, particularly by night.
   g. Determination by all troopers of the ambush party to wait and kill.
   h. A simple clear-cut plan for springing the ambush.
i. Good shooting from all positions: kneeling, sitting, standing, lying and from behind cover.

j. Surprise, the key to successful ambushes.

k. Safety of own forces.

SECTION 2: THE LAYOUT OF AMBUSHES

General

1. **Principles.** There are three fundamental principles of general layout:
   a. All possible approaches should be covered.
   b. A killing ground must be carefully selected.
   c. The ambush must have depth.

2. **Approaches.** Information may frequently give the destination of the terrorists, but will rarely give the exact route they will take. However good information may be, terrorists may well arrive from an unexpected direction. It is therefore essential that all possible approaches be covered.

3. **Killing ground.** A carefully selected killing ground is the key to the ambush and must permit spontaneous and coordinated action on a surprised enemy, thereby ensuring that maximum casualties are inflicted.

4. **Depth.** At the first burst of fire, terrorists scatter with remarkable rapidity and the chances of getting a second burst from the same position are small. It is important, therefore, that groups should be so sited that when the terrorists scatter after the first burst, subsequent groups take a progressive toll of any survivors.

Composition of the Ambush Force

1. **Groups.** On each occasion when an ambush is planned there is a requirement for the military force to be broken down into a number of groups. Ideally, the ambush force should consist of the following groups:
   a. a. Command group.
   b. b. Killing group.
   c. c. Stop/cover groups.
   d. d. Reserve.
   e. e. Lookout groups.
Legend

1. Direction of enemy group approach.
2. Command group - attached to stop group #3.
3. Stop/cover groups - depending on position in ambush.
4. Areas or cone of fire.
5. Killing group and assault groups.
7. Direction of expected enemy reaction.
8. Alternative position for stop group.
9. Reserve - centrally located to assist any group in its mission.

2. **Siting.** In siting, the commander must:
   a. Consider concealment as his first priority. Movement in the area must be kept to a minimum, even at the expense of indifferent fire positions. Each man should enter his position from the rear. The group commander must ensure that all traces of movement into the position are removed or concealed.
   b. Ensure that the man detailed to spring the ambush has a good view of the killing ground.
   c. Ensure that other men of the group will have good fire positions when they break through their concealment, i.e., stand up to engage moving terrorists.
   d. Site his men in a position of all-around defense.
   e. Choose his own position for maximum control of his group.
   f. Ensure the safety of own troops.

**SECTION 3: TYPES OF AMBUSH**

1. **Employment.** Groups may be employed in two ways, bearing in mind the principles of layout:
   a. **Limited ambush.** When definite information indicates that the enemy will be coming to a specific point, for example, a waterhole or food dump, or using a specific track or crossing place, then a limited ambush is sited to cover this specific point. Cut-off groups may be employed to give depth to the ambush and to take a progressive toll of the fleeing enemy.
b. **Area ambush.** When definite information indicates that the enemy will be moving to an area but the exact spot is not known, or that the enemy will be moving through a definite area but the exact route is not known, then an area ambush is laid to cover all possible approaches or routes, bearing in mind depth. An area ambush, in fact, consists of a series of limited ambushes in a certain area with an overall ambush commander.

2. **Duration.** The duration of an ambush will determine whether it is classified as short or long term.

   a. **Short term.** An ambush of less than nine hours' duration which requires no administration other than arrangements for rest within the groups is a short-term ambush.

   b. **Long term.** If ambushes are set for longer periods, they become long-term ambushes and administrative arrangements are necessary for the relief of groups for feeding and sleeping. Such ambushes may be placed on the approaches to a cultivated area which is ready for harvesting, or to a known enemy camp. A rest area must be set up and should be sited far enough away to avoid noises and smells disclosing the presence of troops. Communication routes may have to be cleared so that silent relief's can be carried out. The problem of relief's must be carefully considered, particularly in the case of the area ambush. The following points are applicable:

      i. Normally, relief's will come from the administrative area along the communication route. Although the whole party in the ambush will eventually be relieved, only one member of the party should be changed at a time in case the enemy arrives during this period.

      ii. The ideal is that ambushes should be divided into three parties, one in the ambush position, the reserve, and the party at rest. On relief, the party in reserve takes over the ambush position, the men in the ambush position go into rest and the party resting goes into reserve.

      iii. If a party is less than six and the ambush has to be in position for a long time, the whole party should be withdrawn during set periods to rest. Parties are responsible for their own security when resting. Their food must be precooked and they will not be able to smoke. Adequate water must always be available.

      iv. When a party is over six, but not large enough to carry out the three-group ambush, sufficient men for all-around observation should man the ambush. The others should move away from the ambush position, post sentries and rest. Those resting will act as a reserve and should not, therefore, go far away. They will not be able to smoke and their food must be precooked. Adequate water must always be available.

3. **Night ambushes.** Ambushes can be laid both by day and by night. Night ambushes are often the most successful because enemy parties tend to move during the hours of darkness. In darkness, concealment is easy, but shooting is obviously less accurate. Much therefore depends on good siting of weapons so that the killing ground is interlaced with fire. The doctrine for any ambush also
applies to night ambush; however, the following are to be noted.

a. Factors. If an ambush is to be maintained during the hours of darkness, the following conditions must be observed:
   i. Automatic weapons must fire on fixed lines; the left and right of arcs of personal weapons should be fixed by means of sticks to avoid danger to friendly troops.
   ii. The killing ground must be adequately illuminated.
   iii. The system of relief's for sentries and those manning the position must be modified.
   iv. Alternative means of silent communication are required.

b. Occupation and orders.
   i. Where possible, the position should be occupied before last light.
   ii. Men and groups must be sited closer together than by day so that they can be properly controlled.
   iii. The ambush party must remain absolutely still. All movement can then be assumed to be that of the enemy. No movement from outside to contact an established ambush must ever take place.
   iv. Clear orders, precise fire control instructions, and clear rendezvous and signals are essential.

c. Illumination. As a general rule, all night ambushes should be provided with some sort of artificial illumination. This should be sited to light up the killing ground without blinding the ambush party.

SECTION 4: PLANNING AND PREPARATION

Planning.

Many factors affect a plan for ambush. The following are common to all ambushes:

1. Enemy.
   b. Routes.
   c. Method of movement.
   d. Security measures.
   e. Normal reaction.
   f. Likely assistance.
2. Terrain. Information on the ambush area can be obtained from maps, previous patrol reports, police, surrendered or captured terrorists and air photographs. All possible enemy approaches should be considered. When considering likely ambush sites, the obvious should be avoided.
3. Clearance. Movement of other troops in the area must be considered.
4. Time factor. The necessity of being unseen, coupled with knowledge of local population habits, will dictate a safe time and method for moving into the ambush area.
5. Security. Intentions of the government troops must be disguised from the start; for
example, by moving out to the ambush position during the hours of darkness and/or making a circumspect/indirect approach. The telephone should not be used when discussing plans for an ambush. A cover plan should always be made when time is available.

   a. Location.
   b. Time occupation completed.
   c. Routes, including return.
   d. Strength and special equipment.
   e. Dispositions.
   f. Method of stopping enemy within the killing zone.

7. Preparation.
   a. Success depends on adequate preparation. The time available for preparation is often limited. Certain items must therefore be kept in a state of constant readiness. For example:
      i. Weapons must be kept zeroed and tested.
      ii. Ammunition, magazines and charges must be kept clean and frequently emptied and refilled.
   b. Preparation on receipt of information should include:
      i. Thorough briefing.
      ii. Rehearsal when time allows.
      iii. Firing practice, if time allows.
      iv. Final checking of weapons.

8. Briefing. All members of the ambush party must be fully briefed. It is suggested that briefing be divided into two parts:
   a. Preliminary briefing at a static location. This should include the items shown in Section 8 of this chapter.
   b. Final briefing in the area of actual ambush by the commander of the ambush. This is to be kept to the minimum, but must include:
      i. General area of each group, including direction of fire.
      ii. The pointing out of prominent features on the ground, including rendezvous.
      iii. Location of the commander.
      iv. Any change of plan.

9. Rehearsal.
   a. The more time that can be devoted to rehearsal, the greater will be the chance of success. Rehearsals should not be carried out at the ambush site, as security will be prejudiced immediately. It should usually be possible to select a site for rehearsal closely resembling the actual ambush position. All possible and likely terrorist action should be simulated and the ambush groups practiced in springing the ambush under a variety of circumstances, including the unexpected eventuality.
   b. Rehearsals for night ambushes should be done at night, and where it is proposed to make use of night illumination aids, these should also be employed.

10. Siting.
a. Area ambush.
   i. The ambush commander is first to choose the killing ground and the general area of each group from his personal knowledge of the area, aided by maps and photographs. He is to lay down the directions of the fire for each group in order to obtain the maximum fire effect from the weapons at his disposal, and to ensure the safety of his ops. He is to nominate the rendezvous and give the administrative plan.
   ii. The ambush party moves to a dispersal point from which groups then move by carefully selected routes to their various group positions. The ambush commander may only be able to site one position in detail, leaving the remainder to be sited by group commanders.
   iii. Each group commander is then to carry out his reconnaissance, siting and issue of orders.

b. Limited ambush. On reaching the ambush area, the commander is to:
   i. Carry out his reconnaissance to choose a killing ground and consider the extent of his position, bearing in mind the distance between terrorists. The ambush position should avoid the obvious, if possible.
   ii. Ensure that the man nominated to spring the ambush has a good view of the killing ground.

11. Occupation. The occupation of an ambush position should be carried out with great care. All traces made by the ambush party must be carefully concealed. Remember that suspicious signs such as paper scraps, footprints and bruised vegetation will put the enemy on his guard and it is essential that all items with a distinctive smell which will betray the presence of the ambush party be left behind. Men's hair should be washed free of hair oils and hair creams, and cigarettes, sweets, chewing gum and other scented food must not be carried. It is frequently necessary to wear civilian-type shoes or to disguise the tell-tale marks of military footwear.

12. Locals. Any local inhabitants seen to observe the approach of the ambush party must be detained until the ambush is discontinued.

13. Lying in ambush. Once a group is in position, there must be no sound or movement. This is a test of training and battle discipline. Men must be trained to get into a comfortable position and remain still for long periods. During the wait, weapons must be cocked and ready to fire. As it is not possible for men to remain alert for six to eight hours, arrangements must be made for rest. One or two men in the group will be listening and watching while the others rest in the ambush position. By rest it is meant that a man relaxes in his position, resting his eyes and ears.

14. Springing the ambush. The ambush should be sprung when all possible terrorists are in the killing ground and the range has been reduced to the minimum. There must be no half-heartedness or premature action. All men must clearly understand the orders and drill for opening fire.
   a. The principle to be observed when springing an ambush is that fire should
not be opened so long as terrorists are moving towards someone in a better position to kill. A limited ambush will normally be sprung by the machine gunner on a prearranged signal from the commander or by the commander activating a claymore mine.

b. Should a terrorist act as though he has spotted the ambush, any man who sees this should spring the ambush.

c. All shots must be aimed to kill. Once fire has been opened, targets become more difficult, and to cope with moving targets men may have to stand up.

15. Follow-up action. A signal must be arranged to stop firing, so that immediate follow-up action and search can start as soon as terrorists become impossible to engage. After the ambush has been sprung, men who have been previously detailed are to search the immediate area under cover of ambush weapons and covering each other. They will:

a. Check terrorists in the killing area and secure any who are still living.

b. Search the area, including trees, holes, etc., thoroughly for terrorists.

c. Collect arms, ammunition and equipment and any other clues which may materially assist investigation.

16. Tracker groups and war dogs.

a. A great many terrorists wounded in ambush get away. In many cases they probably escape by rushing into the undergrowth and lying low until the hue and cry has died down, when they can crawl away. The employment of tracker groups will quite often lead to their capture or elimination.

b. Experience has shown that the blood trail left by wounded terrorists is not always an aid to a tracker dog, and is sometimes more useful as a visual aid to the human tracker.

c. The tracker group should not form part of the ambush party, but should stand by at some convenient rendezvous ready to move when shooting indicates that the ambush has been sprung.

d. Under certain circumstances patrol dogs may form part of the ambush group. They may be most profitably employed where several alternative routes lead into the ambush position and it is not known which route the terrorists will take. It must be borne in mind, however, that their presence may give the ambush positions away to the terrorists due to panting, other noises and the smell. However, when used, dogs will invariably be alerted before any human being.

17. Calling off the ambush. A definite signal for calling off the ambush must be arranged. This is particularly important in area ambushes and night ambushes in order to avoid the possibility of an individual or group being left behind. This point must be stressed as officers and men have been killed when returning to collect a man or group left in ambush.

18. Rendezvous (RV). An easily found RV with, where possible, an alternative, must be selected at which troops will rally at the end of the action on receipt of the prearranged signal.
SECTION 5: TRAINING

1. As ambushing is a most successful means of killing terrorists, time must be given to training for it. This is particularly important for group leaders. Training must be aimed at eliminating common faults and improving techniques. Its objects are to:
   a. Achieve silence and stillness in ambush.
   b. Train troops to occupy ambush positions without advertising their presence.
   c. Ensure good siting of weapons and positioning of commanders.
   d. Improve fire control and particularly the even distribution of fire.
   e. Practice clear, well-understood drills for springing ambushes, search and follow-up.
   f. Ensure accurate shooting at difficult moving targets.
   g. Improve care of weapons and eliminate stoppages.
   h. Place special emphasis on silent signals to achieve surprise.

SECTION 6: PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS

1. Cases have occurred where soldiers and police were shot by parties of military forces waiting to ambush terrorists as a result of information received.
2. The primary cause is that the ambush party is keyed up to expect the arrival of the terrorists in the area of the ambush, and, on seeing any movement, fire is opened. Often conditions are such that it is not possible for the ambush group to recognize the identity of the people entering the ambush area.
3. Once an ambush has been set, there should be no movement of any kind by security forces anywhere near the ambush position, unless it is unavoidable. Where it is necessary for such movement to take place, it must be carefully planned and rehearsed. In all other cases, once clearance has been given for the ambush to take place, no movement of any kind is to be allowed. This is of particular importance to the night ambush when no movement from outside to contact an established ambush must ever take place.
4. It is important to ensure that fire discipline is observed.

SECTION 7: WISDOM IN RETROSPECT

1. The following are some reasons for failures which have been reported by ambush commanders. These may help in the training for, and mounting of, ambushes:
   a. "Disclosure of the ambush by the noise made by cocking weapons and moving safety catches or change levers. Check your weapons, practice men in their silent handling and ensure that all weapons are ready to fire."
   b. "There was a tendency to shoot high. This must be corrected on the jungle range."
   c. "Disclosure of the ambush position by footprints made by the ambush party moving into position and by movement of individuals at the crucial
time, when terrorists were approaching."
d. "There was a lack of fire control and commanders were unable to stop the
firing and start the immediate follow-up."
e. "Commanders were badly sited, with consequent lack of control."
f. "There was a lack of all-around observation, resulting in terrorists arriving
in the area of the ambush unannounced."
g. "There were misfires and stoppages through failure to clean, inspect and
test weapons and magazines."
h. "There was a lack of a clearly defined drill for opening fire and orders
were contradictory."
i. "There was a tendency for all to fire at the same target."
j. "Fire was opened prematurely."
k. "It has been found that, provided you achieve surprise, the disadvantage of
being outnumbered can be overcome."

2. A higher proportion of enemy eliminations are achieved in ambushes, and better
opportunities exist to obtain kills, than in any other form of contact. Particularly
when chances of contact are remote, it is essential that full advantage be taken of
every chance offered, and that ambushes laid as a result of direct high-grade
information be based on sound and detailed planning, executed by specially
selected troops.

SECTION 8: AMBUSH ORDERS -- AIDE MEMOIRE

   a. Do not use the telephone.
   b. Do not allow men out after briefing.

2. Situation.
   a. Topography. Use of air photographs, maps and local knowledge; consider
      use of a guide.
   b. Terrorists.
      i. Expected strength.
      ii. Names and anticipated order of march. Photographs.
      iii. Dress and weapons of individuals.
      iv. Which is the VIP?
      v. What are the habits of party concerned?
   c. Local population.
      i. Locations.
      ii. Habits.
      iii. Appearance.
   d. Security forces.
      i. Guides or surrendered terrorists to accompany.
      ii. What other security forces are doing.

3. Mission. This must be clear in the mind of every man, especially when a
   particular terrorist is to be killed.

4. Execution.
   a. Type of layout.
b. Duration of the operation.
c. Position and direction of fire of groups.
d. Dispersal point.
e. Weapons to be carried, including special weapons, e.g., shotguns.
f. Composition of groups.
g. Timing and routes.
h. Formations during move in.
i. Orders to spring the ambush.
j. Distribution of fire.
k. Use of grenades.
l. Action on ambush being discovered.
m. Orders on immediate follow-up.
n. Orders for search.
o. Deliberate follow-up.
p. Rendezvous.
q. Trackers and auxiliaries.
r. Dogs, if any.
s. Deception plan.
t. Alerting.

5. Administration and logistics.
   a. Use of transport to area.
   b. Equipment and dress -- footwear for moving in.
   c. Rations, if any.
   d. Special equipment:
      i. Night-lighting equipment.
      ii. Cameras.
      iii. Fingerprint equipment.
   e. Medical.
      i. First field dressings, first-aid packs and identity discs.
      ii. Medical orderly.
      iii. Stretcher and ambulance.
   f. Relief's.
   g. Administrative area, if required, and orders concerning cooking and smoking.
   h. Transport for return Journey.
   i. Inspection of personnel and equipment:
      i. Men with colds not to be taken.
      ii. Is zeroing of weapons correct?
      iii. Is ammunition fresh?
      iv. Are magazines properly filled?

6. Command and signal.
   b. Signals:
      i. Open fire.
      ii. Cease fire.
      iii. Call off ambush.
iv. Success.
v. Silent signals.
c. Radio:
   i. Allocation of radios.
   ii. Frequencies, schedules, nicknames, etc.
   iii. Radio silence.
d. Password and identification.
7. Remember final check and inspection.
Sweeps

SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

1. **Aim.** The aim of a sweep is to search an area thoroughly and to ensure that no enemy remains undetected, or is able to escape.

2. **Value.** Because of the difficulties involved in control and direction keeping, sweeps are very rarely successful in the bush. Their value has usually been very small in comparison with the number of troops required.

3. **Principles.** The following principles must be observed if the sweep is to have any chance of success:
   a. Good security (secrecy in preparation and secrecy of movement).
   b. Sufficient troops for the task.
   c. The area to be swept must be limited. A very common error is to sweep an area too large for the force available.
   d. Good control, which also implies good communication, e.g., use of report lines.
   e. Clear orders.
   f. A rate of advance slow enough to ensure a thorough search of the area.

4. **Reconnaissance.** This may not be possible as it will often be an indication of subsequent operations.

SECTION 2: ORGANIZATION

1. **Groups.** The available forces must be divided into three groups:
   a. Stop groups.
   b. Sweep group.
   c. Reserves.

2. **Stop groups.** Stop groups must be able to provide a high rate of accurate fire.
   a. **Composition.** Stops will be small and each should therefore include one or more automatic weapons. Each stop should be commanded by at least a non-commissioned officer.
   b. **Siting.**
      i. Stops should be within visual distance of each other, but must be concealed from anyone flushed by the sweeping party.
      ii. It must be possible for the area between stops to be covered by fire.
      iii. Stops will normally be placed on three sides of the area to be swept.
      iv. Stop lines must be denoted by clear, unmistakable features and known to the sweep party and reserve.
   c. **Method of operation.**
      i. Stops must move to their positions by a covered route to avoid being seen arriving, and must remain concealed on arrival. Any
person met en route to stop positions must be detained until the end of the operation.

ii. To avoid disclosing the position of stops, stray individuals who try and break the stop line should, if possible, be detained silently.

iii. on arrival of the sweeping party, stops should stand up and give the prearranged recognition signal.

d. **Discipline.** This must be strict, particularly as stops will be spread out and often out of sight and hearing of an officer. Stops must be ready for instant action throughout the operation, and all noise, smoking and fires forbidden.

3. **Sweep group.**

   a. Aim. The aim of the sweep group is to search an area and to ensure that all the enemy elements are located.

   b. The following points must be noted:

      i. **Flexibility.**

         A. The density of the vegetation in the sweep area will vary from open country, requiring relatively few searchers, to dense bush, built-up areas, outcrops, cultivated lands and settlements, necessitating the use of more troops to complete the task efficiently. It is therefore essential that a commander be able to concentrate or spread out his troops in accordance with the terrain.

         B. It follows that the sweep should not merely consist of an evenly spaced line of individuals, but rather of a line of sub-units, each carrying out a specific task. Report lines, in particular, will indicate the progress of each and will allow for any reallocation of tasks, should the situation warrant this. Report lines are especially necessary if the sweep is to cover a large area.

      ii. Strict supervision at all levels must be ensured so that the ground is covered.

      iii. Every possible hiding place must be searched.

      iv. The rate of advance must be slow enough to ensure that a proper search is conducted.

      v. The sweep party must be ready to engage a fleeing target should the need arise.

4. **Reserve.** A reserve must be available to carry out the following tasks:

   a. To engage and destroy any terrorists who offer organized resistance inside the area being swept. The commander should, whenever possible, have a reserve force, well-armed with automatic weapons and rifles, under his personal command and located near him, to deal with any gang which may give serious and prolonged resistance. The size of this force will depend on the size of the total force taking part, and on the degree of resistance expected.

   b. To follow up and destroy any parties of terrorists which break through the stop line. The ideal is to have in the stop parties a patrol in the middle of
each side of the area being swept, to follow up and destroy any gangs
which may escape from the area. If there are insufficient troops to permit
the commander to cover every side of the swept area in this fashion, he
should deploy his follow-up troops to cover the most likely escape routes.

SECTION 3: CONDUCT OF SWEEPS

1. There are many variations to this type of operation and the conduct will be
dependent on a number of factors. For example:
   a. Nature of the ground.
   b. Time available.
   c. Forces available.
2. The conduct may vary from a simple linear sweep in fairly open country to a
   complex systematic search by a carefully controlled and coordinated series of
   patrols in dense bush or forests. In some cases it may become necessary to
   conduct a sweep of a village.

SECTION 4: GENERAL

1. Aircraft. A spotter aircraft or helicopter is invaluable and may be available. It
   helps the forces to maintain direction as well as spot terrorist movement. It must
   be in radio communication with the commander of the operation, with both sweep
   and stop parties, and with the reserve when deployed. The use of an aircraft does
tend to give away positions to the terrorists.
2. Recognition.
   a. A recognition signal must be decided upon beforehand and known to
everyone taking part.
   b. All civilians participating must wear distinctive headdress and armband.
3. Radio. If the sweep is a battalion operation, control may be in the form of a
   normal battalion radio net to companies, each company having its own forward
   net. In some cases it may be more satisfactory to control all the platoons on the
   battalion net, the battalion's forward control set being r sited on a prominent
   feature which can dominate the whole area of operation.
4. Trackers. In thick bush, due to restricted visibility, patrols must concentrate more
   on searching for terrorist signs and tracks than on the hope of seeing them in
   person. A high standard of fieldcraft is therefore required and every tracker
   available must be allocated to the platoons taking part in the operation. Patrol
dogs may also be used to great advantage to locate hidden terrorists, or to follow
   fresh tracks. They may even be let loose by their handlers to flush terrorists.
Legend

1. Limit of sweep.
2. Direction of sweep.
3. Command element.
4. Sweep parties.
5. Stops and follow-up groups.
6. Reserve.
7. Fire support.
8. Start line.
9. It may be necessary to subdivide the area into unit/subunit areas of responsibility.

Legend

1. Limit of sweep.
2. Command element.
3. Stop groups.
4. Sweep parties.
5. Fire support.

Legend

1. Limit of sweep.
2. Command element. 3. Sweep parties. 4. Inter-unit/sub-unit boundaries. 5. Stop and follow-up groups. s of 6. Reserve. 7. Fire support.

Legend

2. Inner stop groups.
3. Outer stop groups.
4. Sweep parties.
5. Reserve.
6. Inter-unit/sub-unit boundaries.
Defense/Protection of sensitive points

SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

1. Military forces will be required to undertake the defense/protection of sensitive points. These may be considered vital points which, if damaged or secured by the enemy, represent great disadvantage to the government military forces and the population, i.e.:
   a. Installations with a political, administrative, economic and military interest such as:
      i. Essential services, e.g., water, gas, electricity, etc.
      ii. Fuel and industrial installations.
      iii. Vital points of communication, e.g., bridges, tunnels, railways, etc.
   b. Centers of population which must be protected from any contact with the enemy.
2. The protection of sensitive points is a tactical problem and will vary according to the nature of the installation, location, probable enemy action and the troops available for the task. Commanders must strike a balance between the military need to retain mobile forces for offensive tasks and the military or civilian requirement for security. A satisfactory and sound solution will only be found by close cooperation and discussion with the police and civil authorities.
3. A list of sensitive points should, if possible, be drawn up by the local government officials, military and police commanders to establish priorities. The classification of sensitive points should be frequently reviewed in relation to the situation and the consequent possible shift in emphasis. Some sensitive points may only be classified as such for limited periods, e.g., railway siding during the unloading of ammunition.

SECTION 2: ORGANIZATION OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY

1. General. This mission of a unit tasked with defending or protecting a sensitive point would normally be to guarantee at any cost from terrorist action, the installation, together with the people who serve it. In certain cases this may not be possible and it will be necessary to accept that the defense can only be undertaken for limited periods unless external reserves are committed.
2. Appreciation. In making his appreciation, the commander should consider the following basic factors:
   a. The importance and nature of the sensitive point.
   b. The available force, including reserves, and their location in relation to the sensitive point.
   c. The enemy threat.
3. Plan. During his planning, the commander should bear in mind the normal
principles of defense. The following points will require particular attention:
   a. Careful siting of weapons.
   b. Good fields of fire.
   c. Protection and concealment of fire positions.
   d. Efficient system of communications (internal and external).
   e. Control.
   f. Deception.
   g. Security.
   h. Reserve.
   i. Alarm scheme.

4. Siting of weapons. Weapons should be carefully sited to ensure the best use of their characteristics. Positions should be mutually supporting and provide all-around defense and depth. Positions should be changed frequently and, if possible, day and night positions should not be the same.

5. Fields of fire. In certain circumstances it will be necessary to clear fields of fire. Thick bush and other obstacles which make fire and observation difficult should be cleared from the immediate vicinity of the defended area.

6. Protection and concealment. Fire positions should be concealed and protection obtained by the best use of buildings suitably sand-bagged and developed into strong points.

7. Communications. All sub-units involved in the protection or defense of the sensitive point should be linked with an efficient system of communication. This should be duplicated. External communications are also essential.

8. Control. This is achieved through:
   a. Good communications.
   b. Good observation. In certain circumstances it may be necessary to build towers to achieve this.

9. Deception. This may be achieved with alternative positions. However, when the topography does not provide adequate concealment for alternative positions and the deployment of the reserve, it may be necessary to dig communication trenches.

10. Security. In addition to the defense of a sensitive point, it will be necessary to organize an efficient security system, thus:
    a. Reducing the chances of a surprise attack.
    b. Permitting adequate time for troops to occupy defensive/alarm positions.

11. Security of a sensitive point may be organized in the following manner:
    a. Internally.
    b. In close proximity.

12. Internal security. This is obtained through:
    a. An efficient system of sentries.
    b. Night illumination.
    c. Obstacles.
    d. Alarm system.
    e. Identification system.

13. An efficient system of sentries may be achieved through these points:
    a. Sentry posts should be sited so as to ensure all-around observation with the
minimum number of posts. If necessary, towers should be built to achieve this.
b. Sentry posts should frequently be changed and should, if possible, be varied by night.
c. At night, sentries should be doubled and simultaneous changing of sentries should be avoided.
d. War dogs could be used to increase the efficiency of sentries.
e. Reserves should be located in relation to sentry posts for quick reaction.

14. The illumination of likely approaches should be planned and may include conventional flares or the use of improvised means such as kerosene flare drums or the lights of vehicles.

15. Obstacles should be sited to cover likely enemy approaches. Wherever possible, best use should be made of natural obstacles which may require some improvement. Obstacles serve to prevent a successful quick attack, slow down the enemy and enable casualties to be inflicted. Where observation is more difficult, the obstacles should be supplemented with alarm devices, e.g., anti-personnel mines, tins, electrified wires, etc.

16. The alarm scheme should, where possible, provide warning of the approach of the enemy without disclosing this fact, thus enabling the commander to issue the necessary orders for deployment and to achieve maximum surprise. However, should time not permit, a general alarm scheme should exist, thereby enabling alarm positions to be occupied with the minimum of delay.

17. An identification system is necessary to ensure the identity of:
   a. Patrols and detachments operating in close proximity to the sensitive point.
   b. Civilian elements who may be required to enter the sensitive point for their normal functions and activities.

18. The password system of identification is generally used for military personnel while, in the case of civilians, it is normal to issue permits, or only permit entry at predetermined times and places, during which careful screening is carried out.

19. Close proximity security. This is the security of the immediate vicinity of the sensitive point and is achieved by:
   a. Patrols.
   b. Observation posts.
   c. Ambushes, obstacles and booby traps covering likely approaches.

20. Patrols have the task of extending the security of a sensitive point and will be particularly useful when it is not possible to cover all approaches by observation. Their patrol program should be irregular, in both time and routes, to prevent being surprised. The use of dogs should also be considered.

21. Observation posts should be established to cover likely routes to the sensitive point. In all cases these posts must be well concealed, well protected and provided with radio communications.

22. If considered necessary, it may be possible to establish ambushes, obstacles, etc., to cover the most likely concealed approaches of the enemy.

23. Important aspects. When planning the defense and security of a sensitive point, the following points should be borne in mind:
   a. The enemy will always aim to achieve surprise and may even attempt to
penetrate the inner security of the sensitive point before initiating the attack.

b. The enemy will always carry out a reconnaissance, in an attempt to establish the layout of the defense, before attacking. Consequently, fire discipline is essential and fire should only be opened when maximum casualties are ensured. Vigorous patrolling by day will help to prevent enemy reconnaissance.

c. Counterattack plans should be made and any favorable situation should be rapidly exploited.

d. Frequent checks, especially before last light, should be made to ensure the following are known:
   i. Arcs of fire and observation.
   ii. Fire positions.
   iii. Location of the commander.
   iv. Location of adjoining sub-units.
   v. Action in the event of an alarm.
   vi. Sentry duties.
   vii. Time out and in of friendly force patrols.
   viii. Weapons and equipment are available for immediate use.

24. In certain cases it must be accepted that it is impossible to organize the defense of a sensitive point in secrecy. On these occasions it may be preferable to establish the defense openly, thus indicating our strength and efficiency to the local population and possibly the enemy. Obviously, detailed planning will not be disclosed, as security will be vital to the defense of the installation.
Movement Security

SECTION 1: GENERAL

1. During ATOPS there is the ever-present danger of vehicles being ambushed by terrorists. The risk of ambushes varies depending on the nature of the terrain and enemy activity.

2. The various aims of terrorist ambushes are to:
   a. Inflict damage to security force vehicles.
   b. Obtain much-needed supplies such as ammunition, weapons and/or equipment.
   c. Inflict casualties and lower the morale of the military forces.
   d. Create a feeling of insecurity and disrupt the normal routine in an area.
   e. Prevent the tactical and/or logistical movement by security forces.
   f. Improve own morale and sense of achievement.
   g. Acquire support for their cause locally and internationally.

3. The effectiveness of enemy ambushes is dependent on the following:
   a. Selection of a site providing good cover and safe escape routes.
   b. The gaining, from various sources, of information regarding the movement of military forces, thereby giving themselves the opportunity to plan in great detail and, if possible, even rehearse the operation, thereby also achieving surprise.
   c. If necessary, blocking the road with craters, trees, vehicles or other obstacles. Mines and booby traps may also be used.
   d. Vulnerability of soft-skinned vehicles.
   e. Armaments and/or weapons at their disposal.
   f. The importance of routes necessary for the logistical support or tactical movement of military forces.

4. To a degree, the effectiveness of enemy ambushes can be countered, or at least reduced, by a high standard of training, good convoy discipline, good immediate action drills, good security, and the classification of routes and roads.
SECTION 2: ROAD CLASSIFICATION

1. **General.** It may be necessary to introduce a road classification system in the event of terrorist activity in the ambushing of convoys and/or vehicles reaching serious proportions. Roads are classified into three main categories:
   a. Unrestricted (green roads).
   b. Conditional (yellow roads).
   c. Restricted (red roads).

2. **Unrestricted roads** (green). Roads which are free of enemy threat or activity and require no special precautionary measures. Movement of military as well as civilian vehicles or persons is unrestricted and military personnel may travel unarmed, and in any type of vehicle. This classification will be laid down by the appropriate senior headquarters or civil authority. However, a local civil military authority may impose certain restrictions of a temporary nature, if considered necessary.

3. **Conditional roads** (yellow). Roads along which limited enemy activity can be expected. Consequently movement is permitted with certain precautionary measures being necessary. These are:
   a. All military personnel transported in military or civilian vehicles must be armed.
   b. Each military vehicle will carry at least one other armed man besides the driver, and under certain conditions, military vehicles may not be allowed to move individually.
   c. Military personnel may travel alone in civilian vehicles but must be armed.
   d. Under certain conditions it may be necessary to restrict all movement to daylight only and to packets of vehicles.
   e. Tighter control of all convoy movements.

4. **Restricted roads** (red). Roads on which enemy activity is an ever-present risk in any form. For this reason, these roads can only be used by escorted or guarded convoys. Conditions governing movement on these roads are:
   a. All personnel will be armed and each military vehicle will have at least one other armed man besides the driver.
   b. Travel at night will be restricted to moves of operational necessity.
   c. Movement of single military vehicles is not permitted.
   d. Troop convoys of operational units will be primarily responsible for their own protection, but the fullest use will be made of available armored vehicles as escort.
   e. Administrative vehicles, such as a supply convoy, will be escorted by armored vehicles whenever possible.
   f. It is important that vehicles move sufficiently close to each other to render mutual assistance in case of an emergency, but not so close that an ambush is likely to involve several vehicles.
   g. Intervals between vehicles will normally depend on the type of terrain, but visual contact between vehicles must be maintained (50-150m). Armored escort vehicles are to move within this overall density so as to position themselves where they are best able to give protection.
h. Non-operational convoys and civilian vehicles are not to be moved without the authority of the formation headquarters responsible for the area concerned, to ensure that adequate arrangements are made for escorts.
i. Restricted roads may be further subdivided into sections, and special precautions for each section of road may be laid down. Whenever possible, helicopters or other observation aircraft should be assigned for reconnaissance duties and to assist in controlling convoys.

SECTION 3: TYPES OF MOVEMENT

PROTECTION

General

1. The safety of a route depends on certain aspects such as enemy activity, terrain and resources (e.g., vehicles and manpower). There are certain measures which may be taken to ensure safe movement. These are:
   a. Fixed defense. This is based on a series of strong points such as villages, bridges, crossings and areas of likely enemy ambushes, normally linked by patrols. It may be either permanent or temporary.
   b. Mobile protection. This consists of mobile patrols that move out from defended posts or military bases to clear the routes, in particular just prior to convoys using them.
   c. Picquetting. This is essentially a preventive tactic and aims at ensuring the unmolested passage of a convoy or patrol along a selected route.
   d. Escorts. Either on or accompanying the convoy.

2. Fixed Defense

   **Permanent nature.** This system is gradually developed by first establishing strong points at places such as villages and important installations and developing from there to include bridges, crossings, etc. The selection of the points will be governed by the degree of protection that each may require and the degree of enemy influence in the area. It is hoped that these measures in due course result in unrestricted travel. In the permanent concept, the following is applicable:
   a. Troops are deployed and operate as described in Chapter 12.
   b. It is mainly an infantry task. Additional support may be provided, when necessary.

3. Temporary nature. This system entails the utilization of small units of infantry tactically prepositioned at vulnerable points along the route, to be used prior to the commencement of the movement and remaining in their positions until the convoy has passed. The strength and positioning of these groups will be determined by:
   a. Enemy activity and possible enemy strength and assistance.
   b. The nature of the point, i.e., bridge, crossing, cutting, etc.
   c. The nature of the surrounding terrain because patrol action may be
necessary to clear the areas.

4. The two above-mentioned methods require careful planning and execution. The disadvantage of this system is the requirement of many troops.

5. Mobile Protection

Mobile patrols. This task would normally be given to reconnaissance units and armored and/or scout cars. In their absence, infantry units can also carry out these tasks using infantry combat vehicles or armored personnel carriers. The composition and strength of these patrols will be determined by the following:

a. The task of the patrol.
b. Enemy tactics, e.g., the use of mines, booby traps, obstacles such as ditches, felled trees or ambushes. At times, engineer elements will have to be included.
c. The type and number of routes to be patrolled.
d. The nature of the terrain.
e. The availability of own resources.

6. When making use of mobile patrols, the responsible headquarters or commander must determine the best patrol program to ensure that all main routes are patrolled and that enemy activity is reduced to the minimum by making best use of the forces available.

7. Precautions against possible mining and action to be taken on encountering mines are laid down in Chapter 14 of this manual. Regular routes and timings should be avoided and strict security must be maintained to minimize possible enemy reaction.

8. Under certain circumstances it may be necessary to send a mobile patrol along a route or into an area that may have been under enemy influence for some time. The composition of the force will vary, but will normally consist of a reconnaissance element reinforced with infantry and with attached engineer elements. In this case the suggested grouping and tasks are as follows:

a. A clearing group moving in front with flank protection with the task of clearing the road.
b. Search groups working on both sides of the route up to a depth of 300 to 400 meters, depending on the terrain. Their task is to search the verges and adjacent terrain to clear any possible enemy ambushes. They should move well forward, and, if necessary, provide flank protection to the clearing group and mutually support each other.
c. Command group, which is vehicle-borne and moves just to the rear of the clearing group.
d. Fire support group with the task of providing immediate fire support to any of the groups. This can consist of an armored car or other suitable mobile weapon system and should move in the rear of the command group.
e. Reserve group moving mounted and at the rear of the patrol. This group must be able to go to the assistance of any group immediately.
f. The above-described type of patrol is time-consuming and requires a lot of effort; consequently it should not be used to clear a long route and should be used only when absolutely necessary.

9. If available, air support should also be provided for this type of patrol, and
artillery fire support, preplanned and prepositioned, will give added protection against possible enemy reaction.

10. **Picquetting**

Picquetting is a very effective method of ensuring safe passage over selected routes either by determining that there are no terrorists along the route or, if there are, by preventing them from interfering with the movement of the column. Picquets may also be used to secure a route which has been cleared of mines.

11. **Types.** Picquets can be either static or mobile, depending on the number of troops available and the characteristics of the selected route (length, terrain, etc.).

   a. **Static.** Static picquets are deployed along the entire length of the selected route and afford maximum security for movement.

   b. **Mobile.** Mobile picquets surround and move with the column, acting as a protective cocoon. They are not as effective as static picquets in that they do not secure the entire route. Mobile picquets can be either vehicle-borne or foot patrols. Their prime object is to check all high ground and likely ambush positions. Moving under mobile picquet protection slows down the column, and to attain maximum speed a comprehensive picquet drill is essential. Picquetting headquarters must be established to best advantage in the column, preferably closest to the column headquarters, with which it must have radio communication. Picquet areas must be selected quickly. Previous study of maps and air photographs assist in this. As picquets are posted, the next troops for picquetting must take their place in readiness. Rear picquets are withdrawn by the picquetting headquarters on orders from the column headquarters.

   c. **Command and control.** Picquets should be within visual distance of each other and must be in radio communication with each other, and with the picquetting headquarters column. Units should have operational standing orders to cover picquetting drill and be trained in it. Standing orders should cover posting of picquets and the use of picquetting logs, orders to picquet commanders, action of the picquet on arrival in its area and the procedure for withdrawing picquets.

13. **Escorts**

In the event of other systems not proving adequate in the protection of movement against enemy action, an escort system will have to be used to give the added protection. Escorts may also be used in lieu of the other systems mentioned. This protection may be necessary for military and civilian movement.

14. To facilitate the protection to be given by the escorts, convoys should not be too large and very strict standing orders should be laid down.

15. The composition, grouping and strength of escorts will be determined by the following:

b. Expected enemy activity, possible strength and tactics.
c. Nature of route and terrain to be passed through.
d. Own resources available.

16. The escorting force with an appointed escort commander must be interspersed in the convoy, providing for front, internal and rear protection. It is usual to lead with an armored reconnaissance element with the necessary infantry and engineer backup elements, and to bring up the rear with armored reconnaissance elements. These may consist of only one armored or scout car.

17. It is preferable that the convoy and escort commanders move close to each other. In the event of encountering the enemy, the escort commander assumes overall command for the conduct of any counter-measures.

18. Distances between vehicles will be determined by the terrain and the nature of the route. However, contact must be from front to rear and rear to front and vehicles must move close enough to each other to be able to provide mutual support, if necessary. Leading vehicles must only proceed when it is ascertained that rear vehicles are following.

19. In the event of there being no armored vehicles available, the escort will be made up of infantry elements, the strength depending on the size of the convoy. In this case the leading vehicle should be a heavy type adequately prepared against possible mine blasts and, if possible, equipped with mine-detecting equipment.

20. When only an infantry escort is used, the escort commander should be responsible for the following:
   a. Visual contact must be maintained between vehicles.
   b. Each vehicle must carry an armed escort in the cab with the driver to be able to apply the brakes and turn off the engine if necessary.
   c. Each vehicle should have armed escorts in the rear and, if possible, at least one automatic weapon to each vehicle. Smoke and normal grenades should also be carried by the escorting troops.
   d. If possible, a prior air reconnaissance of the route concerned should be made, but care must be taken not to alert the enemy of possible future moves.
   e. Air cover while the move is being conducted.
   f. Good radio communications throughout the length of the convoy and with the convoy commander.

21. Escorts are there to provide protection to convoys and therefore detailed planning and briefing are vital to the success of their actions. They may be drawn from any unit or even from within the unit concerned. Thus all troops must have a high standard of training in escort duties and immediate action drills in the event of encountering enemy action.

SECTION 4: MILITARY CONVOYS

1. For the purpose of this manual a convoy is defined as a group of two or more vehicles.

2. Principles. For the planning, movement and Organization of military convoys, the following principles will apply:
   a. Troop convoys of tactical units will provide their own protection and use may be
made of armored vehicles should they be available.

b. Since the enemy is liable to attack any part of the convoy, protection must be evenly distributed throughout the convoy.

c. Contact between vehicles must be visual from front to rear.

d. Basic organizations must be maintained to ensure an even distribution of fire support and firepower throughout the convoy.

e. Radio contact must at all times be maintained between the convoy commander, escort commander, and sub-units and/or units under command and, in addition, with the superior headquarters and units en route.

f. A high standard of security at all times.

g. Good convoy standing orders.

3. **Unit standing orders for convoys.** Every unit should have comprehensive orders covering movement by road based on the classification system described above. These orders should state clearly who is authorized to put a convoy on the road and should cover in detail the following points:

a. The appointment and duties of convoy and vehicle commanders.

b. The Organization of the convoy.

c. The weapons and ammunition to be carried. Automatic weapons should be included.

d. The state of vehicles, e.g., detailed instructions regarding canopies, tailboards and windscreens and their protection against land mines.

e. Immediate action drills.

f. Security measures, including arrangements for destruction of classified material or documents, if necessary.

4. **Security.** It is essential that the movement of convoys should never become a routine matter and that the maximum precautions are taken to prevent the terrorists gaining advance information of vehicle movement. In this connection it should be remembered that:

a. The telephone system is not secure.

b. Radio messages in clear can be picked up on an ordinary civilian-type receiver.

c. The loyalty of civilian employees cannot be guaranteed, although they are subjected to screening.

d. Troops tend to be talkative both inside and outside their lines. In short, the fewer people who know about the timing, route and composition of a convoy before it sets out, the better. Generally, drivers and escorts should be warned as late as possible and the use of alternative routes and other deception measures should be planned.

5. **The convoy commander.** The convoy commander is not necessarily the senior officer
or non-commissioned officer traveling in a convoy. He should position himself where he considers he can best control the convoy. He should inspect and check the vehicles when they are loaded and prepared. Should there be an escort, he should liaise with the escort commander prior to his briefing.

6. **Briefing.** Briefing by the convoy commander before moving off must be detailed and explicit. All drivers, including civilians, vehicle commanders and men traveling in the convoy should be present at the briefing. The briefing should include:

   a. Details of timings, route, speed, order of march, maintenance of contact and what to do should contact be broken or vehicles breakdown.

   b. The distribution of any extra weapons.

   c. The allocation of men to vehicles and their duties en route.

   d. The appointment and duties of vehicle commanders and sentries, and details of action to be taken in the event of contact with the enemy.

   e. Communications.

A comprehensive example of road movement orders is given in Section 7 of this chapter.

7. **Alertness.**

   a. It must be impressed on all that a high degree of alertness is absolutely essential when moving along routes where enemy ambush is likely.

   b. Vehicle commanders. A commander must be detailed by name for each vehicle. His tasks will be to post sentries, ensure that all personnel are alert and assist in convoy control. He must travel in the rear of the vehicle and not with the driver. He will indicate to the troops traveling in the vehicle which side to debus by giving the command "Debus left or right."

   c. Vehicle sentries. With the exception of smaller vehicles, four sentries should be posted in the back of each troop-carrying vehicle. The two sentries at the front must observe to the front and to their respective sides, the two in the rear must observe to the rear and to their respective sides. Where possible, these sentries should be armed with automatic weapons and smoke grenades. It is the task of the sentries to take immediate action in the event of an ambush and to cover troops dismounting from the vehicle, should it be brought to a halt. Light machine guns and heavy barrel rifles should be evenly distributed throughout the convoy.

   d. The sentry system can be adopted to suit the different types of vehicles.

8. **Preparation of vehicles.**

   a. Men traveling in vehicles must be able to see in all directions, be able to use their weapons or throw grenades over vehicle sides without hindrance, and debus quickly. For these reasons a vehicle such as a three-tonner or one-tonner should have its canopy and canopy-framework removed and the tailboard down. Alternatively, the canopy-framework can be left on and canopies rolled up to give protection against weather conditions. The framework must not, however, restrict the speed of debussing.

   b. All vehicles should be sandbagged. Should this not be possible, the leading three or
four vehicles and all vehicles carrying gas, fuel, ammunition etc., must be sandbagged. The areas to be covered are the floors of the driving compartment and the areas over the rear wheels. Sand-filled maize bags should be used whenever space permits, as these provide greater protection than the conventional sandbag.

c. Folded down or removed windscreens will eliminate the danger of glass splinters causing injury to driver and passenger; however, bearing in mind the wind and dust, it is advisable to retain the windscreens.

d. Should windscreens be removed or folded down, a metal bar or some device must be erected on the front end of the vehicle to protect the driver and other personnel against wires strung across the road.

e. The rear flap must be removed or put down to facilitate rapid debussing.

f. If possible, automatic weapons must be placed on the roof of the cab of the leading vehicle to be able to fire immediately to the front or flanks. Automatic weapons mounted on following vehicles must cover alternate sides of the route.

g. Several vehicles must be equipped with false antennae to prevent the enemy from identifying which are actual command vehicles.

h. Any damaged vehicle that cannot be immediately repaired must either be taken along with the convoy or left with a sufficiently strong protection party. Should this not be possible, it must be rendered useless to the enemy and abandoned. Only under exceptional circumstances will it be destroyed, e.g., when there will be no possible chance of recovering it.

9. The loading of personnel-carrying vehicles.

a. Next to the driver there must be a man ready to protect him; he should also be able to drive or at least apply the brake, cut off the engine and stop the vehicle properly.

b. The number of troops carried in vehicles must be restricted in order to ensure freedom of movement.

c. If possible, troops should be seated in the middle of the vehicle, facing outward.

d. The kit of troops traveling in the vehicle must be neatly stacked in a line down the middle of the vehicle. Where the vehicle has the seats down the middle, the kit will be packed away neatly under the seats.

10. Smoke. Phosphorous smoke grenades, besides producing an immediate, effective smoke screen, can inflict painful phosphorous burns and are useful anti-ambush weapons.

11. Alarm system. An alarm system must be arranged beforehand so that all the vehicles in the convoy, especially those without radio, can be warned immediately.

12. Precautionary measures. Convoys should stop when approaching a likely ambush area and personnel should move forward on foot to clear the area.

SECTION 5: ACTION ON CONTACT

1. Whatever precautions are taken and preparations made, the ambush, when it is sprung, will always be an unexpected encounter. Immediate action drills are simple courses of
action designed to deal with this type of problem. They aim at immediate, positive and offensive action.

2. The terrorist will spring his ambush on ground that he has carefully chosen and converted into a position from which he can kill security forces by firing at them, normally from above, often at point-blank range. The principle behind the immediate action drill dealt with in this section is that it is incorrect to halt in the area which the terrorist has chosen as a killing ground and so covered by fire -- unless forced to do so. The drill, therefore, is to endeavor to drive on when fired upon, to halt only when through the ambush area or before running into it, and to counter-attack immediately from flank to rear.

**Immediate Action Techniques**

3. **The killing ground.** This is the area in which effective terrorist fire can be brought to bear. In order that the terrorists may not have the advantage of opening fire on ground of their own choosing, every effort must be made to get vehicles clear of the killing ground. Thus when vehicles are fired upon:

   a. Drivers are not to stop, but are to attempt to drive on out of the killing ground.

   b. Sentries are to fire immediately to keep the terrorists down.

   c. When vehicles are clear of the killing ground, they are to be stopped to allow their occupants to debus and carry out offensive action.

   d. Following vehicles approaching the killing ground are not to attempt to run the gauntlet of the ambush, but are to halt clear of the area to allow their occupants to take offensive action.

4. Where vehicles have not been able to drive clear of the area under fire, troops are to debus under the covering fire of the lookout men, which should include smoke if possible, and are to make for cover on the side of the road. The actual bailing out drill is dealt with in greater detail later in this section.

**Counter-Attack**

5. Action when no troops have entered the killing ground. The escort commander or convoy commander, or in his absence the senior vehicle commander present, is to launch an immediate flanking attack on the terrorist position, leaving on the ground as supporting fire such weapons as light machine guns and light mortars.

6. Action when all troops are clear ahead of the killing ground. In this case it will be difficult to put in an attack as quickly as in paragraph 5 above, because troops will be moving away from the scene of action. Nevertheless, an encircling attack must be mounted as quickly as troops can be marshaled and brought back to a starting point. It is difficult to preplan who should take the initiative in these circumstances and it must be made clear, at the convoy commander's briefing, whether the rearmost vehicle commanders are to act on their own initiative in this type of situation.

7. Action when some troops are clear ahead of the killing ground and others are halted short of it. With two parties on each side of the ambush, confusion may arise as to which group should put in the attack against the insurgents and time may be wasted in getting
the attack under way. If both parties attack at the same time without coordination, an inter-unit clash may result. It is suggested, therefore, that the party which has not yet entered the ambush make the attack as in paragraph 5 above.

8. Scout car tactics. Usually the best way in which a scout car can assist in counter-ambush action is by driving right up to the killing ground to engage the terrorists at short range. In this way it will probably be able:

   a. To give good covering fire to the flanking attack.

   b. To afford protection to any of the troops caught in the terrorist killing ground. It is vital for a prearranged signal to have been agreed upon between the armored and dismounted troops, so that the supporting fire can be stopped before the actual assault.

9. Command and control. It is always possible that the escort or convoy commander may be killed or wounded by the terrorists' initial burst of fire. He may be pinned down in the killing ground or be on the wrong side of it when the ambush is sprung. In order to ensure that there is always a nominated commander on the spot, whatever the situation, it is essential that vehicle commanders understand their responsibilities for organizing a counter-attack. This should be clearly laid down in unit convoy orders and stressed at the briefing before moving off.

10. Debussing drill. The enemy will attempt to stop the vehicles in his killing ground by the use of mines or obstacles. He then tries to inflict maximum 6 casualties before the troops can debus. When a vehicle is forced to stop in an ambush, the troops must debus instantly.

   a. The vehicle commander is to shout "Debus right" or "Debus left" to indicate the direction in which troops are to muster.

   b. Sentries are to throw grenades and open fire immediately on the terrorist position.

   c. Troops are to debus over both sides of the vehicle and run in the direction indicated.

   d. As soon as troops are clear of the vehicle, sentries are to debus and join the remainder.

   e. At this stage of the battle the aim must be to collect the fit men to e form a body for counter-action. Wounded troops must be dealt with after counter-action has been taken.

11. Training. Debussing drills must be practiced often by vehicle loads, e.g., infantry sections and platoons. When miscellaneous vehicle loads are made up before a journey, two or three practices must be held before the convoy moves off.

12. Logistical convoys. In the case of purely logistical convoys the protective measures detailed in Section 3 of this chapter will be applicable.

SECTION 6: PROTECTION OF RAILWAYS AND TRAINS

1. As for road movement, railway and train protection can be achieved by means of a fixed defense system whereby bridges, tunnels, junctions, workshops, shunting yards and engineering works are protected.
2. Added to the above, mobile patrols and train escorts will provide additional protection.

3. Mobile patrols may take the following form:
   a. Armed escorts transported in light armored wagons that precede the train. These elements act as a deterrent to possible enemy ambushes and may also serve to detect any possible mines that may have been laid by the enemy.
   b. Patrols, either moving on foot or traveling in light wagons or armored type of self-driven railway vehicles, with the aim of constantly patrolling the railway line, thereby denying the enemy the opportunity of mining or damaging the railway line or setting up ambushes.

4. Additional precautions are the possible checking of freight and passengers and their luggage, and the clearance of a restricted zone extending up to 400 meters on both sides of the railway line. It may even be necessary to relocate packets of the local population that may be situated adjacent to or near the railway line.

5. The protection of railways presents a particularly different type of problem because the train moves on a pair of steel rails along a set route. This makes it extremely easy for the enemy either to impede all movement by damaging either one or both rails or by ambushing the line. Usually there is no alternative route.

6. For the above-mentioned reasons a very carefully planned and executed scheme is vital for the protection of railway or trains.

SECTION 7: ORDERS FOR ROAD MOVEMENT

1. The following is a comprehensive layout of a road movement order and would rarely be used in its entirety. Furthermore, a great deal of the contents would normally be included in unit standing orders. Unit/sub-unit commanders are to take this example as a guide and use only those portions that apply to any particular situation.

Situation

2. Terrain.
   a. General characteristics of route. Classification of various sections.
   b. Road sections and critical places:
      1. Possible enemy actions.
      2. Movement difficulties.
   c. Enemy infiltration points and their relation to the route to be utilized.
   d. Suitable places for fixed defense.
   e. Zones which, by their nature, make it possible for our troops to be hit by their own fire, e.g., "S" bends.
   f. Meteorological conditions pertaining to the route (tides, rain, fog, etc.).
   g. Alternative routes.
h. Use of charts, photographs or maps.

3. Enemy forces.
   a. Organization and possible strength in the area.
   b. Individual characteristics of the leader or leaders.
   c. Normal operational techniques (places, times, etc.).

4. Local population.
   a. Attitude towards the enemy and towards military forces.
   b. Settlements to be passed through or in close proximity to the route. Tribal authorities.
   c. Habits and movements.

5. Friendly forces.
   a. Allocated technical maintenance or support elements or sub-units (sappers, mine detectors, etc.).
   b. Support Organization or other installations existing along the route.

Mission
6. As determined by higher authority.

Execution
7. Task, composition and deployment of the escort if applicable.
8. Composition and grouping of the column (including the position of each vehicle).
10. Tasks of sub-units during the movement, if applicable.
11. Individual tasks during the movement.
12. Immediate actions, security measures.
   a. As a whole.
   b. Per vehicle; preparation of vehicle; protection against mines and fire.
   c. Individual.
   d. Alarm systems.
13. Traveling discipline.
   a. Speed (day and night).
   b. Timings to be maintained.
   c. Point of departure and intermediate points (control points).
   d. Use of guides.
e. Driving discipline.

f. Use of lights.

   a. Place and duration.
   b. Security measures to be taken. Use of vehicle lights, if necessary.

15. Crossing of streams/rivers.
   a. Bridges and points.
   b. Various unconventional means. Rules and precautions to be taken.

16. Action to be taken in emergencies.
   a. Allocation of tasks.
   b. Fire discipline and replenishment.

17. Attitudes towards and relationship with the local inhabitants.

18. Orders regarding the transport of civilians.

19. Orders for the inclusion of civilian vehicles in the column. Legal aspects.

Logistics and Administration

20. Rations and water.
   a. Type and number of days to be carried.
   b. Preparation of food. Support/assistance available along the route.
   c. Water resources and precautions to be taken.

   a. Initial issue.
   b. Distribution.
   c. Levels to be maintained.

22. Fuel and lubricants.
   a. Initial issue.
   b. Levels to be maintained.
   c. Existing support Organization or other installations along the route.

23. Medical.
   a. Preventive measures.
   b. Treatment and evacuation of casualties.
   c. Existing support organizations and other installations along the route.
   d. Sanitary measures during halts.

24. Special equipment.
a. Special support vehicles and equipment.
b. Equipment for the removal of obstacles.

25. Breakdowns. Orders and actions with regard to vehicles bogged down and/or broken down.

26. Refueling.
   a. Halts.
   b. Refueling discipline.
   c. Existing organizations and other installations along the route.
   d. Emergency refueling.

27. Embussing and debussing drills.

28. Loading and unloading vehicles.
   a. Separation of classes of supplies.
   b. Load for vehicle type.

Command and Signals

29. Position of the commander and second in command.
   a. During traveling.
   b. During stops.

30. Maintaining contact.
      1. By signals.
      2. Distances to be maintained.
   b. Radio.
      1. Frequencies and schedules.
      2. Call signs including ground to air.
      3. Special instructions.
      4. Deception measures.
   c. Movement control points.
   d. Nicknames and/or code words.

SECTION 8: ROUTE CARD DETAILS

1. The route card should include a sketch of the route showing:
   a. Distance in kilometers.
b. Settlements.
c. Local resources of:
   1. Water.
   2. Fuel and lubricants.
   3. Food.
   4. Accommodation.
   5. Location of friendly units.
   6. Location of critical contact or possible contact.
Mines and Booby Traps

SECTION 1: GENERAL

1. The enemy has found that the use of mines and booby traps as a means of waging war has been particularly profitable. The nature of the terrain and the climate, the limited and undeveloped road network, the enemy's sound knowledge of the bush and inherent qualities of hunting techniques have enabled him to inflict considerable casualties to security forces at minimum risk or expense to himself.

2. The very success of his efforts has resulted in a general increase of activity in this direction, and security forces will be faced with the problem of mine warfare throughout any ATOPS campaign.

3. The aim of this chapter is to give the basic requirements for all ranks to be mine-conscious and to use a sensible approach to respond to another means of waging war.

4. To counter this threat and to reduce the security forces' casualties to an absolute minimum, every man should be trained in the following:
   a. To use his eyes to spot anything unusual on a track or path.
   b. To recognize basic explosives and types of mines in use.
   c. To use mine detectors and mine-lifting equipment issued to his unit.
   d. Finally, and perhaps most important of all, he should know when to leave objects alone and call for an explosives expert.

SECTION 2: TYPES OF DEVICES

1. The types of devices used by the enemy can be divided into two main categories.
   a. Non-explosive.
   b. Explosive.

2. Non-explosive. In the absence of explosive materials the enemy may resort to non-explosive booby-trap techniques. These may include vehicle pits, lassoes, nets, etc. As a rule, these traps in themselves are not lethal or completely destructive, and as a result may be accompanied by ambushes.

3. Explosive. This type of device is widely used and may include the use of all conventional materials. These materials may be acquired from external or internal sources, and frequently include commercial explosives which, through the lack of control, are more readily available. There are two main categories:
   b. Explosive booby traps.

5. Mines. The most common types of mines used are:
   a. Anti-vehicle or anti-tank (AV). Their function is to damage or destroy vehicles, affect morale, restrict movement and inflict casualties. They normally detonate under a
minimum pressure of 60 kilograms. However, because they are frequently connected to anti-personnel mines, or to a booby-trap device, they often operate on a much lower pressure.

b. Anti-personnel (AP). These mines are intended to kill or wound personnel and cause injuries with shrapnel or blast, thereby severely lowering morale. There are numerous varieties and they are designed to operate on the lowest pressures.

c. Improvised mines. These mines are often used by the terrorists, especially when manufactured mines are not available. They can be AV or AP and are normally made from any explosive materials available at the time.

6. General composition of mines. Most mines consist of the following components:

a. Initiating action. This can be mechanical or electrical and operates by pressure, decompression, pull or release.

b. Trigger mechanism. This is the device which activates the detonator.

c. Detonator. This is a small sensitive explosive charge.

d. Primer. This is an intermediate charge which is initiated by the detonator, and the explosion of the primer in the center of the principal charge causes the mine to blow up.

e. Principal charge. This is the basic element of the mine and designed to produce its destructive effects.

7. Basic operating procedures. The initiating action can be set off in a number of ways. However, the most common are by pressure and pull:

a. Pressure. The explosive device is normally buried underground, and the principal charge may or may not be beside the detonator set. The most common ignition process is electric. The pressure exerted completes a circuit, thus initiating the explosion. This system is particularly sensitive and permits the operation of the mine at insignificant pressures. In some cases the ignition process is mechanical and the application of pressure causes the release of a striker which initiates the detonator. This process is usually less sensitive than the electric ignition process and because of this is easier to neutralize.

b. Pull. In this case the explosive device operates when a pull is exerted, normally upon a tripwire, protruding stake, etc. Once activated by the pull, the explosive device can operate either through an electrical system or by mechanical means, all similar to the systems described above.

c. Mixed methods. Sometimes mixed methods are used. For example, pressure can be exerted on a stretched wire or plank, which is buried in very soft earth or a crater, thus initiating the explosive device by a process of pulling due to the ground giving way under the pressure exerted.

8. Anti-lifting devices. Any of the processes described above can be connected to anti-lifting devices. Normally these devices operate by decompression, but are frequently found with other activating devices. Because of this, whenever it is intended to remove an explosive device from the position in which it is found, the job must be done by a man working from cover and using a rope of sufficient length. Only after the explosive
device's removal and a minimum wait of five minutes, in case of delay mechanisms, should the device be approached.

   a. General description. Usually the devices which serve to make up booby traps are hand grenades, shells or bombs and mines, especially the AP variety. The ignition processes are extremely varied and make full use of pressure, decompression, pull release, friction or time-trigger mechanisms.
   b. Basic operating procedures. These are very similar to the techniques described in paragraph 7 above. Nevertheless their diversity is a fundamental characteristic, as operating procedures will simply depend upon the imagination and resources of the users.

SECTION 3: USE BY THE ENEMY

Aims

1. Explosive devices are frequently used by the enemy with the following aims:
   a. offensive action.
      1. To inflict casualties on security force troops.
      2. To lower morale by the creation of a sense of insecurity.
      3. To destroy equipment, namely vehicles, with the dual purpose of reducing material and burdening the war effort.
      4. To deny, hinder and impede tactical or logistical movements.
      5. To channel the movement of troops into areas which might be favorable to the enemy.
      6. To substantially increase enemy areas of influence without maintaining a permanent presence.
      7. To destroy installations essential to the requirements of the troops and local population.
   b. Defensive action.
      1. To defend enemy installations, bases and sanctuaries.
      2. As alarm systems to give him more time and/or space to maneuver.
      3. To save manpower.

Method of Employment

2. Types of explosive devices most frequently used by the enemy.
   a. The most common types of explosive devices used are AP and AV mines of Russian and Chinese origin. These may include the most modern types of mines which are designed to prevent detection by mine detectors.
b. Improvised mines, i.e., wooden or cardboard boxes packed with explosive supplemented with stones, nails and pieces of metal. The quantity of explosive is variable and is, in many cases, larger than that of the conventional mine. The improvised mine is usually detonated with a booby-trapped grenade.

3. Most common areas of laying. The scope is unlimited. However, the most common areas are described below:

   a. AV mines. These are generally placed:

      1. On rises on hills so that vehicles, on detonating the mine, will roll backwards onto other vehicles, thus increasing the damage and number of casualties.

      2. In rocky areas which will hinder prodding and increase shrapnel effect.

      3. Next to fords or on tracks running by a river or gorge so that, on detonating the mine, the vehicle will fall into the river or gorge.

      4. On narrow roads and defiles with the aim of blocking certain routes.

      5. On detours.

      6. On roads where water has accumulated, making detection difficult.

      7. In sandy areas where laying and concealment is less difficult.

   b. AP mines. These are generally placed:

      1. On tracks frequently used by military forces.

      2. Beside trees and other attractive spots which are likely to be used by troops as resting places.

      3. Beside trees and other natural cover near the verges of roads which might be used as cover by troops. This type of mine laying is frequently used in conjunction with AV mines or an ambush, thus causing troops to leave the road in search of cover.

      4. On new tracks made by troops due to the tendency in thick bush to return by the same route.

      5. On tracks recently cleared by troops, which leads them to suppose that they are cleared for the return.

   c. In general, tracks frequently used by the local population are not mined.

4. Common techniques employed by the enemy.

   a. In most cases, the enemy is well-trained in the art of concealment and deception. Explosive devices are frequently laid with the aim of defeating detection techniques.

   b. The enemy will always attempt to exploit the natural reaction of military forces. Thus tiredness, instinctive curiosity, rashness, aggressiveness, excessive confidence, etc., are reactions which are generally exploited.

   c. It is impossible to give examples of every technique. However, some of the more common methods are detailed below:

      1. Pamphlets and subversive material scattered within a mined area in an attempt to
2. Repetition of a number of unbooby-trapped explosive devices, leading troops to suppose that the remainder detected will be in an identical condition.

3. Small objects, such as money, documents and equipment, left where they are visible will be sufficient for anyone, reacting instinctively, to initiate a device.

4. The mining of unlikely areas, such as tarred roads.

5. The placing in the road of the occasional small object which is instinctively avoided, thus diverting traffic into a mined area. Examples are: a dead animal, old vehicle wheel, pool of water, pieces of glass, an area of ground deliberately disturbed so as to look suspicious, or even a small mine, real or dummy, partially exposed.

6. A tripwire exposed as bait and so sited that to reach it one has to cross a mined or booby-trapped area.

7. Booby-trapped booby traps. For example, the booby trapping of a mine with a hand grenade which in turn is booby-trapped by another concealed a short distance away.

8. Planting mines in areas which offer good concealment. For example, recently repaired roads or roads under repair. There have been cases of staged "official" repairs with appropriate traffic signs.


10. The planting of improvised mines, without their container box, thus making detection by prodding extremely difficult.

11. Empty tins (normally discarded by security troops) buried with other metal objects to mislead and confuse magnetic mine-detecting devices.

12. The use of easily dislodged stones placed on booby traps designed to be activated by decompression; for example, hand grenades with safety pins removed.

13. Main charges buried very deep in the ground, or off the actual road or track, and connected by detonating cord to a small activating device difficult to detect.

Methods of laying. It is impossible to lay down rigid patterns of mine laying. Detailed below are some of the methods more frequently used:

a. Anti-vehicle mines.

1. Three interconnected mines are connected by detonating cord, activated by a taut wire leading to a hand grenade. Two of the mines are placed in the center of the road and the third on one of the sides where the vehicle wheel tracks pass. Activation occurs by the pulling of a wire leading through the safety pin holes of a hand grenade and connected to a plank covering a concealed hole. Pressure on the plank by a vehicle or man causes the plank to sink into the hole, thereby pulling the wire from the grenade which then goes off and activates the main charges.

2. A mine is placed in the center of the road with its activating mechanism, operated by the pulling of a buried wire, under a wheel track. Under one of the wheel tracks a hole is made and covered with sticks, grass and earth so as to give way under the weight of a
vehicle or man. Buried in the center of the road is an upturned clay or wooden pot containing several band grenades, nails, glass and slabs of TNT. One of the grenades is well pinned down with a stake and a wire passed through its safety pin holes with the other end passing across the top of the concealed hole to a stake on the far side of the hole. The wire is pulled by a wheel or man sinking into the hole which pulls the wire out of the grenade and activates the device. Sometimes artillery or mortar bombs are placed above the pot, almost at the surface of the road, to give greater effect to the mine.

3. The planting of a minefield along the length of a road generally beings with a pair of mines (one on each wheel track) and then isolated mines separated by three to four kilometers alternating on each track (or simply laid at random) over a distance of 20 to 30 kilometers. However, the enemy will not always lay single mines and may place a number of mines in close proximity to ensure best results.
F taut wire
T twigs, grass and earth covering wire and stake
V wheel track
R reinforcing grenade(s)

NOTE: Section 3 is incomplete it will be added at a later date (web master: TALDOZER).

SECTION 4: COUNTER-MEASURES AND PRECAUTIONS

Action by Troops

1. Dismounted troops. The best protection against mines and explosive devices is a high standard of training and a keenly developed sense of mine awareness. However, listed below are a few simple rules to assist in minimizing the dangers of these devices to personnel:

   a. Only one man at a time should work on a device while the remainder remain under cover.
   
   b. When in doubt, always call in the services of a specialist.
   
   c. Redouble precautions when tired or nearing the base on the return.
   
   d. Keep your eyes on the ground when in a suspicious area.
   
   e. Do not rush; time saved is paid for in lives.
   
   f. Expect continuous changes in techniques used by the enemy and be prepared for them.
   
   g. In dangerous ground be extremely cautious and be very careful with any suspicious-looking object.
   
   h. The man who proceeds incautiously will cause the death of his comrades.
   
   i. Maintain concentration and strict discipline when working with mines or other devices.
   
   j. Never move over suspected ground without good reason and don't ever be careless or overconfident.
   
   k. Do not be misled or jump to conclusions when the first mines found are not activated or are simulated.
   
   l. Never:

      1. Cut or pull taut wires or cord.
      
      2. Pull a slack wire or cord.
      
      3. Simultaneously cut through two metallic strands.
      
      4. Move in compact groups...
   
   m. Treat every mine or device as being booby-trapped.
n. Do not use the easiest or best sign-posted route without careful examination.

o. Whenever possible, avoid moving along paths or tracks and avoid the obvious.

p. Be extremely cautious in the selection of return routes and the use of newly made paths and/or tracks.

q. Keep up to date with new devices and techniques.

r. Look upon mines as a normal risk of war.


a. In addition to the above-mentioned precautions, the following also apply:

1. Move at a minimum distance of approximately 50 meters between vehicles.

2. The vehicle should be sandbagged, in particular the cab, over the wheels and under the seating.

3. If possible, make use of the side boards of the load-carrying part of the vehicle, opening them outwards to a 45-degree angle and reinforcing them with sandbags.

4. Leading vehicles must carry the minimum of personnel.

5. All vehicles must carry serviceable fire extinguishers. The use of petrol-driven vehicles will increase the fire hazard.

6. Vehicles must be properly prepared, which may entail the removing of certain parts and the reinforcing of others either by means of steel plates or sandbags.

7. Exercise extreme caution when moving to the scene of an incident or when moving to reinforce own forces.

8. Vehicles must endeavor to keep in the tracks of the preceding vehicles.

b. Clearing drills. If a mine is seen or suspected, the suggested drill is:

1. Movement is halted and troops debus and establish all-around protection while the vehicle reverses in its own tracks to at least 100 meters away from the device.

2. Two men, each with detection devices and one carrying the grappling iron and nylon cord, then move forward walking in the tracks already made by the vehicle. A protection party, which should be positioned according to the terrain, will move with the detection elements to provide them with close protection.

3. From the point where the vehicle originally stopped they carefully prod their way forward, searching as explained in this chapter.

4. When a mine is encountered, the finder should notify his companion and then proceed with one of the methods described in paragraph 7 below.

Detection

3. Detection aids. The enemy is very adept at laying mines and explosive devices and as his skill and cunning improve he makes the detection of these mines and explosive devices difficult and complicated. However, to detect whatever he has laid, the following aids and methods may be used:
a. Mine detectors. These vary from the type used to detect any metallic object buried below the surface of the ground to the more modern and sophisticated type that will detect any foreign matter buried below the ground's surface. The effectiveness and efficiency of these detectors will depend on the standard of operating, type and model and the enemy's efforts to counter their effectiveness. When used by correctly trained technical personnel, they can be most effective, but because of their limitations they should be used in conjunction with other detection methods.

b. Mechanical detectors. This type can vary from the flail type to a type of remote-controlled vehicle or device moving in front of a vehicle with the intention of detonating any mine or other type of explosive device that the enemy may have planted in the road or track. Its effectiveness will be determined by the enemy's mine-laying techniques.

c. Improvised means. This is probably the most expedient method, bearing in mind the effectiveness and availability of the above-mentioned equipment. This method can be carried out by making use of a prodder or a rake:

1. Prodder. This can be the standard prodder or an improvised type which is used to prod the ground at an angle or to scratch the surface to detect any hidden object. Experience in the use of the prodder will improve its effectiveness.

2. Rake. This is the standard type of rake, but with a longer handle It is used to scrape the ground's surface to detect any possible hidden device. To facilitate its handling, it may be equipped with two small wheels.

d. Users or operators of the above-mentioned equipment must be relieved frequently to avoid the strain placed on them while operating the various types of detectors.

4. Detection techniques. The following are the suggested techniques that may be applied when searching for or endeavoring to detect any concealed devices:

a. Visual search. Whatever aid is being used, as an added means, a visual search will improve its effectiveness. The degree of effectiveness of a visual search will be determined by the experience of the person or persons concerned, their concentration, patience, powers of observation and keen sense of awareness. All soldiers must be made conscious of this awareness and not leave the detection to the operators of the various devices only. Although it will not be possible to mention all the points in this chapter, listed below are a few examples of what to look for which may indicate the presence of a buried or concealed device:

1. Disturbed soil or soil with a varying degree of dampness.

2. Stones loosened or moved from their apparent original or normal position.

3. Smoothed-over soil between tracks and footprints.

4. Soil with suspicious-looking debris such as grass, leaves and sticks scattered over the surface.

5. Footprints converging at a point in the road.

6. Knee-, hand- or footprints in the soil indicating kneeling persons. In this case toe-cap prints will be most pronounced.
7. Vegetation not conforming to its surroundings.
9. Wire or nylon cords, taut or slack.
10. Any type of metallic reflection.
11. Leaves or sticks partially cleaned of normal dirt.
12. Scattered damp soil near wells or drops of water.

b. Dismounted detection. This method is time-consuming and should it be necessary to cover long distances, a careful appreciation must be made, bearing in mind the enemy activity and techniques and terrain, to select the best route that would require the minimum of this type of detection. Best speed with this method is one and a half to two kilometers per hour. For maximum effect a mine detector should be used in conjunction with a prodder. The diagrams below give a suggested technique. For a normal width road two searchers must move abreast of each other with their search patterns overlapping.

c. Mounted detection. This method can employ the mechanical-type equipment already mentioned, or visual means whereby a minimum of two men, placed as far forward as possible on both sides of a vehicle, search the road for any possible hidden device while the vehicle moves. The vehicles move slowly and will halt immediately at the slightest suspicious-looking sign. This method is slow and places great strain on the observers. Consequently they should be relieved frequently.

5. Due to the complexity and unlimited number of devices employed by the enemy and the enemy's improving skill in the use of explosive devices, it is advisable that, whenever possible, units have readily available trained technical experts and specialist equipment to assist in the detection and neutralization of the various explosive devices. This is of particular importance when it is anticipated that a unit will be moving through an area that is suspected of being mined by the enemy. Basic mine-clearing equipment (rope, grapple and prodders) should be standard issue to sub-units engaged in ATOPS. It is essential that all sub-units receive training in the use of this equipment prior to being committed to operations.

6. To develop and improve the awareness previously mentioned, a system must be adopted whereby all personnel are kept informed as to new techniques and lessons learned.

Marking and Destruction

7. Once a device has been detected, the following are possible courses of action:
   a. The device is marked and reported.
   b. The device is destroyed immediately.

8. Device marked and reported.
   a. Once a device has been detected, should there not be a qualified technical expert present, somebody with more experience must carefully inspect the device to ascertain its type, possible trigger mechanism and whether it is booby-trapped. This inspection must be visual so as not to disturb the device, which may result in an explosion. The device
must then be marked in a suitable manner and its location reported to higher headquarters. This report is to include:

1. Its location and how implanted, suspended, etc.
2. Type of device.
3. If possible, trigger mechanism.
4. Whether it appears to be booby-trapped.
5. Any trip wires or cord in close proximity of device.
6. Method used to mark it.

b. After marking and reporting, the device can either be destroyed or, if it is a new device, neutralized. Under no circumstances will a device be neutralized and removed other than by an expert. Once removed, the device may be destroyed or retained for further examination, depending on instructions from higher headquarters.


a. In this event, after the device has been detected and a careful examination has been carried out to determine its nature, the decision is made to destroy it. Whenever possible, a qualified technical expert should perform this task. However, members with practical experience in this respect could also carry out this task. Once the decision has been made to destroy the device where it has been located, the following will apply:

1. Without disturbing the device and immediate vicinity too much, select the principal charge of the device.
2. Ensure that all other troops are safely under cover or a safe distance away.
3. The minimum number of men must be used for the task, preferably only one man.
4. Endeavor to ensure that the explosion will not cause sympathetic detonation of other devices in the same area that may endanger the lives of own troops.
5. Clear the area of dry grass and leaves, etc., to prevent the start of a fire.
6. Place the prepared charge, ensuring maximum destruction results. This could be TNT slabs, plastic explosive or hand grenades.
7. Initiate the charge and retire along a preplanned route to safe cover. Prior to initiation ensure area is clear of own troops. When using hand grenades, a long wire or cord will have to be used to pull out the safety pins. The grenades must be fixed to a stake to ensure positive action.

b. It may, under certain circumstances, be possible to destroy the device by its own system. In this case it may be possible to cause self- destruction by activating the trigger mechanism from a safe distance, e.g., pulling out the retaining stakes or pulling the tripwire from a safe place with a long cord or wire.

c. Under certain circumstances a trained man may remove the device to a safe place for destruction. Extreme caution must be exercised, however, to ensure that anti-lifting devices and/or booby traps are first neutralized or are not present. Anti-lifting devices
invariably have a delay fuse, and provision must be made for this when attempting to lift or remove a device. In this case the best method for removing the device is to use a grapple and rope to pull it from its position.

SECTION 5: EMPLOYMENT BY MILITARY FORCES

10. Where and when the opportunity presents itself and should the circumstances permit, military forces may make use of mines and/or booby traps. Possible reasons for use could be the following:

   a. Protective measures. To protect military bases, camps and installations and possibly certain key installations against possible enemy actions

   b. Nuisance role. To mine or booby-trap possible enemy routes and/or crossing places, in particular across the border from countries giving assistance to the enemy.

   c. Denial role. To deny certain routes or areas to the enemy, e.g. possible fire base positions that the enemy may use or approaches to villages, cultivations, etc.

11. Authority. Before any mines or booby traps are laid, authority must be granted by the highest appropriate headquarters. However, this authority could be delegated to lower levels.

NOTE: Incomplete section web master; TALDOZER.